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This thesis investigates the interaction between the 
evolution of the Irish Question and the re-emergence of 
Britain's two-party political system after World War I.
It challenges the contention summed up in A.J.P. Taylor's 
suggestion that David Lloyd George 'conjured' the Irish 
Question out of existence with the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 
1921. Here, it is shown that on the contrary the Irish 
dispute continued to be a highly sensitive issue for 
successive British governments until the Treaty's 
Boundary Commission report was shelved in 1925.
This was so because British politics was then 
undergoing a profound revolution. Its climax was the 
1924 general election, which established the 
Conservatives as the dominant players in British 
politics, ensured Labour's place as the leading party of 
the left, and confirmed the eclipse of Liberalism. The 
first of this study's two aims is to set the Irish 
dispute within this wider context. Specifically, it 
examines how the answer to the Irish Question that was 
devised by Lloyd George and his Coalition partners was 
constructed and then dismantled as a result of this 
revolution.
The second aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that 
the Boundary Commission was only one element in the 
Treaty's Ulster clauses, all of which were designed to
bring about Ireland's re-unification. The intent was to 
exploit the financial restrictions of the 1920 Government 
of Ireland Act and thus pressure Ulster Unionists into 
joining a single Irish Parliament. This aspect has been 
overlooked in other studies, though it posed as serious a 
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PREFACE
The field of Anglo-Irish history is both a crowded 
and, given its resonance in current-day politics, a 
sometimes dangerous place in which to tread.
Nonetheless, one corner of this field has never been 
explored fully. The aim of this study is to place the 
settlement of the Irish Question in the 1920s within the 
context of the broader revolution which was taking place 
in British politics at that time and to show how each 
affected the other.
It is, for example, difficult to understand David 
Lloyd George's handling of the 1921 Irish Treaty 
negotiations without taking into account the underlying 
purpose which was behind his decision to enter those 
talks in the first place: namely, his goal of merging the 
Conservative and Liberal wings of his Coalition 
government into a new political party. Yet, scholars 
have been curiously hesitant to analyse the negotiations 
from this perspective. Their disinclination to examine 
the interrelationship between developments in Ireland and 
at Westminster seems to intensify when it comes to 
writing about the post-independence period.1 It is 
almost as if an admission of Britain's continuing 
influence over Irish affairs is viewed as tantamount to
xFor a recent example, see T. Garvin, 1922: The Birth 
of Irish Democracy (Dublin, 1996).
Vsustaining the larger country's domination over its 
smaller neighbour. For their part, historians of 1920s 
British politics have approached the Irish Question with 
a certain world-weariness. Their reluctance to 
delve into the subject suggests an aversion to the idea 
that the issue could have had as great and continuing an 
influence on Britain's public life.
I am indebted to a number of people for making it 
possible to research and write this thesis. Even before 
my work formally began at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science, Jack Murray, Holly Buchanan, and 
the Rev. Canon William C. Neuroth generously assisted me 
in gathering together the foundation material on which 
this thesis is based. I owe an equal debt of gratitude 
to the Cummins and Malone families who welcomed me into 
their homes while I was in Dublin to work in the Irish 
archives.
Michael Collins, nephew of the Irish independence 
leader, kindly shared a number of insights about his 
uncle and steered me away from several errors in my early 
research. My thanks also go to the Viscount Davidson and 
to his son-in-law, Richard Oldfield, for allowing me to 
quote from the unpublished correspondence of Joan 
Davidson and Stanley Baldwin. Equally, I wish to thank 
the many copyright holders for allowing me to quote from 
the letters, diaries, and other documents which I have 
researched.
Dr Anthony Howe, John Barnes, and Ronald Brennan 
read drafts of my work at various stages and I am 
indebted to them for their advice. I also wish to thank 
the administrative secretaries of the LSE's Department of 
International History - especially Pat Christopher, Mary 
McCormick, Brigid Spillane, and Susanne Umerski - who 
were generous with their time, their expertise, and with 
their friendship. Without the help and guidance and, 
again, friendship of Larry Ward, and of Carole Simpson 
and Joanne Bourne of the LSE's Information Technology 
department, it would have been impossible for me to 
research and write this thesis using a computer. Their 
support was crucial.
The staffs of all of the research institutes and 
libraries which I visited were unfailingly kind and often 
went out of their way to assist me in my work. In 
particular, I would like to thank the staff of the House 
of Lords Record Office; the Rev. Father Ignatius 
Fennessey, OFM, of the Franciscan Library, Killiney? and 
Godfrey Waller, supervisor of the manuscripts department 
at Cambridge University Library.
Financing this work was not an easy task. I wish to 
thank the University of London's Central Research Fund 
and the Royal Historical Society for providing assistance 
which enabled me to undertake research in both Britain 
and Ireland over the past several years. My thanks also
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go to the LSE's Student Union Hardship Fund.
Most of all, I wish to thank my mother, Florence 
Matthews, and my twin sister, Leah Kay Matthews. They 
have never lost faith in me, and they have always been 
there when I have needed them. I owe an equal, and 
equally unpayable, debt to Andrea Heatley for her 
understanding and for her patience over the past several 
years.
Finally, I wish to thank my supervisor, Professor 
David Stevenson. His advice has been invariably 
accurate, his criticism has always been constructive, and 
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1INTRODUCTION
St. Patrick came to see the land 
From which the snakes he'd banished 
'What's this across my path?' he cried,
'I thought they all had vanished.'
A monstrous serpent squirmed around 
From Antrim Glens to Derry;
'Bad luck to it,' a Southern said,
'Shure, isn't that the boundary.'1
One mid-summer's morning in June 1923, a motorcade 
sped along the back roads of Northern Ireland bound for 
the Irish frontier. The excursion was organised by 
Stephen Tallents, former secretary to Ireland's Lord 
Lieutenant, now the British government's representative 
in Northern Ireland.2 Two guests accompanied Tallents on 
his tour of the boundary: Sir Wilfrid Spender, secretary 
to the Northern Ireland Cabinet, and Spender's wife, 
Lilian.
'[0]ur route corkscrewed about in the most 
bewildering manner', Lady Spender wrote in her diary.
Not wanting to stray into Free State territory, the party 
took 'innumerable by-roads in order to avoid crossing the 
Border' but were often frustrated, as happened at Clady, 
where 'here again the Boundary was an imaginary line 
across the middle of the river bridge.'
To Sir Wilfrid, who had served in the Ulster 
Division during World War I, the boundary 'reminded him
i'«The Boundary Serpent” by ”Turf Clod”', Derry 
Sentinel. ? December 1925, Feetham Papers, 7/1, ff. 42.
2Tallents to Anderson, 22 June 1923, HO 317/68.
more than anything else' of the Western Front, 'complete
with blockhouses, sandbags, barbed wire' and trenches -
most of which 'we have cut ... wherever the roads cross
the Border'. To Lady Spender, it was the 'beautiful wild
country' that was most striking, and it was this memory
that remained with her after the trip. 'The beautiful
blue mountains of Donegal', she wrote
stood up in the west, cut off from us, alas, by 
this tragic state of civil war. It gave one a 
strange feeling to see a country so unnaturally and 
ungeographically divided - like seeing a living 
creature cut in two.3
Despite its seeming permanence - despite the 
trenches, blockhouses, and customs huts - few on either 
side of this, the only international land border in the 
British Isles believed that a boundary so unnatural and 
ungeographical would long remain. And for good reason. 
The boundary travelled by Tallents and the Spenders was 
the result of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act and its 
creation of two Irish governments: one for the twenty-six 
counties of south, west, and northwest Ireland, and 
another for the six counties of northeast Ulster.
Although the 1920 Act temporarily divided the island, its 
'ultimate aim', according to its creators, 'was a united 
Ireland with a separate Parliament of its own, bound by 
the closest ties to Great Britain'.4
3Lady Spender's diary, 25 June 1923, D. 1633/2/26.
4C . 10(19), 3 December 1919, CAB 23/18. Unity remained 
the legislation's stated aim. 'The Act', Irish Chief 
Secretary Sir Hamar Greenwood told Parliament, 'provides 
for the political unity of Ireland'. See HC Deb. Vol. 138, 
Col. 647, 21 February 1921.
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K IL O M E T E R S
A general map of Ireland 
Source: R.W.G. Carter and A.J. Parker, ed., 
Ireland: Contemporary Perspectives on a 
Land and Its People (London, 1989), p. 2.
Even before the 1920 Act reached the Statute Book
few believed that 'such an artificial creation' would be
the government's 'last word' on Ireland.5 Nor was it. A
year later the 1920 Act was supplanted by the Irish
Treaty, creating one government for the whole of Ireland,
including the six partitioned Ulster counties, and
granting to it 'the same constitutional status' in the
British empire as the dominions of Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and South Africa.6 But what this first article
of the Treaty gave in the way of Irish unity was taken
back by a series of clauses beginning with Article 11,
which temporarily suspended the new government's
jurisdiction over the six counties. There then followed
what one of the Treaty's framers later admitted were its
'elements of dynamite': Article 12.7 The first half of
this article gave Ulster's government the choice of
opting out of the new Irish dominion for good. In that
case, the terms of the 1920 Act would remain in place as
far as Northern Ireland was concerned; but once Northern
Ireland opted out,
a Commission consisting of three persons, one to 
be appointed by the Government of the Irish 
Free State, one to be appointed by the Government 
of Northern Ireland, and one who shall be Chairman,
5Hoare to Midleton, 9 November 1920, Templewood Papers, 
I: 12 (18). Anti-Partition League to Lloyd George, 13
March 1920, Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/79.
6Cmd. 1560: Articles of Agreement for a Treaty Between 
Great Britain and Ireland (London, 1921), Article 1. The 
Treaty is reprinted in Appendix II.
7The speaker was Lord Birkenhead. See HL Deb. Vol. 62, 
Col. 1232, 9 December 1925.
to be appointed by the British Government, shall 
determine, in accordance with the wishes of the 
inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with 
economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries 
between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland, 
and for the purposes of the Government of Ireland 
Act of 1920, and of this instrument, the boundary 
of Northern Ireland shall be such as may be 
determined by such Commission.8
For the Treaty's critics in Britain, Article 12
immediately became the focal point of controversy.
Former Conservative Party leader Andrew Bonar Law called
it his one 'serious objection' to the Treaty.9 Whether
the Commission was empowered to make only minor
readjustments to the border, or whether it had the right
to transfer whole counties from North to South was a
matter of hot dispute. Changes, though, there would be.
As one Ulster Unionist MP put it, by the time the
Boundary Commission was finished the six counties would
be 'so cut up and mutilated that we shall no longer be
masters in our own house.' It would mean the end of
partition and the reunification of Ireland.10
But the boundary that Lady Spender saw in 1923 did
not change. Eighteen months later the Boundary
Commission's award was suppressed just as it was about to
be released. All of the politicians had been wrong,
except one. From the moment the boundaries of his new
8Appendix II, Article 12.
9HC Deb. Vol. 149, Col. 203, 15 December 1921.
10Ibid, Col. 56-57, 14 December 1921. Also, see N. 
Mansergh, The Unresolved Question: The Analo-Irish
Settlement and Its Undoing. 1912-1972 (New Haven, 1991), p. 
221.
6state were challenged, Northern Ireland Prime Minister 
Sir James Craig told his followers that there would no 
concessions to anyone. 'What we have', Craig declared,
'we hold'.11 So they did.
***
There, it is supposed, the story ends. Writing many 
years after the fact, A.J.P. Taylor memorably explained 
that with the 1921 Treaty British Prime Minister David 
Lloyd George had not merely answered the Irish question 
for 'good or ill'? he had 'conjured it out of 
existence'.12 Historians find Taylor's imagery seductive 
and for the most part have been content to echo his 
verdict. Lloyd George, one wrote, 'for good or ill, 
effectively settled the "Irish Question" as generations 
of British people had understood it', and this, another 
noted, explains the 'quickly diminishing importance of 
the Irish question ... in British domestic politics' 
after the Treaty was signed.13
“NI HC Deb. Vol. 2, Col. 598, 23 May 1922.
“A.J.P. Taylor, English History; 1914-1945 (Oxford, 
1965), p. 161, 236.
13K .0. Morgan, 'Lloyd George and the Irish', in R. 
Blake, Introduction, Ireland After the Union; Proceedings 
of the Second Joint Meeting of the Royal Irish Academy and 
the British Academy. London. 1986 (London, 1989), p. 83. 
S. Lawlor, Britain and Ireland: 1914-1923 (Dublin, 1983), 
p. 154. 'Except for a brief flare-up in 1922', writes 
Michael Kinnear, 'the Irish question was now shelved until 
the 1970s'. See The Fall of Llovd George; The Political 
Crisis of 1922 (London, 1973), p. 15. D.G. Boyce writes 
that Ireland played a major role 'for the last time with 
its departure from the centre of the British political 
stage in 1922'. See The Irish Question and British 
Politics: 1886-1986 (London, 1988), p. 31.
Certainly, British politicians were ready to turn 
their backs on Ireland. Their wish was granted when in 
1923 most discussion of Irish affairs in Parliament was 
ruled out of order by the Speaker of the House of 
Commons. A year later this ban was further narrowed so 
that MPs could not raise 'any matters of administration 
for which a Minister in Northern Ireland is 
responsible./14
In this way, the Irish problem was left to fester.
As a government white paper explained in 1973, 'the 
uncomfortable lessons of history provided every 
inducement to the Government in London to keep Northern 
Ireland out of United Kingdom politics.' This code of 
silence extended to every level and branch of government. 
Civil servants soon learned that they 'would get little 
thanks in Whitehall or Westminster' if they forced 
ministers and MPs to look too closely into Britain's 
attic; the door was to be kept closed and bolted shut.15
Nor were the men who were supposed to have solved 
the Irish riddle particularly inclined to talk about 
their handiwork. Winston Churchill excepted, their 
recollections (along with an authorised biography of Lord 
Birkenhead) are singularly uninformative when it comes to
14HC Deb. Vol. 162, Col. 2246-2247, 19 April 1923? Vol. 
171, Col. 549-550, 19 March 1924.
15Cmnd. 5460: Royal Commission on the Constitution.
1969-1973 [The Kilbrandon Report] (London, 1973), para. 
1303.
8the Coalition's handling of the Irish Question.16 This 
seeming ladk of interest has proved contagious, and their 
biographers have also largely disregarded Ireland once 
the Treaty negotiations are got out of the way.17
Yet, nearly two years after the fall of the Lloyd 
George Coalition, Herbert Asquith rose in the House of 
Commons to warn that the British people were 'confronted 
with precisely the same problem' which had taken them to 
the brink of civil war in the summer of 1914.18 The 
Irish Question, an issue that dominated British politics 
for the better part of forty years, had not been conjured
16See, e.g., D. Lloyd George, Is It Peace? (London, 
1923), p. 267-275. A. Chamberlain, Down The Years (London, 
1935), p. 144-150. Ephesian [pseud. Bechhofer Roberts], 
Lord Birkenhead (London, 1926), p. 85-88. Churchill, 
characteristically, took the opposite approach. See The 
World Crisis. Vol. V: The Aftermath (New York, 1929), p. 
289-372.
17John Campbell makes only passing reference to the 
troubles the Irish Treaty caused Birkenhead's political 
career. See F.E. Smith: First Earl of Birkenhead (London, 
1983), p. 601, 603, 650. Nor does he address Lloyd
George's flirtation with the Irish issue in 1924 in Lloyd 
Georae: The Goat in the Wilderness. 1922-31 (London, 1977). 
The same is true of Peter Rowland's David Lloyd Georae (New 
York, 1975); of Charles Petrie's The Life and Letters of 
the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain: Vol. II (London, 
1940); and David Dutton's Austen Chamberlain: Gentleman in 
Politics (Bolton, England, 1985). Catherine Shannon, in 
Arthur J. Balfour and Ireland: 1874-1922 (Washington,
1988), p. 279, notes that Balfour sought to influence the 
Boundary Commission's deliberations but does not explore 
his actions. Martin Gilbert, in Winston S. Churchill. 
Vol. V: 1922-1939 (London, 1976) devotes only a page and a 
half to Churchill's role in the 1925 Boundary Commission 
crisis. See p. 137-138. This is difficult to explain 
given that in Winston Churchill - Companion V. Part 1 
(London, 1979) his selection of documents demonstrates the 
importance of Ireland in Churchill's post-Coalition career. 
See p. 151-152, 172-174, 183-197, 203-204, 389-390, 469, 
591-593, 603-617.
18HC Deb. Vol. 177, Col. 46, 30 September 1924.
away. Magic is, after all, based on illusion, and so was 
the notion that Lloyd George had made the Irish Troubles 
disappear.19 Instead, the problem was distilled to what 
was and perhaps still is its intractable core, the 
'central and almost insuperable difficulty' of Anglo- 
Irish relations: 'the question of Ulster'.20
The issue at hand in 1924 was the same as in 1914 
and in 1921. As Asquith told the Commons, the Irish 
dispute 'centred, as it centres now, mainly or 
exclusively upon the position of the two counties of 
Tyrone and Fermanagh'.21 With their Nationalist 
majorities, these two counties were emblematic of the 
larger issue at stake. Both Ulster Unionists and Irish 
Nationalists passionately believed that on the fate of 
Fermanagh and Tyrone hung Ireland's future as a united or 
a divided country.22 It is revealing that in the 
aftermath of World War I an official in Dublin Castle
“According to R.W.G. Carter and A.J. Parker, ed.
Ireland: Contemporary Perspectives on a Land and Its People 
(London, 1989), p. 3, the Irish partition created 'an
island under stress'. Also, see J. Neville, H. Douglas,
and P.A. Compton, 'The Northern Ireland - Irish Boundary', 
Espace. Populations. Societes. No. 2, 1992, p. 215-226.
20'His Conscience Must be Clear', New Statesman. 5
November 1921.
21HC Deb. Vol. 177, Col. 46, 30 September 1924. Also, 
see Churchill's speech, HC Deb. Vol. 150, Col. 1270-1271, 
16 February 1922; Craig's address in NI HC Deb. Vol. 2, 
Col. 1151-1152, 7 December 1922; and C.P. 503(25), 3
December 1925, CAB 27/295.
22See, e.g., Michael Collins's speech in 'Sinn Fein and 
Ulster', The Times. 5 September 1921. For the opposite 
view, see 'Saving the Conference', 6 November 1921, The 
Observer.
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called Fermanagh and Tyrone the 'Alsace Lorraine' of the 
Irish Question.23
Because the most contentious element in the Irish 
dispute - the future of Northern Ireland - was not
settled, it returned to haunt Britain's leaders, and it
did so just as they were caught up in 'a revolution in 
English politics' as profound as any which had been 
experienced in nearly a hundred years.24 By the end of 
this revolution, the Liberals were eclipsed as the 
leading party of the left. In their place, Labour under 
Ramsay MacDonald joined with the Conservatives under 
Stanley Baldwin to re-establish Britain's two-party 
political system. This reformation was the outcome of a
period of extraordinary upheaval in the country's
politics, a time in which there were four governments and 
three general elections in the space of three years. 
Nothing was certain, and for a time it seemed just as 
possible that the Conservatives not the Liberals would be 
consigned to electoral oblivion.25
When it was signed, the Irish Treaty had 'almost 
unanimous approval' and was hailed as the 'crowning 
achievement' not only of the Coalition government of
23Sturgis diary, 14 November 1921, PRO 30/59/5.
24The Annual Register; A Review of Public Events at 
Home and Abroad. 1924 (London, 1925), p. 8.
25M. Cowling, The Impact of Labour: 1920-1924
(Cambridge, 1971), p. 419-421.
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Liberals and Conservatives, but of Lloyd George's 
career.26 A scant three years later, its Ulster clauses 
were being condemned as 'one of the damnable legacies of 
Lloyd Georgeism.' The rebuke, though made by a Labour 
newspaper, could just as easily have rolled off the lips 
of most Conservatives.27 In the midst of Britain's 
political turmoil, the Tories in particular feared being 
trapped in the Irish 'cul-de-sac'.28 Baldwin spoke for 
many public figures, certainly for most Conservatives, 
when he warned Craig: 'I do not want the Irish conflict 
revived in the House of Commons in any shape or form if 
it can justly be avoided.'29
Revived, though, it would be, inspiring hope for 
Lloyd George's political resurrection, hastening the 
downfall of Labour's first government and, throughout, 
threatening Baldwin's reconstruction of the Conservative 
Party as he attempted to reunite those Tories who had 
supported the Lloyd George Coalition with those who had 
destroyed it. Even after the Conservatives' overwhelming 
electoral victory in 1924, another year would elapse 
before the interwar generation of British politicians
26'Towards Irish Peace', The Times: and 'The New
Peace', Manchester Guardian. 8 December 1921. 'A Free
State', Pall Mall and Globe: and 'Real Hope', Daily Herald. 
7 December 1921.
27'Ulster Boundary Crisis', Daily Herald. 29 April 
1924. Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 3 August 1924, NC 
18/1/446.
28See, e.g., Wood to Baldwin, 10 September 1924, 
Halifax Papers, A4.410/14/1.
29Baldwin to Craig, 14 January 1924, SB Vol. 101, ff. 
197-198.
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could safely say that the Irish Question had been put 
behind them. As Churchill reminded fellow MPs in 1925, 
'only a year ago this boundary question very nearly 
became a disastrous and dominating issue in our political 
life'.30
The aim of this study is to set these attempts to 
answer the Irish Question within the wider context of the 
revolution then taking place in British politics. 
Specifically, it means to show how the 'answer' devised 
by Lloyd George and his Coalition partners was 
constructed and then dismantled largely because of this 
revolution.31
The construction began with the Government of 
Ireland Act and, when that proved to be insufficient, was 
completed with the Treaty of 1921. In neither instance 
was Lloyd George primarily concerned with settling the 
Irish conflict. His chief ambition was to win such a 
triumph so as to justify calling a general election. 
Victory at the polls would then be used as the basis for 
reorganising the Coalition as a political party in its 
own right. These plans came unstuck in part because 
Lloyd George failed to settle the question of Ulster, and 
within a year his government fell.
3°HC Deb. Vol. 189, Col. 360, 8 December 1925.
31This point has been alluded to elsewhere but seldom 
explored in detail. See, e.g., G.J. Hand, Report of the 
Irish Boundary Commission: 1925 (Shannon, 1969), p. viii. 
Paul Canning's British Policy Towards Ireland; 1921-1941 
(Oxford, 1985) takes a broad look at many of the issues 
specifically addressed in this study.
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In its place, a new set of politicians came to the 
fore with a very different agenda. This was bound to 
affect those parts of the Irish settlement that were yet 
to be implemented. The rest of this narrative examines 
how the Treaty's inducements for Irish unity were 
dismantled, indeed how they were reversed in Northern 
Ireland's favour, as Coalition politics gave way to a 
return to the traditional two-party system.
When considering whether or not the Treaty's 
negotiators seriously attempted to resolve the Ulster 
Question, other studies have focused almost exclusively 
on the Boundary Commission.32 In fact, the Treaty 
contained a series of inter-related and self-reinforcing 
clauses in Articles 11 through 15 which were designed to 
bring about 'the eventual establishment of a Parliament 
for the whole of Ireland'.33 These clauses were 
themselves linked to other parts of the agreement which 
gave the Free State fiscal autonomy but bound Ulster to 
the restrictive provisions of the 1920 Act.34 'The
32See, e.g., M. Laffan, The Partition of Ireland: 1911- 
1925 (Dundalk, 1983), p. 72-125. Lord Longford concludes 
that successive British governments intentionally misled 
Free State leaders over the Boundary Commission which was, 
anyway, a fraud. See F. Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal (London, 
1935 [1972 edition]), p. 258, 273, 303-305. Peter
Rowland's judgment in Lloyd George, p. 555, that Griffith 
and Collins 'believed with a touching faith' that the 
Boundary Commission alone would bring about unity, does not 
stand up under examination.
33'The Council of Ireland', Commonwealth Relations 
Office memorandum, 19 April 1949, HO 45/23466.
34Mansergh, Unresolved Question, p. 198-199, hints at 
this aspect of the negotiations.
reason of course was obvious', one Whitehall official 
later explained, 'to offer as much inducement as possible 
to the North to come in' to a single Irish state.35 A 
large part of this study is devoted to exploring these 
economic and financial inducements, and to their undoing. 
In the province itself, the dismantling of these 
provisions helped to fossilize politics into the 
sectarianism still practised by both sides. Running 
through this story is an account of how the Unionist 
Party ensured the continued support of working-class 
voters while Roman Catholics were marginalised in the new 
state.
Ireland sent ripples through British politics well 
into the 1920s and beyond. According to Winston 
Churchill, the fall-out from the Irish Treaty paved the 
way for the 'Baldwin-MacDonald Regime', nearly a decade 
and a half during which Baldwin 'in political 
brotherhood' with MacDonald was 'the ruling political 
figure in Britain.'36 Not least, these attempts to 
settle the Irish Question vindicated the politics of 
appeasement to a generation of politicians who came of 
age during the interwar years.37 In the Treaty's wake
35Waterfield to Upcott, 6 April 1923, T 160/163/F.6282. 
Also, see 'Unemployment Insurance in Northern Ireland', 
Hawtrey memorandum, 12 November 1923, T 160/187/F.7136/1.
36W .S • Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948), 
p. 21.
37Paul Canning calls the Treaty appeasement's 'first 
visible manifestation'. See British Policy, p. 177. But 
the term was applied earlier to the Government of Ireland 
Bill. See 'The Irish Impasse', Westminster Gazettef 30
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grew a conviction not only that appeasement should 'make 
itself felt far more widely7 across the British empire 
but that it had 'lessons also for [British] policy in 
Europe.7 38
Early opposition to Lloyd George7s Irish policy 
brought into working partnership Sir Samuel Hoare and 
Edward Wood. With other Tory MPs, they formed the 
'Group7, a collection of backbenchers who were to figure 
prominently in inter-war British politics.3* For 
different reasons and at different times, two other MPs 
were to be plucked from obscurity because of their 
attacks on Lloyd George7s Irish legacy. One, Anthony 
Eden, would go on to become prime minister.40 The other, 
Oswald Mosley, was destined to lead the British Union of 
Fascists.41
March 1920.
38'The New Peace7, Manchester Guardian. 8 December
1921. 'The Irish Peace7, The Times. 5 December 1925.
After the Treaty was signed, one leading journal advocated 
an appeasement policy in all but name in an article 
foreshadowing many of the crises that were to plague Europe 
for the next twenty years. See 'From the Old Policy to the 
New7, The Nation. 10 December 1921.
39'The Coalition Parliament7, unpublished memoir, 
Templewood Papers, XX: (A) 5, p. 3-4. Also, see J.A.
Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare. A Political Biography (London, 
1977), p. 61-62.
4°HC Deb. Vol. 177, Col. 402-404, 2 October 1924. Eden 
was particularly pleased with the report of his speech in 
The Times, 'the best that there has been so far7, he wrote. 
See R. Rhodes James, Anthony Eden (London, 1986), p. 82. 
'Irish Boundary Bill. Unionists and the Commission7, The 
Times, 3 October 1924.
410. Mosley, My Life (London, 1968), p. 150-163. R. 
Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley (London, 1975), p. 96-107.
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Beginning with an overview of the 1920 Government of 
Ireland Act, this study outlines the genesis of partition 
as an issue in post-war British politics. Next, it 
considers the impact of the Irish Question on the Lloyd 
George Coalition, the first unravellings of the Treaty 
settlement, and the role these events played in bringing 
about the downfall of this century's last Liberal prime 
minister. This is followed by an examination of how the 
Treaty's clauses were further nullified under a 
succession of governments led by Bonar Law, Baldwin, and 
MacDonald. Finally, the suppression of the Boundary 
Commission's report is considered, a move that helped 
plant the seeds for later conflict which eventually 
exploded in 1969.42
This study does not claim that the Irish boundary 
dispute was alone responsible for shaping British 
politics in the 20th century. But it does mean to show 
that the Irish Question continued to resonate in the 
nation's public affairs well after most historians, Irish 
as well as British, inexplicably shelve it away. Until 
recently few studies have attempted any detailed 
examination of the boundary dispute after the fall of
42Brian Cathcart, 'It all Began with a Line on a Map', 
Independent on Sunday Magazine. 22 May 1994, points out 
that had the Commission's award been implemented, most of 
what security forces later called 'bandit country' - areas 
loyal to Irish Republican guerrillas - would have been 
transferred to the South.
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Lloyd George's government.43 The Irish conflict seems to 
bore British historians of the interwar period, many of 
whom apparently believe that its importance lies in the 
earlier 1912-1914 Home Rule Crisis.44
Irish historians seem to be equally indifferent. In 
separate works, Ronan Fanning and Joseph Lee have used 
identical words to claim that the 'story of the Boundary 
Commission is well known' and, one of them adds, 'soon 
told'.45 This aversion masks a general reluctance to 
delve into an embarrassing episode.46 It is a chapter in 
Ireland's history when no one, North or South, Free State 
or Republican, Nationalist or Unionist, covered 
themselves in honour, never mind glory.
A year after Baldwin was returned to power in 1924, 
the press magnate Lord Beaverbrook described for an 
American friend 'three difficulties which might have
43An exception is E. Phoenix, Northern Nationalism: 
Nationalist Politics. Partition and the Catholic Majority 
in Northern Ireland. 1890-1940 (Belfast, 1994), though it 
does not explore the dispute's ramifications in British 
politics.
44See, e.g., R. Rhodes James, The British Revolution; 
1880-1939 (New York, 1977). David Marquand's otherwise 
comprehensive biography of Labour's first prime minister 
gives no indication of the threat Ireland posed to 
MacDonald's government in 1924. See Ramsav MacDonald 
(London, 1977).
45R. Fanning, Independent Ireland (Dublin, 1983), p. 
90. J.J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society
(Cambridge, 1989), p. 145.
46Laffan's Partition is much richer in detail though 
it, too, fails to consider how the revolution in British 
politics affected the outcome of the partition question. 
For an Ulster Unionist perspective, see B. Follis, A State 
Under Siege; The Establishment of Northern Ireland. 1920- 
1925 (Oxford, 1995).
developed fatally' for the new government. Of the three, 
the 'far more dangerous risk for the Conservative 
Ministry was the Report of the Irish Boundary 
Commission'. Had that report turned out as it should 
have, Beaverbrook explained, 'the Ministry would have 
fallen.' Then, he wrote, 'a miracle happened.'47
This is the story of that miracle.




[Ireland] ... is a most unfortunate 
country. Something awkward always occurs 
at critical moments in her history.
- David Lloyd George1
'A story', Graham Greene wrote at the beginning of 
his novel The End of the Affair. 'has no beginning or 
end: arbitrarily one chooses that moment of experience 
from which to look back or from which to look ahead.'
What Greene said of fiction is no less true of fact, 
especially when the facts happen to be Irish ones. 
Although the story told here covers only a few years 
after the end of World War I, the controversies that give 
it substance were born in earlier struggles, just as in 
this period the seeds were sown for later conflict in 
Northern Ireland.
To begin at the beginning, this story might record 
the general election of 1918 when, as prime minister, 
Lloyd George ruled out the 'coercion of Ulster' in any 
settlement of the Irish Question.2 But to explain that 
decision it is necessary to go back into the war itself 
when Lloyd George attempted to broker a settlement after 
the Easter Rising. A better starting point might be the 
Home Rule Crisis of 1912-1914, when the Irish Question
Liddell diary, 21 December 1919, in G. Riddell, Lord 
Riddell's Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After:
1918-1923 (London, 1933), p. 153.
2Lloyd George to Bonar Law, 2 November 1918, LG F/68/1.
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took Britain to the brink of civil war. Or, perhaps, the 
storyteller must go back further still, to a time when a 
young Winston Churchill heard his father warn Parliament 
of 'the gathering storm' in Irish affairs.3
Even a sketch of these complex events would be 
impracticable in this account. Here, the moment of 
experience begins on 23 December 1920 when, a year and a 
day after its introduction, the Government of Ireland 
Bill went onto the Statute Book. The date is a good 
point of departure not merely because this legislation 
formalised Ireland's partition. It is also a good place 
to begin because it brings to the fore the related issues 
which were to give the boundary dispute its substance 
over the next five years.
The controversies explored in this chapter begin 
with the nature and extent of Ireland's partition, the 
steps taken by Ulster Unionist leaders to maintain a 
cohesive majority within their new state and, not least, 
the financial elements of the 1920 Act which nearly 
sabotaged the partition settlement. Underlying the 
decisions taken on these questions was the state of 
British politics. The Coalition government which framed 
the 1920 Act declared that this very limited grant of 
self-rule would be Britain's final answer to the Irish 
Question. Yet, within a year this same Coalition was to 
issue a much wider dispensation. The reasons for this
3HC Deb. Third Series, Vol. 253, Col. 1649, 5 July
1880.
21
sudden turn-around, and its ramifications, are also 
explored in this chapter.
'The ultimate aim'
The 1920 Act created two separate parliaments for
Ireland: one for the six northeastern counties in Ulster,
and another for the remaining 26 counties. A federal
assembly, or 'Council of Ireland', made up of an equal
number of members from both North and South, would enable
the two parliaments to deal with matters of common
concern and, eventually, would serve as the springboard
to a single government.4 Despite objections from some
Conservative members of the Cabinet, it was agreed
that the ultimate aim of the Government's policy 
in Ireland was a united Ireland with a separate 
Parliament of its own, bound by the closest ties to 
Great Britain, but that this must be achieved with 
the largest possible support, and without offending 
the Protestants of Ulster ... .*
This commitment was never as real as it seemed,
however, because the imperial government was of two minds
about the Irish Question. Though led by a Liberal, the
Coalition was effectively the instrument of the
Conservative Party. Moreover, the Conservatives who
dominated the Coalition (Arthur James Balfour, Austen
Chamberlain, Walter Long, and Lord Birkenhead) had been
among the most strident opponents of Home Rule before the
war. This was particularly true of their leader, Andrew
4For the genesis of this legislation, see N. Mansergh, 
'The Government of Ireland Act, 1920: Its Origins and
Purposes; The Working of the "Official” Mind', Irish 
Historical Studies. Vol. IX, 1974, p. 19-48.
5C. 10(19), 3 December 1919, CAB 23/18.
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Bonar Law. Cool and rational in other matters, Bonar 
Law's mind, one confidant later wrote, was entirely 
controlled by 'ancient prejudice' when it came to 
Ulster.6
By contrast, the Coalition's leader was ambivalent 
about the Irish Question. Although Lloyd George called 
himself a 'Gladstonian Home Ruler', there was less to 
this claim than he would have his listeners believe.7 In 
any event, by 1920 Ireland was not his primary concern.
In order to escape his dependence on the Conservatives, 
Lloyd George set himself the task of nothing less than a 
wholesale re-structuring of British politics. By 
combining or 'fusing' the two wings of the Coalition, he 
planned to create a new 'Centre Party' with, of course, 
himself at its head.® Fusion was the long-term goal of 
Lloyd George's post-war premiership, and much of what he 
did with regard to Ireland is best understood when this 
aim is kept in mind.
6'Bonar Law. His Chief Service to the Empire', Western 
Mail, 22 May 1923. Tom Jones is credited with the article 
in E.L. Ellis, T.J. A Life of Dr Thomas Jones. CH 
(Cardiff, 1992), p. 251.
7C. 59(20), Appendix III, 13 October 1920, CAB 23/23. 
Even those who knew him best disagreed about the extent of 
Lloyd George's commitment to Home Rule. Frances Stevenson 
called it 'one of the chief planks' of his political 
philosophy. See F. Lloyd George, The Years that are Past 
(London, 1967), p. 189. According to his Welsh alter ego, 
on the other hand, Lloyd George never was 'a crusader for 
Home Rule'. See T. Jones, Lloyd Georae (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1951), p. 186-187.
®This idea had been germinating in Lloyd George's mind 
before the election. See, e.g., Chamberlain to Strachey, 
19 March 1918, Strachey Papers, S/4/5/8.
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Those hoping to settle the Irish Question had to 
contend with another political fact of life: the 1918 
general election had produced the most reactionary 
Parliament of modern times. These were the MPs whom 
Stanley Baldwin famously called the 'hard-faced men who 
look as if they had done very well out of the war./9 
Numbered among these hard-faced men were the 'Die- 
hards' - a wing of the Conservative Party which, though 
relatively small, exercised influence out of all 
proportion to its numbers. The Die-hards first came to 
prominence during the pre-war struggle over reform of the 
House of Lords, and at one time or another included Lords 
Salisbury and Selborne, John Gretton, William Joynson- 
Hicks and, from Ireland, the two leaders of the anti-Home 
Rule movement, Sir Edward Carson and Sir James Craig.10
The earthquake in British politics brought on by the 
1918 election was mirrored by an equally dramatic 
altering of Ireland's political landscape. Ushered in by 
the Easter Rising of 1916, this realignment swept away 
the constitutional Nationalism practised by the Irish 
Parliamentary Party and replaced it with the physical- 
force Republicanism espoused by Sinn Fein. Before the
’'Politics and Affairs', The Nation. 5 November 1921. 
J .M . Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
(London, 1919), p. 133. Jones diary, 25 November 1923, in 
T. Jones, Whitehall Diary: Vol. I. K. Middlemas ed.
(London, 1971), p. 255-256.
10The name originated at the 1811 Battle of Albuera. 
See 'The End of Coalition', Quarterly Review. No. 474, 
January 1923, p. 199. R. Fanning, '"Rats” versus 
"Ditchers”: The Die-Hard Revolt and the Parliament Bill of 
1911', Irish Historical Studies. Vol. XL, 1983, p. 191-210.
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1918 election, Ireland's Parliamentary constituencies 
were held by sixty-eight members of the IPP, eighteen 
Unionists, and seven Sinn Feiners. In its wake, Sinn 
Fein took seventy-three seats and the Unionists twenty- 
six, while Nationalists held onto only six 
constituencies. Equally significant, after 1918 all of 
the Unionist MPs, except for two, and all of the 
Nationalists, save one, represented seats in Ulster.11
With their grip on the South secure, Sinn Fein's MPs 
refused to take their seats in the House of Commons.
British leaders affected to be not the least bit
concerned by this development. Once the Sinn Feiners 
discovered that they could not draw their salaries, the 
Irish viceroy wrote, they would 'soon go bag and baggage 
to Westminster'.12 Instead, the Sinn Fein MPs reaffirmed 
the republic declared during the Easter Rebellion and 
established their own parliament, Dail Eireann, on 21 
January 1919. The Irish Republican Army's guerrilla war 
began that same day.
Six versus nine counties
It was against this back-drop that the terms of the 
1920 Bill were thrashed out. After the Cabinet agreed on 
partition, one issue stood out above all others: namely,
whether the whole of Ulster or only a part of it was to
be separated from the rest of Ireland. And if the answer
1XC . O 'Leary, Irish Elections. 1918-1917: Parties. 
Voters and Proportional Representation (Dublin, 1979), p. 
7.
12French to Long, 14 January 1919, JDPF 8/3.
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to this question was the latter, which part?
Although the province was made up of nine counties, 
only four of these - Antrim, Armagh, Down, and 
Londonderry - were considered predominantly Protestant 
and Unionist. The populations of three other counties - 
Cavan, Donegal, and Monaghan - were, by contrast, 
overwhelmingly Roman Catholic and Nationalist. That left 
Fermanagh and Tyrone, whose disposition had vexed British 
leaders since the eruption of the Home Rule Crisis in 
1912.13 Despite their slim Nationalist majorities, 
Unionists were determined that the two counties should be 
excluded from any plan of Irish self-government. This 
impasse led the Cabinet to consider a number of schemes, 
including one that would have allowed them to join an 
Irish Parliament - but only if 55 per cent of each 
county's voters agreed to do so. The idea was rejected 
as 'so obviously artificial a departure' from the 
principle of majority rule, however, that even the 
Unionists' allies in the Cabinet agreed it would 
impossible to defend.14
The issue again came to the fore during the drafting 
of the Government of Ireland Bill in 1919. Once it was 
agreed that a four-county partition was out of the 
question, debate revolved around whether partition should
“Churchill, World Crisis: I. p. 203-205.
“War Cabinet 120, 16 April 1917, CAB 23/2. 'Draft
Bill for the Government of Ireland', G.T. 8238, 8 May 1917, 
CAB 24/89.
include six or all nine of Ulster's counties.15 During 
these meetings the creation of a Boundary Commission was 
discussed by the Cabinet for the first time.16 After 
taking a vote of residents 'in those districts on either 
side of and immediately adjoining the boundary', it was 
proposed that a commission would be empowered to place 
Catholic areas in the South and Protestant ones in the 
North. Any adjustments would be minor and would not 
entail the transfer of whole counties. On the other 
hand, no mention was made of taking economic or 
geographic conditions into account? the wishes of the 
inhabitants would be the sole criterion for any boundary 
change. Given future events, it is ironic that the 
Commission was suggested by Sir James Craig.17
At these same meetings, Craig made it plain that the 
idea of governing Ulster's three overwhelmingly 
Nationalist counties 'was not relished' by his Unionist 
followers.18 While he could count on support from 
Conservative allies, other members of the Cabinet were 
just as adamant that the Northern assembly's jurisdiction 
'should extend over the whole of Ulster' as this 
'included both Roman Catholics and Protestants, both 
urban and rural districts, and by its size was more
15C. 16(19), 19 December 1919, CAB 23/18.
16The idea was mooted in Parliament much earlier. See 
HC Deb. Vol. 39, Col. 809-810, 11 June 1912.
17C. 14(19), 15 December 1919, CAB 23/18.
18C. 12(19), 10 December 1919, CAB 23/18.
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suited to possess a separate Parliament.7 The important 
point was that a more evenly balanced Ulster assembly was 
more likely to lead the way to eventual Irish 
reunification.19 Rather than allow a split to develop in 
the government itself, the issue was placed squarely in 
the lap of the Ulster Unionist Council.
Settling this question was not so simple for the 
Unionists as it might sound. A six-county partition 
meant repudiation of the pre-war Ulster Covenant in which 
Unionists throughout the province pledged 'to stand by 
one another7 in the fight against Home Rule.20 But any 
appeals to honour were more than balanced out by fears 
that the Unionist Party might be out-voted in a nine- 
county parliament. Added to these worries was an 
alarming perception that 'the Unionist working men of 
Belfast could not be depended on7 as had once been the 
case.21 Following a trip to Ireland, Walter Long 
reported that 'people in the inner circles7 adamantly 
opposed the 'inclusion of Donegal, Cavan, and Monaghan7 
precisely for this reason. In a nine-county assembly,
'the supremacy of the Unionists would be seriously
19See, e.g., C.P. 681, 10 February 1920, CAB 24/98. C. 
16(19), 19 December 1919, CAB 23/18.
2°'Why I Voted for the Six Counties7, April 1920, 
reprinted the 1912 Covenant, in P. Buckland, Irish 
Unionism. 1885-1923: A Documentary History (Belfast, 1973), 
No. 220.
21Ibid, 'Ulster and Home Rule. No Partition of Ulster7, 
April 1920, No. 221. Also, see A. Morgan, Labour and 
Partition: The Belfast Working Class. 1905-23 (London, 
1991), passim.
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threatened' and there was 'a real danger that on certain 
questions the Unionist Labour Party in Ulster might vote 
with the Roman Catholics.'22 This threat would be 
blunted in a smaller parliament, where rural Unionists 
could be counted on to off-set any discontent among 
Protestant working-class voters.
In short, the desire to hold on to power proved to 
be irresistible. At a meeting of the Ulster Unionist 
Council chaired by Carson on 10 March, the decision was 
taken and the three-county Unionists were thrown 
overboard. A ruthless choice had been made, illustrated 
by an equally ruthless analogy. On a sinking ship with 
lifeboats for only two-thirds of the ship's company why, 
asked one Belfast MP, should everyone on board 'condemn 
themselves to death because all could not be saved?'23
So it was that the Ulster Unionists, those safely in 
the lifeboat of the six counties at any rate, rowed away 
from their drowning brethren as fast as they could. 
Anticipating their vote, the Cabinet actually agreed to a 
six-county partition before the Council meeting was even 
held. The Cabinet's minutes, though typically vague, 
indicate that Bonar Law was responsible for this 
decision.24
The arguments rehearsed within the confines of the
22C.I. 58, 4 February 1920, CAB 27/69.
23I. Colvin, The Life of Lord Carson; Vol. Ill (London,
1936), p. 383-384.
24C. 12(20), 24 February 1920, CAB 23/20.
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Council were later aired before the wider world when it 
fell to Charles Craig to explain the Ulster Unionist 
position in the House of Commons. 'We quite frankly 
admit that we cannot hold the nine counties', he said.
In a parliament for the entire province, Unionists could 
be sure of a majority of only three or four. 'A couple 
of Members sick, or two or three Members absent for some 
accidental reason, might in one evening hand over the 
entire Ulster Parliament and the entire Ulster position 
... a dreadful thing to contemplate.'25
These were, pointed out one Labour MP, 'remarkable 
admissions'.26 Not least, Craig's own words undercut 
subsequent claims that the three outlying counties 'were 
generously given up' in return for a government promise 
that this would be the last demand made upon them. His 
speech dramatically testified to the fact that these 
assertions were 'disingenuous in the extreme'.27
'A Protestant state'
The determination of Unionists to ensure their 
ascendant position in the future Northern Ireland reached 
beyond the controversy over the number of counties to be 
included in the new state. Two additional factors came 
into play in 1920. The first of these was a Unionist 
decision to get rid of proportional representation in
25HC Deb. Vol. 127, Col. 990-993, 29 March 1920.
26Ibid, Col. 993.
27'Irish Boundary', Cope memorandum, 3 September 1924, 
LG G/20/2/6.
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their elections? the second, was the creation of a 
paramilitary force, the Special Constabulary.
A year before its introduction of the Government of 
Ireland Bill, the Coalition instituted proportional 
representation (PR) for all Irish elections.28 In place 
of the traditional winner-take-all system, in which 
candidates were elected by a simple majority, Irish 
voters were given the 'single transferable vote' allowing 
them to cast ballots for several candidates in order of 
preference. According to one of Lloyd George's 
subordinates, the 'express purpose' of the bill was to 
protect both Protestants in the South and Roman Catholics 
in the North by ensuring minority representation in all 
elected assemblies. British officials further hoped that 
the legislation would 'blunt the edge' of Sinn Fein, 
following its overwhelming success in the 1918 general 
election.29
Ulster Unionists made no secret of the fact that 
they detested PR. The system was bound to cause 
'difficulties' and why Conservative members of the 
Cabinet had ever allowed it to be introduced, Carson 
scornfully wrote, 'I don't know.'30 This abhorrence was 
confirmed by the results of urban council elections held 
in January 1920. In Ireland as a whole, Unionists were
28'Local Elections in Northern Ireland', 22 April 1924, 
DO 35/893/1/X11/123.
290'Leary, Irish Elections, p. 1-9. 'Irish Boundary',
Cope memorandum, 3 September 1924, LG G/20/2/6.
3°Carson to Bonar Law, 26 January 1920, BL 98/6/4.
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out polled by both Sinn Fein and Labour candidates.31
Even in Ulster, Unionists had little to cheer about. 
Although they edged out an alliance of Sinn Fein and the 
Nationalists, retaining control of twenty-four towns as 
against twenty-one, these victories were off-set by some 
spectacular loses. Sinn Fein-Nationalist coalitions now 
controlled Omagh, Newry and, what was the greatest blow 
to Unionist pride, Londonderry.32 The results in Belfast 
were just as unsettling. The city remained in Unionist 
hands - indeed, it was the only city or borough in all of 
Ireland which still had a Unionist mayor. But whereas 
under the old system the party regularly took fifty-two 
of the council's sixty seats, under PR its total dropped 
to thirty-seven. Ten seats now went to the Sinn 
Fein/Nationalist alliance. But what was most disturbing 
to Craig and his followers was the twelve seats that were 
won by Labour.33
Ulster Unionist MPs were determined to get rid of PR 
and the sooner the better. A provision of the 1920 Bill 
imposed a moratorium preventing either Irish parliament 
from abolishing PR for at least three years. Craig and 
his followers successfully fought off an attempt to 
extend the moratorium even though this would have 
afforded some protection to Unionists living in the
31Inspector General's report, 14 February 1920, CO 
904/111.
32Phoenix, Northern Nationalism, p. 73-75.
33Morgan, Labour and Partition, p. 257.
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South.34 Their action bore out an earlier observation 
that a Unionist government in Ulster would have little 
interest in giving 'reasonable representation' to the 
minority within its own borders.35
Arming the Protestants 
In June 1920 a wave of deadly sectarian riots swept 
across the six counties. The first disturbances in 
Londonderry were followed a month later by the expulsion 
of 7,500 workers from the Belfast shipyards. Though the 
declared intent of the expulsions was to rid the yards of 
Roman Catholics in general and Sinn Feiners in 
particular, labour activists were ousted as well and even 
included an ex-master of an Orange Lodge. As the 
expulsions spread to other businesses, a number of 
Catholics and Protestants were killed over the next three 
days.36 Sporadic rioting continued into September.
According to later analyses, the shipyard expulsions 
were provoked by IRA action in the six counties.37 
Others traced the immediate cause of the disturbances to
34HC Deb. Vol. 134, Col. 1240-1244, 10 November 1920.
35'Local Government in Ireland', The Times. 26 March
1919.
36Morgan, Labour and Partition. p. 265-284. M. 
Farrell, Northern Ireland: The Orange State (London, 1976), 
p. 28-30.
37See, e.g., C . Townshend, Political Violence in
Ireland: Government and Resistance Since 1848 (Oxford,
1983), p. 341-342. Laffan, Partition, p. 75-76, claims 
that the riots were the result of Unionist 'unease' over 
violence in the South.
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the fatal shooting of an Ulster-born RIC officer in 
Cork.38 While IRA activity in the North had increased, 
the RIC's monthly reports show that as late as June its 
presence in the six counties was negligible when compared 
with the rest of the country.39 A likelier explanation 
for the sudden explosion of Unionist anger can be found 
in the election returns for county councils and rural 
district councils held in June.
Announced only days before the Derry riots, the 
results of these elections confirmed the spectacular 
inroads that Sinn Fein was making throughout Ireland 
thanks to proportional representation. Craig and his 
followers were reduced to control of only four county 
councils, while a Sinn Fein-Nationalist alliance retained 
control of Fermanagh and, for the first time, took 
control of Tyrone County Council. The results from the 
rural district council elections were just as 
disconcerting for the Unionists. Of Ulster's fifty-five 
such councils, thirty-four were now controlled by Sinn 
Fein or by the Sinn Fein-Nationalist alliance.40
In the face of this latest electoral setback, Carson
38Belfast RIC Commissioner's report, 1 August 1920, CO 
904/112. T.H. Burns to Tallents, 7 July 1922, CO 906/23.
39See Inspector General's reports, 14 February, 18 
March and 14 July 1920, CO 904/111 and 112. According to 
the chief secretary's office, between 1 January 1919 and 29 
March 1920, there were 95 outrages in Ulster, none of them 
fatal. The breakdown for the other three provinces was: 
Connaught - 137; Leinster - 269; Munster - 588. See Cmd. 
63: Outrages (Ireland^. 1920, xl, 799.
4°Phoenix, Northern Nationalism. p. 84-86. D. 
Macardle, The Irish Republic (New York, 1937), p. 352.
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decided that it was time to rally his Unionist followers. 
At the annual 12th of July celebrations, he furiously 
denounced county councils that swore allegiance to the 
Irish Republic and vowed that Ulster 'would tolerate no 
Sinn Fein organisation or methods' within its borders.
His toughest words were reserved for the leaders of the 
independent Labour movement. These leaders were no 
friends of the Protestant working man. 'Their real 
object' was 'to bring about disunity amongst our people'. 
Like an Old Testament prophet, Carson exhorted his 
wayward followers to return to the true religion lest 
they find themselves 'in the same bondage and slavery as 
is the rest of Ireland'.41
In such a tinderbox atmosphere, Carson's rhetoric 
all but invited the shipyard expulsions which took place 
a few days later. There was, in fact, no evidence that 
Protestant labour leaders were in league with Sinn Fein. 
There was however a good deal of evidence, supplied by 
that year's local elections, to demonstrate that 
independent Labour posed a serious challenge to the 
Unionist party. That could not be allowed to continue.
As Richard Dawson Bates pointed out, it was imperative 
'for all Unionists to work as one Party' if they were to 
retain their dominant position.42
One way to glue the old Unionist alliance back
41'Record Twelfth in Ulster', Belfast News-Letter. 13 
July 1920.
42Phoenix, Northern Nationalism, p. 74. Morgan, Labour 
and Partition, p. 224.
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together would be to resurrect the pre-war Ulster 
Volunteer Force. Carson had, in fact, mooted this idea 
at the 12th of July celebrations in 1919. Then, his 
proposal was roundly denounced by English supporters; 
Bonar Law, it seems, even considered condemning the 
speech.43 But by the time Carson raised the issue a year 
later, a change of attitudes had taken place.
As it happened, the notion of forming the UVF into 
officially sanctioned units had since been floated about 
in government circles.44 At a Cabinet conference on 23 
July, both Lloyd George and Churchill were attracted to 
the idea as a way of relieving troops for duty not only 
in the south of Ireland but elsewhere in the empire.45 
Craig, not surprisingly, jumped at the idea and came up 
with a plan that went well beyond establishing the UVF as 
a paramilitary police force. In addition, he called for 
the appointment of an RIC commissioner with sole 
authority in the six counties and, more importantly, 
proposed that an under-secretary of state should be 
appointed to represent the British government in the 
North. To gain support for his proposal, which would 
effectively partition Ireland even before the 1920 Bill 
was passed, Craig made a thinly veiled reference to Sinn
^'Statesmanship in Ulster', The Timesf 14 July 1919. 
Bayford diary, 19 July 1919, in Lord Bayford, Real Old Tory 
Politics: The Political Diaries of Lord Bayford. J.
Ramsden, ed. (London, 1984), p. 127-128.
44See, e.g., French to Long, 1 July 1920, JDPF 8/3.
45C.P. 1693, 23 July 1920, CAB 24/109.
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Fein's recent electoral victories. The party had already 
established its dominance 'over a considerable portion' 
of Ulster, he pointed out, and 'rebel influences are 
spreading' .46
Bonar Law promptly backed Craig's proposals. 'We 
cannot afford to have everyone in Ireland against us', 
the Tory leader reasoned. Unless the government acted 
promptly, there was 'a danger of the Orangemen getting 
completely out of hand and something like a general 
massacre happening in Belfast'.47
This logic was perverse, as was underscored by the 
response of both civil and military authorities. Sir 
John Anderson was horrified. 'I sincerely trust there is 
no foundation for [this] rumour', he wrote to the 
Conservative leader. 'You cannot in the middle of a 
faction fight recognise one of the contending parties and 
expect it to deal with disorder in the spirit of 
impartiality and fairness'. General Sir Nevil Macready, 
the commander of British military forces in Ireland, was 
equally appalled and wanted to have no part in 'raising 
Carson's army from the grave'. The chief of the imperial 
general staff agreed. The government's plan, Sir Henry 
Wilson wrote, was 'simply inviting trouble'.48
46Craig to Bonar Law, 1 September 1920, BL 102/10/3. 
C. 53(20), Appendix IV, 2 September 1920, CAB 23/22.
47Bonar Law to Lloyd George, 2 September 1920, LG 
F/31/1/43.
48Anderson to Bonar Law, 2 September 1920; Macready to 
Anderson, 18 June 1920, CO 904/188(1) and (4). Wilson to 
Macready, 14 September 1920, HHW 2/2B/2.
According to Wilson, Bonar Law realised that 'arming 
the Ulstermen means civil war'.49 Nevertheless, at a 
conference on 8 September, the Cabinet gave Craig 
everything he asked for. By creating a Unionist 
paramilitary force, observed the Daily News. Lloyd George 
and his colleagues had abandoned any pretence of 
impartiality and in the process raised serious questions 
about 'the sanity of the government'. Wrote one army 
officer in Dublin: 'Where, oh where, are Gilbert and 
Sullivan!' Macready saw less a comic opera than a 
tragedy in the making. Once the Specials began operating 
in the six counties, he predicted, they 'would most 
assuredly paint the place red.'50
Appeals for a government investigation into the 
continuing violence in Ulster were, meanwhile, brushed to 
one side.51 Irish Chief Secretary Sir Hamar Greenwood 
showed a callous indifference to the plight of the 
expelled workers, telling the House of Commons that it 
was quite beyond his power 'to compel employers to employ 
or workmen to work'.52 While the government sat on its 
hands, the problem was allowed to fester so that, as 
Craig later put it, the issue became 'one of the most
49Wilson to Macready, 2 September 1920, HHW 2/2A/50.
5°C. 53(20), Appendix V, 8 September 1920, CAB 23/22. 
'"Order11 in Belfast', Daily News. 15 September 1920. 
Greer[?] to Anderson, 1 September 1920, BL 102/7/1. 
Macready to Wilson, 1 September 1920, HHW 2/2A/49.
51See, e.g., HC Deb. Vol. 134, Col. 1379, 11 November
1920.
52HC Deb. Vol. 132, Col. 1977, 2 August 1920.
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delicate and difficult stumbling blocks to peace'.53
Paying for Partition
After the Government of Ireland Bill went on to the 
Statute Book, one Presbyterian minister lamented that his 
fellow Ulster Protestants had accepted 'a form of Home 
Rule that the Devil himself could never have imagined'.54 
But most of his co-religionists were more than happy with 
the bargain they had struck. By any measure, it was a 
victory for the Ulster Unionists and their Conservative 
allies. Summing up their achievement, Charles Craig told 
Belfast shipyard workers that once the Unionists had 
their own Parliament 'no power on earth would ever be 
able to touch them.'55
If that achievement can be marked down to one man, 
his name was Bonar Law. Without his 'uncompromising 
support' there would have been no Northern Ireland.56 
That said, he himself realised that the 1920 Act was not 
the end of the Irish contest. On the contrary, Bonar Law 
was playing a long game which, at this stage, meant 
passing the 1920 Bill 'with as little alteration as 
possible'. This would then place the Unionists in a 
strong position for the real battle over Ireland's future 
which still lay ahead. 'I feel certain', he wrote,
S3Craig to Churchill, 30 January 1922, WSC 22/11/52-53.
54J. Bardon, A History of Ulster (Belfast, 1992), p. 
440, 514.
55'Despair in Ireland', The Times. 7 October 1920.
56R. Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister; The Life and 
Times of Andrew Bonar Law (London, 1955), p. 531.
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that at the moment it is not possible to have any 
sort of an understanding with the Sinn Feiners? 
that such an understanding may be possible later 
but, if so, the fewer concessions we make now the 
better for whatever we give at present would not 
be looked upon as final but would be regarded as a 
jumping off ground for further concessions.57
On one issue, however, Bonar Law and the Ulster
Unionists had failed to secure their six-county state.
Except for the provisions partitioning Ireland,
nothing in the 1920 Act generated as much criticism as
its financial clauses. Opponents attacked the provisions
as so complicated and so restrictive that it would be
nearly impossible for the two Irish parliaments to
govern.58 Fourteen of the Act's seventy-six articles and
nine schedules dealt solely with tax and finance.59
Roughly speaking, revenue for the Dublin and Belfast
Parliaments was to come from two sources. 'Transferred
taxes', such as death and motor vehicle duties, were to
be collected directly by the Irish governments within
their respective areas. 'Reserved taxes', such as
customs and excise duties, and income and corporation
taxes, were to be collected by the imperial government so
that they would be maintained at the same level
throughout the United Kingdom. Estimates vary as to the
57Bonar Law to Long, 30 September 1920, BL 103/5/9.
58Stephen Gwynn called the provisions 'wanton'. See 
'The Better Government of Ireland Act', Contemporary 
Review. Vol. CXVII, April 1920, p. 483.
59Follis, State Under Siege. p. 117. For the 
government's defence of the bill's taxation scheme, see HC 
Deb. Vol. 127, Col. 1032-1036, 29 March 1920. Also, see 
Cmd. 645; Outline of Financial Provisions (London, 1920), 
xl, 771.
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percentage of total revenue that the two parliaments were 
expected to take in from transferred taxes. In any case, 
it was known from the outset that the main source of 
revenue for both Irish governments, reserved taxes, would 
be beyond their control.60
Moreover, London held prior claim to revenue 
collected from reserved taxes for what was called the 
'imperial contribution'. This sum went towards defence, 
foreign affairs, and payment of the United Kingdom's 
debts. Once the imperial contribution was paid for, a 
separate deduction would then be taken from the reserved 
taxes to pay for 'reserved services', i.e. those 
governmental duties to be administered in Ireland by 
London. Both the contribution and the reserved services 
bill would be determined annually by a Joint Exchequer 
Board made up of British and Irish officials.
Only after the imperial contribution and reserved 
services had been paid for would the two Irish 
governments receive most of their funding. This amount, 
known as 'reserved revenue', would then be added to 
whatever was received from transferred taxes. From this 
combined total the two governments were expected to fund 
'transferred services', i.e. those governmental duties 
for which they were now responsible - notably law and 
order, and social services such as unemployment
6°R.J . Lawrence, The Government of Northern Ireland; 
Public Finance and Public Services. 1921-1964 (Oxford, 
1965), p. 40-41. P. Buckland, The Factory of Grievances: 




It has since been argued that the act's financial 
provisions were unrealistic, based as they were on 
estimates of Ireland's wealth made during the short-lived 
economic boom following World War I. The Treasury, it is 
worth noting, vigorously denied this assertion.61 In any 
case, because these clauses were not adequately thought 
through they were bound to cause trouble down the road.
'The Troubles'
The problem with the 1920 Act, F.S.L. Lyons once 
wrote, was that it was '[tjotally divorced ... from the 
realities of political life in Ireland'.62 This same 
verdict could as easily be applied to the government's 
Irish policy in general. Confronted by an insurrection 
unlike anything previously experienced, the government's 
reaction was contradictory and, ultimately, self- 
defeating.63 Publicly, ministers vowed to use every 
available force and every available resource to defeat 
Sinn Fein's campaign of secession.64 But, despite this 
tough rhetoric, they refused to admit that they were 
fighting a war as that 'would be a confession of
61Buckland, Factory of Grievances. p. 82. Cmd. 786; 
Government of Ireland Bill - Basis of Financial Estimates. 
1920, xl, 787. Niemeyer to Colwyn, 19 May 1922, T 
163/6/8/G.256/042.
62F .S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (London, 
1971), p. 412.
63Austen to Ida Chamberlain, 29 December 1919, AC 
5/1/147.
64HL Deb. Vol. 40, Col. 430, 19 May 1920.
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failure'.65 Rather than increase the number of regular 
army units stationed in Ireland, the Cabinet decided to 
recruit ex-soldiers who would then be deployed as members 
of the RIC. The soon-to-be nicknamed 'Black and Tans' 
were joined a few months later by a separate contingent 
of ex-officers, or Auxiliaries. A policy of unofficial, 
followed by officially sanctioned reprisals soon turned 
the conflict into a struggle between alien mercenaries 
and the native population.66
Politically, this course was ruinous. In Britain, 
no one was pleased? nearly everyone was alienated. While 
the government's policy did not go far enough to satisfy 
those who wished to wage all out war on Sinn Fein, it 
drove away those who believed that there should be a 
compromise settlement. 'Collective punishment', Robert 
Cecil told his brother, Lord Salisbury, was 'sometimes a 
necessary evil'. He could live with that. 'Casual 
felony' was quite another matter.67
In the face of such criticism, senior Conservatives 
in the government nonetheless were determined that there 
should be no reversal of government policy.68 Their 
stubbornness, though, was costing Lloyd George 
politically, and that was something he could not ignore.
65C. 23A(20) , 30 April 1920, CAB 23/21.
66K.O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity; The Lloyd George 
Coalition. 1918-1922 (Oxford, 1979), p. 128.
67Cecil to Salisbury, 11 October 1920, S(4) 93/122-123.
68Long memorandum, 25 July 1920, LG F/180/5/6/272.
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Being saddled with a Government of Ireland Act which his 
own supporters admitted fell 'far short of the Liberal 
standard', left him especially vulnerable to attack by 
former colleagues led by Herbert Asquith.69 The 'Wee 
Free7 Liberals exploited this opportunity to stoke up the 
fires of anti-Coalition feeling with a sustained attack 
on the government's entire Irish policy. These attacks 
hit home and had already helped to defeat an attempt at 
fusion in mid-March.70
At the same time, the Irish War was having a 
corrosive effect on Lloyd George's relations with a group 
of younger, first-time MPs who formed the nucleus of the 
New Members Coalition Group.71 Though hardly sympathetic 
with Sinn Fein, many of these MPs were disgusted by 
British conduct in Ireland.72 This included 'one of the 
most interesting of the newcomers', Oswald Mosley.
However disreputable his future was to be, Mosley at this 
time established himself as a courageous figure in
69Scott diary, 16 March 1920, in C.P. Scott, The 
Political Diaries of C.P. Scott: 1911-1928. T. Wilson, ed. 
(London, 1970), p. 382.
7°'Ireland a Dominion', Daily Telegraph. 21 May 1920. 
Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, p. 186.
71Riddell diary, 7 September 1919, in G. Riddell, The 
Riddell Diaries; 1908-1923. J.M. McEwen, ed. (London, 
1986), p. 290. D. Close, 'Conservatives and Coalition 
After the First World War', Journal of Modern History. Vol. 
45, No. 2, June 1973, p. 244.
72Morgan, Consensus and Disunityr p. 177-178. Colin 
Coote, in A Companion of Honour: The Story of Walter Elliot 
(London, 1965), p. 63, recalled that Elliot was 'more 
distressed' by the government's conduct in Ireland 'than by 
any of the other post-war disappointments'.
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Parliament, where his attacks on the government won him 
praise for breaking up 'the Black and Tan savagery'.73
As the year wore on, it seemed to some that the 
government's only real objective in Ireland was a desire 
to avoid 'traversing the old difficulty' lest it cause a 
break-up of the Coalition.74 Even worse, it was all too 
apparent that plans to implement the 1920 Act had no 
chance of success, at least in the 26 counties.75 The 
threatened alternative, crown colony government, made no 
impression on the Irish people. This point was brought 
home to the Cabinet when, in December, Macready warned 
its members to prepare for an IRA-led boycott of 
elections for the Southern Parliament. As Lloyd George 
pointed out, if the Sinn Fein leader Michael Collins 
'could stop three million people using their vote it did 
not say much for the policy His Majesty's Government were 
now pursuing.'76
Bonar Law resigns 
From about the middle of 1920 onward, nothing seemed 
to go right for the Coalition. A post-war economic boom, 
for which the government had claimed credit, burst 
towards the end of the year and, as Lloyd George told his
73C . Coote, Editorial: The Memoirs of Colin R. Coote 
(London, 1965), p. 103. O'Connor to Cynthia Mosley, 10 
December 1923, in Mosley, My Life, p. 157.
74HC Deb. Vol. 127, Col. 977, 29 March 1920.
75'Memorandum on the present political situation in
Southern Ireland', 12 February 1921, LG F/181/1/1.
76C. 79A(20), 29 December 1920, CAB 23/23.
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colleagues, the country was 'in for a bad time'.77 
Between December 1920 and March 1921, unemployment more 
than doubled. By the following June, over two million 
would be out of work. Although this figure then began to 
fall, the jobless rate would never drop below one million 
for the next twenty years.78
In the spring of 1921, the government found itself
staring into the abyss of a general strike led by a
'Triple Alliance' of coal miners, railwaymen, and 
transport workers. Within the United Kingdom, the army 
had enough units to fight the Irish rebellion or to 
contain industrial unrest before it exploded into 
revolution. It could not do both at the same time. 
'Denuded of troops', Edwin Montagu wrote, the Cabinet 
faced the unknown 'with a certain grim determination; but 
with no undue optimism'.79
In the middle of this crisis, Bonar Law unexpectedly 
resigned from the government. Despite emphatic 
statements that his departure was brought on by ill- 
health, 'a genuine case of "doctor's orders"', as Lady
Spender put it, it was soon being rumoured that a split
had erupted between the Tory leader and Lloyd George over 
the Irish Question.80 Bonar Law's own physician helped
77C. 61(20), 17 November 1920, CAB 23/23.
78Taylor, English History, p. 145.
79Montagu to Reading, 7 April 1921, 10, MSS Eur. E. 
238/3, No. 1.
8°Spender diary, 19 March 1921, D.1633/2/24. Also, see 
Sturgis diary, 20 March 1921, PRO 30/59/4.
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feed this speculation, telling one newspaper editor that 
his patient's sudden departure was 'due to one thing only 
- cold feet about Ireland'.81
Years later, Bonar Law's biographer would conclude 
that he was indeed ill and likely suffering from a case 
of high blood pressure.82 It is just possible that both 
sides were correct, that Bonar Law's symptoms were real 
but were brought on because he knew that talks with Sinn 
Fein could no longer be avoided. By January 1921 Lloyd 
George was clearly toying with the idea and at one 
meeting persistently raised the issue even though Bonar 
Law 'tried to put the subject off'.83 From an earlier 
Cabinet meeting, Bonar Law knew that these negotiations 
must include Michael Collins, as he was the only Irish 
leader 'with whom effective business could be done'. 
Perhaps shaking hands with 'the organiser of murder' was 
something that Bonar Law could not bring himself to do.84
For Conservatives, the shock of Bonar Law's sudden 
exit was compounded by Walter Long's retirement a month 
earlier. Although Long's departure was not unexpected, 
his resignation meant that yet another member of the 
government who regarded negotiations with Sinn Fein as 
'unthinkable' had departed the scene. Isolated, only
81Stevenson diary, 11 November 1921, in F. Lloyd 
George, Lloyd Georae: A Diary by Frances Stevenson. A.J.P. 
Taylor, ed. (New York, 1971), p. 236-237.
82Blake, Unknown Prime Minister, p. 423-424.
83Jones diary, 30 January 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 49-50.
84C. 77(20), 24 December 1920, CAB 23/23.
47
Arthur Balfour remained.85
Almost by default, Bonar Law's position as 
Conservative leader fell to Austen Chamberlain. This 
proved to be a momentous decision both for the party and 
for the course of Anglo-Irish relations. Although 
Chamberlain's accession to the leadership was supported 
by the party's hierarchy, most Tory MPs found him to be 
an aloof, even distant figure.86 Nor was Chamberlain 
popular in the country. As chancellor of the exchequer, 
it had fallen to him to put through a series of measures 
that had proved be particularly odious to Tory voters.87
His greatest problem, though, was summed up by one 
of his successors. 'He was respected', Harold Macmillan 
wrote of Chamberlain, 'but never feared'.88 This fact, 
more than any other, did not augur well for a government 
about to face its toughest challenge since the war. To 
grasp the nettle of the Irish Question, Chamberlain would 
have to take his party where it did not want to go. For 
that, he would need to be both feared and trusted by his 
followers and he was neither.
85J . Ramsden, A History of the Conservative Party; The 
Aae of Balfour and Baldwin. 1902-1940 (London, 1978), p. 
150. Long to Midleton, 26 July 1920, PRO 30/67/43. Jones 
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86Davidson to Bonar Law, 24 March 1921, BL 107/1/4. 
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87George Younger[?] to Long, 18 March 1921, Long 
Papers, Add. MSS 62,426, ff. 33-38.
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Negotiations versus War 
In late April and again in mid-May, the Cabinet 
engaged in a wide-ranging debate over whether or not it 
should make a public offer to negotiate with Sinn Fein.
At both meetings, Lloyd George stubbornly opposed 
concessions or any let-up in the war against the IRA. 
'These people will come round sooner or later7, he 
assured his colleagues.89 Yet, a mere six weeks later he 
was preparing for talks with Sinn Fein's president. 'No 
British Government7, Winston Churchill later wrote, 'has 
ever appeared to make so complete and sudden a reversal 
of policy7.90
The reasons for this turnaround are extraordinarily 
tangled, but roughly three factors added up to make for 
Lloyd George's decision to negotiate: the results of the 
Irish elections, the military situation and, an issue 
that is seldom explored, his own political survival.
The Irish elections 
At the end of May, voters went to the polls to elect 
representatives to the two Irish parliaments created by 
the 1920 Act. In the South, Sinn Fein candidates stood 
virtually unopposed in 124 of 128 seats, putting paid to 
any lingering hopes that the party might be sidelined. 
Their victory was then used to constitute the Second Dail
89Jones diary, 27 April and 12 May 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 
55-63 and 66-70.
9°Churchill, World Crisis: V . p. 303.
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Eireann.91
The results for the Northern Parliament told a 
different story. There, Sinn Fein won only six seats and 
the Nationalists an identical number, while Unionists 
swept the polls electing forty MPs.92 This was true even 
in the depressed, working-class areas of Belfast. 
Independent Labour candidates, who had declared that 
partition was 'an unworkable stupidity', were soundly 
rejected.93
In any event, the elections were important from the 
government's perspective, because they demonstrated that 
it was fulfilling its pledges to the Ulster Unionists. 
This gave Lloyd George some leeway to explore an 
alternative arrangement with the South.
In the early months of 1921, it looked as if British 
military efforts in Ireland were at last bearing fruit. 
'The Forces of the Crown are gradually wearing down the 
Irish Republican Army', Greenwood confidently told Lord 
Curzon, 'and bringing this Irish business to a head.'94 
All too soon, however, it was clear that these estimates 
were wildly optimistic. In late spring, the Cabinet's
910'Leary, Irish Elections. p. 9.
92Ibid.
93'To the Electors of South, East, and West Belfast', 
Irish News. 21 May 1921. Follis, State Under Siege. 
Appendix 1, p. 195-197.







Irish Situation Committee began to discuss imposing 
martial law throughout the 26 counties. Given that the 
government still refused to admit that a war was even 
taking place in Ireland, it was going to be hard to 
justify so drastic a step. In any event, Macready warned 
that there must be no more 'half-hearted coercion'. It 
had to be 'a case of "all out" or "nothing"', he told the 
committee. 'Could the Government go "all out"?'95
Both politicians and generals faced a conundrum.
Sir Henry Wilson advocated 'flattening out the rebels' 
with a summer-long, win-the-war offensive. Yet, he was 
well aware that this would be impossible 'unless England 
was on our side'. England, Worthington-Evans told him, 
'was not on our side and could not be got on it'.
Support would come about only when the government had 
devised a strategy with some reasonable chance of 
bringing the war to a conclusion. At that, even Wilson 
had to concede 'that it would be madness' to carry on 
with the war any further.96
The coup against Lloyd George
A couple of weeks before the Irish elections,
Frances Stevenson confided to Mark Sturgis that 'in his 
inmost heart' Lloyd George still hoped to impose the 1920 
Act on southern Ireland 'without any additions
95S.I.C. 9th Conclusions, 15 June 1921, CAB 27/107.
96C.P. 2965, 24 May 1921, CAB 24/123. Wilson diary, 22 
June 1921, HHW 1/30/1.
51
whatsoever'.97 Despite Sinn Fein's victory at the polls, 
he held onto this conviction and pressed ahead with plans 
for all-out war against the IRA until the end of June.
Then, the turn-around. This points to another 
factor behind the decision to negotiate with Sinn Fein.
In a nutshell, that factor was Lloyd George's political 
survival.
Throughout his four and a half years as prime 
minister, Lloyd George was beset by heirs apparent, none 
more so than Birkenhead and Churchill.98 His relations 
with both men, and with Churchill in particular, reached 
a breaking point in the spring of 1921 when he thwarted 
his junior partner's desire to become chancellor of the 
exchequer.99 According to Lord Beaverbrook, Churchill 
was now 'the bitter enemy of [Lloyd] George', while 
Birkenhead intended to 'challenge Chamberlain's 
leadership of the Tory Party.'100
Initially, it seems that the two men attempted to 
concoct a plot centring on Lloyd George's removal of Dr 
Christopher Addison from the Ministry of Health and his 
subsequent appointment as a minister without portfolio. 
When this plan failed to attract support, it was decided 
that a far larger collection of opponents might be
"Sturgis diary, 11 May 1921, PRO 30/59/4.
"See, e.g., Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 18 January
1920, NC 18/1/240.
"Churchill had harboured this ambition since 1919. 
See Wilson diary, 25 October 1919, HHW 1/28/1.
100Beaverbrook to Borden, 12 May 1921, BBK C/51.
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assembled against Lloyd George on the charge that he had 
lost his way in Ireland.101
Within both wings of the Coalition, discontent with 
the government's Irish policy was by now boiling over.
Even in Lloyd George's own backyard, Asquith's Liberals 
were making inroads by focusing on the government's 
handling of the Sinn Fein rebellion. 'Ireland, Ireland, 
Ireland', reported one of the prime minister's Welsh 
supporters, 'they keep harping on that one string and 
people listen, - to our loss!'102
From the other side of the Coalition, members of the 
'Group', a collection of influential Tory backbenchers, 
had also emerged as leading opponents of government 
policy. After a trip to Ireland in March, one of the 
Group's main figures, Sir Samuel Hoare, confronted Lloyd 
George at a private meeting, telling him that 'his show 
in Ireland was rotten from top to bottom'.103
With the premiership seemingly ready to drop like a 
piece of overripe fruit, Lloyd George's opponents 
proceeded to shake the tree for all they were worth. 
Throughout the spring and summer, Lord Beaverbrook 
attempted to broker an alliance between discontented 
leaders such as Birkenhead and Churchill and backbench
101Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, p. 98-103. Cowling, 
Impact of Labour, p. 120.
loaC. Price White to Winifred Coombe Tennant, 24 March 
1921, LG F/96/1/15.
103Hoare to Beaverbrook, 13 June 1921, Templewood 
Papers, 1:12 (36).
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Tories.104 In the hothouse atmosphere of Westminster it 
was impossible to keep such a plot secret for long. For 
the better part of a month, Lloyd George bided his time 
pretending that nothing but the usual problems troubled 
him. 'Crises', he airily wrote to Bonar Law, continued 
to chase 'each other like shadows of clouds across the 
landscape. Miners, unemployment, reparations, Siberia 
and always Ireland'.105
On 21 June, Birkenhead implicitly attacked the 
government's Irish policy while ostensibly defending it 
in the House of Lords. Contrary to the government's 
previous claims, he now admitted that 'a small war' was 
going on in Ireland. Worse, he conceded that the British 
effort to defeat the IRA was failing. Under the current 
leadership, however, there would be no change of policy, 
no concessions, nothing to leaven the terms of the 1920 
Act.106
Lloyd George chose this moment to strike back.107 
Word of the plot to oust the prime minister because of 
his Irish policy was leaked to two newspapers: first to 
the Daily Mirror, and a day later to the Manchester
104See, e.g., Birkenhead to Bonar Law, 5 May 1921, BL 
107/1/22; and Beaverbrook to Hoare, 9 July 1921, Templewood 
Papers, 1:12 (37).
lt)5Lloyd George to Bonar Law, 7 June 1921, BL 107/1/35.
1P6HL Deb. Vol. 45, Col. 679-696, 21 June 1921.
107Lord Beaverbrook, The Decline & Fall of Lloyd George 
(London, 1963), p. 72-74.
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Guardian.108 No one who might be a challenger escaped 
censure in one or other of the reports, including Bonar 
Law. Immediately, the articles punctured any schemes to 
remove Lloyd George from the premiership. A 'Coup 
D'Etat' now, Lord Winterton admitted, 'would be ... 
fatal'. The best that could be hoped for was 'a gradual 
stampede' in the autumn, and that would depend on 
Birkenhead and Churchill leaving office to lead the 
dissidents.109 In the circumstances, however, neither 
man was willing to take such a risky move.
With his position secure, at least for the time 
being, Lloyd George could at last change course on 
Ireland. The issue had proved to be a potential Achilles 
Heel. But, as he had earlier told his colleagues, they 
must be patient and wait for the 'best opportunity', not 
the 'first opportunity', to negotiate with Sinn Fein.110 
The end of June afforded Lloyd George the best 
opportunity to make his move and, he realised, it might 
not come again.
The offer to talk
While the plot against Lloyd George was spinning out 
in London, George V was in Belfast for the formal opening 
of Northern Ireland's Parliament. The occasion allowed
108'Queer Plot to Oust Mr. Lloyd George', Daily Mirror. 
22 June 1921. 'The Scheme that Failed. Attempted Unionist 
Revolt Against the Premier', Manchester Guardian. 23 June 
1921.
109Winterton to Hoare, 11 July 1921, Templewood Papers,
1:12 (38).
110Jones diary, 12 May 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 67.
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the king to appeal for reconciliation between North and 
South, and to call on Irishmen and women to 'forgive and 
forget'.111 What was said was less important than the 
fact that the speech gave the government the excuse it 
needed for a dramatic break in policy.112
Two days later, at an emergency Cabinet meeting, 
Lloyd George suggested that the time was right to invite 
both Craig and Sinn Fein President Eamon de Valera to 
come to London for talks. Disregarding his own previous 
advice, he now said that such an offer would not be a 
sign of weakness. On the contrary, if de Valera refused, 
the government would be in a much stronger position to 
wage all-out war against the IRA. At any rate, a 'last 
attempt at peace' had to be made, Chamberlain told his 
sister, Hilda, 'before we go the full lengths of martial 
law'.113
As it happened, de Valera was willing to talk - but 
he refused to have anything to do with a conference where 
he and Craig were seen to be on an equal footing. On 
reflection, this also suited the British, as separate 
discussions might enable them to put the Ulster Question 
to one side. On 8 July Macready and de Valera met at the 
Mansion House in Dublin where they signed a formal truce 
ending the Anglo-Irish War. Fighting lasted another
llx'King's call for a new Spirit in Ireland', Manchester 
Guardian, 23 June 1921.
112But see Lyons, Ireland. p. 425.
113Jones diary, 24 June 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 79-81. 
Austen to Hilda Chamberlain, 26 June 1921, AC 5/1/202.
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three days, before hostilities finally ended at noon, on 
Monday, 11 July. 'The last revolver shot' of the Anglo- 
Irish War was fired at five minutes before the hour. In 
Ulster.114
The Lloyd George-de Valera talks
By most accounts, Lloyd George's discussions with de 
Valera were not one of his happier experiences. After 
their first encounter, one assistant later wrote, the 
leader of the British empire emerged 'white and 
exhausted' having made no impression whatsoever.115
Nor did Lloyd George find the going any easier in 
separate talks with Craig and his colleagues. At a 
meeting with the Unionists on 18 July, Lloyd George made 
it plain that a settlement with Sinn Fein was impossible 
unless the six-county state accepted some sort of 
arrangement for an all-Ireland government. He then 
outlined five suggestions for an accommodation, only to 
be told that 'none of them were acceptable'. Instead of 
putting forward counter-proposals, Craig abruptly 
announced that further discussions 'would serve no useful 
purpose' and that he and his colleagues were returning to 
Belfast. So far as Craig was concerned, the negotiations 
with Sinn Fein turned solely on relations between 
Southern Ireland and Great Britain. If, and when, the 
interests of Ulster became involved 'in a practicable
114C.P. 3130, 13 July 1921, CAB 24/126.
115G. Shakespeare, Let Candles be Brought In (London, 
1949), p. 76.
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manner', the Northern Ireland Cabinet would return to 
London for further consultations.116
News of Craig's departure nearly brought the entire 
negotiations crashing down.117 Lloyd George managed to 
hold the situation together just long enough so that he 
could put forward his government's initiative for a 
comprehensive settlement with Sinn Fein.118 Compared to 
the 1920 Act, these proposals were an extraordinary step 
forward. In a carefully-worded letter to Bonar Law, Tom 
Jones explained that the Irish were being offered 
'"Dominion Status" with all sorts of important powers, 
but no Navy, no hostile tariffs, and no coercion of 
Ulster'. As usual, Jones wrote, the 'crux of the 
problem' was 'this question of unity'.119
De Valera's immediate response was, in Lloyd 
George's own words, 'not very hopeful'. The Sinn Fein 
president was unwilling to accept Dominion status unless 
it included Ulster. His 'only other alternative', Lloyd 
George told Craig, was 'complete independence for 
Southern Ireland.' Lloyd George hoped that Craig would 
meet with de Valera to demonstrate that Ulster was a
116'Rough Notes' of a meeting, 18 July [misdated June] 
1921, PRONI, CAB4/3/1.
117De Valera to Collins, 19 July 1921, FLK, de Valera 
Papers, File No. 151.
1i8' Proposals of the British Government for an Irish 
Settlement', 20 July 1921, Pail Eireann: Official
Correspondence Relating to the Peace Negotiations. June- 
September 1921 (Dublin, 1921), p. 6-8.
119Jones to Bonar Law, 22 July 1921, BL 107/1/46.
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'fact' not a 'figment' created by the British.
Otherwise, he feared, 'a settlement will always be 
unattainable' .120
Craig was not about to do anything of the kind. On 
the contrary, he refused to meet with de Valera again 
until the Sinn Fein leader acknowledged Northern 
Ireland's separate status. Ulster had already made its 
'sacrifice' for peace by agreeing to have its own 
government. 'Much against our wish', Craig wrote, 'we 
accepted this as a final settlement' and, he emphatically 
concluded, 'we have nothing left to give away'.121
The political fall-out 
The dramatic turn of events in Ireland had an 
immediate impact on British politics. On his left, Lloyd 
George's move suddenly cut the ground out from underneath 
anti-Coalition Liberals. Though they wanted a settlement 
('God grant it', wrote Lord Crewe), peace in Ireland 
would remove one of the Wee Frees' main grievances 
against the government. Furthermore, if Lloyd George 
could pull a deal out of his hat, he would almost 
certainly call a general election for which the Asquith 
Liberals were not prepared.122
On Lloyd George's right, a number of Conservative 
MPs were 'a good deal perturbed' that de Valera had been
12°Lloyd George to Craig, 21 July 1921, Grigg Papers, 
MSS Film 1010.
121Craig to Lloyd George, 29 July 1921, LG F/ll/3/15(a).
122Crewe to Asquith, 11 July 1921, Crewe Papers, C/40.
59
invited to London in the first place. A Tory Party 
resolution 'condemning such dealing altogether7 was 
resisted but only in return for another which expressed 
'anxiety' about the talks - hardly a ringing endorsement 
of the government or its leaders.123 As time dragged on, 
these misgivings increased. 'I think that we shall have a 
split over the Irish question7, Austen Chamberlain 
confided to his step-mother, with as many as thirty or 
forty MPs defecting from the party. 'Ireland will be the 
reason for some and the excuse for others.7124
The 20 July proposals were not officially rejected 
by the Irish Cabinet until 10 August.125 Among other 
objections, de Valera denied that Britain had any right 
to solve 'our local problem7 by partitioning the six 
counties. 'If your Government stands aside7, he 
asserted, 'we can effect a complete reconciliation7.
Quite how this was to be accomplished was unclear, though 
international arbitration was suggested as one 
possibility. But the most obvious method was 
specifically ruled out. De Valera emphatically stated 
that his government did not 'contemplate the use of 
force.7126
Although Lloyd George welcomed de Valera's pledge
123Bayford diary, 16 July 1921, p. 158.
124Austen to Mary Chamberlain, 25 August 1921, AC
4/1/1207.
125De Valera to Lloyd George, 10 August 1921, LG
F/14/6/14.
126Ibid.
not to attack the North, he was not about to refer the 
Irish Question to foreign mediators.127 Throughout 
August and September, newspaper accounts continued to 
stress that Ulster was 'the crux of the Irish 
problem'.128 In fact, the real bone of contention was de 
Valera's demand for the recognition of Irish national 
sovereignty and Lloyd George's refusal to concede it.129 
The knot was finally cut by the prime minister's proposal 
to ascertain 'how the association of Ireland with the 
community of nations known as the British Empire may best 
be reconciled with Irish national aspirations.' De 
Valera's reply was in effect to agree to disagree.130 
Formal talks were set to begin on the 11th day of 
October.
The two sides had taken 'a big step', Mark Sturgis 
wrote in his diary.131 Even so, he and others recognised 
that the Ulster Question might still block a final 
settlement. 'To ask the Irish people to leave Ulster 
out', one Cabinet official observed, 'would be like 
asking the English Parliament to leave Yorkshire outside
127Lloyd George to de Valera, 13 August 1921, LG 
F/14/6/15.
128See, e.g., 'The Crux of the Irish Problem', The
Observer. 28 August 1921; and 'A Signal for Peace',
Manchester Guardian. 7 September 1921.
129For the exchange of letters between Lloyd George and 
de Valera, 24 August - 20 September 1921, see LG F/14/6/16-
26.
13°Lloyd George to de Valera? and de Valera to Lloyd 
George, 29-30 September 1921, LG F/14/6/27 and 28.
131Sturgis diary, 30 September 1921, PRO 30/59/5.
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their jurisdiction.'132
The point of no return
By opening negotiations with Sinn Fein, Lloyd George 
crossed his Rubicon, setting in motion a chain of events 
which would culminate with his downfall a year and a half 
later. In direct response to the Irish initiative, 
eighteen Die-hards formed the nucleus of the group which 
was to be instrumental in overthrowing the Coalition.133 
Equally important, this was the one issue which might 
draw Bonar Law out of retirement. The question was not 
if, but rather how long he could ignore appeals to lead 
Conservative opposition to the 'Surrender policy in 
Ireland' .134
In that sense, Lloyd George was taking a calculated 
risk; but did he have any choice? The Coalition's 
initial response to the Irish Question - its 1920 
Government of Ireland Act, coupled with suppression of 
Sinn Fein - had clearly failed. Moreover, while these 
actions may have satisfied Ulster Unionists and a section 
of the Tory Party they eroded support for the Coalition 
in general.
However much members of the Cabinet, including Lloyd 
George, might have despised the Irish rebels and what 
they stood for, they could not be wished away. This
132'Rough notes on views of Irish delegates', 21 July 
1921, LG F/29/4/61(b).
133Kinnear, Lloyd Georae. p. 96-97.
134Menzies to Bonar Law, 13 August 1921, BL 107/1/51.
62
point was driven home by the government's chief civil 
servant, the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir 
Warren Fisher. It was no good 'withholding recognition 
of Sinn Fein as a political party', Fisher wrote. 'It is 
a political party, however much people may dislike 
it'.135 Lloyd George, no less than his Tory allies, was 
reluctant to accept this advice. But once the political 
damage being inflicted on the Coalition began to tell, he 
had no hesitation about altering course.
Although this sudden change of direction opened 
Lloyd George to the charge that his Irish policy was 
unprincipled and capricious, this was not the case.
Quite the contrary, by his lights it was the sort of 
action that made the difference between 'ordinary and 
extraordinary men'. As he explained it to Lord Riddell: 
'when the extraordinary man is faced by a novel and 
difficult situation, he extricates himself by adopting a 
plan which is at once daring and unexpected'.136 No 
other words better sum up Lloyd George's own approach to 
Ireland.
Even so, by the summer of 1921 Lloyd George had 
still not escaped his dilemma. If anything, the 1920 Act 
and the related concessions made to the Ulster Unionists 
had created new difficulties from which he would find it 
hard to extricate himself. Bargaining with Sinn Fein saw
135Fisher memorandum to Lloyd George, Bonar Law and 
Chamberlain, 15 May 1920, HO 317/50.
136Riddell diary, 3 April 1919, Intimate Diary, p. 45.
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off the immediate threat to his premiership but only at 
the cost of giving his opponents a possible issue, and a 
possible alternative leader, around whom to rally.
A fortnight after the failed coup to oust Lloyd 
George, Harold Laski penned a letter to American Supreme 
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. 'I think Lloyd 
George will be in for another ten years', Laski unhappily 
predicted, 'so that one might as well cultivate one's 
private garden and be screened from the public view'.137
Lloyd George would have been amused by that thought. 
If only he could be so sure.
137Laski to Holmes, 6 July 1921, in M. DeWolfe Howe, 
ed. , Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr.
Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski. 1916-1935. Vol. I 
(Cambridge, 1953), p. 348.
Chapter 2 
The Treaty and After
Not much rest for the wicked in this life.
- Lord Birkenhead1
On the evening of 10 October 1921, the 
Meteorological Office reported that weather conditions 
'over these islands7 were about to assume 'a somewhat 
complex character7. Through the night a low-pressure 
system rolled in from Ireland, breaking a spell of 
unseasonably warm temperatures. On the 11th rain fell 
over London, accompanied by thunder and lightning.2
In this unpromising atmosphere, the Irish Treaty 
negotiations finally got under way. Five delegates 
representing Dail Eireann - Arthur Griffith, Michael 
Collins, Eamon Duggan, Robert Barton, and George Gavan 
Duffy - were to press the claim for an independent, 
united Ireland. Eamon de Valera, his status recently 
elevated to that of president of the Irish republic, 
refused to attend. Facing the Sinn Fein delegates across 
a conveniently wide table, was Lloyd George, Birkenhead, 
Churchill, Greenwood, Worthington-Evans, and Sir Gordon 
Hewart. Austen Chamberlain joined the negotiations the 
next day.3
^Notes, Irish meeting7, 5 December 1921, LG 
F/101/139(e).
2See weather reports, The Times. 11-12 October 1921.
3'Difficult Problems for the Irish Conference7, Daily 
Telegraph. 14 October 1921.
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Little was accomplished at these early sessions. 
Incredibly, the Irish delegates were sent to London 
without a detailed alternative to Lloyd George's 20 July 
proposals. While de Valera continued to spin out his 
theory of 'External Association', a half-way house 
between his cherished republic and Dominion status, the 
Irish delegates were sent packing with a bare-bones 
proposal called 'Draft Treaty A' which, revealingly, did 
not address the Ulster Question.4
Such were the uncertain beginnings of the 
negotiations that were to end with Ireland's 
independence. Five issues stood in the way of agreement: 
free trade within the British Isles versus protection for 
Irish industry; Ireland's liability for a proportion of 
the United Kingdom's debt versus Irish claims of over­
taxation; defence; Dominion status versus a republic; and 
partition. Neither of the first two issues was likely to 
disrupt the talks; nor was defence, although the problems 
there were trickier. The break, if it were to come, 
would be over Ireland's continued allegiance to the 
crown, or over the partition of Ulster.5
A day-by-day, sometimes hourly, chronicle of the 
Treaty talks has been written elsewhere, and it is not 
within the ambit of this study to repeat that exercise.
In his account, Lord Longford maintained that 'Ulster was
4The document is reprinted in Macardle, Irish Republic. 
Appendix 16, p. 937-939.
5Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal. p. 89-97.
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not the main issue' dividing British and Irish 
negotiators, but instead became 'a strange abstract 
factor in tactics'.6 This conclusion is largely based on 
the fact that the Ulster Question hardly figured in the
Dail's subsequent Treaty debates. It is indeed
astonishing that in a public debate which took some 338 
pages to record, only nine of those pages are devoted to 
partition. The private sessions are even less 
enlightening, 'as fewer than five of 182 pages deal with
Ulster.'7
But that was not the way the matter was viewed by 
the participants, least of all by the British. Among 
mainstream politicians, certainly those within the 
Coalition, the idea of allowing an Irish republic was 
never seriously entertained. The 'fly in the ointment', 
as Alfred Cope put it, was 'the "Ulster Question" and not 
the "Republic"./s
The object here is to show that partition continued 
to be the fly in the ointment throughout the Treaty 
negotiations and after. Once it became clear that the 
Ulster Unionists would not agree to a single government 
for Ireland, and that this refusal would be supported by 
the Conservative Party, Lloyd George devised a complex
6Ibid, p. 93.
7M. Wall, 'The Ulster Question', in D. Williams, ed., 
The Irish Struggle; 1916-1926 (London, 1966), p. 87. J.M. 
Curran, The Birth of the Irish Free State; 1921-1923 
(University, Alabama, 1980), p. 314, n. 7.
®Cope to Jones, 15 August 1921, TJ G/2/11.
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arrangement to turn this refusal against itself. This 
arrangement became the Treaty's Ulster clauses, of which 
the Boundary Commission was just one part. Hidden 
beneath the other clauses was a trap designed to ensnare 
the Ulster Unionists in the complicated restrictions of 
the 1920 Act. Compared with the freedoms offered by 
Dublin, these restrictions would be so onerous as to make 
the lure of an Irish parliament irresistible. In this 
way, Lloyd George could say that he had kept his pledge 
not to fiddle with the 1920 Act while, at the same time, 
he could sell the agreement to the Irish delegates as a 
contract that made reunification inevitable.
What is important to remember is that Lloyd George's 
goal in the autumn of 1921 was to remove the Irish 
Question from his list of problems. An agreement would 
take what was a political liability and, with a bit of 
skilful handling, turn it into a platform for the next 
general election. This in turn could provide the 
springboard from which to launch his long-desired Centre 
Party. Viewed from this angle, the details of an Irish 
agreement were secondary. As Lloyd George reminded his 
colleagues: 'We are after a settlement - that [is] our 
objective.'9 Coming to grips with the consequences of 
the settlement was for a later time. In fact, they would 
occupy British politicians to a greater or lesser degree 
for the better part of the next four years.
For now, Lloyd George's concern was that he not
9Jones diary, 14 November 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 164.
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become bogged down in an Irish war fought over partition. 
'Men will die for the Throne and Empire', he pointed out 
to his Cabinet. 'I do not know who will die for Tyrone 
and Fermanagh.'10 If the war had to be renewed, the 
government would need the widest measure of public 
support. That made it imperative that any breakdown 
should occur over allegiance to the crown, not over two 
distant Irish counties.
A few days into the negotiations, the twin rocks of 
Fermanagh and Tyrone emerged once again to block Lloyd 
George's way. In no uncertain terms, the Irish delegates 
declared that they could not agree to a partition 
including those two counties. 'This', Lloyd George told 
Jones, 'is going to wreck [the] settlement'.11
The Ulster discussions
The positions taken by both sides during their 
initial discussions on Ulster can be immediately 
summarised. The negotiators first came to grips with 
partition at their fourth and fifth sessions, held on 14 
and 17 October. Hammering home Sinn Fein's contention 
that the six county partition was 'unnatural', Griffith 
argued that the dispute in Ireland was not between 
Protestant and Catholic. Sectarianism, he held, was 
being used to divert the average Ulsterman 'from
10Jones diary, 7 September 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 110-111.
11'Notes at Cabinet meetings', 17 October 1921, TJ 
G/2/32.
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industrial questions'.12 If the British stood aside,
Sinn Fein would make 'a fair proposal' to persuade 
Unionists to join a single Irish government. If the 
Ulstermen refused, they could retain their separate 
Parliament? but its reach would cover only those 
constituencies voting for exclusion and which formed a 
'territorially continuous group'. Moreover, any such 
government must be subordinate to the national Parliament 
in Dublin, not Westminster.13
Lloyd George dismissed these arguments out of hand, 
telling the Sinn Feiners that they 'must face facts'. No 
British government could coerce the Ulster Unionists into 
an all-Ireland Parliament? it 'would only lead to civil 
war'. Yes, the six county partition was not 'logically 
defensible'. But would the Sinn Feiners prefer putting 
all nine Ulster counties under a Belfast Parliament?14
The first breakthrough came a few days later, when 
Griffith dangled the possibility of Sinn Fein accepting 
Dominion status - but only if the British ended 
partition. This link was more explicitly drawn the 
following day. 'In the end', Griffith wrote, 'I told 
them that no Irishman could even discuss with his 
countrymen any association with the British Crown unless
“Chamberlain's Notes, 14 October 1921, CAB 21/253/1.
“The proposal is reprinted as Appendix 1 in J. Bowman, 
De Valera and the Ulster Question: 1917-1973 (Oxford, 
1982), p. 339. S.F.(C) 7, 17 October 1921, CAB 21/208.
“ Ibid, S.F.(C) 7. Chamberlain's Notes? and Jones's 
Notes, 14 October 1921, CAB 21/253/1 and 3.
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the essential unity of Ireland was agreed to' by both 
sides. This position was formally confirmed a few days 
later by the Irish delegation as a whole.15
If the offer was sincere, the British negotiators 
were in dangerous territory. 'We can't give way on the 
six counties', Churchill pointed out to his colleagues,
'we are not free agents.' Already facing a vote of no 
confidence in Parliament, it would be politically 
suicidal for Lloyd George and his colleagues to propose 
an all-Ireland Parliament to Craig, at least for the time 
being. In any case, Lloyd George was not willing to play 
Griffith's game. Before he would take any risks on 
Ulster, he had to be sure that the Irish would give up 
their republic.16
Lloyd George 'smites the Die-hards'
At the end of October roughly three dozen Tory MPs 
tabled a motion demanding that the government abandon its 
talks with Sinn Fein and work the 1920 Act.17 The number 
of Conservatives supporting the motion was not 
unexpected, Chamberlain told his wife, though 'one or two 
of the names are a surprise to me.'18 Faced with what 
amounted to a vote of no confidence, Lloyd George decided
15Griffith to de Valera [extracts], 24 and 25 October 
1921, FLK, de Valera Papers, File No. 347. S.F.(C) 21A, 29
October 1921, CAB 43/3.
16Grigg's Notes, 25 October 1921, CAB 21/253/2.
17HC Deb. Vol. 147, Col. 1367, 31 October 1921.
“Austen to Ivy Chamberlain, 26 October 1921, AC 
6/1/433.
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it was time that he 'threw down the glove'. If the 
motion succeeded, he announced that he would resign and 
call a general election.19 At the same time, he decided 
to use the Parliamentary drama to focus minds in the 
Irish delegation.
On the 27th, Griffith and his colleagues received a 
memorandum from their British counterparts insisting that 
they declare once and for all whether or not they were 
prepared to accept Dominion status, as well as the 
government's other demands concerning defence, trade, and 
finance. Ulster was carefully side-stepped. Griffith's 
response was to turn these questions back on the British, 
making any agreement conditional on the 'unimpaired 
unity of Ireland'.20 This sparring match set the stage 
for a private meeting between Lloyd George and Griffith 
on the eve of the Commons censure debate. What exactly 
transpired between them is a matter of dispute.
According to Collins, at any rate, the result was that 
the two sides had reached 'absolute dead level'. In 
return for a united Ireland, the Dail would have to 
accept membership within the British Commonwealth, along 
with safeguards for the Ulster Unionists and guarantees 
for British security. Otherwise, he told the IRA's chief 
of staff, there would be war and 'no fooling about it
19Sturgis diary, 28 October 1921, PRO 30/59/5.
2°S.F . (C ) 21 and 21A, 27 and 29 October 1921, CAB 43/3.
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either.'21
Griffith reported to de Valera that the British had 
to be 'certain of real good-will on our side' before they 
would risk their careers in a fight with the Die-hards.
'If I would give him [Lloyd George] personal assurances 
on this matter', Griffith wrote, 'he would go out to 
smite the Diehards, and would fight on the Ulster matter 
to secure essential unity.'22
It is difficult to see how Lloyd George could have 
kept such a bargain, unless he was prepared to sacrifice 
his Coalition partners. As Chamberlain explained to his 
wife: 'F.E. and I are so pledged that we could not 
honourably alter the Ulster boundaries (by subtraction, I 
mean) or powers without Craig's consent'. If an attempt 
was made to 'force Ulster into a sacrifice', both men 
would be forced to resign from the Cabinet.23 Whether 
Lloyd George was willing to carry matters that far is 
unclear, though he did put out tentative feelers to the 
Wee Frees suggesting that together they might form an 
alternative government. But his threat to call a general 
election was never really serious. 'It would be foolish 
to do so', he admitted to Donald Maclean, 'unemployment
21Collins to Mulcahy, 31 October 1921, Mulcahy Papers, 
P7/A/72.
22Griffith to de Valera [extract], 31 October 1921, 
F.L.K. de Valera Papers, File No. 347.
23Austen to Ivy Chamberlain, 30-31 October 1921, AC 
6/1/441.
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being as rampant as it was.'24
In the end, no drastic measures were needed to 
survive the censure vote. Lloyd George did indeed smite 
the Die-hards, crushing his opponents by 439 votes to 43. 
It was a brilliant performance, though Tom Jones had to 
admit that more than once his master 'was on very thin 
ice' .2S
On 2 November, the personal assurance that Griffith 
had given to Lloyd George in the run-up to the Commons 
debate was put into writing. Again, everything was 
'conditional on the recognition of the essential unity of 
Ireland'.26 The British, he reported to de Valera, were 
now 'satisfied to face the "Ulster" question on it, and 
assure me that if "Ulster" proves unreasonable they are 
prepared to resign rather than use force against us.'
Even if they failed, Griffith was certain that no one 
could form an alternative government which committed 
itself to 'a war-policy against Ireland'.27 Britain's 
military commander in Ireland agreed. It would be 
insane, Macready wrote, to go to war 'merely if Ulster
24Maclean memorandum, ? October 1921, Maclean Papers, 
Dep. c. 466, ff. 103.
25HC Deb. Vol. 147, Col. 1412-1427, 1479-1484, 31
October 1921. Jones diary, 31 October 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 
152.
26S.F. (B) 45, 2 November 1921, CAB 43/2. In an earlier 
draft, Griffith explicitly stated that he could not 
recommend Dominion status if 'the unity of Ireland were 
denied in form or in fact' [sic]. See Griffith to Lloyd 
George, same date, LG F/21/1/1.
27Griffith to de Valera [extract], 3 November 1921, 
F.L.K., de Valera Papers, File No. 347.
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objects to a plebiscite in Tyrone and Fermanagh.'28
Bonar Law intervenes
On 5 November Craig was summoned to London for 
urgent consultations. The gist of the British proposal 
to be presented to him was that Ulster's government would 
retain its powers within the six counties but that its 
representatives would sit in Dail Eireann rather than the 
British Parliament. Austen Chamberlain thought that the 
British might persuade Ulster's premier to see the 
advantages of this new arrangement. As matters stood, it 
would be difficult if not impossible for Craig to govern 
Tyrone and Fermanagh 'with their Sinn Fein majorities'.29
Craig seems to have been unprepared for what awaited 
him in the British capital. The government's proposals, 
he said afterward, gave him 'the biggest shock' he had 
ever had in his life. Worse still, he discovered 'many 
"backsliders" amongst old friends and colleagues'.30 His 
reaction was to seek help from any quarter but, above 
all, from Bonar Law. As early as September Lloyd George 
had foreseen that his former colleague's presence might 
be a problem if the Irish negotiations became tricky.
His solution was to dispatch Bonar Law, along with 
Balfour, to represent Britain at the Washington Naval 
Conference. Balfour accepted, as did Bonar Law - until
28Macready to Wilson, 3 November 1921, HHW 2/2F/46.
29Austen to Ivy Chamberlain, 2 November 1921, AC
6/1/447.
3°Lady Craig's diary, 5 November 1921, D.1415/B/38.
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he learned that Lloyd George was to remain in London to 
orchestrate the discussions on Ireland.31
Just as he had feared, Bonar Law quickly emerged as 
the chief obstacle to the government's peace plan. 'B.L. 
is rampaging', Chamberlain told his wife, and 'seeing red 
on the subject of Ulster'. It was only a matter of time 
before the former Tory leader's uncompromising attitude 
began to infect the Cabinet. Chamberlain knew that he 
could depend on Birkenhead. Horne was also reliable, 
though he seemed at times 'puzzled and troubled' by the 
government's Irish policy. Curzon, Chamberlain 
suspected, 'does not know where he is. Worthy puzzles me 
a little and, if trouble arises, Baldwin would be much 
under Bonar's influence.'32
Despite their pledges of loyalty, Lloyd George also 
suspected that his Coalition partners would desert him if 
the Irish issue became too hot. They had made the same 
sort of pledges before, on that occasion to Asquith just 
before Lloyd George had forced his resignation. Within 
days, he reminded Tom Jones, 'I was putting the nose bags 
of office round their necks. Curzon, L. W.-E. and 
Baldwin, they will all go over to Bonar if the 
opportunity comes.'33
31Grigg to Curzon, 14 September 1921, 10, MSS Eur. F. 
112/220(a), ff. 78-81.
32Austen to Ivy Chamberlain, 7, 8, and 9 November 1921,
AC 6/1/455, 458, and 459.
33Jones diary, 8 November 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 156.
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The Boundary Commission 
With support ebbing away, it seems that Lloyd George 
actually considered resigning at about this time. 'There 
is just one other possible way out7, he told Jones.
Namely, Southern Ireland would be granted Dominion 
status, while Craig's government would retain the powers 
granted to it by the 1920 Act, as well as representation 
in the imperial Parliament. But, the Ulstermen would do 
so at the cost of bearing a higher proportion of taxation 
than the South. Under no conditions would Northern 
Ireland be granted Dominion status. Furthermore, the 
Unionists would have to accept a Boundary Commission 
which would be charged with redrawing the Irish 
frontier.34
What prompted Lloyd George to resurrect the Boundary 
Commission is unclear. When he had mooted the proposal 
during an earlier round of the Treaty negotiations, the 
Irish were decidedly cool to the idea.35 It is plausible 
that Lloyd George returned to the concept because a 
similar commission, then at work in Upper Silesia, was 
much in the news.36 An additional attraction was that 
Craig himself had proposed just such a commission the
34Ibid, Jones diary, 7 November 1921, p. 155.
35Jones's Notes, 14 October 1921, CAB 21/253/3.
36These provisions in the Treaty of Versailles later 
figured in the Free State's case to the Irish Boundary 
Commission. See North-Eastern Boundary Bureau, Handbook of 
the Ulster Question (Dublin, 1923), p. 149-152.
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year before.37 In that case, it would be hard for him to 
object to it now.
Whatever its origins, Collins instinctively disliked 
the idea when it was put to him and Griffith.38 Jones 
raised the offer again the following day, this time with 
Griffith and Duggan. Lloyd George, he said, 'was 
prepared to play the Boundary Commission as an absolutely 
last card', but he would do so only 'if he could feel 
sure that Sinn Fein would take it, if Ulster accepted.' 
Jones's choice of words was crucial, and so was 
Griffith's. 'It is not our proposal', the Irish leader 
replied, and he would not pledge that the Sinn Fein 
delegates would accept the scheme. 'We would prefer a 
plebiscite', he told Jones, 'but in essentials a Boundary 
Commission is very much the same.'39
The idea for a Boundary Commission was initially put 
to Griffith with only the six counties in mind. Jones 
was later told to make it plain that the Commission's 
writ must apply to all nine Ulster counties, and he 
claimed that he passed this information along to the 
Irish leader.40 Neither of Griffith's letters to de 
Valera over the following two days, however, mention 
this. On the contrary, throughout his correspondence 
Griffith makes it clear that the Commission's sole
37See chapter 1.
38Jones diary, 8 November 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 155-156.
39Ibid, 9 November 1921, p. 156-157.
4°Ibid, 9-10 November 1921, p. 157-158.
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function would be to 'delimit' Northern Ireland's 
territory.41 That is a very different proposition from 
the British understanding that the Commission would 
'adjust' the boundary to both include as well as exclude 
territory in either direction.42
The trap of the 1920 Act
As well as asserting that the Boundary Commission 
would only be empowered to take territory away from the 
six-county state, Griffith's reports also informed de 
Valera that whatever remained of Northern Ireland would 
find itself handcuffed by the terms of the 1920 Act. 
Specifically, the truncated Ulster state 'would have to 
bear itself its proportion of British taxation' and would 
be 'subject to equal financial burdens with England.'43
In order to win Cabinet approval to negotiate with 
Sinn Fein in the first place, Lloyd George's 20 July 
offer had to stipulate that any settlement 'must allow 
for full recognition of the existing powers and 
privileges of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, which 
cannot be abrogated except by their own consent'.44 
Craig and his supporters in the Conservative Party
“Griffith to de Valera [extracts], 8, 9, 11, 12
November 1921, F.L.K., de Valera Papers, File No. 347. 
Austen Chamberlain also spoke of a 'new delimitation' of 
the six-county state. See Chamberlain to Lloyd George, 11 
November 1921, LG F/7/4/31.
“Curtis memorandum, 8 November 1921, LG F/181/4/1/204.
“Griffith to de Valera [extracts], 9 and 12 November 
1921, F.L.K., de Valera Papers, File No. 347.
44See British proposals, 20 July 1921, DE: Official
Correspondence. p. 7.
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assumed that this statement gave them an iron-clad 
guarantee, making it impossible for Lloyd George to do a 
deal with the Irish rebels behind their backs.
The genius of Lloyd George's latest proposal was 
that it turned this pledge on its head. If, he pointed 
out to his colleagues, 'Belfast wanted to remain with Gt. 
Britain then she must carry the same burdens as Glasgow, 
Liverpool and Birmingham.' The choice before Craig and 
his followers was both simple and fair: either join the 
Irish Dominion or remain within the United Kingdom. The 
Unionists, he said, 'can't expect to get all the benefits 
of both systems.' According to Jones, 'the atmosphere 
was at once electric' when the 'great and sudden 
revelation' of Lloyd George's offer to Griffith dawned on 
the Conservatives. Chamberlain, in particular, was 
'disturbed' by its implications, but no one could refute 
the prime minister's logic.45
Lloyd George's arguments carried the day in Cabinet, 
setting the stage for the exchange of a series of letters 
between the British and Ulster prime minister during mid- 
November.46 The first of these placed two alternatives 
before Northern Ireland's Cabinet: participation in an 
all-Ireland Parliament with Belfast's government 
retaining the powers conferred on it by the 1920 Act, the
45Jones diary, 10 November 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 159, 161.
46Cmd. 1561: Correspondence Between His Majesty's
Government and the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland 
Relating to the Proposals for an Irish Settlement? Sess. 
II., i, 83.
advantages of lower taxation, a voluntary imperial 
contribution and the assurance that trade and commerce 
between the North and the rest of Ireland would not be 
hindered. Alternatively, Northern Ireland could maintain 
its separation from the rest of Ireland, but only at the 
price of bearing higher taxation, a 'proportionate share' 
of the imperial debt and the certain erection of a 
customs barrier on the Irish frontier. As for the 
boundary, this question was in either case 'reserved' for 
further discussion; but it was made clear that 'an 
amicable settlement' of the issue would be much more 
likely if the Unionists were willing to participate in a 
single Irish government.47
The response of Craig's Cabinet was unyielding. So 
far as the Unionists were concerned, they had already 
made the 'supreme sacrifice' by accepting the 1920 Act. 
Furthermore, negotiations were impossible so long as the 
possibility of an all-Ireland Parliament was 'open to 
discussion'. But Craig and colleagues then tried having 
it both ways. Although Northern Ireland's territory was 
deemed to be an 'essential' component of the 1920 Act, 
the legislation itself was far from sacrosanct. Quite 
the contrary, Craig and his colleagues now proposed that 
Northern Ireland should be granted Dominion status as 
well. Such a move meant, of course, the end of the 
United Kingdom. But this was a price Unionists were 
willing to pay, as they regarded 'the loss of
47Ibid, Lloyd George to Craig, 10 November 1921.
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representation at Westminster as a less evil than 
inclusion in an All-Ireland Parliament.'48
Griffith was elated by Craig's reply. Here was 
proof of 'Ulster's sordidness', all 'for the sake of a 
lower income tax'. Jones encouraged this thinking, 
telling the Irish leader that if Lloyd George could rely 
on the Sinn Feiners' continued support, 'we might have 
Ulster in before many months had passed.'49
Although Craig's arguments found some support in the 
Cabinet, they were soon given short shrift.50 Lloyd 
George even enlisted the help of an unlikely ally, Bonar 
Law, in his cause. At a meeting on 12 November, the 
Cabinet was told that the former Tory leader was willing 
to accept a Boundary Commission and, further, that he 
agreed that the Ulster Unionists must pay the same taxes 
as those levied in Britain. 'That is coercion of 
Ulster', Lloyd George observed. 'It is fair but it is 
fiscal pressure.'51
As was so often the case with Lloyd George, this was 
only half the story. Bonar Law's point was that if the 
Unionists could not be won over by the promise of lower 
taxation, then Irish unity could be achieved only if Sinn
48Ibid, Craig to Lloyd George, 11 November 1921.
49Jones diary, 12 November 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 163.
soAmery to Worthington-Evans, 22 November 1921, W-E, 
MSS Eng. hist., c. 910, ff. 209-210. Also, see 
Worthington-Evans memorandum, S.F.(B) 25, 12 November 1921,
CAB 43/2.
51Jones diary, 12 November 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 163.
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Fein resorted to force. That the British would never
allow.52 Nevertheless, he made it clear to Craig that he
was no more inclined to give the Unionists the 'benefits
of both systems' than was Lloyd George. 'As regards the
question of the taxation of Ulster', Bonar Law wrote:
I will repeat the exact conversation between Craig 
and myself on that subject the first day I saw him.
I said to him 'you will be told that the alternative 
to going into an All-Ireland Pari, is remaining in 
the U.K. and paying our taxes - what do you say to 
that?' His reply was 'We would jump at it.' I told 
him that his reply was very gratifying to me as I 
could not have undertaken to share in fighting their 
battle here on any other terms. He said to me that 
any other position was quite indefensible. They 
could not say when it is a question of the form of 
Govt. 'We are part of the U.K. and our right to 
remain part of it is not diminished because we live 
in the island of Ireland' and then say when it is a 
question of taxation 'We are a part of Ireland and 
must be treated not in the same way as the rest of 
the U.K. but in the same way as the rest of 
Ireland.' In other words they cannot claim the 
privileges (such as they are) of remaining with 
us and refuse to bear our burdens.53
Craig and his friends appeared to be trapped. 'I do 
not know of any explicit pledge that the North should 
have economic equality with the South', admitted Ronald 
McNeill. '[W]e have to face the fact that our demand has 
always been for a "clean cut" out of Home Rule and it may 
be said against us that if we demand the privileges of 
remaining in communion - if not union - with England, we 
must bear our share of the burdens'.54
Be that as it may, the Coalitionists themselves were
52Bonar Law to Croal, 12 November 1921, BL 107/1/83.
53Bonar Law to Salisbury, 2 December 1921, BL 107/4/17.
54McNeill to Hugh Cecil, 19 November 1921, Quickswood 
Papers 29/231-232.
in an equally vulnerable position. At this most delicate 
moment of the Irish negotiations, the Conservatives were 
due to hold their annual National Unionist Association 
Conference in Liverpool, 'the stronghold of Orange 
Toryism'. This occasion would be Chamberlain's first 
address to the party's rank and file as their leader. 
Added to his 'catalogue of troubles' was Bonar Law, 
'itching to be back in politics where he is disposed to 
think that the first place might & ought to be his.' 
Chamberlain believed that he was fighting for his
political life.55 And not just his alone. Watching from
the sidelines, Edwin Montagu wrote: 'I can't say whether 
the Government will survive or not'.56
The Liverpool Conference 
In the run-up to the Liverpool Conference, the
Coalition's opponents believed that their hour, and their
man, had finally come. Bonar Law's letter bag was filled 
with correspondence urging him to re-join the battle to 
save Ulster from 'the tender mercies' of the IRA.57 
Initially, this was exactly what he intended to do. 'If 
L.G. goes on with his present proposals I will oppose 
them', he told one confidant. More than that, 'I shall
55Austen to Hilda Chamberlain, 13 November 1921, AC 
5/1/220. Austen to Neville Chamberlain, same date, NC 
1/27/57.
56Montagu to Reading, 17 November 1921, 10, MSS Eur. E.
238/3, No. 24.
570rmsby Gore to Bonar Law, 15 November 1921, BL
107/1/68.
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try to get the Conservative party to follow me./58
It was all but certain that if the former Tory 
leader appeared at the Liverpool Conference there would 
be a stampede of support in his direction. Prior to the 
conference, Sam Hoare warned Churchill that there were 
deep resentments welling up among Tory MPs. 'Give them a 
big issue and they will move off in a solid formation. 
Ulster will give them the issue they want, it may also 
give them the leader they need.'59
But Bonar Law did not lead a revolt at Liverpool? in 
fact, he did not even attend the conference.
Instead, on 10 November he met with Lloyd George in 
an attempt to persuade him that he could not coerce 
Ulster and preserve the Coalition at the same time.
Bonar Law had another suggestion. 'Don't confine your 
bullying to Ulster. Try it on the Sinn Feiners too.' 
Warming to this idea, he proposed telling Griffith that, 
despite their best efforts, the British had found it 
impossible to win any concessions from Northern Ireland's 
Cabinet. That being the case, the Southern Irish would 
be invited to form their own Dominion government with the 
knowledge that it would be in Ulster's material interest 
eventually to join with the South.60
This indeed was the line taken by Lloyd George when
58Bonar Law to Croal, 12 November 1921, BL 107/1/83.
59Hoare memorandum to Churchill [copy], 12 November
1921, BBK C/307.
6°Bonar Law to Croal, 12 November 1921, BL 107/1/83.
85
he next met with Griffith.61 As a result, the Irish 
leader gave his assent to a memorandum promising not to 
reject the offer of a Boundary Commission. According to 
Griffith, this document merely clarified his earlier 
willingness to consider the proposal and that the Irish 
would not repudiate it while the Coalition Tories faced 
their opponents at the Liverpool Conference.62 But when 
shown to Chamberlain and Birkenhead, Lloyd George 
interpreted the memorandum to mean that the Irish would 
not break on the Ulster issue at all.63
Without a leader, the Die-hard threat at Liverpool 
began to disintegrate.64 However, the overwhelming 
defeat of the Die-hards' motion condemning the Irish 
talks 'was far from being a vote of confidence in the 
P.M.'65 The situation looked good 'on the surface', Lord 
Derby told Lloyd George. But underneath, there was 'a 
good bit of disquiet' among the party faithful which 
would erupt at the mere hint of a 'breach of faith' 
regarding Ulster.66
61Stevenson diary, 14 November 1921, p. 237.
“Griffith to de Valera [extract], 12 November 1921, 
F.L.K. de Valera Papers, File No. 347. A version of the 
memorandum appears in Chamberlain's Notes, 5 December 1921, 
CAB 21/253/1.
“Austen to Ivy Chamberlain, 13 November 1921, AC 
6/1/463.
64NUA Conference Minutes, 17-18 November 1921, NUA
2/1/37.
“Jones to Hankey, 25 November 1921, CAB 63/34.
“Derby to Lloyd George, 18 November 1921, LG
F/14/5/33.
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Treaty talks: the final phase
The outcome of the Liverpool Conference confirmed 
Lloyd George in his determination to follow Bonar Law's 
advice. On 16 November Griffith and his colleagues were 
handed a proposed draft treaty. Ireland would be firmly 
situated within the British empire as a Dominion and 
would allow the Royal Navy to maintain bases on its soil 
to guarantee British security. Craig's government would 
have up to one year to opt out of the new Irish state.
If it did so, 'the provisions of the Government of 
Ireland Act, 1920, ... shall continue to be of full force 
and effect' - code words meaning that the six counties 
would pay British rates of taxation and a proportion of 
the imperial debt. At the same time, a Boundary 
Commission would determine the boundary between the two 
Irish states. The sole criterion for any border change 
would be 'the wishes of the inhabitants'.67
This draft serves to confirm the later testimony of 
one of the Irish delegation's principal secretaries. 
According to John Chartres, Griffith's willingness to 
accept Dominion status was 'expressly contingent' on the 
agreement also ending the 'exclusion of large bodies of 
Nationalist Irishmen' from the Irish state. 'No one ever 
mentioned "minor rectifications" of the existing 
boundary', Chartres wrote, and he rejected claims that 
Griffith would have made even a tentative offer to
67S.F.(B) 46, 16 November 1921, CAB 43/2. Liddell's 
Notes, 18 November 1921, CAB 21/253/6.
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recognise the crown in return for so minor a 
commitment.68
To support his assertion, Chartres pointed to the 16 
November proposal. 'In that draft', he pointed out, 'the 
wishes of the inhabitants are made subject in the proviso 
to NO LIMITATION WHATEVER. There is not a word about 
economic or geographical considerations.' Chartres 
continued:
The limiting words were introduced afterwards 
in case the Boundary Commission should feel itself 
obliged to transfer small, distant, non-contiguous 
districts, such as the Glens of Antrim. The Glens 
of Antrim were mentioned by Lloyd George (pointing 
to a map) to illustrate possible exceptions to the 
general rule. On Mr Collins acquiescing in this,
Mr Lloyd George said, 'Then there will be no 
difficulty about the wording.' The limiting words 
were inserted simply and solely to provide for such 
a case as the Glens of Antrim, Mr Lloyd George him­
self raising and stating the point in the presence 
of all the British none of whom made any demur, 
correction, exception or addition.69
Nearly a week elapsed before the Irish responded to 
the 16 November proposals with what amounted to a re­
statement of External Association; a complete breakdown 
of the talks was only narrowly averted by a meeting of 
the principal players.70 This episode set the tempo for 
a series of nerve-wracking back and forth encounters that 
lasted until the Treaty was finally signed. The nadir 
occurred during a disastrous confrontation on 4 December
68Chartres to Mulcahy, 5 February 1924, D/T, S 1801/E. 
'Note on the Boundary Negotiations', 19 October 1924, 
F.L.K., de Valera Papers, File No. 354.
69Ibid, 'Note'.
7°S.F. (B) 47, 22 November 1921, CAB 43/2. File No.
22/N/l, 23 November 1921, CAB 21/208.
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when Griffith, along with Barton and Gavan Duffy, once 
again proposed External Association as the basis for a 
settlement. No new proposals were put forward concerning 
the Ulster question, justifying a British belief that 
partition was no longer an issue.71 Instead, the impasse 
was reached on the crown and allegiance. 'Our 
difficulty', Duffy admitted, 'is to come inside the 
Empire' .72
'In that case it is war', declared one of the 
British negotiators, bringing the discussion to an abrupt 
end.73
It is commonly acknowledged that at this juncture 
Tom Jones's intervention was decisive. The result was a 
personal meeting between Lloyd George and Collins on the 
morning of the 5th. With characteristic bluntness,
Collins said that he was 'perfectly dissatisfied' with 
the British proposals and especially 'with the position 
as regards the North East'. Shortly afterwards, Collins 
wrote:
He [Lloyd George] remarked that I myself pointed 
out on a previous occasion that the North would be 
forced economically to come in. I assented but I 
said the position was so serious ... that for my 
part I was anxious to secure a definite reply from 
Craig and his Colleagues, and that I was as 
agreeable to a reply rejecting as accepting. In 
view of the former we would save Tyrone and 
Fermanagh, parts of Derry, Armagh and Down by the
71C. 89(21), 5 December 1921, CAB 23/27.
72File No. 22/N/l, 4 December 1921, CAB 21/208.
73Ibid.
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Boundary Commission ... ,74
This encounter was just enough to keep the 
negotiations going. Collins walked away from the meeting 
under the impression that Britain's prime minister agreed 
with his assessment of what would result from the 
proposed Ulster clauses. A couple of hours later, 
however, Lloyd George was saying something quite 
different. In this instance, he assured his Cabinet 
colleagues that the Boundary Commission would provide for 
nothing more than 'a re-adjustment of the boundaries'.
Nor was anything said about Ulster being *forced 
economically to come in' to an all-Ireland Parliament.75
Later that same day, the two sides met again. This 
time Collins was joined by Griffith and Barton; Lloyd 
George had assembled Chamberlain, Birkenhead, and 
Churchill. Griffith again tried to make Sinn Fein's 
acceptance of Dominion status conditional on Craig's 
government accepting Irish unity. Lloyd George refused 
and accused the Irish delegates of breaking faith, 
producing as proof the 12 November memorandum in which 
Griffith agreed not to reject the government's Ulster 
proposals.76
In the most widely disseminated account of this 
meeting, Griffith then replied: X1 said I would not let
74Collins memorandum, 5 December 1921, F.L.K., de
Valera Papers, File No. 1327.
75C. 89(21), 5 December 1921, CAB 23/27.
76Barton's Notes, 5 December 1921, Pail Deb II: Private 
Sess.. Appendix 14.
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you down on that, and I won' t .'77
However, Austen Chamberlain's notes show that there 
was more to this exchange. When challenged about his 
earlier acceptance, Griffith said to Lloyd George: 'Then 
in that case, if you stand by the Boundary Commission, I 
stand by you.' In other words, Griffith would stand by 
his pledge so long as Lloyd George stood by his. To this 
the British prime minister, according to Chamberlain, 
agreed.78
Then followed Griffith's more celebrated remark, 
after which Lloyd George's colleagues said that they too 
'stood by the proposal for a Boundary Commission'. A 
little later still, the Irish delegates said that instead 
of allowing Northern Ireland six months to decide whether 
or not to join in with the rest of Ireland, they would 
prefer that Craig's government 'should give its answer at 
once[,] i.e. within one month of the passing of the Act.' 
The Irish had good reason to insist on this final demand, 
believing it was altogether likely that Bonar Law might 
be prime minister within the year. In that case, the 
Treaty's Ulster clauses might 'be put into the waste 
paper basket with all other promises.'79
Having satisfied himself on these points, Griffith 
announced that he was ready to sign the Treaty. He was 
speaking for himself only, not for his colleagues. This
77Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal, p. 237.
78Chamberlain's Notes, 5 December 1921, CAB 21/253/1.
79Ibid. Sturgis diary, 6 December 1921, PRO 30/59/5.
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final snag prompted Lloyd George's controversial threat 
to declare war - 'and war within 3 days' - unless the 
agreement was accepted by Irish delegation as a whole.80
Others have recorded the emotional, sometimes bitter 
struggle that ensued between the Irish delegates and the 
final dramatic moments before the agreement was finally 
signed in the early hours of 6 December.81 The 'Articles 
of Agreement for a Treaty', or the 'Treaty' as most were 
soon calling it, was a richly complex document, intricate 
in its simplicity.82 The first ten of its eighteen 
articles spoke of Ireland as a whole, granting to it 'the 
same constitutional status' as the other Dominions of the 
British Empire.83 Not least, the Irish Free State, as it 
was to be called, was granted full fiscal autonomy. 
Article 5 pledged the Irish to assume a share of the 
United Kingdom's debt up to the granting of independence. 
The exact figure would be settled by arbitration.84
These measures alone signalled a fundamental change. 
Where the two Irish states were treated as equals under
8°Ibid, Chamberlain's Notes.
81Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal. p. 243-249. T.P. Coogan, 
Michael Collins: A Biography (London, 1990), p. 274-276. 
Churchill, World Crisis: Vol. V . p. 321-322.
82See Appendix II.
83It has been suggested that in these articles 'the 
prospect of reunification was more imaginary than real'. 
See Fanning, Independent Ireland, p. 23. Ulster Unionists
felt rather differently. See Craig to Lloyd George, 
S.F.(B) 42, 14 December 1921, CAB 43/2? and Charles Craig's 
speech in HC Deb. Vol. 149, Col. 54, 14 December 1921.
84Appendix II, Article 5.
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the 1920 Act, these clauses placed the Ulster Unionists 
at a decided disadvantage should they insist on remaining 
outside the Irish Dominion.
This set the stage for Articles 11 through 15, what 
became known as the Treaty's Ulster clauses. Both of the 
first two of these articles declared that the 'provisions 
of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 ... shall, so 
far as they relate to Northern Ireland, continue to be of 
full force and effect'.85 Later arguments over the 
Treaty's Northern Ireland articles have focused almost 
exclusively on the second half of Article 12, which 
established the Boundary Commission. Article 11 and the 
first half of Article 12 have been overlooked.86 But in 
the view of British civil servants familiar with the 
negotiations, Northern Ireland's financial obligations, 
as affirmed in these two articles, posed at least as big 
a threat to Craig's government as the Boundary 
Commission.
According to a later Treasury memorandum, the two
articles made formal 'a pledge [that] was given by H.M.G.
to the Southern Ireland representatives' not to extend
the Ulster government's powers in any way, shape or form.
'The reason of course was obvious':
namely to offer as much inducement as possible to 
the North to come in. If she could hope for a 
gradual extension of her autonomy ... naturally 
she would be less disposed to abandon her
85Appendix II, Articles 11 and 12.
86See, e.g., Lee, Ireland, p. 148-149.
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independence.87 
Explained another Treasury official, it was because of 
the 1920 Act's restrictive financial provisions 'that the 
Free State representatives secured the insertion of 
Article 11', and any 'concession which makes separate 
existence more attractive to Northern Ireland is really a 
breach of this condition of the Treaty.'88
These interpretations, along with a memorandum 
written by Lionel Curtis, explain the wording of Lloyd 
George's letter to Craig which accompanied a copy of the 
Treaty. The letter, in confirming Northern Ireland's 
right to opt out of an all-Ireland Parliament, explicitly 
told Craig that the price of such a decision would be to 
'share the rights and obligations of Great Britain.'89
If these inducements were not enough to bring about 
unity, Article 13 ensured that Dublin nevertheless would 
have a voice in the North's affairs through the Council 
of Ireland. No such reciprocal right for Belfast 
remained. The last two articles provided for the North's 
entry into the Free State, guaranteeing to its government 
a range of safeguards concerning patronage, taxation, 
trade and, even, the right to establish and control its
87Waterfield to Upcott, 6 April 1923, T 160/163/F.6282.
88Upcott to Snowden, 30 January 1924, T
160/131/F.4855/02/1.
89Curtis to Devonshire, 17 November 1922, CO




Across the political spectrum, the British press 
greeted news of the settlement as an unrivalled 
triumph.91 Beyond Ireland itself, Lloyd George's skill 
had vindicated the broader policy of appeasement.
'Nothing henceforth can be as it was before', the 
Manchester Guardian confidently predicted. In the 
Treaty's wake, not only should appeasement 'make itself 
felt far more widely' across the British empire but that 
it had 'lessons also for [British] policy in Europe.'92 
For a man already casting an eye in that direction, this 
was music to Lloyd George's ears.
An ocean away, one absent member of the Cabinet was 
rather more restrained in his appraisal. Arthur Balfour 
agreed that there was much to be said for the Treaty, not 
least that it would 'make an immense difference' to 
Anglo-American relations. But, he told his sister, 'I 
cannot help feeling a little uneasy about Ulster, - I 
trust without good reason.'93
Ulster Says 'No'
Balfour's misgivings did not begin to compare with
9°Appendix II, Articles 13-15.
91'Downing St. Drama of the Negotiations', Daily 
Chronicle, 7 December 1921. 'Towards Irish Peace', The 
Times; and 'The Settlement', Daily Telegraphr 8 December 
1921. For a dissenting opinion, see 'The Provisional 
Agreement', Morning Post. 7 December 1921.
92'The New Peace', Manchester Guardian. 8 December
1921.
93A .J . to Alice Balfour, 9 December 1921, AJB-S, GD 
433/2/76, Reel 8.
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the unease felt by his friends in Northern Ireland. The
predominant reaction of the Unionist press to news of the
Treaty was 'one of profound astonishment', which soon
turned to anger. 'Ulster has been betrayed', declared
the voice of Unionism in County Tyrone, by that 'Judas
Iscariot' - Lloyd George. This same newspaper was even
more scathing, if that is possible, when it came to
Chamberlain and Birkenhead, the last of whom was 'the
most despicable of all'.94 This sense of betrayal
carried right the way across the Unionist community. A
friend told Lady Spender that
it was the saddest day of her life. "England 
doesn't want us," she said, with a depth of 
bitterness I cannot convey. ... And now we know 
that worse is to come, and further pledges are to 
be broken, for two of the six counties may be 
taken from us - Tyrone and Fermanagh.95
Craig, 'very suspicious of [the] Boundary clauses
and financial arrangements', rushed to London where he
conferred with Lloyd George and Chamberlain on the 9th.
Accounts of what took place vary wildly. Lloyd George
emerged from the discussions claiming that Craig was
ready to consider Sinn Fein's proposals for an all-
Ireland settlement.96 According to Lady Craig, her
husband said nothing of the kind insisting, instead, that
'on no account' would he give up portions of the six
94'Belfast Uneasiness', Irish Independent. 8 December 
1921. 'The Agreement with Sinn Fein'; and 'Ulster 
Betrayed', Tyrone Constitution. 9 and 16 December 1921.
95Lady Spender's diary, 16 December 1921, D.1633/2/25.
96Lady Craig's diary, 7 December 1921, D.1415/B/38.
Jones diary, 9 December 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 186.
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counties. Craig further demanded that the Treaty's 
financial arrangements should 'be drastically amended.' 
She also wrote that Lloyd George assured Craig that 'mere 
rectifications of the Boundary' were all that was 
envisaged by Article 12, and that the territorial changes 
would involve 'give and take on both sides'.97
It is clear, however, that Craig toyed with the idea 
of appointing a Boundary Commissioner - provided that the 
British government would guarantee 'full compensation' to 
any Unionist who was transferred to the Free State.98 
Two peers (Lords Dunedin and Clyde) were approached about 
chairing the Commission; from the Unionist point of view, 
Bonar Law wrote, 'either of the appointments would be 
good.'99 Meanwhile, an unnamed person was approached to 
represent Northern Ireland on the tribunal.
'Personally', Charles Craig told his brother, 'I think 
that with either of the two people as Chairman who were 
mentioned on Monday, and with our friend as our 
Commissioner, nothing very serious could happen to 
us.'lo° Even so, Craig was still apprehensive. 'There 
is nothing in the terms of the treaty', he pointed out to
97Ibid, Lady Craig's diary, 9 December 1921. Also, see 
Craig to Lloyd George, S.F.(B) 42, 14 December 1921, CAB 
43/2.
98Craig to Chamberlain [not sent], 14-15[?] December 
1921, PRONI, CAB9Z/3/1.
"Bonar Law to Lloyd George, 19 December 1921, LG 
F/31/1/60.
100Charles to James Craig, 21 December 1921, PRONI,
CAB9Z/3/1.
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Bonar Law, 'to show that the Boundary Commission must 
necessarily limit its functioning' to 'little re­
adjustments' .101
Any last thoughts that Craig had about going along 
with the Ulster clauses were erased by Lloyd George's 
performance during the Treaty debates in the House of 
Commons. His address, especially on the 'vexed question 
of Ulster', was vintage Lloyd George, giving with one 
hand what the other promptly took away.
'[N]ever for a moment' had the government sought to 
coerce Ulster - but, that 'did not preclude us from 
endeavouring to persuade Ulster to come into an All- 
Ireland Parliament.'
A 're-adjustment of boundaries' was all that was 
envisaged when the Treaty's negotiators drafted Article 
12. On the other hand, there was 'no doubt - certainly 
since the Act of 1920 - that .the majority of the people 
of two counties prefer being with their Southern 
neighbours to being in the Northern Parliament.'
Just as it would be wrong to coerce Ulster, the 
government did not 'believe in Ulster coercing other 
units.'
Before sitting down, Lloyd George also confirmed 
John Chartres's later assertion that the economic and 
geographical qualification in the boundary clause was 
inserted solely to prevent the transfer of isolated areas
101Craig to Bonar Law, 13 December 1921, BL 107/1/93.
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such as the Glens of Antrim.102
The speech immediately set off alarm bells. Craig 
sent a threatening letter to Chamberlain insisting on the 
right of Unionists to arm themselves 'forthwith'. As 
matters stood, he warned, many of his followers now 
believed that 'violence is the only language understood 
by Mr. Lloyd George and his Ministers.7103 Chamberlain 
flatly rejected Craig's allegations that the Unionists 
had been betrayed. They had only themselves to blame if 
they were presented with a fait accompli. he reminded 
Ulster's premier, because Craig and his colleagues had 
refused to join the Treaty negotiations unless an all- 
Ireland Parliament was specifically ruled out of the 
discussions. If the British 'had accepted your condition 
for attending the Conference', Chamberlain pointed out, 
'there would have been no Conference for you to 
attend.7104
In any event, the Tory leader assured Craig that the 
British had not 'overlooked your interest7. It was 
obvious that any boundary revision could not 'be carried 
out by Counties as a whole7. To back up his argument, 
Chamberlain cited Bonar Law's speech in the Commons only 
the day before, which 'quite correctly interpreted the 
spirit and the method' in which the Boundary Commission
1Q2HC Deb. Vol. 149, Col. 38-42, 14 December 1921.
103Craig to Chamberlain, 15 December 1921, AC 31/2/48.
104Chamberlain to Craig, 16 December 1921, PRONI,
CAB9Z/3/1.
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would work.105 Indeed, to the surprise of many, 
certainly to the chagrin of quite a few, Bonar Law 
endorsed the Treaty when he spoke in the House of 
Commons. Notwithstanding his 'serious objection' to 
Article 12, he was convinced that the Ulster Unionists 
had nothing to fear from the agreement.106
Lloyd George, meanwhile, quickly back-peddled from 
the controversial statements made during the first day of 
the Treaty debates. Faced with accusations that he had 
promised Tyrone and Fermanagh to the Irish negotiators, 
he solemnly declared that no deals had been struck. He 
also now implied that the economic and geographic 
qualifications in Article 12 would sufficiently curb the 
Boundary Commission's remit.107
The bitterness displayed in the Commons debate was 
more acrimonious still in the House of Lords. 'What a 
fool I was', Lord Carson famously declared. 'I was only 
a puppet, and so was Ulster, and so was Ireland, in the 
political game that was to get the Conservative Party 
into power.' It is worth noting that Carson did not 
address himself to the Boundary Commission but, rather, 
to the Treaty's financial clauses which he believed to be 
a greater threat to his Ulster supporters.108
losIbid.
106Salisbury to Bonar Law, 13 December 1921, BL 
107/1/92. Sturgis diary, 17 December 1921, PRO 30/59/5. 
HC Deb. Vol. 149, Col. 196-209, 15 December 1921.
107Ibid, Col. 314-315, 16 December 1921.
losHL Deb. Vol. 48, Col. 36-53, 14 December 1921.
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Birkenhead's response, in which he likened Carson's 
speech to the ravings of an 'hysterical school-girl', was 
equally withering. Nor would the lord chancellor give 
any credit to claims that the government was attempting 
to coerce Northern Ireland. Was it coercion to insist 
that if Ulstermen remained in the United Kingdom they 
ought to pay the same rate of income tax as other British 
subjects? Surely not. '[W]ith the single exception of 
the Boundaries Commission', Birkenhead declared, the 
Ulster Unionists retained all the powers granted to them 
by the 1920 Act.109
Both houses of Parliament voted for the Treaty by 
lopsided majorities on 16 December. In the Commons, 401 
MPs supported the agreement, while 58 were opposed. In 
the Lords, 166 peers were 'content' with the Treaty? 47 
members were 'not-content'. Three days later, Parliament 
was prorogued until the end of January.110
While these debates were taking place in London, a 
longer drama was being played out in Dublin. Others have 
explored Dail Eireann's Treaty debates in such detail 
that it would be superfluous to cover them here.111 And, 
as has already been pointed out, the agreement's Ulster 
clauses played but a minor role in these debates. Irish 
unity hardly rated as a concern to the Treaty's critics,
109Ibid, Col. 196-213, 16 December 1921.
11QAnnual Register; 1921. p. 146.
li;iSee, e.g., M. Hopkinson, Green Against Green; The 
Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), p. 34-40.
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so consumed were they by hatred of the oath of 
allegiance. 'The difficulty', de Valera admitted during 
one private session, 'is not the Ulster question7.112
Nevertheless, the Dail's dilatory handling of the 
agreement dashed Griffith's hopes of settling the Ulster 
Question in the near term. His willingness to sign the 
Treaty was based in part on Lloyd George's pledge to 
submit the agreement to Parliament 'as early as 
possible'. Griffith, in turn, planned to call the Dail 
'within a week' to have the Treaty ratified.113 Instead, 
nearly three weeks elapsed between the Dail's opening 
debate on the agreement and its acceptance of the Treaty 
by the slim margin of 64 votes to 57.114 The result,
Austen Chamberlain admitted, 'does not promise any too 
well for the future.'115
Lloyd George was 'furious' when the Dail failed to 
come to a quick decision on the Treaty. With his Irish 
triumph in hand, he wanted to call a snap general 
election to lay the foundation for his long-cherished 
Centre Party. But those plans could not be advanced so 
long as the decision in Dublin was in doubt. 'It has 
only lately dawned on him', said one observer, 'that the
112Dail Deb II; Private Sess. . p. 153, 15 December 1921.
113Chamberlain's Notes, 5 December 1921, CAB 21/253/1.
114Dail Treaty Deb, p. 345-346, 7 January 1922.
115Austen to Ivy Chamberlain, 8 January 1922, AC
6/1/474.
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signing in London hasn't disposed of the matter.'116
'Groping in the dark'
The Irish Treaty was the crowning achievement of 
Lloyd George's post-war administration. 'Nothing has 
happened since the Armistice', The Nation told its 
readers, 'that is comparable to this act in importance.' 
The political ramifications were enormous. Many saw the 
Treaty not merely as 'a vindication of the principle of 
Coalition' government but also as the 'funeral of 
Unionism'. In the Commons debate on the Treaty, wrote on 
reporter, 'the listener could hear the hollow thud of the 
earth upon the coffin.'117
That was why so many Tories loathed the achievement.
At first glance, the biggest losers to come out of 
the Treaty negotiations were the Ulster Unionists and 
their Die-hard allies. Seeing his government placed on 
an unequal footing with its Southern counterpart, Craig 
spent the last days of 1921 fending off Northern Irish 
businessmen who, 'afraid of their pockets', thought 'they 
would be better under Dublin than Westminster'.118 Even 
if they withstood the economic pressure designed to bring 
them into an all-Ireland Parliament, there was still the 
Boundary Commission, whose decision would be 'a matter of
116Sturgis diary, 20 December 1921, PRO 30/59/5.
117'Events of the Week', The Nation. 10 December 1921. 
'The Peace', Evening Standard. 7 December 1921. 'The
Funeral of Unionism', Westminster Gazette. 17 December
1921. Carson agreed. See HL Deb. Vol. 48, Col. 36, 14
December 1921.
118Lady Craig's diary, 20 December 1921, D.1415/B/38.
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life and death' to Unionists.119
But the reality was that Craig's government was in a 
much stronger position than had been the case only a 
month before. To retain the loyalty of Tory backbenchers 
during the Commons censure debate on 31 October, Lloyd 
George gave in to a demand for the transfer of executive 
power to the Northern Ireland government.120 On 22 
November a range of executive functions were handed over 
to the Belfast ministries further entrenching partition. 
Further transfers covering local government, education 
and other services were staggered over the next three 
months.121 Most importantly, this first transfer gave 
Craig's government 'unfettered control' of law and order 
and the administration of justice within the six 
counties, including supervision of the Special 
Constabulary. This decision was taken even though it was 
well-known within government circles that relations 
between Northern Catholics and the 'B' Specials were 
'extremely bitter' and likely to cause trouble. As Mark 
Sturgis predicted, the government's decision now made 
'Ulster the danger point' in the Irish conflict.122
119HC Deb. Vol. 149, Col. 56-57, 14 December 1921.
12°C.P. 3369, 6 October 1921, CAB 24/128. HC Deb. Vol. 
147, Col. 1414-1415, 31 October 1921. Birkenhead to Lloyd 
George, 1 November 1921, LG F/4/7/32.
121J. McColgan, British Policy and the Irish 
Administration. 1920-22 (London, 1983), p. 53-70.
122Sturgis diary, 14 November 1921, PRO 30/59/5. 
'Ulster Cope memorandum to Jones, November 1921, CAB 
21/243.
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It is against these concrete gains that the Treaty's 
transitory promises must be weighed. At the outset, it 
should be said that Griffith and his colleagues were sent 
to London to do the impossible: to secure Irish unity 
and, if not a republic, then a form of government with 
greater independence than that of a Dominion. This is 
not the place to renew the debate over External 
Association. Rather, the question here is did Griffith 
and Collins really believe that the Treaty's Ulster 
clauses would bring about Irish unity in the near term?
Most certainly, the answer is yes. At their meeting 
with the British negotiators on the afternoon of 5 
December, both men pressed Lloyd George to ask Craig 
whether or not he would join an all-Ireland Parliament.
'It might help us even if it was a negative', Collins 
said, as this would mean that they would 'have a Boundary 
Commission at once.'123 Because re-unification was not 
achieved, Griffith and Collins have since been accused of 
too readily assuming that Article 12 meant the same thing 
to both sides.124
But according to Lloyd George, it did. Writing many 
years later, he argued that in such disputes the 'guiding 
principle' of peace should be the allocation of national 
groups 'to their motherlands'. This 'human criterion', 
he held, 'should have precedence over considerations of
123Chamberlain's Notes, 5 December 1921, CAB 21/253.
124Joseph Lee, for example, blames the boundary debacle 
on 'the immaturity of nationalist thinking'. See Ireland, 
p. 52-53.
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strategy or economics or communications, which can 
usually be adjusted by other means.7125 If this was true 
in other parts of Europe, how was the Irish situation any 
different? Moreover, in the Irish case, if the Boundary 
Commission failed to bring about unity in the near term, 
Craig's government would find itself slowly strangled by 
the financial restrictions of the 1920 Act. These 
elements of the agreement have since been overlooked.
This inescapably leads back to the promises made, or 
not made, by Lloyd George. It is tempting to write off 
his handling of the Treaty negotiations as crafty at best 
and, at worst, 'an offence against the light of nations'. 
In Lord Longford's estimation, Lloyd George may have been 
an 'inspired negotiator', but his handling of the Irish 
question showed him to be 'out of place in peace­
making. /126
Judgments such as these have been made too easily 
and, anyway, they fail to take account of the state of 
British politics at the time. It should be remembered 
that Lloyd George had decided to negotiate with Sinn Fein 
for a number of reasons. Beset on all sides by threats 
to his government, his aim was to use an Irish agreement 
first to neutralise his opponents, then as a 
steppingstone for a new general election, before moving 
on to the creation of his Centre Party. Once he realised
125D. Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties: 
Vol. I (London, 1938), p. 406.
126Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal. p. 259.
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that he could not achieve Irish unity, he looked for the 
next best thing.
This helps to explain his sudden willingness to drop 
the goal of an all-Ireland Parliament and to switch the 
pressure he had applied to the Ulster Unionists onto 
Griffith and his colleagues. As was pointed out earlier, 
the details of the Irish agreement were not important to 
Lloyd George. 'We are after a settlement', he reminded 
his colleagues, 'that [is] our objective.'127
On at least one front, Lloyd George scored a clear- 
cut victory. Ireland 'was the one topic on which the 
[Wee Free] Liberals could fairly criticise our Coalition 
policy'. But, Lloyd George said triumphantly, 'we've got 
rid of it.'128 Carson was another casualty. His 
intemperate opposition to the Treaty accelerated his 
political eclipse, so much so that one former colleague 
was forced to conclude that Carson was doing 'a lot of 
harm' to the Unionist cause.129
Nonetheless, the British politician who was to pay 
the highest price for the Irish Treaty turned out to be 
Lloyd George himself. During the Irish negotiations, he 
more than once lived up to his own definition of the 
'extraordinary man', extricating himself time and again 
by doing the 'daring and unexpected'.130 But in the
127Jones diary, 14 November 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 164.
128Ibid, 9 December 1921, p. 187.
129Long to Bonar Law, 6 February 1922, BL 107/2/9.
13°Riddell diary, 3 April 1919, Intimat& Diarv. p. 45.
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process, Lloyd George justified the worst suspicions 
about himself. The Irish Treaty was very much his 
personal creation, and thus was a reflection of him at 
his best and at his absolute worst.
These suspicions were confirmed by Lloyd George's 
performance during the Treaty debates. The result was 'a 
strained atmosphere all round', especially on the 
Conservative backbenches. 'Half are dissatisfied with 
Austen', Freddie Guest reported, and few believed that 
the Treaty had any real chance of success. The only 
thing stopping a full-fledged revolt was the absence of a 
leader of 'sufficient standing'.131
That was no longer true. Despite repeated denials, 
Bonar Law had emerged as the unofficial leader of the 
Die-hard movement. Even if the former Tory leader 
continued to sit on the backbenches, his 'designs', as 
one reporter put it, 'are on the command'.132
Earlier in the year, Tom Jones had suggested to 
Lloyd George that 'if he settled Ireland he might be 
satisfied and "go to Heaven,"' but Lloyd George would not 
hear of such a fate. '"There is still Europe,"' he told 
Jones.133 With Ireland at last 'settled', he now 
contemplated 'a new Conference on the economic world
131Guest to Churchill, 14 December 1921, Comp IV. 3. p. 
1690-1691.
132'Comments', The New Statesman. 3 December 1921.
'Premier and Sir J. Craig', The Times. 19 November 1921.
133Jones to Bonar Law, 22 July 1921, BL 107/1/46.
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outlook' .134
The truth, of course, was that he had not settled 
Ireland. Bonar Law recognised this, even if Lloyd George 
did not. 'It is absurd to think we have settled the 
Irish Question', he told the Commons. On the contrary, 
Bonar Law saw 'terrible difficulties' ahead.135
Mark Sturgis called the Dail's vote in favour of the 
Treaty 'another milestone' in settling the Irish 
conflict. But, he wrote, 'if Ireland - or England - 
expects that the Golden Age is dawning I hope they won't 
be too roughly disillusioned. It is a huge gamble and we 
are groping in the dark.'136
134Jones to Hankey, 6 December 1921, CAB 63/34.
135HC__Deb, Vol. 149, Col. 208, 15 December 1921.




Then came the Great War. Every institution, 
almost, in the world was strained. Great 
empires have been overturned. The whole map 
of Europe has been changed. The position of 
countries has been violently altered. The 
modes of thoughts of men, the whole outlook 
on affairs, the grouping of parties, all have 
encountered violent and tremendous changes in 
the deluge of the world. But, as the deluge 
subsides and the waters fall short we see 
the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone 
emerging once again. The integrity of their 
quarrel is one of few institutions that has 
been unaltered in the cataclysm which has 
swept the world.
- Winston Churchill1
In December 1921 Lloyd George stood at the summit of 
his post-war premiership. Accolades for his Irish 
settlement flowed in from every nation. 'Even the 
French', Maurice Hankey reported from the Washington 
Naval Conference, 'crowded round with tributes'.2 Bonar 
Law's earlier prediction - that Lloyd George could be 
'Prime Minister for life if he wants' - looked as if it 
might be true after all.3 Much as Beatrice Webb detested 
Lloyd George, she too agreed that he had 'revolutionized 
the political situation'. With the Irish Treaty in his 
pocket, he could now call a general election and romp 
home with 'a secure majority of personal followers'
1HC_Deb, Vol. 150, Col. 1270, 16 February 1922.
2Hankey to Lloyd George, 9 December 1921, CAB 63/34.
3M. Pugh, Llovd George (Harlow, 1988), p. 128.
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leaving his critics in the dust.4 Then, at long last, he 
could build his new Centre Party.
But instead of going from strength to strength, the 
last ten months of the Coalition government were to be 
punctuated by a succession of crises in which Ireland 
figured prominently. Lloyd George's plans for a snap 
general election had to be delayed and then finally 
abandoned in the face of stubborn Conservative 
opposition. Neville Chamberlain was not the only Tory MP 
who was determined not to be led into the next election 
by that 'dirty little Welsh attorney'. Nor would he 
fight a campaign based on an Irish policy which was 'not 
yet settled' and which was supported by Conservatives 
only 'very reluctantly'.5
Once the Treaty election was abandoned, Lloyd George 
turned his back on Ireland to embark on a series of 
international conferences aimed at restoring Europe's 
pre-war prosperity. '[A]11 his hopes are concentrated on 
Genoa', wrote Lord Riddell, referring to an international 
conference scheduled for mid-April.6 Irish affairs were 
turned over to the Colonial Office and to a Cabinet 
committee chaired by Churchill, where they could absorb 
his boundless energy.7
4Webb diary, 7 December 1921 and 4 January 1922, Vol. 
36, 3871-3872 and 3881.
5Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 7 January 1922, NC 
18/1/333.
6Riddell diary, 23 March 1922, [McEwen], p. 366-367.
7P .G .I. 1, 21 December 1921, CAB 27/154.
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Far from proving to be an electoral asset, the 
Treaty turned out to be something of a liability for the 
Coalition, at least among Conservatives. In the 
meantime, the Anglo-Irish War did not end so much as 
degenerate into a series of violent clashes within 
Northern Ireland and along the Irish frontier. By June 
1922 Irish Nationalists and Ulster Unionists would be in 
a virtual state of war with one another. Only the advent 
of civil war in the South between pro- and anti- 
Treatyites would prevent the resumption of full-scale 
hostilities between Britain and the IRA.
These events have been explored elsewhere and it is 
not proposed to delve into them in great detail here.®
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the Treaty 
settlement began to unravel as Lloyd George and his 
colleagues found themselves in an increasingly untenable 
political position. Both the Treaty and the political 
situation reflected and, in the process, altered the 
other. Just as mounting chaos in Ireland accelerated the 
Coalition's demise, so the government's increasing 
instability forced the Coalition's leaders slowly to back 
away from the inducements in the Treaty that were 
supposed to bring about Irish re-unification. In 
particular, this chapter will scrutinize the decisions 
taken by Winston Churchill. During the last ten months 
of the Lloyd George government, no British politician was
®See, instead, Curran, Irish Free State, and Hopkinson,
Green Against Green.
112
more important in Irish affairs. At the same time, 
Churchill was beginning his long trek from the Liberal 
Party back to the Conservatives. The decisions he took 
on Irish policy were bound to be affected by this journey 
and by his isolated position in British politics.
Churchill's efforts, however, would not be enough to 
save the Coalition government. Looking back many years 
later, Leo Amery recalled that with each new incident in 
Ireland Tory MPs felt a mounting 'sense of shame and 
indignation' that they had ever allowed themselves to be 
persuaded to support the Treaty.9 Far from fading away, 
Ireland was the thunder of a storm gathering force just 
beyond the horizon. The rumble of discontent over the 
Irish settlement was a warning of what was to come when 
the storm finally hit, sweeping Lloyd George from power 
forever.
Ambiguities in the Treaty
A week after Dail Eireann voted for the Treaty, the 
Southern Ireland Parliament created by the 1920 Act met 
to elect a Provisional Government to administer Ireland 
until the Free State formally came into being. It then 
dispersed, never to sit again. Two days later, Collins, 
as head of the Provisional Government, formally took 
possession of Dublin Castle and the British Army began 
its withdrawal from the 26 counties. Here was an 
'outward and visible sign that British rule was indeed at
9L.S. Amery, My Political Life. Vol. II: War and Peace. 
1914-1929 (London, 1958), p. 231.
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an end7.10 Already, though, there were problems with the 
agreement. It was clear that the British and the Irish 
interpreted the Treaty differently and that their 
disagreements centred, not surprisingly, on Ulster.
As Sir James Masterton-Smith, the Colonial Office's 
chief civil servant, explained it, the matter boiled down 
to a distinction between two words. The Irish were under 
the impression that the British Parliament's December 
vote on the Treaty had 'ratified' the agreement, when in 
fact it had merely been 'approved'. Ratification of the 
Treaty would come later with the simultaneous 
ratification of the Irish Free State Constitution, a 
process that was going to take several months to 
complete. Only then would the Treaty's 'Ulster month' 
commence, the four-week interval during which Craig's 
government would have to decide if it was going to join 
the Free State. 'This', Masterton-Smith conceded, 'will 
be a disappointment to the Irish signatories, who took 
the view that they ought to be informed, within a month 
or two of the approval of the Treaty by the Dail, whether 
Northern Ireland intended to stay out or come in.'11
That was an understatement. The new Free State 
leaders were more angry still when they learned that 
instead of proceeding with the Treaty's ratification, 
Parliament first had to give the Provisional Government
1QAnnual Register: 1922. p. 9-10.
“Masterton-Smith to Churchill, 4 January 1922, WSC
22/11/2.
114
'a legal existence7, allowing it to administer the South, 
to write a Constitution, and to call an election. Both 
Griffith and Collins objected. Collins pointed out that 
the Treaty was signed on the understanding that Ulster 
would have a month in which to decide whether or not to 
join the new dominion. If not, the South could expect to 
gain 'two whole and two half counties7 from Craig7s 
state. Now, however, they 'found the Treaty working out 
on di f f erent 1 ines7.12
Collins7s determination to settle the Ulster dispute 
sooner rather than later had already resulted in the 
first of what became known as the Craig-Collins Pacts.13 
In short order the Pact set aside the Boundary Commission 
and proposed that the two leaders would 'mutually agree7 
to Ireland7s 'future boundaries7. Likewise, the Council 
of Ireland was to be dropped in favour of 'a more 
suitable system ... for dealing with problems affecting 
all Ireland.7 Collins further pledged to end the 
'Belfast Boycott7, a Sinn Fein-led campaign against the 
city7s businesses in response to the shipyard expulsions 
of 1920. Craig, in turn, pledged to see to it that the 
expelled workers were allowed to return to their jobs - 
economic conditions permitting. Collins also pressed for 
the release of political prisoners being held in Northern
12Minutes of conferences with Irish Ministers, 
22/N/60(3) and (5), 5-6 February 1922.
13M. Hopkinson, 'The Craig-Collins Pacts of 1922: Two 
Attempted Reforms of the Northern Ireland Government7, 




Although the agreement was widely hailed in the 
British press, it ran into trouble within a fortnight.15 
According to Craig, his discussions with Collins were 
premised on his opening statement that 'an All Ireland 
Parliament was out of the question' and that one could 
not be expected for 'years to come - 10, 20, or 50 
years'. Craig pointed out to his Cabinet that the new 
boundary agreement, as well as getting rid of the hated 
Commission, was significant for two reasons: first, it 
meant that Collins recognised that Northern Ireland was 
here to stay and, second, the amending of Article 12 
meant that the entire Treaty 'was now no longer 
inviolate'. In other words, the Provisional Government 
could have no room for complaint if the Ulster Unionists 
and their Conservative allies further revised the Treaty 
in the House of Commons. Craig said little about the 
Pact's economic clauses, except about the Boycott. As 
for the promise of an amnesty, Ulster's premier said that 
he looked upon political prisoners as '"trump” cards to 
be played' in return for Sinn Fein displays of good 
behaviour.16
Collins's reasons for signing the Pact could not
14C.P. 3644, 21 January 1922, CAB 24/132.
15'The First Step Towards Unity', Westminster Gazette: 
'A Step Towards Irish Unity', Yorkshire Post? 'Towards 
Irish Unity', Liverpool Post: 'Irish Union*, Manchester
Guardian, all dated 23 January 1922.
“Cabinet conclusions, 26 January 1922, PRONI,
CAB4/30/1.
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have been any more different. His object was to 'exclude 
English influence' from Irish affairs, especially on the 
boundary question. It had lately dawned on Collins that 
the real power to determine Ireland's frontier lay with 
the Boundary Commission's British-appointed chairman. 
Taking London out of the equation changed all that. 'It 
will be for us to insist upon our interpretation',
Collins declared, and although his government was 
committed to a 'peace policy', it was prepared to 'fight 
for that [interpretation] in the event of the North 
refusing to come in.'17
The breakdown of the Craig-Collins Pact on 2 
February exploded 'like a bombshell in the Coalition 
ranks'. Parliament was due to begin debate on the Irish 
Free State (Agreement) Bill to give the Provisional 
Government legal standing. The bill stood no chance in a 
Conservative-dominated House of Commons if the Treaty 
would allow counties or parts of counties to vote 
themselves out of Northern Ireland.18 Even Churchill was 
baffled. 'Everything is in the soup again', he told 
Curzon, 'and I have no idea at present what ought to be 
said about it.'19
Up to this point, the Provisional Government was in
17Collins to King, 26 January 1922, D/T, S 1801/Q. PG 
Minutes, 30 January 1922, D/T, G 1/1.
“ 'Coalition Teetering Over New Irish Abyss', Sunday 
Express. 5 February 1922.
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a stronger position than Craig and his lieutenants. This 
advantage began to shift when the partition issue became 
entangled in what amounted to a spate of state-sanctioned 
kidnappings of Unionists along the Irish frontier. From 
this point until the onset of the Irish Civil War, the 
boundary region was a scene of ongoing violence. Collins 
may have felt that he had good reason to back such 
operations, as they turned the attention of anti-Treaty 
elements of the IRA against a common enemy.20 In the 
long run, however, this decision was self-defeating 
because it cost the Provisional Government much of its 
credibility in London. Churchill was right when he told 
Collins that a 'bloody fight' on the frontier would 
benefit only those 'who wish to see Ireland partitioned 
permanently' .21
Just as Churchill had predicted, the chain-reaction 
of events along the border had a 'disturbing effect' on 
Conservative MPs. Within the government itself, a group 
of Tory junior ministers decided 'to act together' to 
thwart any large-scale hand over of Ulster's territory to 
the South. 'The only way out', Lord Bayford wrote, 'seems 
to be to appoint as Chairman someone who is sure to 
decide as we want' though, he admitted, 'that seems a 
poor game.'22 Poor game or not, Chamberlain could ill-
2°Hopkinson, Green Against Green, p. 77-88.
21Churchill to Collins, 13 February 1922, CO 906/20.
22'Attack on Irish Treaty', The Times. 15 February
1922. Bayford diary, 14 February 1922, p. 173.
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afford to ignore this seething rebellion in his own 
ranks. Unless the Provisional Government took clear 
steps to release the kidnapped men and end the border 
disturbances, he warned Griffith, 'I will consider myself 
absolved from the Treaty'.23 This was no idle threat.
'Legalising' the Provisional Government
In the spring of 1922, the struggle over Ireland's 
future was fought on two fronts in the British political 
arena. Publicly, the government and its opponents 
battled one another over the Irish Free State (Agreement) 
Bill. Privately, Craig was engaged in an all-out effort 
to re-write the financial provisions of the 1920 Act and, 
hence, the Treaty.
Aware that they did not have enough votes to kill 
the Free State Bill outright, Die-hards planned to 
introduce a series of amendments most of them directed at 
the Treaty's boundary clauses. If Churchill failed to 
give definite assurances on Northern Ireland's 
territorial integrity, as many as 150 Conservatives were 
ready to bolt from the government. On the other hand, if 
Parliament narrowly defined the Commission's remit, an 
open breach would be created with Collins and Griffith.24 
Either way, the aim was to mortally wound the Coalition 
and so bring about its collapse.
23Conference minutes, 22/N/153, 9 February 1922, CAB 
21/254.
24'Attack on Irish Treaty', The Times. 15 February
1922. James to Charles Craig, 11 February 1922, PRONI, 
CAB9Z/3/1.
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Churchill faced the Die-hard challenge head-on. He 
admitted that the Boundary Commission's award might 
affect Northern Ireland's existing frontiers; indeed, it 
might 'affect them prejudicially'. There was no point 
glossing over this fact. But what was the alternative? 
Short of 'tearing up the Treaty', Parliament had no power 
whatsoever to alter Article 12. Later, though, he 
dismissed the 'absurd supposition' that Northern Ireland 
would be reduced 'to its preponderatingly Orange areas'. 
Not only would this create 'a fatal and permanent 
obstacle' to Irish unity; if Ulster was so 'maltreated 
and mutilated', Churchill suggested, the government would 
be bound to protect Northern Ireland as a separate 
'economic entity'.25 By such gestures - now on one side, 
now on the other - Churchill steered the Irish Bill 
through the Commons to complete its passage on 8 March.
A similar effort by Birkenhead ensured its passage in the 
House of Lords later that same month.26
The financial balance
While the fight over the Treaty's boundary clauses 
took place in public, Craig was involved in an equally 
intense struggle to undo the financial arrangements which 
already were beginning to be felt by his government.
There were three pressing issues: Craig was determined to 
roll back his government's imperial contribution, to
25HC Deb. Vol. 150, Col. 1269-1271, 1279, 16 February
1922.
26See, e.g., HL Deb. Vol. 49, Col. 901-912, 27 March
1922.
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secure financing of the Special Constabulary, and to 
ensure the solvency of the Northern Ireland Unemployment 
Insurance Fund. Giving in to these demands, however, 
meant that Lloyd George and his colleagues would have to 
break their pledge to the Irish Treaty signatories that 
Northern Ireland's status would not be altered, for good 
or ill, if it opted out of the Free State.
Craig's immediate problem sprang from his demand for 
the transfer of executive power to the Belfast government 
in the autumn of 1921. In a word, his ministers did not 
have enough money to administer the departments which 
they now controlled. Further complicating matters, the 
British government was nearly two-thirds of the way 
through its 1921-22 fiscal year when the services were 
transferred. Two civil servants, R.G. Hawtrey, 
representing the Treasury, and Ernest Clark, representing 
Northern Ireland's Department of Finance, were told to 
devise an arrangement which would eliminate the deficit 
while still remaining 'within the four corners of the 
Government of Ireland Act'.27
To square the circle, Craig accepted the Treasury's 
method for allocating revenue for the last third of the 
fiscal year; in return, he received an additional grant 
of £600,000. This arrangement conveniently covered a 
£530,000 shortfall in Ulster's unemployment fund and 
provided an additional cushion for last-minute
27Hawtrey memorandum, 10 December 1921, T
163/4/10/G.256/08.
122
emergencies. Immediate funding for the Specials was 
taken care of by Lloyd George's suggestion that the 
Constables should be temporarily classified 'as a 
military force', so that this shifted the burden of 
paying for law and order onto imperial shoulders. 
According to Otto Niemeyer, the Treasury's controller of 
finance, the deal was also probably illegal. Certainly, 
it was not 'within the four corners of the 1920 Act' nor 
of the Treaty.28
Civil servants both in and out of the Treasury were 
particularly uneasy about continued British subsidies for 
the Specials. A report to Churchill's Irish Committee 
recommended terminating British support of the force 'at 
the earliest date that is legal or possible'.29 
Elsewhere, Robert Horne, the chancellor of the exchequer, 
wrote that the government did not intend 'to let N.E. 
Ireland have Specials ad libitum'.30
Even so, in early March the Cabinet agreed to a 
grant of £850,000 to underwrite the Specials through the 
first six months of fiscal year 1922-23. Knowing that 
such a move would likely lead to protests in the House of 
Commons, the Cabinet approved a plan - conceived by Horne 
- to hide the assistance in 'a general grant of money to
28Ibid, and Niemeyer memorandum, 12 December 1921? and 
Niemeyer to Cuthbertson, 16 December 1921.
29Ibid, 'Draft Report on the Special Constabulary', 17
January 1922.
3°Ibid, Horne to Niemeyer, 15 December 1921.
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Ulster for unemployment and other services'.31 A few
days later, Churchill's committee agreed that the Joint
Exchequer Board should be asked to re-consider the amount
of Ulster's imperial contribution for the next two years.
At the same time, the committee also concluded that if it
could be shown that the establishment of the Free State
resulted in a higher cost of reserved services for
Northern Ireland, the difference would be made up by the
British Treasury.32
Taken together, these measures disguised a
fundamental re-ordering of Northern Ireland's financial
relations with Great Britain. The complaint 'could
reasonably be made', pointed out one member of
Churchi11's committee, that
Ulster was being bribed to remain disassociated 
from the South, whereas in the negotiations with 
the Southern Irish the British Government had 
always stated that if Ulster chose to disassociate 
herself from the South, she would have to bear her 
full share of the financial burdens of the United 
Kingdom.33
Put another way, these decisions were a 'breach of 
faith' with Irish leaders.34 As both Tom Jones and 
Lionel Curtis reminded the Cabinet, Arthur Griffith had 
accepted that Northern Ireland might remain outside the 
Free State. But, if so, its 'powers, privileges and
31C. 15(22), 6 March 1922, CAB 23/29.
32P .G .I. 56(Revise), 7 March 1922, CAB 27/154.
Blackett to Colwyn, 16 March 1922, T 163/6/8/G.256/042.
33P.G.I. 16th Conclusions, 10 March 1922, CAB 27/153.
34Jones to Lloyd George, 17 March 1922, LG F/26/1/17.
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revenues were to be no greater and no less than they 
would have been' under the 1920 Act. Now, however, a 
military force was in the making whose ultimate purpose 
might be to thwart 'the most vital provisions of the 
Treaty.'35 Despite the fact that Austen Chamberlain 
believed that Jones and Curtis were 'substantially 
right', their objections went unheeded.36
Northern Ireland's Unemployment Insurance Fund 
Although these developments went some way toward 
alleviating Craig's financial worries, they did not solve 
a potentially longer term problem. Few other regions of 
the British Isles suffered from the post-war economic 
depression as much as Northern Ireland.37 Under the 1920 
Act, however, unemployment relief was a 'transferred' 
service, for which the Belfast government was solely 
responsible - a fact that Treasury officials repeatedly 
reminded Craig and his ministers, not to mention their 
own political masters.38
Again, Ulster's prime minister found himself in a
35C.P. 3873, 18 March 1922, CO 739/4/15533.
36Chamberlain to Churchill, 24 March 1922, WSC 
22/12/66.
37According to one historian, by the summer of 1922, 25 
per cent of Northern Ireland's work force was unemployed. 
In the other regions of the United Kingdom most severely 
affected by the economic downturn, the unemployment rates 
were 21 per cent (Scotland) and 18 per cent (the Midlands 
and North-east England). See Rhodes James, British 
Revolution. p. 438.
38Niemeyer memorandum, 12 December 1921, T 
163/4/10/G.256/08. Niemeyer to Horne? and Blackett to 
Horne, 5 May and 12 June 1922, T 163/6/11/G.256/049.
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dilemma largely of his own making. In March he publicly 
declared that where 'unemployment and benefits are 
concerned', Ulster's workers would receive the same 
assistance as their British counterparts. Making this 
guarantee was highly irresponsible, because Craig was 
again committing his government to expend money it did 
not have. He admitted as much in this same speech, 
pointing out that such programmes would be 'difficult to 
finance at the moment'.39
But whereas the imperial government was ready to 
lend a hand when it came to financing the Specials, this 
time there was to be no bail out for Craig's government.
It soon became obvious that Ulster's premier was getting 
round this refusal by using funds for the Special 
Constabulary to employ jobless Protestants. In May, he 
informed Horne and Churchill that he needed another £5 
million for the Specials to carry 'us over the immediate 
few months'. At the same time, he asked for an 
additional £160,000 to cover an earlier shortfall in the 
unemployment budget, arguing that the deficit had 
occurred before his government took over responsibility 
for the fund.40
Viewed from the Treasury, Craig's incessant demands 
simply proved that he wanted 'the best of both worlds'.41
39NI HC Deb. Vol. 2, Col. 18-19, 14 March 1922.
4°Craig to Churchill? Niemeyer memorandum; and Craig to
Horne, 17, 22 May, 5 June 1922, T 163/6/11/G.256/049.
41Ibid, Blackett to Horne, 12 June 1922.
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In early June, Horne outlined for his Cabinet colleagues 
the extent to which the British Exchequer was propping up 
Craig's government. This support had 'already gone far 
beyond what was contemplated in the [1920] Act', and it 
was becoming 'increasingly difficult' to defend such 
grants in the House of Commons.42 But having fed the 
Belfast government's appetite, Horne and his colleagues 
were discovering that its needs were insatiable. At the 
end of May, the Committee of Imperial Defence approved a 
request allowing active military officers to be 
temporarily assigned to the Specials. The committee also 
approved the 'loan' of munitions and other supplies, 
including 23,000 rifles and nearly 300 machine guns.43
On 19 July, Horne agreed to contribute another £2 
million to the Specials, doing so 'on the definite 
understanding that it is all that I can grant for the 
financial year 1922/23.' While Craig readily accepted 
this condition, the deal provoked a storm of protest in 
Churchill's Irish Committee. However, its members had 
little choice but to accept the deal once they were told 
that 'any Prime Minister of Northern Ireland would resign 
if he were deprived of the f,Bn and "C" specials'.44 
Despite the condition imposed by Horne's 'final' offer, 
within two months Craig was back again. This time, he
42C.P. 4201, 9 June 1922, CAB 24/137.
43S.S. (I.C.) 5th Minutes, 22 May 1922, CAB 16/42/1.
44Horne to Craig? Craig to Horne? and P.G.I. 24th 
Conclusions, all dated 19 July 1922, T 160/131/F.4855/1.
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wanted another £200,000 for fiscal year 1922-23, and a 
British commitment to grant £1.35 million to the Specials 
for the following year.45 It is true that the 
deteriorating situation in Ireland played its part in 
persuading Lloyd George and his colleagues that they must 
come to the aid of Ulster's government.46 But that does 
not explain why the Coalition so readily gave in to 
Craig's demands. To do that, it is necessary to return 
to the world of British politics.
Conservative rebellion
In the early months of 1922, Lloyd George and his 
colleagues were, as one of them wrote, 'in a very awkward 
position'. Simply put, the government was running out of 
ideas and of support.47 This dilemma was particularly 
acute for the government's Tory supporters. As Leo Amery 
pointed out to Chamberlain, there was not 'a single item 
in our present policy' which appealed to the 'instincts 
or traditions' of the Conservative Party. 'What shall we 
have to offer', Amery asked, 'beyond a vista of 
Conferences which may, or may not, bring us nearer to 
European peace?' As for Ireland, Amery felt that most 
Tories would concede that 'the Irish arrangement was 
inevitable, possibly even wise'. But, he went on, 'their 
main feeling is one of despondency and moral
45Ibid, Craig to Churchill, 19 September 1922.
46See, e.g., C. 27(22), 16 May 1922, CAB 23/30.
47Montagu to Reading, 23 February 1922, 10 MSS Eur. E. 




In mid-January, a group of activists that included 
Carson, Lord and Lady Londonderry, Lord Salisbury, Ronald 
McNeill, and Sir Henry Wilson (though he was still chief 
of the imperial general staff) discussed the formation of 
'a real Conservative Party'.49 As one dissident put it, 
'unless Mr Chamberlain's action in surrendering to Sinn 
Fein be repudiated' there seemed to him no reason for the 
party's continued existence. 'If it does not matter 
whether you are a Unionist or a Home Ruler', he asked, 
'does anything matter at all'?50 The trouble for the 
Die-hards was, as always, finding someone to lead the 
rebellion.51
With Bonar Law still holding back, Die-hard hopes 
turned to Arthur Balfour. Recently returned from his 
successful negotiations at the Washington Naval 
Conference, both pro- and anti-Coalitionists believed 
that Balfour still retained a good deal of influence 
within the party. Carson, who was certain that the 
former leader could be won over to the Die-hards, openly 
advocated a 'Conservative election headed by A.J.B.' If 
nothing else, another Die-hard wrote, Balfour's defection 
would give their movement the 'push off' needed to 'get
48Amery to Chamberlain, 26 January 1922, AC 24/4/1.
49Wilson diary, 14 January 1922, HHW 1/31/1.
5°01iver to Salisbury, 15 March 1922, S(4) 100/89.
51Lady Carson's diary, 23 January 1922, D.1507/C/7.
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rid of L.G./52 For this reason alone, Lloyd George was 
just as determined to keep him in the Coalition.53 The 
stumbling block was Balfour's notable, and disturbing, 
silence on Ireland.
To head off Balfour's defection, Birkenhead drafted 
one of the most controversial, not to say oft-quoted, 
pronouncements ever made by a Treaty negotiator on the 
agreement. In a personal letter, Birkenhead assured his 
elder colleague that, whatever anyone else might say, 
there was no possibility of Northern Ireland losing 
counties to the Free State. The Boundary Commission,
'not being presided over by a lunatic', would be aware of 
the limits of its jurisdiction and 'reach a rational 
conclusion.'54 As will be shown in a later chapter, 
Birkenhead's justification was not nearly as conclusive 
as he led Balfour to believe. For the moment, though, he 
succeeded in his primary aim. 'If a "lead” from me is 
what people want', Balfour told Sir Edward Grigg the next 
day, 'they shall certainly have it'.55
In a major address delivered on 7 March, Balfour 
gave a ringing endorsement not only to the Coalition but
“Wilson diary, 1 March 1922, HHW 1/31/1-2.
“Riddell diary, 28-29 January 1922, Intimate Diarv. p.
351.
“Birkenhead to Balfour [copy], 3 March 1922, PRONI, 
CAB9Z/8/1. The letter is reprinted in Appendix III.
“ Balfour to Grigg, 4 March 1922, AJB-S, GD 433/2/1, 
Reel 1.
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also to its handling of Ireland.56 Instead of boosting 
support for Lloyd George, however, Balfour's speech 
undermined his own credibility with many Tories who now 
saw him as hopelessly out of touch. After his glorious 
'resurrection7 at the Naval Conference, there were hopes 
that Balfour might again become a major political figure. 
But, wrote one disappointed admirer, these hopes were 
dashed by his 'shocking relapse in the city last week!757
Despite murmurings of discontent among Conservatives 
of all shades, Chamberlain throughout this period 
continually misjudged the mood of his party. Convinced 
of a 'growing movement of opinion7 against the Die- 
hards,58 he called a meeting of Conservative MPs in mid- 
March, where they were asked to endorse the leadership's 
'determination to stand by the Prime Minister.7 Instead, 
backbench Tories made it plain that they would do nothing 
that might cause a split with those who opposed the 
government 'on the ground of its Irish policy7. For 
Lloyd George, the resulting situation was 'worse than if 
the meeting had never been held.759
Emboldened by their success, the Die-hards went over 
to the attack. On 5 April, William Joynson-Hicks and 
Ronald McNeill laid down a parliamentary motion demanding
56'"Coalition Best." Sir A. Balfour on Unity7, The 
Times, 8 March 1922.
57Tyrrell to Strachey, 17 March 1922, Strachey Papers, 
S/19/4/11.
58Austen to Ida Chamberlain, 11 March 1922, AC 5/1/229.
59'The Expiring Coalition7, The Times. 15 March 1922.
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to know 'whether in principle the Coalition is Liberal or 
Conservative.'60 Much of the ensuing debate provided a 
foretaste of the charges that were to swirl round the 
government later in the year. Months before the storm 
burst over Lloyd George's sale of honours, his opponents 
rained down abuse on the government for promising to 
pursue 'one policy and one set of principles in regard to 
Ireland' only to lead Parliament in the opposite 
direction. This, said Viscount Wolmer, explained why the 
public had 'lost faith in the sincerity of the Coalition' 
and in politicians in general.61
Chamberlain, in his own words, turned on these 
tormentors 'like a nasty, vicious beast' and gave what 
some regarded as the best fighting speech of his career. 
The gamble worked, and the Die-hards' motion was soundly 
defeated by a vote of 288 to 95. Although justifiably 
proud of his victory, Chamberlain drew the wrong 
conclusions from this episode. Combined with a vote of 
support for Lloyd George's Genoa policy, held two days 
earlier, this turn of events led the Tory leader into a 
false sense of security. It would prove to be a costly 
mistake.62
'Churchill's dilemma
The effect of the Conservative rebellion brought on
6°HC Deb. Vol. 152, Col. 2344-2357, 5 April 1922.
61Ibid, Col. 2375-2376.
62Ibid, Col. 2365-2374, 2387-2390. Austen to Hilda
Chamberlain, 18 April 1922, AC 5/1/233. Dutton,
Chamberlain. p. 178. Annual Register; 1922. p. 44.
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by Ireland was not solely a problem for Tory members of 
the government. Churchill at this time found himself 
increasingly out of step with Lloyd George in particular, 
but also with his Coalition Liberal colleagues.
Depending on the issue, complained Edwin Montagu,
'Winston jumps from the diehard to the Liberal camp as he 
works from Egypt or India to Ireland.'63
There was every indication that Churchill would not 
follow Lloyd George out of office if he could help it.64 
But where was he to turn? The Conservatives - many of 
whom saw him as 'the friend of our enemies, and the enemy 
of our friends' - did not want him.65 Having left the 
party in 1904, it was difficult to see how he could work 
his way back into its ranks. Nevertheless, Churchill at 
this time began to re-establish himself as a 'Tory 
Democrat'.66 This transformation was bound to affect his 
outlook on any number of issues, none more so than 
Ireland.
Churchill's change of direction was evident during 
the debates on the Irish Free State (Agreement) Bill.
While he maintained that 'fair play' must be the
63H .A .L . Fisher diary, 17 January, 21 and 28 February 
1922, MSS 18. Montagu to Reading, 23 February 1922, 10, 
MSS Eur. E. 238/4, No. 6.
64Sassoon to Lloyd George, 13 February 1922, LG 
F/45/1/8. Beaverbrook to Lloyd George, 13 March 1922, LG 
F/4/6/6.
65'Duke's Angry Shriek', Irish Independent. 12 June
1922.
66'I am what I have always been - a Tory Democrat', he 
later said. Riddell diary, 30 May 1923, [McEwen] p. 388.
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watchwords in Britain's dealings with both Irish 
governments, he went on to say that 'though we are 
impartial we cannot be indifferent. Naturally, our 
hearts warm towards those in the North who are helping, 
and have helped so long, to keep the old flag flying.'67
In unguarded moments, he went much further, as 
occurred at a dinner party in early March. 'My chat with 
Winston was most interesting', Lady Craig wrote in her 
diary. His assurance that no one in Lloyd George's 
Cabinet 'would stand more than rectification of 
boundaries' and that 'Ulster would come out top' was then 
repeated to Craig himself, so boisterously that Ulster's 
premier turned to Clementine Churchill for help. 'Take 
him home', Craig implored, 'before he incriminates 
himself further!'68
Given the circumstances, one such incident might be 
dismissed. However, Churchill then repeated these 
assurances to Craig while they were in the middle of 
negotiations the following day.69 As Churchill himself 
later put it to Tom Jones, it was important to him that 
he 'retain the confidence of the Ulster people'.70 While 
he may have had sound reasons for feeling this way, 
Churchill's actions put a question mark over any claims 
that he was impartial in his dealings with the two Irish
67HC Deb. Vol. 150, Col. 1281, 16 February 1922.
68Lady Craig's diary, 9 March 1922, D.1415/B/38.
69Ibid, 10 March 1922.
7°Jones diary, 7 June 1922, Vol. Ill, p. 210.
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governments.
The road to civil war
Despite the massive assistance rendered to Craig's 
government, outrages occurred almost daily in the six 
counties, especially in Belfast. In an attempt to stem 
the violence, Churchill convinced the two Irish 
governments to meet at the Colonial Office at the end of 
March. The result was an 11-point agreement which became 
known as the second Craig-Collins Pact.71 Much of the 
accord dealt with the restoration of law and order in the 
six counties; but it also included a British promise of 
up to £500,000 to employ the jobless. Craig again 
pledged to 'use every effort to secure the reparation of 
the expelled workers' of 1920, economic conditions 
permitting. Clause 7 pledged the three governments to 
meet again after Parliament's ratification of the Free 
State Constitution, but before the end of the Ulster 
month, to ascertain '[w]hether means can be devised to 
secure the unity of Ireland' or, barring that, whether it 
was possible to settle this issue other 'than by recourse 
to the Boundary Commission'.72
Although the Pact opened with a ChurchiIlian 
flourish - 'PEACE is today declared' - the immediate 
result was more, not less, killing in the six counties.
In his later report on the agreement, S.G. Tallents




surmised that though both Irish governments desired to 
make the Pact succeed, 'they were estranged by causes 
which were from the start ... beyond their control.'73 
It is probably closer to the truth to say that the two 
governments were committed to the agreement only in, so 
far as it advanced their own interests.
In any case, with the violence continuing unabated, 
Collins agreed to a highly risky 'invasion' of the North 
by both pro- and anti-Treaty factions of the IRA. A 
series of attacks, mounted along the border between mid- 
May and early June, climaxed when pro-Treaty forces 
clashed with British troops in the towns of Belleek and 
Pettigo on the Fermanagh-Donegal border. Despite efforts 
to hide Provisional Government involvement, Craig's 
government soon had enough evidence linking Dublin to the 
border violence.74 The result of the invasion, aside 
from its abject failure, was to blight Collins's 
credibility with the British and served to excuse the 
repressive actions taken by Craig's government, including 
the wholesale internment of Nationalist and Sinn Fein 
leaders in the North.
The fracturing between London and Dublin was further 
complicated by the fact that southern Ireland was well on 
the road to civil war. Challenges to the Provisional 
Government's authority were rampant, the most spectacular 
being the occupation of Ireland's legal centre, the Four
73S.F.(B)-66, 6 July 1922, CO 739/16/33341.
74Spender to Tallents, 29 June 1922, CO 906/23.
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Courts, by members of the anti-Treaty IRA. In an effort 
to avoid disaster, Collins startled everyone when, on 20 
May, he signed an electoral pact with de Valera. Both 
pro- and anti-Treaty wings of Sinn Fein were guaranteed a 
proportion of seats in the new Dail Eireann to be elected 
in June, based on their equivalent strength in the 
previous assembly. In other words, the pro-Treaty 
faction would maintain a slight advantage.75
Collins's move confirmed Churchill's worst fears 
that he was witnessing Ireland's 'social disintegration'. 
Chamberlain was equally apprehensive. On the eve of the 
Sinn Fein pact, he still believed that Collins and 
Griffith were 'playing straight'. Now, he spoke for most 
of his Cabinet colleagues when he said that though he 
continued to trust Griffith, he no longer believed that 
Collins was 'keeping faith with us'.76
Collins was far from the only member of the 
Provisional Government who would have found that 
accusation hard to stomach. Among the Treaty's 
staunchest supporters in Ireland there was growing 
disenchantment and a feeling that they were being misled 
by the British. This was nowhere more true than when it 
came to the Ulster clauses, which London seemed to 
reinterpret in favour of Craig's government with each new 
pronouncement. The British 'would do nothing to put
75Hopkinson, Green Against Green, p. 72-73, 97-101.
76C. 27(22), 16 May 1922, CAB 23/30. Chamberlain to 
Long, 19 May 1922, AC 33/1/63. Conference minutes, 23 May 
1922, CAB 21/208.
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Belfast right7, Collins complained to Tom Jones; 'even 
the P.M. was incredibly callous about the murder of 
Ulster Catholics.777
In Belfast, Craig used the Collins-de Valera 
agreement to justify repudiating his own second pact with 
the Provisional Government chairman. Nor would he hear 
any more foolishness about altering Northern Ireland7s 
frontiers. 'What we have now we hold, and we hold 
against all combinations.778 'The Boundary Commission7, 
Craig told Churchill a few days later, 'has been at the 
root of all evil.779
Amid this turmoil, Collins and Griffith presented 
the Free State7s proposed Constitution to the British 
Cabinet. In an effort to win over anti-Treatyites, they 
proposed a document which, in the words of one historian, 
'would be short, simple, and easy to change as Ireland 
moved to complete freedom.780 In other words, it was a 
document that was bound to be wholly unacceptable to any 
British government which depended on the Conservative 
Party to stay in office. As Lloyd George bluntly put 
it, this was not a Dominion constitution, 'it was a
77See, e.g., Mulcahy to Griffith, 24 March 1922, in M. 
Farrell, Arming the Protestants: The Formation of the
Ulster Special Constabulary and the Roval Ulster 
Constabulary. 1920-27 (London, 1983), p. 100. Jones diary, 
30 May 1922, Vol. Ill, p. 203.
78NI HC Deb. Vol. 2, Col. 598, 23 May 1922.
79Craig to Churchill, 26 May 1922, CO 739/14/26434.
8°Curran, Irish Free Statef p. 200.
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Republic in disguise.781
In fact, the two sides were back where they were 
before the Treaty was signed. Once again, the issues 
were partition on the one hand and allegiance to the 
crown on the other. As before, the government could 
expect greater support from the public if a break 
occurred over allegiance; on partition, Lloyd George 
pointed out, 'our case was weak.7 If anything this was 
truer now than ever. As he reminded his colleagues, the 
fact was that most of those killed in the six counties 
were Catholics. 'No one had been punished, we had made 
no enquiry, we had armed 48,000 Protestants.7 Craig7s 
Specials, Lloyd George argued, were no different from 
Mussolini7s Black Shirts - and just as ill-disciplined.
As during the Treaty negotiations, it was imperative that 
they 'eliminate the Ulster issue and leave a clean issue 
of "Republic versus the British Empire”.782
In the end, a complete breakdown over the proposed 
Constitution was settled by Griffith7s answers to a 
series of questions which securely anchored the Free 
State within the British Commonwealth.83 Collins, 
meanwhile, repudiated his Pact with de Valera two days 
before the Irish went to the polls on 16 June. When the
81 According to Churchill, the document had a 'Bolshevik 
character7! See 'Irish Conference7, and chronology of 
negotiations, 27 May 1922, CAB 21/257.
82C. 30(22), 30 May 1922, CAB 23/30.
83Lloyd George to Griffith, S.F.(B) 62, 1 June 1922,
CAB 21/256(11).
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votes were tallied, only thirty-six anti-Treaty 
candidates were victorious. The new Dail Eireann would 
be composed of fifty-eight pro-government TDs, along with 
thirty-four members representing Labour and several other 
smaller parties all of whom also supported the Treaty.84
Despite the outcome of the South's elections, these 
events had further eroded support for Lloyd George and 
his colleagues within the House of Commons. Opposition 
from the Die-hards was taken for granted. What was 
worrying was the evident restlessness of more moderate 
Tory MPs such as Sam Hoare. Though he still counted 
himself a 'friend' of the Treaty, Hoare and others like 
him were manifestly dissatisfied with the course of 
events. Leo Amery felt that in some ways the government 
was in a 'far worse mess' than if the Treaty had never 
been negotiated in the first place.85
If these tribulations were not enough, the 
government was also being battered from other directions. 
By mid-May, it was clear that Lloyd George's gamble on 
the Genoa negotiations had failed? with it, went the last 
real hopes for his political survival. In June a wholly 
unexpected crisis erupted over the Coalition's sale of 
honours for the creation of a Lloyd George political
84Annual Register; 1922. p. 63.
85Wilson diary, 31 May 1922, HHW 1/31/1. HC Deb. Vol. 
154, Col. 2158-2162, 31 May 1922. Amery diary, 31 May
1922, in L.S. Amery, The Leo Amerv Diaries. Vol. Is 1896- 
1929. J. Barnes and D. Nicholson, ed. (London, 1980), p. 
286.
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fund.86 On 21 June Henry Wilson spent the afternoon in 
the Commons watching fellow Die-hard John Gretton attack 
the government front bench. 'Austen was rather heckled 
about L.G.'s Honours List', Wilson wrote in his diary,
'and Gretton told me he was going to have a go at it 
again tomorrow. ... A lovely day.'87
The next afternoon Wilson was shot to death on the 
front-step of his home in London by two members of the 
IRA.
Ireland's Civil War
Henry Wilson's assassination echoed round 
Westminster and produced a profound shock which soon 
turned to profound anger.88 In Britain, his murder drew 
a veil over his activities in Northern Ireland, where he 
had acted as Craig's military adviser. Churchill soon 
forgot that only a few weeks earlier he had held the 
field marshal and de Valera to be equally culpable for 
the violence then raging in the six counties.89 
Meanwhile, the assassination exposed Lloyd George and his 
colleagues, and Austen Chamberlain in particular, to 
scorching abuse.90 Even Chamberlain's brother began to 
have doubts about the Treaty. The assassination, Neville
86Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, p. 339-340.
87Wilson diary, 21 June 1922, HHW 1/31/2.
88Bayford diary, 25 June 1922, p. 176-177.
89Memorandum of meeting with Belfast businessmen, 2 
June 1922, CO 906/25.
9°See, e.g., McNeill to Chamberlain [two letters], 23 
June 1922, AC 24/4/19-20.
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Chamberlain wrote, was 'enough to make anyone despair of 
Ireland and curse the Irish as a hopeless and impossible 
race.'91
On the same day that Wilson's body was laid to rest 
in St. Paul's Cathedral, the House of Commons assembled 
to discuss the Irish situation. MPs were so ill-tempered 
that Lloyd George was not at all sure beforehand if the 
Coalition would survive the debate.92 By most accounts, 
Churchill's speech saved the day. Having linked Wilson's 
assassins to the Irregular IRA contingent which occupied 
the Four Courts, Churchill demanded that the Provisional 
Government clear out this 'nest of anarchy and treason'; 
otherwise, His Majesty's Government would do the job for 
it.93
However, the mood of the House was captured by Bonar 
Law. In effect, Amery wrote, the former Tory leader told 
Lloyd George and his colleagues 'that this was their last 
chance.' Though he had supported the Treaty in December, 
Bonar Law now declared that had he known then 'what the 
position would have been today' he would not have voted 
for it. This warning shot, made 'amid loud cheers', was 
the clearest sign yet that he was ready to lead a revolt
91Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 24 June 1922, NC 
18/1/354.
92Stevenson diary, 26 June 1922, p. 243.
93H .A .L . Fisher diary, 26 June 1922, MSS 18. Amery 
diary, same date, p. 287-288. Annual Register; 1922. p. 
64.
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against his former colleagues.94
The Coalition's ultimatum to the Provisional 
Government very nearly backfired. Another 'crack of the 
English whip', Cope warned, would do more harm than good. 
In any case, the Provisional Government had decided to 
attack the Four Courts before news of Churchill's speech 
was received. More important than the dire warnings 
issuing from London was the change in Collins's own mind. 
'I think we'll have to fight these fellows', he is said 
to have told Richard Mulcahy. From that moment, there 
was no turning back.95
For Churchill, at least, the attack on the Four 
Courts erased his suspicions about the Provisional 
Government and his doubts about the Treaty settlement. 
'Now', he wrote to Collins on 7 July, 'all is changed.' 
Once the Free Staters established their authority 
throughout the South, 'as I do not doubt you will in a 
short time',
a new phase will begin far more hopeful than any 
we have hitherto experienced. In this phase the 
objective must be the unity of Ireland. How and 
when this can be achieved I cannot tell, but it is 
surely the goal towards which we must all look 
steadfastly.96
In this same letter, it was necessary for Churchill
94Ibid, Amery and Fisher diaries. HC Deb. Vol. 155, 
Col. 1744, 26 June 1922.
95Curran, Free State. p. 229-232. Hopkinson, Green 
Against Green, p. 116-118. Cope to Curtis, 27 June 1922, 
LG F/10/3/8. Churchill to Cope, 1 July 1922, LG
F/10/3/13(b).
96Churchill to Collins, 7 July 1922, CO 739/6/36749.
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to address himself to the latest dispute between North 
and South: Craig's proposal to abolish proportional 
representation in Northern Ireland's local elections. 
'Minor irritations' such as these should not be allowed 
to 'lead us off track', Churchill counselled.97 However, 
the abolition of PR was anything but a minor irritation 
to Collins. His fight against it would be his last major 
battle on behalf of Northern Nationalists and the last 
major Irish dispute for the Lloyd George Coalition.
Abolishing proportional representation
On 31 May Craig's government introduced a bill to 
repeal proportional representation for elections to all 
local government bodies in the six counties.98 Alfred 
Cope suspected that Craig wanted to abolish PR before the 
next round of local elections, scheduled for January, 
because he feared the loss of Belfast city council to an 
alliance of Nationalist and Labour councillors. It is, 
indeed, revealing that the only member of the Ulster 
House of Commons to speak against abolition argued that 
the bill was aimed as much against Labour as it was 
against Nationalists or Republicans.99
In addition, it is likely that Craig and his 
colleagues were looking for an opportune moment to rush
the legislation through their Parliament before anyone in
"Ibid.
98NI HC Deb. Vol. 2, Col. 748, 31 May 1922.
"Cope to Curtis, 9 September 1922, HO 45/13371/15. NI 
HC Deb. Vol. 2, Col. 845-851, 917, 26 June and 5 July 1922.
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Dublin or London took notice. With the Provisional 
Government seeming to be on the verge of collapse, the 
early summer of 1922 afforded as good a chance as any.
The 'South is so busy with its own affairs7, Craig 
pointed out, 'that little attention will be paid to what 
happens in the North7.100
If that was Craig7s plan, he miscalculated. Even as 
the attack on the Four Courts was still in progress, 
Collins found time to send Churchill a stinging 
denunciation of the proposed statute. Its repercussions, 
Collins protested, would effectively eliminate the 
'representation of Catholic and Nationalist interests7 
especially in counties Fermanagh and Tyrone and Derry 
City. He also pointedly reminded Churchill that while 
safeguards for Southern Unionists 'have been frequently 
demanded and readily granted by us7, the rights of 
Northern Nationalists 'under the Craig regime are not 
protected in the slightest degree.7101
Using Craig7s own words, Collins maintained that 
abolishing PR was part of a wider strategy to 'wipe out 
the Boundary Commission7. A glance at the bill7s 
provisions shows what he meant. Besides restoring the 
winner-take-all system of elections, the proposed 
legislation required all local officials to swear an oath 
allegiance both to the king and to the Northern Ireland
100Craig to Masterton-Smith, 22 July 1922, HO
45/13371/1.
101Collins to Churchill, I.T.C. 53, 28 June 1922, CAB
27/160.
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government. To boost support for Ulster Unionist 
candidates, members of the Special Constabulary and their 
wives were to be allowed to vote in local elections even 
if they were not permanent residents.102 These measures 
struck at the heart of the case that Nationalists planned 
to make to the Boundary Commission. What better evidence 
of the 'wishes of the inhabitants' could there be than 
local councils which refused to recognise the Belfast 
Parliament?
As Alfred Cope reminded the Colonial Office, Irish 
acceptance of the Treaty 'was based on an understanding' 
that both London and Dublin would work for 'an early 
United Ireland'.103 This assurance was repeated by 
Churchill himself in his 7 July letter to Collins and, 
yet again the following month. 'With Mr. Churchill's 
authority', Cope reported, 'I gave them hope of the North 
coming in on terms provided the Provisional].
G [overnment]. won through their present troubles and did 
not compromise' with the Republicans.104
Craig's bill placed Churchill in an extremely 
awkward position. It did not help matters that the 
colonial secretary was 'no lover of the system' of PR, as 
he privately confessed.105 Nevertheless, Collins had a
102Ibid. Richard Best memorandum, 6 July 1922, HO 
45/13371/1(a).
103Cope to Curtis, 21 August 1922, HO 45/13371/4.
1£>4Cope to Masterton-Smith, 10 August 1922, CO 906/31.
105Churchill to Craig [not sent], 6[?] July 1922, CO 
739/14/31545.
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strong case. To get round the problem, at least for the 
moment, Churchill withheld the royal assent, explaining 
that it was necessary to examine the bill's 
ramifications.106
At a meeting on 28 July Craig did not challenge 
Churchill's claim that the imperial government was within 
its rights to withhold the bill. Instead, he merely fell 
back on his favoured weapon of last resort, making it 
clear that if the bill was not allowed onto the Statute 
Book he would resign and take his whole government with 
him. The meeting ended with Churchill promising that the 
royal assent would be granted by 31 August, an assurance 
that Craig then passed along to his Cabinet.107
Churchill's decision infuriated Collins. 'Do you 
not see, or have His Majesty's advisers not disclosed the 
true meaning of all this?' he asked. The abolition of PR 
was intended to accomplish one end - 'to paint the 
Counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh with a deep Orange tint 
in anticipation of the ... Boundary Commission'. So far 
as Collins was concerned, this was nothing less than 'an 
attempt to defeat the obligations of His Majesty's 
Government contained in the Treaty', and on that score 
alone Churchill could expect trouble from the Free
106Spender to Tallents; Tallents to Spender, 13, 15 July 
1922, HO 45/13371/1.
107Masterton-Smith memorandum, 28 July 1922, HO 




Instead, within a matter of days both Griffith and 
Collins were dead. On 12 August Griffith died suddenly 
from a cerebral haemorrhage, the result of years of over­
work and the stresses and strains brought on by the Civil 
War. On 22 August Collins was killed during an ambush 
near his home in County Cork. The loss of these two men 
to the Nationalist cause was incalculable. Having played 
no part in the Treaty negotiations, William Cosgrave, the 
Provisional Government's new chairman was less likely to 
retaliate if the British acguiesced in Craig's wishes.
The fate of the PR Bill was finally decided at a 
meeting of British Treaty signatories on 7 September. 
Although Lloyd George conceded that the legislation was 
'a breach of the spirit of the Treaty', the government 
was unwilling to force a showdown with Ulster's Cabinet.
In a conciliatory gesture, Craig said that he would 
postpone county and rural district council elections; but 
on the main issue he stood firm. He would hear of no 
further delays on the bill itself. Nor would he hold up 
local urban elections scheduled for January.109
The return of winner-take-all elections signalled 
the resurrection of Unionist hegemony in Ulster local 
government. As Craig promised, county council and rural 
district council elections were postponed until 1924, the 
excuse being that time was needed to re-draw electoral
108Collins to Churchill, 9 August 1922, LG F/183/1/402.
lt)9S .F . (B) 32nd Conclusions, 7 September 1922, CAB 43/1.
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districts. The following January, Nationalist disunity 
combined with the abolition of PR to return Londonderry 
to Unionist control, and the party re-asserted its 
dominance of Belfast city council.110
The battle over PR was a turning point in relations 
between London and Belfast.111 As Curtis pointed out in 
the middle of the dispute, if the British refused to 
allow the PR Bill onto the Statute Book, Craig and his 
fellow ministers 'would have no option but to resign.'
The ensuing general election in the six counties almost 
certainly would endorse their action, and the imperial 
government then would be at an impasse.112 Practically 
speaking, there were only two courses of action: allow 
the Ulster Unionists to abolish PR, or return the six 
counties to direct rule from London. Fifty years later 
those were still the only alternatives when a 
Conservative government re-imposed direct rule.
The fall of the Coalition 
It has been written that the collapse of the Lloyd 
George Coalition 'occurred quite suddenly and 
spectacularly'. In retrospect, so it would seem. But as 
Kenneth Morgan has also pointed out, the government's 
demise had little to do with the honour's scandal. Nor,
110Phoenix, Northern Nationalism, p. 269-271.
li;LBuckland, Factory of Grievances. p. 267-268.
112Curtis to Churchill, 1 September 1922, HO 45/13371/9.
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in the end, would the Chanak crisis prove to be 
decisive.113
If anything, the Coalition's handling of the crisis 
in Turkey won it a measure of grudging respect from some 
of its most inveterate foes. 'The last thing the Goat 
did - the thing wh[ich] finally undid him - is in my 
opinion the most virtuous act of his recent years', wrote 
F.S. Oliver.114 Viscount Cave was like-minded. It was 
precisely because 'I could not agree with you about 
Ireland', Cave told Chamberlain, that he felt all the 
more bound to disassociate himself from other attacks 
which 'appear to me to be wholly unjustified.'115
The government's demise occurred when it did because 
of the decision to call a snap general election in the 
middle of the Chanak crisis. This in turn brought about 
the famous Carlton Club meeting of 19 October. Much has 
been written elsewhere about these proceedings - about 
which speakers were influential, and which were not; 
about which issues were uppermost in the minds of Tory 
MFs when it became time to vote for or against the 
Coalition.116 It is fair to say that Bonar Law's speech 
at the meeting was decisive, if only because he at last
113Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, p. 346.
11401iver to Selborne, 21 November 1922, Selborne 
Papers, MSS 87, ff. 83-84.
115Cave to Chamberlain, 15 October 1922, Cave Papers, 
Add. MSS 62,464, ff. 68.
116See, e.g., Cowling, Impact of Labour. p. 209-212. 
Kinnear, in Fall of Llovd George, p. 87, 120-134. Morgan, 
Consensus and Disunity, p. 348-350. Ramsden, Balfour and 
Baldwin. p. 164-167. Cross, Hoare, p. 364, n. 61, disputes 
Kinnear's conclusions.
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put himself forward as an alternative leader. This made 
it safe for middle-of-the-road MPs to turn against 
Chamberlain, who had 'revealed himself as an unrepentant 
and convinced Coalitionist'.117
Stanley Baldwin's speech was also influential.
Lloyd George, he famously declared, was 'a dynamic 
force', and it was because of him that the Conservatives 
now found themselves in their current troubles. This 
same dynamic force had destroyed the once great Liberal 
Party, and, if the Coalition continued, the Conservative 
Party too would be ' smashed to atoms'.118 These words 
crystallised what those at the meeting most feared: by 
continuing to associate with Lloyd George and his 
methods, their leaders were forsaking Conservative 
principles and, in the end, would destroy the unity of 
their own party.
But when it came to pinning specific allegations to 
this general charge, no one mentioned the honours 
scandal. Only Chamberlain dwelt at length on the Chanak 
crisis. Only Bonar Law devoted much time to the threat 
posed by Labour. As Balfour pointed out, and as one Die­
hard had earlier admitted, when it came to the charge 
that Conservative principles had been abandoned, one 
issue stood out above all others, and that was Ireland.
The seething discontent about this issue was at the
117Amery diary, 19 October 1922, p. 300. 'A Chamberlain 
Apologia', The Times. 14 October 1922.
118'Unionist M.P.s' Decision. Mr Chamberlain Defeated', 
The Times. 20 October 1922.
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bottom of the Conservative revolt.119 'The extraordinary 
thing', Lord Derby observed some months before, was that 
the Coalition's critics could not 'point to any one 
thing, except perhaps the Irish matter, which the 
Government have done wrong'.120 Edward Wood echoed this 
sentiment when he later drew a connection between 
'distrust of the Prime Minister' and disaffection over 
Ireland. While most Conservatives had no desire to go to 
war again with the IRA, they none the less thought that 
their party 'existed to fight for a particular Irish 
policy'. Instead, they were forced to watch the 
'apparently complete reversal of this policy' by their 
'accredited spokesmen'. Was it any wonder, then, that 
the party was in 'a state of irritation and 
bewi lderment' ?121
The onset of Ireland's Civil War only served to 
reinforce the impression that the government's Irish 
policy had failed. In the South, Unionists became a 
favoured target of the Irregular IRA. Although Northern 
Ireland experienced a lull in violence following the 
attack on the Four Courts, by September 'the situation in
119David Close maintains that the Treaty was the Die- 
hards' 'main grievance' against the Lloyd George Coalition. 
See 'Conservatives and Coalition', p. 254.
12°Derby to Chamberlain, 22 March 1922, AC 33/1/51.
121'Thoughts on Some of the Present Discontents of the 
Conservative Party', Summer 1922, Halifax Papers, A4.410/9.
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Ulster was unsatisfactory and becoming worse.'122 It is 
revealing that even when troops were desperately needed 
for service in Turkey at the height of the Chanak crisis, 
Churchill refused to transfer any military units from 
Ireland. Forces in Ulster, he said, 'could in no case be 
weakened.'123
This is where Irish matters stood when the Carlton
Club meeting took place. The Treaty had not answered the
Irish Question. Instead,
... the endless continuance of civil strife in 
Ireland - where peace had been promised with such 
vain assurance - and the outbreak of a new crisis 
in Asia Minor - for which the Prime Minister 
appeared to be in some degree personally 
responsible - combined to vex the faithful 
supporters of the Cabinet'.124
It was enough. When the votes at the Carlton Club 
meeting were counted, only 87 MPs stood by Chamberlain.
The overwhelming number, 187, were ready to back Bonar 
Law.
'The irony of fate'
Lloyd George was nonchalant when news of the Carlton 
Club vote reached Downing Street. 'That's the end', were 
his only words, and he walked out to tender his 
resignation to the king.125 As it happened, he was to
122Spender to Tallents, 2 August 1922, CO 906/21. 
S.F.(B) 32nd Conclusions, 7 September 1922, CAB 43/1. Lady 
Spender's diary, 27 September 1922, D.1633/2/26.
123Conference No. 147, 26 September 1922, CAB 23/39.
124'The End of the Coalition', Quarterly Review. No. 
474, January 1923, p. 202.
125A .J . Sylvester, The Real Lloyd Georae (London, 1946), 
p. 99.
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remain prime minister for another four days until Bonar 
Law secured the leadership of the Conservative Party. In 
the interim, one of Lloyd George's first acts was to 
assure Cosgrave that no action would be taken to 
'compromise the Treaty' and that Britain was still 
pledged to ratifying the Free State Constitution by the 6 
December deadline. The telegram was later given to the 
press, lest any of Bonar Law's Die-hard friends had other 
ideas.126
By most accounts, Lloyd George was almost jocular at 
this twist of fate.127 There were no sad partings.
True, he had sustained a reversal. But this was only 
temporary. He would be back.
In fact, he never crossed the threshold of power 
again.
In less than a year, Lloyd George descended from 
what seemed to be an unassailable position to the abyss 
of utter defeat. As for his colleagues, Churchill, as he 
himself famously put it, was without an appendix, without 
an office and, soon, without a Parliamentary seat.128 
Chamberlain, Birkenhead, Balfour, Horne, and Worthington- 
Evans also found themselves cast into the wilderness. Of 
the lot, Conservatives were especially unforgiving toward
126Lloyd George to Cosgrave, 19 October 1922, LG 
F/10/3/56. Jones diary, 21 October 1922, Vol. Ill, p. 217.
127Riddell diary, 19 October 1922, [McEwen] p. 378-379. 
Scott diary, 23 October 1922, p. 429.
128Churchill had to undergo an emergency appendectomy 
in the middle of the crisis. R. Rhodes James, Churchill: 
A Study in Failure. 1900-1939 (London, 1970), p. 147.
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Birkenhead. He, 'far more than Lloyd George', was held 
responsible for the attempts to force the party into a 
general election after the Irish Treaty was signed and, 
again, that autumn. Birkenhead, according to George 
Younger, 'has been the evil genius of the piece all 
through./129
In the end, a number of factors combined to bring 
about the Coalition's downfall. As Chamberlain wrote 
some weeks after the event, no government could have held 
office 'for four such critical and difficult years' 
without inciting 'discontent and disappointment' among 
its followers. Nor was it at all surprising that these 
same adherents had grown uneasy with Lloyd George's 
leadership and his unsettling habit 'to startle and 
surprise the country.'
Here you have matter enough for widespread 
discontent and grumbling. Then comes the Irish 
settlement accepted by the great majority of the 
Party, but bitterly resented as a betrayal by a 
small section of it. Gradually around this section 
all the discontents crystallised and ... the 
feeling against a continuation of the Lloyd George 
premiership grew into a formidable force.130
Churchill agreed. 'Much of the bitterness which
suddenly exploded at the Carlton Club was due to the fury
of the Die-Hards at the Irish Treaty', he wrote from his
sick-bed. 'This was the deed they could not forgive and
129Younger to Strachey, 20 November 1922, Strachey
Papers, S/19/4/26.
13°Chamberlain to Lloyd, 7 December 1922, AC 18/1/35.
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for which they were determined to exact vengeance.'131
Yet, by this time the Irish Treaty was not the same 
agreement that had been signed less than a year before, 
and for that Churchill was largely responsible. Under 
his guardianship, the Boundary Commission was postponed 
and the financial restrictions that were meant to serve 
as an inducement to unity made far less onerous. 
Consequently, the prospects for re-uniting the island 
were not what they had been before he took charge of 
Irish affairs.
But where, exactly, did Churchill stand on the 
question of Irish unity? Alfred Cope believed that 
Churchill's personal view was that 'the practical working 
of the Treaty would inevitably lead to a reunited 
Ireland'.132 Indeed, during the Treaty negotiations, 
Churchill advocated a policy that 'might well include the 
creation & recognition of an all-Ireland Parliament'.
His only condition was that 'no physical force' should be 
employed against Ulster.133
By the time of the 1922 general election, however, 
he had shifted ground. To retain the support of Tories 
in his constituency, Churchill announced that he would 
'oppose all attempts to coerce Ulster' into joining the
131Churchill to Robertson, 27 October 1922, WSC 
5/28(a)/20-30.
132Cope to Masterton-Smith, 13 October 1922, CO
739/2/51232.
133Churchill to Lloyd George, 9 November 1921, LG
F/10/1/40 [emphasis added].
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Irish Free State.134 In effect, he was giving the Ulster 
Unionists an absolute veto over Irish re-unification. He 
would oppose efforts to bring economic pressure to bear 
on Craig's government, and he was now definitely 
committed to resisting any Boundary Commission award 
which might endanger Northern Ireland's separate 
existence. These were Churchill's new touchstones, and 
their consequences would be far-reaching if he ever 
become involved in Irish affairs again.
For the moment, however, those affairs had passed to 
other hands. Churchill took a certain pleasure in 
knowing that the final stages of the Irish settlement 
would be carried out by the very men who for 'so long 
fomented the quarrel' between Britain and Ireland and who 
had spent the past year 'abusing in the harshest terms 
the men who had made the peace.' It was, as he called 
it, 'the irony of fate'.135
1340akley to Churchill; and Churchill to Oakley, 1-2
November 1922, WSC 5/28(a)/79-80 [emphasis added].




The Legacy of Bonar Law
Before the war there were only two things 
which I really cared for as matters of 
conviction, - the rest was mainly a game.
One was tariff reform? the other was fair 
play to Ulster, and I feel as strongly 
about it [now] as I did then.
- Andrew Bonar Law1
If it had not been for Ireland it is likely that 
Andrew Bonar Law never would have become prime minister. 
In virtual retirement less than twelve months before 
taking office, he re-emerged only to intervene in the 
Treaty negotiations, smashing Lloyd George's plans to 
force Ulster Unionists into a single Irish state. Now he 
was in Lloyd George's place, having acquired from the 
Coalition what one contemporary journal called 'a 
heritage of mismanaged problems ... the most disquieting' 
of which was Ireland.2
Bonar Law was the first modern British prime 
minister not to appoint an Irish Chief Secretary to his 
Cabinet. And, as John Ramsden has written, he did not 
'intend to have an Irish policy either.'3 But by doing 
nothing, Bonar Law in effect was doing something. That 
something was to change the dynamic embodied in the 
Treaty settlement. The centrepiece of Lloyd George's
^onar Law to Croal, 12 November 1921, BL 107/1/83.
2'The End of the Coalition', Quarterly Review. No. 474,
January 1923, p. 211-212.
3Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin, p. 169.
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Irish policy was to hold out to Nationalists the hope of 
eventual North-South re-unification. With the Tories in 
power, 'a definite change in political facts' took 
place.4 'Henceforth', Paul Canning has noted, 'British 
policy was directed almost solely towards preserving the 
status quo in Ireland.' This change was 'more real than 
apparent', because to outsiders it seemed that Britain's 
Irish policy was allowed to drift throughout Bonar Law's 
ministry.5
For evidence of this drift critics needed to look no 
further than the Colonial Office and its new secretary, 
Victor Cavendish, 9th Duke of Devonshire.6 Of all the 
legacies left by the Lloyd George Coalition, the most 
'complicated' was 'Winston Churchill's policy in 
Ireland.'7 But where Churchill was conspicuous in 
directing Colonial Office policy, nothing of the sort 
could be said of his successor. Craig was among those 
who noted the difference. Devonshire's activities, the 
Ulster premier later said, were for the most part 
'confined to nodding and receiving notes on slips from
“Curtis to Cope, 20 October 1922, CO 739/7/52403.
5Canning, British Policy, p. 73, 74-85.
6Although responsibility for communicating with 
Ulster's government was transferred to the Home Office, the 
Colonial Office continued to be intimately involved in 
North-South relations. See C. 70(22), 11 December 1922, 
CAB 23/32.
7'The End of the Coalition', Quarterly Review. No. 474, 
January 1923, p. 212.
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officials./8
Of these officials, none was more important than 
Lionel Curtis. Active though he had been in shaping the 
Coalition's Irish policy, Curtis now assumed a crucial 
role in constructing a framework for Anglo-Irish 
relations. His importance was such that colleagues 
considered him 'the repository of tradition concerning 
the Treaty.'9 An unblushing imperialist, Curtis's 
primary objective was to anchor the Free State firmly 
within the British Commonwealth. Irish unity - and, it 
must be said, the rights of Northern Nationalists - were 
secondary concerns. Curtis argued that these issues 
could be resolved only after Dublin had shown Ulster 
Unionists that it could be trusted.10
These judgments are true, but only so far as they 
go. Even if Devonshire abdicated responsibility for 
Irish policy, it would wrong to assume that the rest of 
the Cabinet, not least the prime minister, followed suit. 
Upon reflection, it is hardly likely that a man as 
committed to the Ulster Unionists as was Bonar Law would 
have passed up any opportunity to further their cause.
The advent of Bonar Law marked a decided shift in British 
policy on two matters that were essential for ending 
Ireland's partition. The first of these was the Council
8Tallents to Anderson, 8 May 1924, HO 144/3915/7.
9Upcott to Piercy, 25 April 1923, Piercy Papers, 10/15.
10Lavin, Curtis, p. 197, 204-226. Canning, British
Policy, p. 73-85.
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of Ireland; the more important issue was Northern 
Ireland's financial relations with Great Britain.
The evidence that Bonar Law played such a decisive 
role is, admittedly, fragmentary, his interventions in 
Irish affairs not nearly as obvious as those of his 
flamboyant predecessor. Britain's new prime minister 
took the role of one who remains discreetly in the 
background. Nevertheless, Bonar Law marked off new 
parameters in Irish policy beyond which his successors 
could not, or would not, go.
Toward a new *status quo'
The day after the Carlton Club vote brought an end 
to the Lloyd George Coalition, a group of leading 
Conservatives met to discuss policy now that the party 
was again on its own. According to Leo Amery, Bonar Law 
was 'anxious' to have their views on only two subjects: 
'Ireland and fiscal policy.'11 Because of the events 
that had brought him to power, Bonar Law decided that his 
new government must call a general election. But his 
desire to go to the country for a mandate immediately ran 
into a complication. Hemmed in by Lloyd George's public 
declaration that Britain would honour its commitment to 
ratify the Irish Constitution by the Treaty's December 
deadline, any election would have to be held immediately. 
Although at least one member of Bonar Law's government 
saw no reason for going to the polls, a general election 
it was decided there would be, and because of the Irish
“Amery diary, 20 October 1922, p. 307.
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commitment it would have to be held by mid-November at 
the latest.12
This decision caused no small amount of anxiety on 
both sides of the Irish frontier. 'Naturally', Kevin 
O'Higgins confided to Lady Hazel Lavery, 'our hearts are 
with the men who forged the settlement'.13 Like many 
others, the Provisional Government's leaders fully 
expected that Lloyd George soon would be back to lead the 
British nation. North of the border, Bonar Law's 
decision was viewed as being 'of the very gravest moment 
for Ulster, no matter how the fight goes.' In the six 
counties, partition was bound to be the main issue, the 
only issue, and one that was 'full of deadly peril'.14
Unionists were right to be anxious. Their 
Nationalist opponents meant to use the campaign 'to 
register another emphatic protest against Partition.' In 
outlining this strategy, Kevin O'Shiel, a legal adviser 
to the Provisional Government, pointed out that the 
Nationalists' only realistic chance of winning any seats 
was in the twin constituency of Fermanagh and Tyrone. By 
concentrating their energies on a constituency where 
voters elected two MPs, a win there would be 'an
12Amery diary, 19 October 1922, p. 300. Jones diary, 
23 October 1922, Vol. I. p. 216.
130'Higgins to Lavery, 27 October 1922, BL 114/1/20. 
How such a potentially embarrassing letter found its way 
into Conservative hands is unclear. A note accompanying 
the letter says that Devonshire 'has seen it with 
satisfaction'.
14'Gravest Moment for Ulster', Belfast Telegraph. 23 
October 1922.
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important victory in view of the Boundary Commission.'15
Although Eamon de Valera called for a boycott of the 
election, his appeal was largely ignored. The 1922 
campaign proved to be one of those instances in which 
Northern Nationalists buried their differences and 
profited as a result. Two candidates were nominated to 
stand for the Fermanagh-Tyrone seats: the Irish 
Parliamentary Party MP T.J.S. Harbison, and the pro- 
Treaty Sinn Fein journalist Cahir Healy who, at the time, 
was one of several hundred Nationalists interned on the 
prison ship Araenta. When the votes were counted, both 
men decisively beat their Unionist opponents, registering 
majorities of over 6,000 apiece. Beyond rejecting the 
Unionist candidates, border Nationalists believed their 
votes had sent a warning shot across the bow of the new 
Conservative ship of state. 'The inhabitants had 
declared their wishes', said the chairman of Omagh Urban 
Council, 'and if Bonar Law did not accept them, then he 
must tear up the Treaty.' If he did the latter, his new 
government would face a 'fight for the liberty of all 
Ireland' .16
Although he had no intention of re-igniting the 
Anglo-Irish War, the notion of tearing up the Treaty must 
have appealed greatly to Bonar Law. Fate had played a 
wicked trick on the man who had taken his country to the
150'Shiel to Collins, 26 October 1922, J.H. Collins 
Papers, D.921/2/3/1.
16'Tyrone-Fermanagh Election Result', Ulster Herald. 25 
November 1922. Phoenix, Northern Nationalism, p. 262-263.
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brink of civil war over Home Rule only a decade before.
Now, he found himself responsible for shepherding through
Parliament a Constitution giving the Irish greater
independence than anyone had dreamed of in 1914 - and the
sort of freedom that only two years before he himself had
declared could not be given unless Britain was prepared
to commit 'national suicide'.17
Bonar Law was deeply ambivalent about the Irish
settlement. When, a few months after voting for the
Treaty, he renounced even this qualified support, he did
so making this 'vital' point:
I thought that those who signed the Treaty ... 
accepted the position that Ulster could never be 
brought in [to an all-Ireland government] until 
they were willing to be brought in. Everything 
that has happened since has shown that I was 
wrong.18
The new prime minister's suspicions of Ireland 
outside Ulster were deep-rooted. 'When I was young', he 
told one confidant, 'I used to travel frequently to 
Ireland.' Belfast was 'less different from Glasgow 
probably than Edinburgh is.' Not so, Dublin. There, a 
young Bonar Law found himself 'in obviously a foreign 
atmosphere', a conviction he held for the rest of his 
life. Among those who worked with him, Bonar Law's 
reputation for a 'granite-like resistance to any
17'Mr Bonar Law on Ireland', The Times. 1 December
1920. Also, see HC Deb. Vol. 127, Col. 1120-1133, 30 March 
1920.
18HC Deb. Vol. 155, Col. 1744, 26 June 1922.
164
tampering with the rights of Ulster' was well-known.19 
Many of his supporters shared these prejudices, and this 
explains why the new prime minister was anxious to 
maintain the Irish status quo - though one as he defined 
it.
Bonar Law inherited a Conservative Party badly 
shaken by the split between pro- and anti-Coalitionists. 
Even those who supported the Carlton Club vote doubted 
that there was support in the country for a 'pure 
Conservative Government' and that 'another form of 
Coalition' would be the most likely outcome of the next 
election.20 This split also, in the main, marked off 
those who were proud that they had played a role in 
ending the Irish conflict from those who 'felt a sort of 
hurt that so old a sore could be healed.'21 Though they 
conceded that the time was 'not yet ripe', Bonar Law's 
Die-hard supporters fully expected that it soon would be 
necessary to re-impose British rule in Ireland.22 In 
such an atmosphere, it was hardly surprising when one of 
Bonar Law's Cabinet ministers gloomily predicted that the
19Bonar Law to Croal, 12 November 1921, BL 107/1/83.
'Bonar Law. His Chief Service to the Empire', Western Mail.
22 May 1923.
2°Peel to Reading, 27 July 1922, 10, Eur. E. 238/5, No.
16. Wood to Chamberlain, 'draft', ? October 1922, Halifax
Papers, A.4.410/26/2.
21Coote, Elliot, p. 75. According to Lord Winterton,
the Treaty 'caused heart-burnings in the Conservative 
Party.' See Orders of the Day (London, 1953), p. 105.
22Gretton memorandum, 16 October 1922, S(4) 103/27-39.
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new government might 'be only an affair of weeks7.23
Instead, the Tories won a clear-cut victory in the 
1922 election, surprising even themselves. Bonar Law now 
commanded a comfortable majority in the House of Commons 
and needed the support of no other party to maintain his 
position.24
Throughout his term in office, however, Ireland 
continued to be a potential source for trouble. From the 
Die-hard wing of the party, Lords Cave and Salisbury were 
particularly 'obstinate7 about the Treaty and were 
'unwilling to realise that it had to be swallowed without 
change and the Constitution ditto.725 Others counselled 
that the 'Free State Government must be given a fair 
chance7 and, eventually, even some Die-hards recognised 
that their room for manoeuvre in recasting Irish policy 
was limited. Salisbury, for one, was consoled by the 
fact that 'the men principally responsible [for the 
Treaty] are out of office, and we all want to forget and 
make f ri ends.7 26
It was time to move on. Independence for the South 
was a done deal. The Treaty had been accepted by the
23Salisbury to Selborne, 25 October 1922, Selborne 
Papers, MSS 7, ff. 146-147.
24The Conservatives and their Unionist allies took 344 
of the 615 seats in the Commons. See Annua 1 Reaister: 
1922. p. 120.
25Jones diary, 16 November 1922, Vol. I . p. 223.
26Griffith-Boscawen to Bonar Law, 25 October 1922, BL 
110/1/1. Salisbury to Bonar Law, 22 October 1922, BL 
111/29/37.
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British people in the 1922 election, and Conservatives 
had campaigned on a promise to restore 'tranquillity' to 
the country. Once in office they could not very well 
turn around and create a situation that might bring on a 
new Anglo-Irish war.27 In the end, Bonar Law's Cabinet 
ministers resigned themselves to the fact that they 'had 
no alternative' but to carry on with the Treaty. As 
Amery later wrote, 'there could only be loyal acceptance 
of the existing position.'28 At this same meeting, the 
Cabinet also agreed that they would adhere to the Treaty 
'not only in the letter but in the spirit'. As Bonar Law 
explained to Tom Jones, 'if the Treaty and Constitution 
must be put through it was better to do it handsomely 
than in any niggardly spirit.'29
Yet this decision, however magnanimous Bonar Law may 
have thought it to be, was storing up future trouble for 
the Conservatives. It was all very well to promise to 
adhere to both the letter and the spirit of the Irish
27Austen to Ida Chamberlain, 21 November 1922, AC 
5/1/252.
28C. 68(22), Appendix II, 22 November 1922, CAB 23/32. 
Amery, My Political Life, p. 241.
29Ibid, CAB 23/32. Jones diary, 16 November 1922, Vol■ 
I, p. 223. Also, see 'Extract from Mr Bonar Law's Election 
Address to his Constituents at Glasgow, October 27th, 
1922', in Cmd. 2264: Irish Boundary Extracts from
Parliamentary Debates. Command Papers, etc.. Relevant to 
Questions Arising out of Article XII of the Articles of 
Agreement for a Treaty Between Great Britain and Ireland. 
Dated 6th December 1921 (London, 1924), p. 51. That said, 
implementing the Treaty was a task which gave Bonar Law 
'neither enthusiasm nor satisfaction.' See J.C.C. Davidson 
and R. Rhodes James, Memoirs of a Conservative; J.C.C. 
Davidson's Memoirs and Papers. 1910-37 (London, 1969), p. 
138.
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agreement. But what would the party's attitude be when, 
as had happened already and was bound to happen again, 
interpretations of the 'letter' and the 'spirit' differed 
in London and Dublin? Though willing to give Cosgrave's 
government its 'fair chance', Sir Arthur Griffith- 
Boscawen warned Bonar Law that the party would allow 'no 
interference with the rights and position of Ulster.'30
%A stiffer attitude'
Whatever worries Bonar Law's supporters harboured 
about his Irish policy were nothing compared to the 
nightmare a Tory government posed for Irish 
Nationalists.31 Within days of the Carlton Club meeting, 
Provisional Government Chairman William Cosgrave 
travelled to London for a hastily arranged meeting with 
the new prime minister. Warned to 'anticipate a stiffer 
attitude', Cosgrave was worried that the Conservatives 
might engineer fundamental changes in the Treaty or delay 
Parliament's ratification of the Irish Constitution. So 
it was that when the two sides met, discussion centred on 
Bonar Law's attitude toward the Irish settlement in 
general. Cosgrave confined himself to a re-statement of 
his government's policy, which was 'the Treaty'. Upon it 
and it alone the new Free State 'meant to stand in the 
spirit and the letter'. And, Cosgrave continued, he 
'looked to the British Government to do the same.'
3°Griffith-Boscawen to Bonar Law, 25 October 1922, BL 
110/1/1.
31See, e.g., 'Our Dublin Letter', Ulster Herald. 4 
November 1922.
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Despite press speculation that the Treaty's Ulster 
clauses must have been one of the main topics of 
discussion, the subject never crossed anyone's lips. No 
one thought it politic to mention the Boundary 
Commission.32
It was Bonar Law's fortune never to face the 
boundary issue directly, and for that he had Irish 
Republicans largely to thank. So long as the Civil War 
still raged in the South, it was impossible to raise the 
boundary issue. Kevin O'Shiel, newly appointed director 
of the North-Eastern Boundary Bureau, summed up Dublin's 
problem. 'What a ridiculous position we would cut', he 
wrote, 'both nationally and universally - were we to 
argue our claim at the Commission for population and 
territory when at our backs in our own jurisdiction is 
the perpetual racket of war'.33
The Council of Ireland 
Because of the vital need to establish its authority 
in the 26 counties, the Irish government had little time 
for problems north of the border. As Kevin 0'Higgins 
told an audience some two years later, the Civil War was 
fought against 'men who had not cleared the blood from
32Curtis to Cope, 20 October 1922, CO 739/7/52403. 
'Meeting between Mr Bonar Law and the Irish Ministers', 24 
October 1922, CO 739/7/54174. 'Free State Leader Mr 
Cosgrave Received by Mr Bonar Law', Morning Post. 25
October 1922.
330'Shiel to Cosgrave, 17-page memorandum, undated, 
Mulcahy Papers, p7/B/101. Ireland's president admitted as 
much to the Tories. See Cosgrave to Bonar Law, 16 May 
1923, D/T, S 1801/C.
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their eyes'.
The Provisional Government was simply eight young 
men in the City Hall standing amidst the ruins of 
one administration with the foundations of another 
not yet laid, and with wild men screaming through 
the keyhole.34
These circumstances, particularly after Collins's death, 
did not go unnoticed in London, and the benefits to 
Britain were soon made plain.
As well as ratifying the Irish Constitution, Bonar 
Law's government was committed to enacting further 
legislation which would address several disputes raised 
by the Treaty. Chief among the issues to be addressed in 
the Consequential Provisions Bill was the 'anomaly' of 
the Free State's role in the Council of Ireland.35
The 1920 Act gave both Irish governments an equal 
say in matters handled by the Council on both sides of 
the border. But whereas the Treaty gagged Belfast on 
southern Irish affairs, Dublin retained its say in 
matters related to Northern Ireland. Craig wanted the 
Council abolished altogether, to be replaced by joint 
meetings of the Belfast and Dublin Cabinets. So long as 
Collins had been alive any such demand was 'deprecated' 
unless the Ulster Unionists were willing to make 
concessions aimed at re-unification.36
34T. de Vere White, Kevin O'Higgins (Tralee, Ireland, 
1948 [1966 edition]), p. 83-84.
35C .I.L . 3rd Meeting, 22 November 1922, CAB 27/157. HC 
Deb. Vol. 151, Col. 800, 3 March 1922.
36Ibid, C.I.L. 3rd Meeting. Appendix II, Articles 12 
and 13. Craig to Devonshire and Craig memorandum, 6 
November 1922, CO 739/1/55311. Conference minutes, 29
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Now, however, as a gesture of good-will Cosgrave's 
government offered to set aside the Council for up five 
years. During that time, the British would exercise the 
Council's powers in Northern Ireland, while the two Irish 
governments considered possible alternatives. If no 
agreement was reached at the end of five years, the 
Council could then be called into being.37 This gesture 
was spurned by Craig, who wanted no time limit. Hugh 
Kennedy, the Provisional Government's legal adviser, 
rejected his demand, arguing that it would 'in effect 
wipe out the Council of Ireland altogether'.38
At a Cabinet committee meeting called to discuss the 
dispute, Sir John Anderson pointed out that, strictly 
speaking, 'the Northern Government had no say in the 
matter'. That kind of advice, Lord Salisbury pointedly 
answered, failed to take account of the new political 
reality. The Conservatives were not about to override 
Craig's objections and 'put Ulster under the South', even 
when Curtis and other senior civil servants pointed out 
that they had no other choice short of repudiating the 
Treaty. In this instance, 'the bargaining power' 
entirely lay in the hands of the southern Irish. 'It was 
a mistake to think that these provisions were put into 
the Treaty by inadvertence', Anderson explained; 'on the
March 1922, CAB 43/5.
37'Irish Free State (Consequential Provisions Bill)',
Jones memorandum, 25 November 1922, BL 117/7/7. HC Deb. 
Vol. 159, Col. Col. 388-389, 423-433, 27 November 1922.
38C .I.L . 3rd Meeting, 22 November 1922, CAB 27/157.
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contrary, Mr. Griffith and Mr. Collins had attached great 
importance to them'. Sir James Masterton-Smith agreed.
If 'Collins were now alive', he told the Conservatives, 
the Provisional Government's offer never would have been 
made without 'some substantial concession' from the 
Ulster Unionists. As far as Masterton-Smith was 
concerned, 'the Northern Government were getting 
something for nothing and would be ill-advised to 
refuse./39
So it was that the Council of Ireland was put into 
cold storage by the Consequential Provisions Act. Bonar 
Law and his colleagues were 'anxious' to avoid the issue 
and were happy to leave Dublin and Belfast to 'thresh the 
matter out' themselves over the next five years.40 What 
is extraordinary is that a full eighteen months would 
elapse before the issue was raised in Dail Eireann, and 
only then by accident. During a debate on a railways 
bill, Kennedy, by then Free State attorney-general, 
flabbergasted opposition TDs when he off-handedly 
mentioned the moratorium. Kennedy defended the 
agreement, claiming that to do otherwise would have given 
Northern Ireland a voice in Southern affairs.41 It is 
unclear whether he actually believed this explanation or 
whether he was attempting to avoid an embarrassing
39Ibid. C.I.L. 4, 12 November 1922, CAB 27/157.
Curtis to Devonshire, 17 November 1922, CO 739/8/56786.
4°HC Deb. Vol. 159, Col. 389, 27 November 1922.
41Dail Deb. Vol. 7, Col. 1498-1503, 28 May 1924.
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situation. Whatever the case, as the government's chief 
legal expert, he ought to have known that this was 
untrue.
Opposition leader Tom Johnson returned to the issue 
in mid-June, attacking the moratorium and pointing out 
that, in British eyes at least, this was a change or 
'variation of the Treaty'.42 But more importantly,
Johnson argued that the chances of ending partition were 
far greater through the Council than anything that might 
be achieved with the Boundary Commission. Once 'you have 
secured unification of control', Johnson told the Dail, 
'you have ensured ultimate unity'.43
Yet, Johnson and other government critics were 
hardly innocent in this matter. Their failure to take 
notice of the moratorium when it was made public in 
November 1922 was staggeringly incompetent, and was 
surpassed only by the arrogance of Cosgrave's later 
rebuke. Opposition TDs, the Irish president said, could 
not take 'the ostrich line' and claim they had been kept 
in the dark about the Consequential Provisions Act. Its 
terms were fully reported in Irish newspapers during its 
passage through the British Parliament. This was true. 
Still, it begged the question of his own government's 
failure to inform the Dail of legislation which, even he
42HC Deb. Vol. 159, Col. 388, 27 November 1922. The
phrase was used by William Ormsby-Gore, the under-secretary 
of state for the Colonies.
43Dail Deb. Vol. 7, Col. 2355, 2379, 13 June 1924.
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admitted, 'greatly concerned us.'44
Cosgrave backed away from Kennedy's assertion that 
the Council would have given the Ulster Unionists a say 
in Free State affairs. Instead, he argued that the 
Council was 'defective' and this necessitated the 
agreement. This explanation masked a larger concern 
which was the likely reason for Cosgrave's decision to 
forgo the Council. As one government supporter told the 
Dail, a Council devised for two 'subordinate Parliaments 
could not possibly ... suit a Sovereign Parliament.'45 
In other words, fear that the Free State's independence 
might in some way be compromised overrode the desire for 
re-unification. Not for the last time, a Dublin 
government felt that staking out the Free State's 
separate identity was more important than seeking after 
Irish unity.
The financial trap
On 6 November Craig penned a letter to Devonshire, 
outlining the changes he expected his Conservative 
friends to make to the Irish settlement while they were 
in power. With the outcome of the 1922 general election 
still uncertain, but with a government in office which 
had no 'fear of hurting the susceptibilities of the Irish 
Provisional Government', Craig was determined to seize 
the moment. Abolition of the Council of Ireland was only
44Ibid, Col. 2606-2608, 18 June 1924.
45Ibid, Col. 2608, 18 June 1924? Col. 2829-2831, 20
June 1924.
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one item on his agenda. Equally important, he wished to 
re-negotiate certain ' [outstanding Financial 
questions' .46
Northern Ireland, as one historian has pointed out, 
was created as a political unit 'not an economic one.'
In financial or economic terms, the six-county state was 
a 'near disaster'.47 Although based on the British 
model, the six-county state was neither large enough nor 
diverse enough to sustain the same level of services as 
could found elsewhere in the United Kingdom.48
Throughout the remaining months of the Lloyd George 
Coalition, the consequences of this situation had been 
held at bay by a series of emergency grants from the 
British Treasury. These 'temporary expedients', as Craig 
called them, were 'calculated to stave off the most 
pressing difficulties of the moment.' But they were in 
no sense a long term solution. Moreover, officials in 
Belfast chafed at the knowledge that as long as they 
worked under the restrictive conditions of the 1920 Act 
they 'must always appear in the character of a 
suppliant.749
This situation Craig now intended to rectify, using
46Craig to Devonshire, 6 November 1922, T
160/150/F.5814/1.
47Mansergh, Unresolved Question, p. 245.
48Churchill to Steel-Maitland, 13 March 1925, T
160/187/F.7136/4.
49Craig to Devonshire, 6 November 1922, T
160/150/F.5814/1. Clark to Piercy, 8 September 1923,
Piercy Papers, 10/12.
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as his pretext southern Ireland's establishment as a 
dominion. Ultimately, he demanded a complete reappraisal 
of his state's financial relationship with London, 
covering three issues: Northern Ireland's imperial 
contribution? the funding of its social services, 
particularly its unemployment insurance programme? and 
payment for its security force, the Ulster Special 
Constabulary.
This letter also marked the beginning of the 
decisive role Stanley Baldwin was to play in Irish 
affairs, beginning here in his role as Bonar Law's 
chancellor of the exchequer.
Baldwin's subordinates at the Treasury reacted to 
Craig's demands with undisguised irritation. His 
'proposals would be incredible', Otto Niemeyer told 
Baldwin, 'if they were not in black and white'. In an 
accompanying memorandum, Niemeyer argued that Craig's 
letter 'proceeds on a wholly false basis' because 
ratification of the Irish Constitution in no way affected 
the operation of the 1920 Act in Northern Ireland. And, 
he added for good measure, Craig was proposing a 
fundamental change in the Act which 'is regarded by 
Ulster in other connections as inviolable'.50
The Colwyn Committee 
The day after Niemeyer submitted his memorandum,
Craig met privately with Baldwin and Bonar Law. By the
“Niemeyer to Baldwin and Niemeyer memorandum, both 
dated 20 November 1922, T 160/150/F.5814/1.
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time the three men left the room, they had agreed that 
'all outstanding financial questions between the British 
Treasury and that of Northern Ireland ... should be 
submitted for arbitration.' Why Bonar Law agreed to this 
arrangement is unclear. It is likely that Craig 
persuaded him that unless there were changes in the 
financial relationship between Northern Ireland and the 
rest of the United Kingdom, the Ulster government soon 
would be bankrupt. Whatever the reasons, Baldwin told 
Craig that, 'as far as possible', he wanted a 'clean 
cut'. He meant by that 'a settlement which will clear up 
the existing uncertainties and reduce to an absolute 
minimum' any possible future controversy between London 
and Belfast.51
This was the genesis of what was officially called 
the Northern Ireland Special Arbitration Committee, but 
was better known as the Colwyn Committee, named for its 
chairman, Frederick Henry, first Baron Colwyn. The 
committee was to determine if, in light of the 
establishment of the Irish Free State, 'any alteration is 
needed in the present scale of the contributions of 
Northern Ireland to the cost of Imperial Services'.
Before its work was finished, the committee issued two 
reports. First, it recommended a series of changes to 
the imperial contribution required of Northern Ireland 
for fiscal years 1922-23 and 1923-24. A second report
51Baldwin to Craig, 22 November 1922, T
160/150/F.5814/1.
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dealt with how Belfast's imperial contribution should be 
determined in the future.52
Along with Lord Colwyn, who also chaired the Joint 
Exchequer Board, the committee was made up of Sir Laming 
Worthington-Evans and Sir Josiah Stamp. Both Colwyn and 
Worthington-Evans had been proposed by Craig, the latter 
because he 'was mainly responsible' for the 1920 Act's 
financial provisions.53 Stamp's appointment turned out 
to be equally advantageous for the Ulster Unionists. In 
a 1921 article written for the journal of the Royal 
Economic Society, Stamp anticipated many of the arguments 
that the Northern Ireland government would make to the 
committee. As one historian has noted, that Stamp should 
hold these same views proved to be 'most fortunate' for 
Craig's government.54
Early in their deliberations, the Colwyn Committee 
was cautioned to do nothing that Dublin might interpret 
as adversely affecting the 'ultimate fusion' of Southern 
and Northern Ireland. In a letter to William Piercy, the 
committee's secretary, G.C. Upcott explained that Craig 
had demanded Dominion status for his province on learning 
of the Treaty's likely terms in November 1921. 'Since 
then', Upcott wrote, Northern Ireland 'has often tried in
52Cmd. 2072: First Report of the Northern Ireland
Special Arbitration Committee; 1924, xi, 341. Cmd. 2389: 
Final Report of the Northern Ireland Special Arbitration 
Committee? 1924-1925, xiv, 125.
53Craig to Baldwin, 23 November 1922; and Baldwin to 
Craig, 27 November and 4 December 1922, T 160/150/F.5814/1.
54Follis, State Under Siege, p. 137.
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one way or another to get herself put on an equality of 
status with the Free State'. The demands now being put 
before the committee by Belfast were merely another 
attempt to achieve this same end and should be 
rejected.55 Not surprisingly, the Ulster Unionists took 
the opposite view, arguing that 'should they consider it 
necessary' it was within the committee's power to suggest 
'drastic alterations' to the 1920 Act.56
According to a later Treasury memorandum, the first 
Colwyn Committee report 'gave substantial advantages to 
Ulster', reducing its contribution to the Imperial 
Exchequer from £6.74 million to £5.85 million for 1922- 
23, and from £5.8 million to £5 million for 1923-24. In 
addition, the committee awarded Craig's government 
£500,000 to supplement a previous British grant of £1.5 
million to cover claims for malicious damages inflicted 
since January 1922; another £400,000 was awarded for the 
construction and maintenance of colleges and other public 
buildings. However, the committee went against the 
Unionists on two other claims. First, the unemployment 
relief grant embodied in the second Craig-Collins Pact 
was reduced from £500,000 to £300,000, although the 
Belfast authorities were given an unlimited amount of 
time to dispense the money. Nor would the committee back 
Craig's claim for a larger share of funds from a housing
55'Note of a conversation with Mr. Upcott', 13 April
1923? Upcott to Piercy, 25 April 1923 and 12 October 1923, 
Piercy Papers, 10/15.
56Follis, State Under Siege, p. 142.
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grant for Irish ex-servicemen. Based on population, 
Northern Ireland had been awarded 28 per cent of £1.5 
million allocated to house Irish war veterans; the 
remaining amount was awarded to the Free State for the 
same purpose. Craig wanted 40 per cent of the total, or 
the equivalent in the form of a separate grant to his 
government.57
The Colwyn Committee's second report, presented in 
December 1924, accepted the substance of Northern 
Ireland's case. Niemeyer was vindicated in his earlier 
prediction that the imperial contribution would become 'a 
last charge' on Ulster's government, allowing it to 
'deduct all that they are likely to spend locally from 
their revenue and give us only what is left.' Niemeyer 
was no less scathing after the report was issued, calling 
it 'an unsatisfactory document in every way.' In a note 
to Churchill, who was by then chancellor of the 
exchequer, he concluded that, 'instead of getting at any 
rate peace with penury in the future, I fear we shall 
have incessant disputes.'58
Although some writers have blamed the final Colwyn 
award for snuffing out Northern Ireland's long-term 
economic and financial development, they admit that the
57Snowden memorandum to MacDonald, 26 September 1924, 
JRM, PRO 30/69/61. Cmd. 2072. Upcott memorandum to 
Snowden, 30 January 1924, T 160/131/F.4855/02/1.
58Niemeyer memorandum, 20 November 1922, T 
160/150/F.5814/1. Niemeyer to Churchill, 25 March 1925, T 
160/150/F.5814/2. Also, see Hawtrey memorandum, 27 May 
1924, T 208/83.
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report gave Ulster Unionists nearly everything they 
wanted and was, indeed, heartily welcomed in Belfast.59 
Craig was sanguine about the payments, predicting that in 
time the contribution would 'melt away altogether.'60 
Which is what happened. Between 1924 and 1931, Ulster's 
annual payments to the British Treasury tumbled from £4.5 
million to £500,000. This latter contribution was 
virtually wiped when, also in 1931, an identical sum of 
£500,000 was given to Stormont by the British government. 
With it, the imperial contribution disappeared.61
Taken together, the Colwyn awards substantially 
altered Northern Ireland's financial relationship with 
the British government. The committee members may have 
felt there were good reasons for doing so; but their 
decisions breached the Irish Treaty and further 
entrenched partition.
No 'clean cut'
Not long after the Colwyn Committee began its work, 
Baldwin discovered that he was not going to get the 
'clean cut' he thought he had agreed to with Craig. On 
the contrary, Ulster's leader wished to see the committee 
become a 'standing tribunal to which fresh claims may be 
referred.' Baldwin, in a letter written only days after 
he succeeded Bonar Law as prime minister, told Craig he
59Follis, State Under Siege. p. 146, 152. Lawrence, 
Northern Ireland. p. 46-48. But see Pollock's speech, NI 
HC Deb. Vol. 6, Col. 451-452, 7 May 1925.
60NI_HC_Deb, Vol. 6, Col. 468, 7 May 1925.
61Lawrence, Northern Ireland, p. 49, 53.
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'could not possibly agree' to any such thing.62
But Craig was not so easily deterred. As the Colwyn 
Committee was on the verge of submitting its first 
report, Piercy received a letter from Sir Ernest Clark, 
secretary to Northern Ireland's Department of Finance. 
Although the issue was not mentioned in Craig's 6 
November letter to Devonshire, nor was it 'part of the 
case originally put forward' by the Belfast government, 
Clark's superiors now wanted the Colwyn panel to consider 
a claim of assistance for Northern Ireland's unemployment 
insurance fund.63
Throughout 1923 Northern Ireland's economy continued 
to stagnate and showed no signs of improving. Conditions 
were such that, in September, Craig attempted to alter 
the first Colwyn report to hide its reduction of the 
Craig-Collins unemployment grant. With the help of 
Worthington-Evans, Ulster's premier hoped that the 
committee would combine the £300,000 unemployment grant 
with the £400,000 expenditure on public buildings, so as 
to hide the actual reduction from Northern Ireland's 
voters. 'It would get him over political difficulties', 
Worthington-Evans confided. The rest of the committee
62Upcott memorandum Neville Chamberlain, 15 September
1923, T 160/131/F.4855/02/1. Baldwin to Craig, 28 May 
1923, T 160/163/F.6282.
63Clark to Piercy, 5 September 1923, Piercy Papers,
10/12.
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rejected the idea, however, as 'impracticable7.64 Nor 
were they willing to consider Northern Ireland7s claims 
regarding unemployment insurance. Any such request,
Clark was informed, could be referred to the committee 
only by the chancellor of the exchequer.65
Craig took Piercy7s advice just as Baldwin7s first 
government was drawing to a close. Fearing the 
possibility of a Liberal or even Labour administration in 
the wake of the December 1923 general election, Craig 
sought to have the Colwyn Committee issue an immediate 
report on the future of Northern Ireland7s imperial 
contribution. At the same time, he wanted the committee 
to re-consider imperial backing for his government7s 
unemployment insurance fund.
'Your proposal7, Neville Chamberlain told Craig, 'in 
the present political circumstances is, I fear, quite 
impossible.7 Time would not allow the committee to issue 
its final report before a new government came into 
office. Nor, as chancellor of the exchequer, was 
Chamberlain willing to refer 'an entirely new claim7 to 
the Colwyn Committee. Such a move would bind the next 
government to the panel7s decision - which is precisely 
what Craig was after.
Even if the Conservatives7 fall from power had not
64Worthington-Evans to Piercy, 26 September 1923? and 
Piercy to Worthington-Evans, 3 October 1923, Piercy Papers,
10/14.
65Piercy to Clark, 8 October 1923, Piercy Papers,
10/12.
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been in the offing, Chamberlain doubted that he could 
back the Unionists' claims for support of their 
unemployment fund. Doing so, he reminded Craig, would 
involve 'a fundamental amendment' to the 1920 Act.66 
That should have been the end of the matter. But as 
officials at the Treasury were learning, the Unionists 
were more adept at saying 'no', than they were at taking 
it for answer.
Paying for the Specials
In his letter establishing the Colwyn Committee, 
Baldwin determined that there should be a 'sole 
exception' to the issues open to arbitration. This one 
matter, 'to be reserved for separate consideration', was 
also the most contentious dispute between the two 
governments: Britain's continued funding of the Ulster 
Special Constabulary.67
Though conceived as a temporary force during the 
Anglo-Irish War, the 'A', 'B', and 'C-l' Special 
Constabulary still numbered roughly 42,000 at the end of 
1922.68 During the remaining months of the Coalition 
government, Craig was able to ensure continued imperial 
backing for the force simply by claiming that various 
Cabinet members had promised to 'see him through'. His 
ploy confounded Treasury officials - not least because it
66Chamberlain to Craig, 3 January 1924, HO 45/13743/1.
67Baldwin to Craig, 22 November 1922, T 
160/150/F.5814/1.
68A. Hezlet, The 'B' Specials: A History of the Ulster 
Special Constabulary (London, 1972), p. 93.
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was seldom challenged and, even then, the Ulster leader 
still got his way.69
Craig seems to have thought that his claim on 
Treasury funds for the Specials would be immune from 
Bonar Law's 1922 election promise to reduce the 
government's budget. He was in for a shock. On 23 
November, Craig urgently wrote to Baldwin concerning a 
matter that had to be taken care of 'as speedily as 
possible': namely, funding for the Specials for the next 
financial year, as well as an additional request for 
£200,000 needed for 'the current financial year, promised 
by Winston Churchill' while he was still colonial 
secretary. Citing the 'present burdens of the British 
taxpayer', Baldwin did not see how he could possibly 
promise any future aid for the Specials. As for the 
£200,000 request, he was 'informed that Winston Churchill 
made no [such] promise'.70
This rebuke forced Craig to fall back to his 
position of last resort: he implicitly threatened to 
resign. 'I doubt if anyone could be found to carry on 
here unless they were assured that the present 
magnificent system of Special Constabulary was maintained 
at a sufficient strength', Craig told Baldwin. And the 
price tag for that 'sufficient strength' had just gone 
up. In this same letter, Craig explained that his home
69Niemeyer to Horne, 5 May 1922, T 163/6/11/G.256/049.
7°Craig to Baldwin, 23 November 1922; Baldwin to Craig, 
27 November 1922, T 160/150/F.5814/1.
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minister and inspector-general had 'underestimated' the 
number of 'A' Specials needed to maintain order.
Therefore, his government was now asking for £1.5 million 
for financial year 1923-24, instead of the £1.35 million 
initially requested.71
Once again, the Ulster Unionist position was saved 
by Bonar Law. On 4 December Baldwin informed Craig that 
after consulting with the British prime minister,
Belfast's demand for an additional £200,000 would be 
granted after all. Even so, Baldwin felt bound to insist 
that Churchill had no authority to commit the British 
Treasury to such a promise. Nor, he pointedly added, 'do 
I think that he did in fact do so.' The matter of future 
budget requests was, for the moment, put to one side.72
Officials at the Treasury warned that underwriting 
the Specials marked a serious departure not only from the 
spirit but also the letter of the 1920 Act. It also 
breached Article 11 of the Treaty. G.C. Upcott pointed 
out to Baldwin that with the South absorbed in a civil 
war, the Specials no longer could be regarded as an 
adjunct to the British Army. Their main function now 
consisted of maintaining internal order in the six 
counties and as 'a means of providing for unemployment
71Ibid, Craig to Baldwin, 28 November 1922.
72Ibid, Baldwin to Craig, 4 December 1922. Baldwin 
agreed to the £1.5 million grant in February. See Niemeyer 
memorandum, 22 February 1923, WO 32/5330. In total, the 
Specials received £2.7 million from the British Treasury 
for financial year 1922-23. See Snowden memorandum to 
MacDonald, 26 September 1924, JRM, PRO 30/69/61.
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[sic] in Ulster'. If previous experience was anything to 
go by, Upcott continued, 'only direct financial pressure 
on Northern Ireland will secure substantial reductions in 
this expenditure.'73
Lord Derby, Bonar Law's secretary of state for war, 
was also critical Craig's spendthrift habits when it came 
to the Specials. Nor was he confident about the 
relationship between the Specials and army units 
stationed in the North. In case of trouble, Derby 
confided to the home secretary, 'we might be badly let 
down by the Constabulary.' But, far from disbanding the 
Specials, Derby's solution was to absorb the force into 
the British military as a division in the Territorial 
Army.74
Derby's proposal came about because the War Office 
was under intense pressure to reduce the number of army 
units throughout the empire. As many as sixteen 
battalions were stationed in Northern Ireland, a number 
Derby wanted reduced to five. As an incentive, he 
pointed out that if the money Belfast wanted for the 
Specials was used to raise a Territorial division, 'Craig 
could have something like 65,000 men for the same cost as 
he now has some 25,000 Constabulary.'75
Aside from budgetary - never mind military -
73Upcott memorandum to Baldwin, 6 February 1923, T 
160/131/F.4855/02/1.
74Derby to Bridgeman, 11 December 1922, WO 137/4/11-12.
75Ibid. Derby to Bonar Law, 9 December 1922, BL
111/13/71.
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considerations, there was a political aspect behind
Derby's proposal. This aspect was laid out most baldly
in a report calling for the 'C-l' Specials to 'provide
the nucleus of an Ulster Territorial Division.' The two
officers who wrote the report argued that the formation
of such a unit was necessary because:
There exists in Northern Ireland amongst all classes 
a grave mistrust of the British Government. We do 
not mean particularly the present one, but rather 
of any Government which may be in power in Great 
Britain in the future. This mistrust will take 
years to remove, and ... can only be eradicated by 
bringing Northern Ireland more and more into the 
United Kingdom, and particularly as regards military 
matters.
Having said all that, the report's authors then laid 
down a series of exceptions for use of the Ulster 
Division, exceptions which would apply to no other 
Territorial unit. First, the division could not be 
removed from the province without the consent of Northern 
Ireland's government. Conversely, this same government 
would be empowered to mobilize the division for service 
in the province, 'irrespective of whether the remainder 
of the Territorial Army has been called out or not.'76
While the War Office might fancy the idea of 
clothing the Specials with the authority of the British 
Army, others were appalled. Sir Charles Wickham, the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary's inspector-general, warned 
that the 'C-l' constables were 'a highly political body
76'Report on the Organization of the Constabulary 
Forces in Northern Ireland' by Major General Sir Archibald 
A. Montgomery and Colonel H.H.S. Knox, 12 February 1923, WO 
32/5330.
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formed originally for the absorption of a dangerous 
independent Orange force'. Nor would this plan prevent 
conflict between the army and the Specials. Even if they 
were converted into a Territorial division, Wickham was 
certain that in any dispute between Belfast and London, 
the 'C-ls' would 'refuse orders from their Imperial 
officers' creating, as he put it, a 'difficult 
situation' .77
The idea that he would be provided free of charge
with a fully-equipped army division was beyond Craig's
wildest dreams and, in the end, any possible realisation. 
Despite War Office support, the plan was allowed to hang 
fire through the summer and autumn of 1923. In early 
November, Craig attempted to resurrect the proposal, 
telling Derby that his government was now prepared to 
'acquiesce' in the conversion of the 'C-l' Specials into 
a Territorial division. But Craig had been overtaken by 
events. Derby explained that the plan faced 
'considerable legislative and financial difficulties' 
and, despite his own personal support, he could not 
promise 'anything definite in the present fluid state of 
politics./78
Craig, however, would not give up on the prospect of
his own army division even when the Conservatives left
office. In late January 1924, the new war secretary,
77Tallents to Anderson, 27 August 1923, HO 144/3915/8.
78Craig to Derby, 9 November 1923; Derby to Craig, 19
December 1923, WO 32/5309.
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Stephen Walsh, received the first of a series of letters
from Craig claiming that 'in accordance with the wishes'
of his predecessor, the 'C-l' Specials had been retained
to prepare for their formation as a Territorial division.
Craig was employing the same tactic that had worked
so well in his dealings with the Treasury. But this time
his bluff was called. Pleading that Walsh's refusal to
honour Derby's 'request' would cause the Ulster
government acute 'embarrassment', Craig tried to salvage
the situation by using the denial to win yet further
grants for the Specials. When even this ploy failed, he
became aggressive. 'You are doubtless aware', Craig
sternly reminded Walsh on 11 March,
that Northern Ireland, in contributing her quota 
to the Imperial Exchequer, is paying for her share 
of the National Debt and the Imperial expenditure 
on the Forces of the Crown. We have a claim, 
therefore, that Northern Ireland should be put on 
the same footing as other parts of the United 
Kingdom when it comes to the expenditure of these 
sums ....
Craig wrote these words all the while he was doing 
everything he could to reduce his government's imperial 
contribution.
Derby's suggestion finally was put to rest by Derby 
himself. After receiving copies of Walsh's 
correspondence with Craig, he denied committing the War 
Office to any plans for an Ulster Territorial Division. 
Derby's response could have served as a useful warning to 
anyone dealing with Sir James Craig. 'It just goes to 
show how careful one ought to be not to make any casual 
remark which can be construed into a definite statement
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of policy', he ruefully admitted.79
'A very dangerous topic'
By the time Derby penned those words, Bonar Law was 
dead. A victim of throat cancer, he resigned as prime 
minister on 20 May 1923 and did not live to see the end 
of the year. Shortly before Bonar Law's resignation, 
Cosgrave wrote to inform him of the 'collapse of armed 
resistance' and the end of the Irish Civil War. Unaware 
of Bonar Law's condition, the Free State president 
suggested that it would soon be time for their 
governments to make ready for the Boundary Commission.80 
Four days later Bonar Law stepped down as prime minister.
One last time the poisoned chalice had passed from 
his lips. Bonar Law could go to his grave, the 
uncompromising champion of Ulster. According to his 
biographer, Northern Ireland's existence was his legacy 
as much as, if not more than, Edward Carson's or James 
Craig's.81
What Bonar Law would have done about the boundary 
issue had his health not given way can be no more than a 
matter for speculation. One possible answer was given 
nearly a year after his death by former Canadian Prime 
Minister Sir Robert Borden. According to Borden, Bonar
79Ibid, Craig to Walsh, 23 January 1924? Walsh to 
Craig, 25 February 1924? Craig to Walsh, 28 February 1924? 
Walsh to Craig, 6 March 1924? Craig to Walsh, 11 March 
1924? Derby to Kenneth Lyon, 17 March 1924.
8°Cosgrave to Bonar Law, 16 May 1923, D/T, S 1801/C.
81Blake, Unknown Prime Minister, p. 531.
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Law was 'prepared to let Ireland go', meaning that he 
would have accepted the declaration of a republic in the
South.82 If this is true, it is likely that Bonar Law
would have gone along with such a declaration not so much 
as an acceptance of the will of the Irish people, but as
a way of scuppering once and for all any chance of
reconciliation and re-union between North and South. 
Moreover, by the time of his death, support for this 
trade-off was gaining ground in both Conservative and 
Unionist ranks.83 Yet such a solution would have 
required a good deal of explanation. Under Bonar Law, it 
was a Tory article of faith that an Irish republic would 
be a direct threat to the future of the British Empire.
Bonar Law held his country's highest elected office 
for only 210 days. In that short time, Britain's Irish 
policy veered further away from the course that had been 
charted in December 1921. The Boundary Commission was 
indefinitely postponed; the Council of Ireland, too, was 
put on hold. Equally important, under Bonar Law the 
process of altering the Treaty's financial clauses was 
advanced so that these, too, would no longer pose a 
threat to Northern Ireland's existence. His feat has 
gone largely unrecognised, then or since, an unknown 
triumph for the 'Unknown Prime Minister'.
82Borden to Beaverbrook, 9 October 1924, BBK C/51.
83See e.g., 'Ireland, Rome, and the Republicans', 
Quarterly Review. No. 477, October 1923, p. 415. Churchill 
to Curtis, 8 September 1924, Curtis Papers, MSS 89, ff. 89- 
90.
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Ever the pessimist, he himself seems not to have 
realized his accomplishment. A few weeks after leaving 
Downing Street, Bonar Law was paid a visit by the 
Cabinet's assistant secretary, Tom Jones. The dying man 
thought his successor was making a good start as prime 
minister. Nevertheless, he confided to Jones, 'the real 
trouble' for Stanley Baldwin 'would be over the Boundary 
Commission - it was a very dangerous topic.'84
So it was. But the rest of the Treaty's Ulster 
clauses, the ones designed to bring about economic 
pressure on Northern Ireland, had largely been rendered 
impotent. This change marked a serious blow for the 
prospects of Irish unity, a change that might never have 
taken place but for the return of Bonar Law to politics.
84Jones diary, 10 June 1923, Vol. Ill, p. 221.
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Chapter 5 
Mr Baldwin Takes Charge
The fact is that a big fight is coining 
on in Great Britain over the Protection
issue and they are unable to think of any­
thing else.
- Eoin MacNeill1
As the Irish negotiations edged to their climax on 
the evening of 5 December 1921, at least one member of 
the British Cabinet was unmoved by the history being made 
round about him. 'It's rather a depressed SB this 
afternoon', Stanley Baldwin confided to a friend, 'for I 
have been done out of my dinner at Trinity (and a stay at 
the Lodge, if you please!)'.2
Unlike the man he was destined to succeed as prime 
minister, Baldwin had never shown much interest in Irish
affairs. Those who knew him would not have been
surprised that he found a reunion at his old college far 
more congenial than awaiting the outcome of the Irish 
negotiations, however dramatic that might be. By his own 
reckoning, Baldwin's feelings about Ireland were those of 
'an ordinary rank-and-file member of the Unionist [i.e. 
Conservative] Party'.3 The description was apt. Like 
most Tories, Baldwin had little sympathy for the 
Nationalist cause and, like most Tories, what views he
MacNeill to O'Higgins, 2 November 1923, D/T, S 1801/C.
2Baldwin to J.C.C. Davidson, 5 December 1921, Davidson 
Papers.
3S. Baldwin, 'Why I Support the Irish Agreement', 
Popular View. Vol. I, No. 9, January 1922, p. 3.
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did have were coloured by a degree of anti-Catholic 
prejudice.4
As president of the Board of Trade in the Coalition 
government, Baldwin was bound to support the Irish 
Treaty. He spoke in favour of it in the House of Commons 
and wrote at least one article explaining 'Why I Support 
the Irish Agreement'.5 This support, however, was 
conditional. The Free State must remain a faithful 
member of the Commonwealth and, more importantly,
Ulster's 'equal rights' within the United Kingdom must 
not be disturbed. 'Whether in years to come she thinks 
fit to enter a United Irish Parliament', he wrote in the 
Popular View, 'is her business and her business alone.' 
Baldwin was among those who saw the Treaty as a final 
settlement, a new status quo, and like most other 'rank 
and file' Conservatives he was more than happy to see the 
Irish problem disappear from Britain's political agenda.6 
In that sense, Baldwin much more than Bonar Law reflected 
the true spirit of the Conservative Party after 1918.
Yet, however much they may have desired to put the 
Irish question behind themselves, post-war Conservatives 
could not walk away from Ireland, and this proved to be 
truer for Baldwin than for most. The history of the
4K. Middlemas and J. Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography
(London, 1969), p. 67.
5HC Deb. Vol. 149, Col. 119-124, 14 December 1921.
6Baldwin 'went out of his way to identify with the rank 
and file' of the Tory Party, a point made in John Ramsden's 
discussion of the 'New Conservatism'. See Balfour and 
Baldwin, p. 207-215.
195
Conservative Party in the first years after the fall of 
Lloyd George is above all the story of men seeking first 
to reunite former Coalitionists with their Tory 
opponents, before going on to re-establish the party as 
the dominant player in British politics. In their 
hearts, most Conservatives were glad that the Coalition 
had produced the Irish Treaty, that it was 'impossible to 
put the clock back to 1920'.7 But because Ireland's most 
contentious issue - the relationship between North and 
South - had not been settled, this conflict was bound to 
re-emerge, thus threatening to upset the party's drive 
toward unity and electoral dominance.
For Baldwin in particular, the events that took 
place on the night of 5-6 December 1921 continued to 
shadow his career. As chancellor of the exchequer, he
had already played an important role in altering the
contours of that settlement, making it less likely that 
financial considerations would spur the two Irish 
governments toward unity. Now, as leader of his country, 
it was left to him to face, what his predecessor had
called that 'very dangerous topic'.
'Indefinite postponement'
When Conservative MPs met to confirm Baldwin as 
their leader in May 1923, the most 'striking feature' of 
the gathering was the 'appeal for unity within the 
party'. Baldwin picked up on this theme in his
7'The End of the Coalition', Quarterly Review. No. 474, 
January 1923, p. 212. Also, see Cowling, Impact of Labour, 
p. 127-128.
196
acceptance speech, appealing to his followers to 'avoid 
any discussions that may prevent or delay a final and a 
complete reunion' which, he hinted, might be brought 
about 'at no very distant date'.8
Despite these warm words and a 'now or never' appeal 
from his followers, Austen Chamberlain refused to have 
anything to do with the party he once led. From Paris, 
he issued a letter freeing his colleagues from 'any 
obligations arising out of our joint action in the Irish 
Treaty and last October' (i.e. the Carlton Club meeting) 
so that they could accept office in the new government.9 
Chamberlain was under no illusions 'as to my unpopularity 
with the Die-hards', who now dominated the Tory inner 
circle. Much as Baldwin might wish to restore party 
unity, many in the Cabinet opposed Chamberlain's 
inclusion in the leadership, and they were even more 
vehemently hostile toward Birkenhead.10
Chamberlain's foes had not forgotten the part that 
he and Birkenhead had played in the Treaty negotiations. 
Above all, the two stood condemned for the settlement's 
Ulster clauses, which the Belfast News-Letter called 'as
8'Prime Minister as Leader', The Times. 29 May 1923.
^orthington-Evans to Chamberlain, 22 May 1923? 
Chamberlain to Worthington-Evans, 24 May 1923? and 
Chamberlain to Birkenhead, 31 May 1923, AC 35/2/2, 6, and 
18.
10Peel to Reading, 30 May 1923, 10, MSS Eur. E. 238/6, 
No. 17.
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gross a betrayal as it is possible to imagine.'11 In 
November 1922, Chamberlain attempted to refute these 
allegations, telling delegates from the Ulster Unionist 
Council that he believed the Boundary Commission would 
make only minor readjustments to the Irish frontier. But 
he then went on to say that the current border was 
neither a 'logical or good boundary'. Worse, he admitted 
that the Coalition 'never affected to believe that the 
Act of 1920 could be permanent.'12
Chamberlain compounded his woes the following 
spring, when he involved himself in a very public 
exchange over allegations that a 'Ministerial 
undertaking' was given to Irish leaders guaranteeing that 
the Treaty would end partition.13 Although Chamberlain 
was absolved of any responsibility for the pledge, the 
timing of this incident could not have been worse. When, 
finally, he and Baldwin met, Chamberlain had little 
choice but to accept Baldwin's explanation that he had 
simply 'never thought of' including Austen in his new
lx'Mr. Chamberlain and Ulster', Belfast News-Letter. 2 
November 1922.
12Ibid. Also, see 'Mr. Chamberlain and Ulster', The 
Times, 2 November 1922.
13'The Irish Revolution', 12 May 1923; 'Irish 
Settlement. Mr. A. Chamberlain on Partition', 18 May 1923; 
'Irish Partition. The Alleged Promise', 25 May 1923; and 
'Irish Boundary. The Alleged Secret Understanding', 12 
September 1923, all in The Times. Also see, W. O'Brien, 
The Irish Revolution and How It Came About (Dublin, 1923), 
p. 441-445, which claims that the assurance was given by 
Churchill and Lloyd George.
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government.14 In fact, Baldwin was dissembling, because 
he gave the idea a good deal of thought.
As a formality on Baldwin's assumption of the 
premiership, all members of the Cabinet tendered their 
resignations. As told to Neville Chamberlain, the Duke 
of Devonshire offered to step down from the Colonial 
Office to make way for another appointee if that would 
help to restore party unity. 'Accordingly', Neville 
wrote in his diary, 'Baldwin had thought of offering the 
C.O. to Austen but had reflected that he would be 
prejudiced by his Irish record (!)'.15 Neville 
Chamberlain's story was confirmed a few days later by 
Lord Peel. Two issues stood in the way of Austen's 
return to the party's inner circle, Peel told India's 
viceroy. The lesser of the charges was that 'he had 
shown little friendliness' towards Bonar Law's 
government. The graver charge, the one that his 
colleagues still could not forgive, was that 'he had been 
one of the signatories of the Treaty with Ireland'.16
Much as Chamberlain wished to put Ireland behind
“Chamberlain memorandum, 27 May 1923, AC 35/2/ll(b).
“Chamberlain diary, 1 June 1923, NC 2/21. The source 
for this story was Bonar Law. If Devonshire's offer was 
made in writing, Baldwin seems not to have kept it. But 
see the cryptic postscript in Devonshire to Baldwin, 23 May 
1923, SB Vol. 42, ff. 46. According to Worthington-Evans, 
Baldwin told Robert Horne that he had intended to offer the 
Colonial Office to Chamberlain but changed his mind after 
learning 'that Conservative feeling was strongly against 
Austen' in both Cabinet and party circles. See memorandum, 
undated, W-E, MSS Eng. his., c. 894, ff. 32-42.
“Peel to Reading, 12 June 1923, 10, MSS Eur. E. 238/6, 
No. 20.
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him, the Die-hards were unwilling to forgive or to 
forget.17 In late June, Ronald McNeill, now a junior 
minister in Baldwin's government, used the first 
anniversary of Sir Henry Wilson's assassination to mount 
a savage attack on Coalition leaders. Lloyd George, 
'jointly with Mr Austen Chamberlain, was the author' of 
the policy that led directly to Wilson's killing, McNeill 
told his audience. As well as attacking Chamberlain, the 
speech provoked a sharp reaction from Dublin which, for a 
time, Baldwin feared would cause a 'serious reaction' 
within the party.18
Even without these distractions, it was going to be 
impossible for Baldwin to ignore the Irish Question for 
long. Less than three weeks after he took over as prime 
minister, Cosgrave informed Britain's new leader that the 
Irish government soon would be ready to present its case 
to the Boundary Commission.19 The day after Cosgrave 
wrote, Tom Jones discussed the problem with Bonar Law, 
and the two agreed that it could cause Baldwin 'real
17Lord Crawford found it amusing, 'in a grim fashion', 
that while the Die-hards would not forgive Chamberlain for 
his role in the Irish Treaty, they were willing to accept 
the former Liberal Reginald McKenna as chancellor of the 
exchequer, even though he had been 'the bitterest opponent 
of Ulster'. See Crawford diary, 26 May 1923, p. 483-484.
18'Irish Chaos. Mr. R. McNeill's Reply to Mr. Lloyd 
George', Morning Post. 25 June 1923. Curtis to Masterton- 
Smith, 26 June 1923? and Cosgrave to Baldwin, 27 June 1923, 
CO 739/18/34181. Baldwin to Cosgrave, 2 July 1923? and ? 
to Curtis, 3 July 1923, SB Vol. 99, ff. 8-10. Incidents
like this occurred throughout Baldwin's first government. 
See, e.g., Curtis to Jones [letter excerpt], 3 October 
1923, Vol. Ill, p. 225.
19Cosgrave to Baldwin, 9 June 1923, CO 739/18/30127.
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trouble'. In that case, it might be best to play for an 
'indefinite postponement' of the entire issue.20
Whether or not Jones passed on the advice, these two 
words became the alpha and omega of Baldwin's Irish 
policy for the next six months. Baldwin, like Bonar Law, 
avoided public discussion of the issue whenever he could 
and was evasive when he could not.21 The issue was 
quarantined in the Colonial Office by Devonshire and his 
subordinates. Never, during Baldwin's first government 
was the boundary question discussed in Cabinet.22
The right 'psychological moment'
While avoiding the boundary question may have been 
an option for Baldwin, it was not for Cosgrave. No 
longer fettered by the diversion of civil war, Free State 
leaders faced increasing pressure to direct the same 
energy toward ending partition as they had devoted in 
their fight against the Irregulars of the IRA.23 Such 
criticism was particularly galling when it came from 
Northern Nationalists who were themselves divided over 
how to achieve re-unification. In fact, Nationalists in 
the six counties were bitterly split into several
2°Jones diary, 10 June 1923, Vol. Ill, p. 221.
21See, e.g., Baldwin's exchange with Oswald Mosley in 
HC Deb. Vol. 167, Col. 1699-1700, 2 August 1923.
22Although the Cabinet held several discussions on 
disputes with Dublin over compensation payments and land 
purchases, there was no discussion of the boundary issue 
between 30 May 1923 and 22 January 1924. See CAB 23/46.
23'Boundary Commission - Memorandum', 11 July 1923, 
D/T, S 1801/C.
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factions. These divisions included not only pro- and 
anti-Treatyites. There was also the older rift between 
Sinn Fein and the Irish Parliamentary Party led by Joseph 
Devlin. This second division, in part, mirrored yet 
another split. On one side were those in the border 
counties who expected to be transferred to the Free State 
by the Boundary Commission. On the other were those 
Nationalists living in eastern Ulster, especially 
Belfast, who could expect no such 'rescue'. Their 
position would be made considerably worse if any boundary 
award did not end partition entirely but, instead, left 
them in an even more homogenous Protestant state.24
This latter group, overwhelmingly Devlinite in its 
political allegiance, had been highly critical of 
Cosgrave's Northern policy throughout the Civil War. The 
corrosive effect of such criticism soon told on Free 
State supporters. One of these supporters was John Henry 
Collins, a Newry solicitor recently employed by the Free 
State's North-Eastern Boundary Bureau. Collins's primary 
job for the bureau was to gather evidence to present to 
the Boundary Commission; his other duty was to 'keep in 
touch' with Nationalist sentiment in his area.25 As 
early as January 1923, Collins warned bureau director 
Kevin O'Shiel of growing scepticism 'about the honesty 
and bona-fides of your Government'. Although the Civil
24See Phoenix, Northern Nationalism, for a detailed
history of these divisions.
25Ibid, p. 173, 259-260.
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War had not yet been won, Collins pressed for the
Boundary Commission's immediate establishment, to 'have
the thing brought to a head'. As long as the panel
worked 'honestly and quickly', he told O'Shiel, 'I cannot
conceive of anything that will be of greater assistance
to the Irish government'.26
O'Shiel's response was one Collins may have
reflected on bitterly in later years. The Northern
Nationalists had to be 'patient', O'Shiel told Collins,
and judge the Free State 'not by their fears of what they
think it may do, but by the ultimate results of the
issue.'27 By early May, however, the situation was, if
anything, worse. 'One thing I can tell you', Collins
wrote to another bureau official,
and I cannot emphasise it enough - that the longer 
you leave these Counties in the position they are 
in without enforcing the Boundary Commission, the 
worse it is for the Irish Supporters here ... it 
is hard to convince them that the South has not 
abandoned them entirely.
It is time ... that something definite was 
stated from Dublin regarding the Commission.28
Such advice was not taken kindly in the Irish
capital. When a delegation of Northern Nationalists
requested a meeting to press their demands, the minutes
of the Executive Council, Ireland's Cabinet, noted that
they brought with them a resolution 'breathing' a 'spirit
26Collins to O'Shiel, 27 January 1923, J.H. Collins 
Papers, D.921/2/4/1.
270'Shiel to Collins, 30 January 1923, J.H. Collins 
Papers, D.921/2/4/2.
28Collins to E.M. Stephens, 8 May 1923, J.H. Collins 
Papers, D.921/2/4/90.
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of hostility to the Free State Government'. Eoin 
MacNeill, the minister of education, and O'Shiel were 
instructed to tell the delegates that the government was 
'making active and unceasing preparations for the 
Commission' but that it would not act until the right 
'psychological moment.' At the same time, the 
Nationalists were warned that their Southern allies would 
not 'allow themselves to be stampeded into any hasty 
action./29
The charge often levelled against the Free State's 
founding fathers is that the deaths of Griffith and 
Collins 'sanctified' the Treaty so that it became for 
them not a means to an end but an end in itself.30 While 
true in one sense, this accusation paints an incomplete 
picture. Although the Civil War was over, the country 
was just beginning to reckon with its cost, and the 
Ulster guestion was not the only concern bearing down on 
Cosgrave and his colleagues.
The Free State was shattered physically, emotionally 
and, on a more immediate if prosaic level, financially. 
Detractors were quick to contrast conditions in the 
'stable' North with those in the 'unstable' South. While 
Craig's government could boast a small budget surplus of 
£32,042, the Free State was saddled with a staggering
29Executive Council Minutes, 14 May 1923, D/T, G 2/2, 
C.1/106.
3°Fanning, Independent Ireland, p. 42. According to 
Roy Foster, 'the dominant pre-occupation of the regime was 
self-definition against Britain'. See Modern Ireland. p. 
516.
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deficit of £26 million, the greater part of which, the 
Annual Register reported, 'was directly due to the losses 
entailed by the Republican campaign of destruction.' In 
1923-24 alone, fully 37 per cent of the new country's 
revenue was spent on defence or compensation for personal 
injury or property damage resulting from the Civil War.31
This burden of debt would not begin to ease until
the end of the decade. Until then it would be a
continual source of weakness which the southern Irish
could not ignore in their dealings with Britain. 'When
the Free State was founded', Kevin 0'Higgins's biographer 
noted, 'it was probably the only country in the world 
without a National Debt'. A year later, 'it was on the 
verge of bankruptcy.'32
Given this situation, Cosgrave and his lieutenants 
hardly can be blamed for concentrating on the necessary, 
if mundane, duties of building a new state. Nor is it 
logical to claim that because the Free State's leaders 
focused their attention on implementing the Treaty 
settlement, they were willing to forsake their Northern 
brethren. One did not preclude the other, and there is 
no reason to doubt Cosgrave's sincerity when he said that 
Article 12 was 'just as vital as any other clause of the 
Treaty./33
31Annual Register: 1923. p. 151, 155. Fanning,
Independent Irelandf p. 39.
32White, O'Hiaains. p. 151.
33'President Cosgrave in Tirconaill', Ulster Herald. 18 
August 1923.
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The dilemma facing Ireland's new leaders was more 
complicated than that. Much as they desired to end 
partition, the Free Staters also had to show that de 
Valera and the Republicans were wrong, that the Treaty 
gave Ireland real independence.34 The problem was that 
whenever these two goals collided the Dublin government 
found that asserting Irish independence was far more 
likely to produce results than was making sacrifices for 
Irish unity.
Further complicating the Free State's Ulster policy 
was Bonar Law's victory in the 1922 general election. In 
a December memorandum, Kevin O'Shiel reminded the 
Executive Council that the 'object' of the Free State's 
Ulster policy, which was 'not the setting up of a 
Boundary Commission' but the larger goal of 'National 
Union'. With 'a strong Conservative government in power 
in Great Britain', O'Shiel pointed out, the Commission 
might further entrench partition, not end it.35
Despite this concern, in early June the Executive 
Council met to consider the 'maximum' and 'minimum' 
territorial claims that the Free State could make to the 
Boundary Commission. Were the Commission to base its 
findings solely on the wishes of the inhabitants and to
34At this time, e.g., the government became involved in 
a prolonged wrangle with London over its decision to issue
its own passports and to establish an embassy in the United 
States. See G. MacMillan, 'British Subjects and Irish 
Citizens: The Passport Controversy, 1923-24', Eire-Ireland. 
Vol. XXVI, No. 3, p. 25-50.
35Quoted in Lee, Ireland, p. 143-144.
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the exclusion of 'every conceivable geographic and 
economic principle', Northern Ireland would be reduced to 
a rump consisting of nothing more than 'Co. Antrim, the 
extreme north east corner of Co. Derry, a portion of 
north and mid Armagh (excluding Armagh City) and north 
and mid Co. Down.'
A more realistic claim, and the one O'Shiel felt was 
'the best possible line' to take before the Commission, 
would still give the Free State all of Ireland 'except 
Co. Antrim, the extreme east portion of Co. Tyrone 
bordering Lough Neagh, the eastern half of Co. Derry, the 
northern portion of Co. Armagh and the northern portion 
of Co. Down.' This latter claim, O'Shiel told the 
Executive Council, 'should be regarded as the minimum 
claim of the Free State beyond which they could not 
recede.'36
'Grave political disadvantages': the Irish tariff
The Boundary Commission was not the only vehicle by 
which the Dublin government hoped to convince Ulster 
Unionists of the folly of partition. In late February 
1923, Cosgrave surprised the British by announcing the 
erection of a customs barrier to begin operations on 1 
April.37 The Free Staters seem to have thought that they 
could achieve two goals with this one act. Besides 
generating income for the struggling government, the
36Executive Council Minutes, 5 June 1923, D/T, G 2/2,
C.1/116. Phoenix, Northern Nationalism, p. 288-289.
37Loughnane to Curtis, 23 February 1923, CO
739/20/11976.
Map of Free State claims to Northern Ireland 
territory, based on Poor Law Unions 
Source: North-Eastern Boundary Bureau, Handbook of 
the Ulster Question (Dublin, 1923), p. 52.
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tariff would be an obvious demonstration of Irish 
independence. Second, imposing a tariff was in keeping 
with the strategy outlined by Collins if the Ulster 
Unionists refused to come into an all-Ireland government. 
The resulting economic war, Collins had promised one 
County Derry ally, would be 'in the nature of Tariffs far 
far more effective than the Boycott ever was.'38
But of the two goals, it was clear that unity took 
second place. According to N.G. Loughnane, the Colonial 
Office's representative in Dublin, the Free Staters 
settled on their tariff policy 'without, apparently, 
having given the matter serious - or at least adequate - 
consideration.' Evidently, they believed that the 
British government was itself about to establish tariff 
barriers. The Irish set theirs up first, Hugh Kennedy 
told Loughnane, 'in order to demonstrate the Free State's 
independence of British control.' Timothy Healy,
Ireland's governor general, dismissed this sort of 
thinking as 'madness'. By making Northern goods more 
expensive in the South, he predicted that 'in a few 
months time the Catholic population of Tyrone and 
Fermanagh will be given a financial interest in partition 
which ... will not tend to improve the Free State 
position if the Boundary Commission should be set up at 
an early date.' Cosgrave admitted that establishing the 
customs barrier was going to cause 'grave political 
disadvantages' in North-South relations? but, by then, it
38Collins to Walsh, 7 February 1922, D/T, S 9241.
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was too late to go back.39
Dublin's leaders had demonstrated that the Irish 
Free State was indeed, sovereign - though at a cost.
Less than a year after the decision to erect a customs 
barrier was announced, the Boundary Bureau's secretary 
pointed out that with the fiscal systems of Ireland's two 
parts diverging, 'new vested interests spring up', making 
re-unification 'daily more difficult.'40
Elections, 1923: The Irish Free State
The need to demonstrate Ireland's independence was 
made urgent by the fact that the Free State Constitution 
required the government to call elections before the end 
of 1923. Unpopular in some quarters for their ruthless 
suppression of the Irregulars, and in others because the 
Irish economy was in a slump, Cosgrave and his colleagues 
felt that they had to play the national card to ward off 
de Valera and Sinn Fein. They could ill-afford to be 
vulnerable on the Ulster question, and this explains why 
Cosgrave began to press first Bonar Law and then Baldwin 
to call the Boundary Commission into being.41
Opinion in the Executive Council was sharply divided 
over how the boundary would develop as an election issue. 
Although they agreed that 'progress must have been made 
in the matter of the Boundary Commission before the
39Loughnane to Curtis, 27 February 1923; Loughnane to
Curtis, 28 February 1923; and Curtis to Loughnane, 24
February 1923, CO 739/20/11976.
4°Stephens to McGann, 18 January 1924, D/T, S 1801/D.
41Lee, Ireland, p. 94.
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coming General Election', Free State leaders realised 
that they could not predict with any certainty how events 
would play out once set in motion.42 Provided that the 
British government did not respond too quickly to the 
Irish request, Cosgrave and his associates could go to 
the electorate without having to explain what they would 
do if, as expected, Craig's government formally refused 
to name its Commissioner. Others in the Dublin ministry 
feared just the opposite, that the British would generate 
'extended delays at every stage', exposing the Free 
Staters to a charge of impotence. Still another faction 
believed that Craig's refusal could itself be turned to 
their advantage, if the government called on Irish voters 
to rally behind their 'efforts to compel the terms of the 
Treaty to be carried out.'43
On 19 July Healy formally notified Devonshire that 
Eoin MacNeill had been chosen as the Free State's 
Boundary Commissioner.44 The next day Cosgrave made the 
appointment public, telling Dail Eireann that 'the 
opportune moment has arrived to give effect to the 
remaining provisions of Article 12'.45 That did not
42'Boundary Commission - Memorandum', 11 July 1923, 
D/T, S 1801/C.
43Ibid.
44Healy to Devonshire, 19 July 1923, Cmd. 2155; 
Correspondence Between His Majesty's Government and the
Irish Free State and Northern Ireland Relating to Article 
12 of the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty Between Great 
Britain and Ireland (London, 1924), No. 1.
45Dail Deb. Vol. 4, Col. 1223-1225, 20 July 1923.
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mean, however, that he was looking for an immediate 
British response. Far from it. As Devonshire explained 
to Baldwin, 'We know that Mr Cosgrave does not want or 
expect that anything further should be done while the 
elections are in progress'.46 In this, Baldwin and his 
colonial secretary were only too willing to co-operate.
In his 20 July letter to Baldwin, Devonshire 
proposed that after the Irish election Cosgrave and Craig 
should be invited to London to see if they could reach a 
mutual agreement on the boundary. Despite the 
willingness of both Irish leaders to meet with one 
another, the portents for a such a conference were not 
good. Cosgrave and Craig met at least twice during the 
Civil War and failed to see eye to eye on any matters of 
importance.47 When Cosgrave raised the boundary question 
at one such meeting, Craig was stubbornly 'unreceptive' 
and would not even discuss the issue. The meeting 
fizzled out with the two men reduced to a pointless 
conversation about 'cricket and the weather.'48 Craig 
later dismissed the incident, telling his Cabinet that 
although Cosgrave had raised the boundary question 'there 
was little discussion between them on the subject.'49
Ulster's premier had, however, been thinking about 
the problem and had concluded that, unless Baldwin 'stuck
46Devonshire to Baldwin, 20 July 1923, CO 739/18/36328.
47Ibid. Hopkinson, Green Against Green, p. 252.
48Curtis to Devonshire, 30 July 1923, CO 739/20/42192.
49Cabinet Conclusions, 30 July 1923, PRONI, CAB4/84/12.
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to the Treaty', the British would find themselves in 'a 
great difficulty.' But by honouring the agreement, Craig 
believed that his friends in London would then be faced 
with one of two alternatives. Either the imperial 
government could ask the Ulster Unionists to name their 
representative to the Boundary Commission (which they 
would refuse to do); or Baldwin could inform Cosgrave 
that he was willing to appoint a Boundary Commission 
chairman 'as soon as the Northern Government has 
appointed their representative.'
This was Craig's preferred option. It 'would lead 
naturally to the Free State approaching us about the 
appointment of our representative and the guestion 
generally' and, in time, to an 'amicable' settlement. He 
even suggested the problem might not even get that far. 
Once the Free State elections were out of the way, Craig 
felt that 'the whole agitation will very likely die 
down.'50
On the face of it, such optimism was ill-founded.
The Ulster Unionist press was guick to label MacNeill's 
Boundary Commission appointment an election 'stunt'.
Craig himself publicly slammed the door on any 
accommodation with Dublin and again refused to appoint a 
Commissioner.51
South of the border, Cosgrave and his colleagues
5°Ibid.
51'Irish Boundary "Crisis." Ulster Premier's 
Declaration', Manchester Guardian. 23 July 1923.
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seemed to be no less determined. To audiences throughout 
the country they made expansive claims for what could be 
expected from a Boundary Commission award, claims that 
could not be justified even in the heat of an electoral 
campaign. The Free State's case 'was a good one', Ernest 
Blythe said in one speech, and the South was 'bound to be 
awarded a very considerable tract of territory.'
Cosgrave was even less reticent. 'If there are any 
people who think we are going to allow any clause of the 
Treaty to be inoperative, they are making a very grave 
mistake', he declared. What many voters failed to notice 
was that these pledges were conditional. As Blythe 
admitted to an audience at Clones, Free Staters could 
expect this promised award only if the Commission was led 
by 'a fair chairman' - and that was something the Dublin 
government could in no way guarantee.52
Moreover, by this time Cosgrave had secretly 
committed himself to Devonshire's conference proposal 
even though this would effectively scrap the Boundary 
Commission. 'It will cost me a good deal of support 
among my followers', he told Curtis when the idea was put 
to him informally. But he believed that this 'is the way 
in which it ought to be settled.'53
Publicly, however, the government's new political
52'The Boundary Commission. After the Free State
Election', 4 August 1923; and 'President Cosgrave in 
Tirconaill', 18 August 1923, Ulster Herald.
53Curtis to Jones [letter excerpt], 28 June 1923, Vol.
Ill, p. 222.
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party, Cumann na nGaedheal, was still committed to the 
Boundary Commission when the country went to the polls on 
27 August. The results, according to one contemporary 
source, were a 'smashing defeat for the Republicans', 
given that Independent, Labour, and Farmer 
representatives, as well as Cumann na nGaedheal, all 
backed the Treaty settlement. But as a later analysis 
pointed out, the 'overall result' of the election was 
that Cosgrave now headed a minority government. Had it 
not been for de Valera's refusal to lead Sinn Fein's 
forty-four TDs into the Dail, the Free State's founders 
would have been forced to form a coalition. Instead, 
they found themselves in a situation where they could 
take decisions 'characterised by a boldness rarely 
associated with minority governments.'54 This was to 
have a telling impact when the boundary question reached 
its climax in 1925.
'Saving England's face'
On 22 September Devonshire formally invited Cosgrave 
to the proposed boundary conference with Baldwin and 
Craig.55 Among Cosgrave's advisers, the invitation 
aroused deep misgivings. The North-Eastern Boundary 
Bureau's secretary, E.M. Stephens, pointed out that the 
Free State had little to gain and much to lose from such 
a meeting. The 'rights of the Free State on the Boundary
54Annual Register: 1923. p. 156. O'Leary, Irish
Elections, p. 21-22. Lee, Ireland, p. 94-95.
55Devonshire to Healy, 22 September 1923, Cmd. 2155.
No. 4.
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question are secured', he observed, whereas 'the very 
fact of entering a conference suggests that they are 
going to be reduced.' At the same time, the conference 
might be used to 'let England slip out of her liabilities 
in the matter' and allow the British to 'escape the 
odium' of breaching the Treaty should Northern Ireland 
refuse to name its Boundary Commissioner. Stephens saw 
no reason for 'saving England's face'.56
O'Shiel felt that if the Free State accepted 
Devonshire's invitation, conditions must be attached.
Like Stephens, O'Shiel believed that any conference 
concerned solely with Article 12 was not in the Free 
State's interest. Both men urged the government not to 
have anything to do with the conference unless its goal 
was Irish unity. Barring that, the Free State should 
attend only if the British guaranteed that in the event 
of a breakdown they would 'enforce the Boundary clause by 
delivering to us the areas where our supporters are in a 
majority, whether the North consents or not.' Otherwise, 
O'Shiel forecast, the cry would go up among Northern 
Nationalists that they had been 'betrayed again'.
O'Shiel also suggested that Cosgrave could use the 
recent Irish election results to his advantage. The 
forty-four Sinn Fein TDs were a 'blessing in disguise, as 
they will enable us to ... drive a harder bargain than we 
could have done, say before the last Election.' Their
56Stephens to O'Higgins, 25 September 1923, D/T, S 
1801/C.
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mere presence, hovering at the entrance of Dail Eireann, 
would allow Cosgrave to be uncompromising in his demands. 
'We can blame everything on them and the British cannot 
say anything in reply7, he wrote.57
Nor were these the only advantages now at hand. In 
another show of independence, the Free State that autumn 
gained its own seat at the League of Nations. By making 
specific reference to the Boundary Commission when 
defining the state7s frontiers in their League 
application, Irish representatives shifted the Ulster 
Question from the realm of British politics and 
potentially made it a cause for international concern.58 
'We can no longer say, as we could formerly about the 
whole Irish question, that it is an internal matter7,
M.E. Antrobus pointed out after the Free State 
application was accepted. The Irish, Antrobus feared, 
might claim that they 'had cause for complaint against 
us, in that we have not carried out the Treaty by 
delaying to appoint the Boundary Commission.759
57Ibid. 0 7Shiel to Cosgrave, 5 October 1923, D/T, S 
1801/C.
58The link between the Free State7s League application 
and the boundary issue was drawn by 07Shiel in 'Memo. Some 
Possible Dangers in the N.E. Situation7, undated, D/T, S 
1801/C. Also, see D. Harkness, The Restless Dominion; The 
Irish Free State and the British Commonwealth of Nations. 
1921-31 (London, 1969), p. 35-37. Lavin, Curtis, p. 213- 
215.
59Antrobus to Curtis, 19 September 1923, CO 
739/25/45749. According to Lee, Ireland, p. 144, as early 
as April, 07Shiel had advised the Executive Council to 
delay any moves on the boundary question until the Free 
State could appeal against an unsatisfactory decision 
either to the League or to the Imperial Conference.
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As Curtis warned British League delegates Lord 
Robert Cecil and Edward Wood, such an appeal might occur 
if, as expected, Northern Ireland refused to appoint its 
Boundary Commissioner. A declaration by Baldwin's 
government that it could not enforce Article 12 might 
then provoke an Irish appeal for League intervention.
The alternatives were just as unappealing. Baldwin could 
appoint Ulster's representative, or London itself could 
act on Belfast's behalf on the Commission. Either of 
these options, though, required additional legislation. 
'Such a proposal', Curtis predicted, 'might seriously 
divide the Govt, supporters and even the Cabinet.'60
Despite these advantages, Cosgrave failed to make 
any attempt to strengthen his hand. Without any 
conditions whatsoever, the Free State government accepted 
Devonshire's invitation, suggesting only that the 
conferees should address 'the present unsatisfactory 
position of Northern Ireland in relation to the rest of 
the country'.61 Cosgrave made no attempt to use the Sinn 
Fein threat nor did he even hint at a possible appeal to 
the League of Nations.
Why?
6°Curtis to Devonshire, 10 September 1923, CO 
739/20/49361. Wood later claimed that the Free State's 
League application implied a 'narrower interpretation of 
the Boundary Commission's functions'. Even so, his 'devout 
hope' was that the issue should never be raised in the 
international forum. See Wood to Curtis, 9 September 1924, 
JRM, PRO 30/69/61.
61Healy to Devonshire, 8 October 1923, No. 7? for 
Craig's acceptance, see Abercorn to Bridgeman, 13 October 
1923, No. 8, both in Cmd. 2155.
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Given political conditions in Britain, the Irish 
president may have felt that a hard-line stance would be 
counter-productive and that it was anyway better to play 
for time. As O'Shiel himself pointed out, a Conservative 
government was hardly likely to nominate a Boundary 
Commission chairman who would be sympathetic to Free 
State claims. This view was also shared by Tim Healy.
The Free State's governor general informed Cosgrave and 
his colleagues that, according to a 'leading personage in 
political and journalistic circles in England', Bonar Law 
continued to back the Ulster cause even in retirement. 
'[A]s long as he wields his present influence', Healy 
warned, 'quarters that might otherwise be friendly will 
not be inclined to assist us openly.'62 Cosgrave 
possibly felt that it was better to be seen as co­
operating with the British initiative when delay was, 
anyway, the best option.
A simpler explanation may be that Cosgrave said what 
he meant: that the boundary question ought to be settled 
between the two Irish governments with as little outside 
interference as possible. This would account for the 
fact that the Executive Council seems never to have 
seriously considered taking the issue to the League of 
Nations. Yet, either of these possibilities fails to 
account for a third factor. By late 1923 Cosgrave knew 
better than anyone that Craig was impervious to
62'Boundary Commission - Memorandum', 11 July 1923, 
D/T, S 1801/C. Healy's likely source was Beaverbrook.
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negotiation on this issue. In that case, a conference 
was going to be a waste of time. Perhaps Cosgrave hoped 
that by being reasonable he would garner British support 
at Craig's expense. But there is no direct evidence that 
he ever took this into consideration, leaving a question 
mark over his failure to make use of the Boundary 
Bureau's advice.
'A sedative to Irish nerves'
When the boundary conference was initially proposed, 
Curtis had hoped that it might be coupled with the 
Imperial Conference scheduled for October. The presence 
of other Dominion leaders in London, he thought, 'might 
help to produce an atmosphere more favourable to 
settlement.'63 In fact, the gathering further delayed 
work on the boundary question. This was beginning to
cause trouble for Cosgrave, for which he and his
colleagues had only themselves to blame. Having promised 
swift action during the general election campaign, the 
Free State government fell silent on the issue as summer 
faded into autumn.64 Finally, on 2 November Cosgrave 
announced that he had accepted Devonshire's invitation to 
a boundary conference but only after news of the proposal 
had been leaked to the press either in London or Belfast. 
The announcement sparked outraged protests among Northern 
Nationalists, despite an assurance from Dublin that they
63Curtis to Loughnane, 22 October 1923, CO
739/17/50990.
64Anderson to Tallents, 31 October 1923, CO
739/20/52770.
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had nothing to fear. 'One thing is certain', a priest 
warned Ernest Blythe about the Free State pledge, 'your 
government will live or die on it.'65
Events were about to take nearly as dramatic a turn.
On 25 October, Baldwin surprised nearly everyone by 
linking his party's fortunes to tariff reform. As it 
was, Devonshire had already informed Eoin MacNeill (who 
was in London to attend the Imperial Conference) that a 
meeting on the boundary guestion could not be held before 
January at the earliest. Now that Baldwin had staked his 
party's future on tariff reform, a further postponement 
was unavoidable. 'The fact is that a big political fight 
is coming on in Great Britain over the Protection issue', 
MacNeill told O'Higgins, 'and they are unable to think of 
anything else.'66
Amid this increasingly fevered political atmosphere, 
Curtis told Loughnane that there was 'considerable 
likelihood of a general election within the next three 
months, if not the next three weeks'. That, however, was 
not necessarily a bad thing. Curtis and Sir James 
Masterton-Smith felt that the intervening lull would give 
civil servants time to review the boundary problem, 'to 
see what cards the British government will have in its
65Executive Council secretary to MacNeill, 3 November 
1923, D/T, S 1801/C. 'Boundary Commission: Index to Dates 
and Conferences', 1-19 November 1923, D/T, S 1801/P. 
Phoenix, Northern Nationalism, p. 293-294.
66MacNeill to O'Higgins, 2 November 1923, D/T, S 
1801/C.
221
hands', and 'in what manner they can best be played.'67
A meeting of those civil servants most intimately 
involved in Irish affairs was scheduled for 15 November 
and seems to have led to a 27-page memorandum written 
after the 1923 election.68 This document is crucial, 
because it foreshadows subsequent British action on the 
boundary question, and also because it reveals a decided 
shift in 'official' thinking. Its writer could only 
justify the strategy being proposed if he could produce a 
new version of the genesis of Article 12.
According to this rendering of events, partition was 
the 'real crux' of the 1921 Treaty negotiations. A 
settlement based on a single Irish government was reached 
early on, only to be scuppered by Craig. In return for 
allowing Northern Ireland to opt out of an all-Irish 
Parliament, Lloyd George told the Sinn Fein delegates 
that they would be 'entitled to a revision' of the 
boundary. The Irish accepted solely because of Lloyd 
George's threat to 're-open hostilities within 72 hours.' 
Subsequent claims of a British guarantee that the Free 
State could expect the transfer of whole counties from
67Curtis to Loughnane? and Curtis to Anderson, both 9 
November 1923, CO 739/20/54021.
68Curtis to Jones [letter excerpt], 10 November 1923, 
TJ Class Z. Those invited to the meeting were: Masterton- 
Smith, Curtis, Anderson, Tom Jones, Mark Sturgis, G.G. 
Whiskard, Loughnane, and Tallents. Another, smaller 
meeting may also have taken place. According to CO 783/4, 
the records of these meetings were destroyed. See, 
instead, 'Memorandum on the Boundary question', undated 
['late December 1923?'], unsigned, TJ GG/2/2. All 
subsequent quotes in this section are from this memorandum 
unless otherwise indicated.
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Northern Ireland were dismissed as a figment of Collins's 
imagination. Equally important, Article 12's wording was 
now turned on its head. When determining the boundary, 
economic and geographic conditions were no longer to be 
read as a qualification to the wishes of the inhabitants. 
Quite the reverse, they were now granted a status equal 
to - perhaps greater than - the desires of the border 
population.69
At the same time, however, the memorandum's writer 
refused to countenance Ulster Unionist claims that they 
could stop the Boundary Commission simply by refusing to 
appoint a representative. Were that to happen, 'the face 
of England would be blackened for ever not only in 
Ireland but throughout the civilized world.' That said, 
allowing the Commission to go forward would be even more 
hazardous. 'It is difficult to picture an award', the 
writer maintained, 'which would not precipitate war 
between the North and South'. This possibility had to be 
taken into account as there now existed a 'large force of 
Specials equipped and armed by the British taxpayer', one 
of whose 'functions may be to resist the findings of the 
Boundary Commission.'
Postponement, yet again, seemed to be the only 
answer, though this time with a definite purpose in mind. 
To allay fears in both parts of Ireland, it was suggested 
that a Boundary Commission chairman ought to be appointed
69This interpretation is refuted by any number of 
contemporaneous sources. See chapter 2 above.
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immediately. This would show that while the British had 
'no intention of being rushed over the boundary question 
neither have they any intention of playing fast and loose 
with the provisions of the Treaty.' Not least important, 
the chairman should be the sort of person who 'would act 
as a sedative to Irish nerves in North and South.'
Once appointed, the chairman could visit the Irish 
border, where he 'would have time to study the whole 
subject until he had fully grasped the issues at stake; 
and inevitably he would realize that on those issues 
depended the peace of Ireland.' Afterward, he could then 
put forward proposals acceptable to both governments, 
obviating the need to appoint the Commission's other two 
members.
Given the state of Irish politics, the proposals it 
was suggested that the chairman might make were barely 
credible. According to the writer, Loughnane actually 
seems to have believed that Cosgrave's government would 
accept a plan expanding Northern Ireland's territory to 
include County Donegal as this would lead to 'an immense 
improvement ... from the point of view of administrative 
convenience.' In return, Craig's government would be 
asked to provide 'certain safeguards to the Catholic 
minority'. These included restoring proportional 
representation and redrawing constituency boundaries for 
Parliamentary seats. It was also suggested that 
additional powers might be given to the Council of
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Ireland.70
Whatever its shortcomings, the recommendations in 
this document set the pace for Britain's Irish policy 
over the next year. The Boundary Commission was a 
threat, not least because of those tens of thousands of 
Specials armed and paid for by the British taxpayer. It 
would be better to bury the Boundary Commission which, 
according to this new official version of the past, was 
never meant to make any great changes anyway. As had 
occurred with the advent of Bonar Law in political 
circles, so now among British civil servants, the goal 
was no longer Irish unity nor, even, an equitable 
settlement. The goal now was to find a 'sedative to 
Irish nerves in North and South.'71
Elections, 1923: the United Kingdom 
Unlike the hotly contested campaigns between 
Conservative, Liberal and Labour candidates in Great 
Britain, the election brought on by Baldwin's embrace of 
tariff reform was very much a one-party affair in
7°According to Wilfrid Spender, through an intermediary 
Cosgrave later proposed just such an expansion of the 
Ulster state. However, the offer was probably part of an 
overall plan to bring about reunification. Even if 
Cosgrave would have agreed to this expansion, it is 
unlikely that his government could have withstood 
opposition to the move. See Spender to Londonderry, 22 
August 1924, PRONI, CAB9Z/8/1.
71Curtis almost certainly penned the memorandum. Its 
content and style bear striking similarities to 
contemporaneous documents written by him. See, e.g., 
Curtis to Loughnane, 25 December 1923, CO 739/26/433? 
'Appreciation of the Present Political Position in 
Ireland', 9 May 1924, CAB 21/281; and Curtis to Churchill, 
19 August 1924, Curtis Papers, MSS 89, ff. 76-83.
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Northern Ireland. Official Unionist candidates were 
challenged in only three constituencies. Of that number, 
they were opposed by Nationalist candidates in only one 
of them: again, the two-seat constituency of Fermanagh- 
Tyrone. And, as happened the year before, border 
Nationalists used the election as a referendum on 
partition, giving both T.J.S. Harbison and Cahir Healy 
convincing victories over their Unionist opponents.
Viewed from London, the result inconveniently 
'complicated' matters, showing once again that 'in 
Fermanagh and Tyrone there exists a substantial majority' 
favouring inclusion in the Free State.72 Unionists were 
no less annoyed by the Nationalist victory which, the 
Northern Whig acidly predicted, would be 'hailed as fresh 
proof that a large majority of the two counties are eager 
to break away from Ulster'.73
In Britain, by contrast, no party won a clear-cut 
victory. Instead, the election held on 6 December 
resulted in a disaster which, Tom Jones recorded in his 
diary, 'S.B. never foresaw or imagined.' The number of 
Conservative MPs dropped from 345 to 258, a net loss of 
87 seats. Although still the single largest party in the
72 Annual Register: 1923. p. 153. An Independent
Unionist in North Belfast and a Labour candidate in West 
Belfast offered the only other opposition to the official 
Unionists. Both were defeated. 'Memorandum on the 
Boundary question', undated ['December 1923?'], unsigned, 
TJ GG/2/2.
73Quoted in D. Kennedy, The Widening Gulf: Northern 
Attitudes to the Independent Irish State. 1919-1949 
(Belfast, 1988), p. 136.
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House of Commons, Conservatives faced a combined Liberal- 
Labour opposition of 159 and 191 members respectively. 
Baldwin's gamble, far from winning a mandate for tariff 
reform, reunited the Liberal Party, a feat, Austen 
Chamberlain bitterly told one of his sisters, 'no Liberal 
could do'. The Liberals, in turn, were ready to place 
Labour 'in office, but not in power', and Baldwin 
suddenly faced the very real prospect of losing not only 
the leadership of his nation but that of his party as 
well.74
Westminster Interlude
Much ink has been spilled trying to explain why 
Baldwin allowed himself to be manoeuvred into calling the 
1923 election barely 11 months after Bonar Law had won a 
convincing mandate for the Conservative Party. This is 
not the place to carry on that debate. Nonetheless, as 
one Conservative historian has written, the election's 
'consequences were to be of weighty significance' for 
years to come, a judgment that is as true for Ireland as 
it is for Britain.75 For this reason, it is necessary to 
explore those consequences in order to see how, by 
changing Britain's political landscape, they affected the 
settling of Ireland's boundary question.
When the anti-Coalition Tories cast Lloyd George
74Jones diary, 22 December 1923, Vol. I . p. 261. D. 
Butler and J. Freeman, British Political Facts; 1900-1967 
(London, 1968), p. 142. Austen to Ida Chamberlain, 17 
November 1923, AC 5/1/298. Taylor, English History, p. 
210.
75Rhodes James, British Revolution, p. 467.
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into the political wilderness in 1922, they were 
motivated by more than a simple desire to get rid of an 
unpopular leader. At the Carlton Club meeting, Kenneth 
Morgan has written, the Conservative Party turned its 
back on 'high policy' for the 'more parochial but more 
reassuring world' of two-party politics. This was 
Labour's desire, as well, and all the more so after the 
1923 election. Both Conservative and Labour party 
strategies, according to Maurice Cowling, 'were based on 
the assumption that the two-party system was natural and 
desirable'. The problem was that 'the Liberal Party 
refused to die.'76
And, therein, for both Conservatives and Labour, lay 
the danger.
There is a tendency among some historians to judge 
the outcome of the 1923 election through the prism of the 
election that followed it less than a year later. Thus, 
it is said that the 'principal casualty was the Liberal 
Party', while Baldwin and the Conservatives actually came 
out of the 1923 debacle 'in a strong position.'77 That 
was not the way matters looked at the time. Only after 
the dust had cleared did Baldwin realise that he had an 
opportunity to destroy the Liberals from the right, while 
MacDonald saw that Labour now had the chance to stake its 
claim as the party of the left. Even then, it would not
76Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, p. 356. Cowling,
Impact of Labour, p. 362. Taylor, English History, p. 195.
77Rhodes James, British Revolution, p. 467. Ramsden,
Balfour and Baldwin, p. 183.
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have been safe to wager that the doom of the Liberals was 
a foregone conclusion.78
That outcome was not possible so long as the three 
parties remained on roughly equal terms. This unstable 
situation also increased the chances for another 
coalition government, and in fact many at the time 
thought that this would be the outcome of the 1923 
election. Both Labour and the Conservatives had to take 
into account the fact that a new coalition could be 
hatched from either side of the political spectrum - and 
that either of those outcomes could be achieved by one 
man: Lloyd George.
There is much evidence that at this time not only 
Lloyd George but other members of the old Coalition 
contemplated a re-grouping of their forces. Although 
these plans came to nothing, Birkenhead's attempt to put 
together an anti-Labour (some would say, anti-Baldwin) 
coalition in the wake of the 1923 election meant that 
Lloyd George's resurrection could not be written off as 
pure fantasy.79
Baldwin later asserted that by staking his claim to 
protectionism he 'dished the Goat', thus thwarting any 
plans Lloyd George had to form a new coalition centred
78Cowling, Impact of Labour. p. 361, 419-420.
Marquand, MacDonald, p. 312.
79See, e.g., Churchill to Lloyd George, 8 November 
1923, LG G/4/4/6. Horne to Lloyd George, 2 January 1924 
[misdated 1923], LG G/10/6/1. Campbell, Lloyd George, p. 
49-52. Also, see A.J.P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (London,
1972), p. 217-220.
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round this issue. While such an explanation may have 
been 'devised after the event', what is not open to 
dispute is that Baldwin had to put an end to any hopes of 
a revived Coalition once and for all if he was ever to 
re-unite the Conservative Party.80
Asquith's decision to allow Labour to take office 
did much of Baldwin's job for him, for it left 'a painful 
impression on those members who still hankered after some 
form of coalition' between Conservatives and Liberals. 
Austen Chamberlain 'upbraided' Asquith for this decision 
when the House of Commons met in mid-January 1924, doing 
so, one contemporary noted, 'more in sorrow than in 
anger'. Baldwin, on the other hand, 'prophesied that the 
future would lie between Conservatism and Labour, to the 
exclusion of Liberalism.'81 Over the next ten months, 
the Tories would use every opportunity to remind voters 
that the Liberals were responsible for 'handing over 
power to a Socialist Government.'82 The task of 
destroying the Liberal Party was one for Baldwin to 
relish, fuelled, as it was, by his hatred of Lloyd George 
- a hatred one backbench MP remembered as 'quite
8°Taylor, English History, p. 207. But see Jones
diary, 22 December 1923, Vol. I . p. 261. J.C.C. Davidson 
was equally certain that Baldwin's fear of Lloyd George 
precipitated the 1923 election. See Davidson and Rhodes 
James, Memoirs of a Conservative, p. 184-185.
81Annual Register; 1924. p. 7.
82Peel to Reading, 3 and 21 January 1924, 10, MSS Eur. 
E. 238/7, Nos. 1 and 4.
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pathological' .83
MacDonald's antipathy toward Lloyd George was not 
nearly as obsessive, never mind pathological. That said, 
the two disliked each other intensely. On the one hand, 
'Lloyd George was a threat to MacDonald's personal 
ambition, his only rival as a charismatic popular 
leader'. On the other, MacDonald was the one man who 
could prevent Lloyd George from regaining his former 
glory as the 'national leader of the Left'. Nor was 
MacDonald, any more than Baldwin, in favour of coalition 
government. MacDonald's primary goal was to show that 
his party was fit to govern and that it could do so 
without a formal alliance with the Liberals. 'Coalitions 
are detestable', he was to tell the House of Commons.
And, he added for good measure, 'dishonest'.®4
Like Baldwin and his colleagues, MacDonald and his 
fellow Labour leaders believed that their party's 
position would not be secure until the Liberals were 
destroyed once and for all. 'The real and significant 
issue before the country is Liberalism v. Labour',
83Coote, Editorial, p. 100. According to Tom Jones, 
Baldwin's malice for Lloyd George amounted to an 
'obsession'. See his diary entries for, 30 September and 
25 November 1923, Vol■ I . p. 243, 255. Also, see Campbell, 
Lloyd George. p. 3, 7, 41, 46-47. This ill-will was
returned in full measure. Urged to back Baldwin's tariff 
plan, Lloyd George replied that if Baldwin 'had been one of 
the men who stood by me' he would do so. 'But Baldwin 
knifed me and I shall knife Baldwin.' See Amery, My 
Political Life, p. 281.
84Campbell, Lloyd George. p. 86. Cowling, Impact of 
Labour, p. 354. Taylor, English History. p. 210. 
Marquand, MacDonald, p. 297-300, 311, 339.
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Beatrice Webb wrote at the beginning of the 1923 
election. Webb held Lloyd George personally responsible 
for 'reviving the old glamour of the great Liberal Party' 
which 'has suddenly blazed out again into a possible, 
some would say probable, Alternative Govt.' Were that to 
happen, 'Labour would be set back for a decade or 
more.'85
On the morrow of the 1923 election, Webb's anxieties 
had, if anything, increased. Although she felt that 
Labour 'must accept rather than refuse office', she knew 
that it would do so without a mandate, for which it would 
later pay a price. 'The honest way out of the impasse'. 
she wrote,
the course which would be approved by the majority 
of the British people, would be a Liberal- 
Conservative Coalition - [an] Asguith, Baldwin, 
Chamberlain, Lloyd George Cabinet, Free Trade and 
anti-socialist in home affairs and pacific in 
foreign policy. It is only the struggle for power 
between the leaders and parties that prevents this 
carrying out of the clearly expressed will of the 
people.86
The manoeuvrings of Britain's party leaders in the 
wake of the election were watched with keen interest in 
Dublin. An analysis prepared by the North-Eastern 
Boundary Bureau in mid-December considered the four 
possible outcomes: a re-constructed Conservative 
government; a Labour government; a Liberal 'caretaker' 
government, allowed to take office with the support of 
one or both of the other parties; or the Conservative-
85Webb diary, 19 November 1923, Vol. 37, 3987-3988.
86Ibid, 12 December 1923, 3997-4002.
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Liberal coalition which Beatrice Webb thought most voters 
wanted but which the bureau regarded as 'unlikely.7
The bureau felt that either a Labour or Liberal 
government 'would probably give the strongest support to 
our claims7. That said, if either such government 
attempted to force a boundary settlement on Craig the 
likely effect would be to 'consolidate the Conservatives 
in opposition.7 In fact, the bureau fancifully suggested 
that 'pressure on the North from a Conservative 
government is best7 as that would mean 'there can be no 
opposition in England7 to a settlement of the boundary 
question.87 However true that may have been, it was 
unrealistic to hope that Conservatives would ever force 
Craig to accept a settlement that he did not like. Even 
after MacDonald accepted the seals of office, the Free 
Staters would have to bear in mind the unstable condition 
of British politics. A minority Labour government, the 
bureau warned, meant the 'possibility of another strong 
Conservative government after the next election, which 
may come at any time.788
MacDonald intended to put off that day for as long 
as possible. But because the Liberals were at best an 
unreliable ally, he realised that 'it was essential to be 
on good terms with the Conservative leaders.789 Among
87'North-Eastern Boundary Bureau7, memorandum, 13 
December 1923, D/T, S 1801/C.
88Ibid.
89Cowling, Impact of Labour, p. 380.
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other things, this meant that MacDonald dare not take any 
initiative on issues likely to provoke the Tory rank and 
file. Ireland, he need not have been told, was one such 
issue.
Time, also, figured in Baldwin's calculations. Once 
the soon-to-be-ex-prime minister rode out the storm 
following the 1923 defeat, John Ramsden writes that 'the 
next eight months saw very little discord' in 
Conservative ranks. In fact, Baldwin's hold on the party 
was not really secure until after the 1924 election.
'S.B. will remain leader', Neville Chamberlain told one 
his sisters, 'but whether he is the next P.M. of our 
party will depend on how he shapes in opposition.'90 
Well into May Baldwin still feared 'the cynical 
combination of the chief three forces of the Coalition' - 
Lloyd George, Churchill, and Birkenhead - and this was 
likely the chief reason for his controversial newspaper 
interview with The People.91 Although Baldwin disavowed 
much of what was said in the article, he had once again 
shown 'his habit of bursting out with some inconceivable 
folly'. For months to come the question continued to be 
asked in the Tory heartland: 'What is the Conservative
9°Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin, p. 190. Cowling, 
Impact of Labour. p. 382-387, 392. Neville to Hilda
Chamberlain, 9 February 1924, NC 18/1/425. Also, see, 
Beaverbrook to Brisbane, 13 March 1924, BBK C/64. Cecil to 
Salisbury, 10 April 1924, Cecil Papers, MSS 51085, ff. 126.
91'Baldwin Turns and Rends His Critics', The People. 18 
May 1924. 'Memorandum: Stanley Baldwin's Interview with 
"The People" reporter, May 18, 1924', AC 24/6/3.
234
Party going to do about Mr Baldwin?'92
Only as 1924 wore on would it become fashionable to 
renounce Lloyd George and all his works, to view the idea 
of coalition government as, somehow, ignoble, and for the 
'survivors of 1922' to look back with 'embarrassment' on 
their former associations.93 Austen Chamberlain, 
ironically, seems to have realised this earlier than 
most. No more in sorrow, nor in anger, but as a cold­
blooded politician, he told Sam Hoare that 'our business 
now is to smash the Liberal Party'. Past associations, 
past loyalties, past commitments, none of these things 
mattered any more. For Austen Chamberlain, 'the world of 
party was now the only loyalty that counted.'9*
Chamberlain's days as the prodigal son of 
Conservative politics were drawing to a close. Defeat 
finally gave Baldwin the opportunity to bring the 
Coalitionists 'back into the true fold'. Nevertheless, 
Chamberlain told one of his sisters, 'the old 
difficulties' remain. While most party leaders were now 
willing to receive Austen Chamberlain in 'full 
communion', others continued to hold him 'responsible for 
two of the worst acts of the Coalition - the Irish Treaty
92Austen to Ida Chamberlain, 29 June 1924, AC 5/1/322. 
'Life and Politics', The Nation. 24 May 1924.
93Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, p. 7, 357, 365.
94Chamberlain to Hoare, 28 January 1924, Templewood 
Papers, V:1 (51). Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, p. 363.
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and the Indian policy.'95 Like an albatross, the Irish
settlement hung round Austen Chamberlain's neck and would
do so for years to come.
Tory Die-hards were not alone in finding it hard to
let go of the past. Others were equally reluctant to
accept that they now stood on the threshold of a new
political landscape, and this was true of Lloyd George
most of all. Frustrated as Asquith's second-in-command
in a re-united Liberal Party, he hankered for a revived
Coalition. As Herbert Gladstone wrote of him in the
summer of 1924:
Ll.G., himself, appeared to live in [a] constant 
ferment of activity as a Statesman, Politician, 
Orator, Newspaper Proprietor, and the holder of 
large financial resources. Disturbing rumours 
were prevalent of close interviews with Beaver- 
brook, Robert Horne, Churchill, and others. He 
seemed to be manoeuvring for position, but not 
with the Liberal Party alone. ...96
Unlike Baldwin and MacDonald, Lloyd George was not
interested in a period of calm. 'Still dynamic,
creative, and ambitious', he 'was eager for combat and
did not much care how things worked out so long as there
was turmoil.'97
95Salisbury to Baldwin, 26 January 1924, SB Vol. 159, 
ff. 258-261. Austen to Hilda Chamberlain, 24 January 1924, 
AC 5/1/304. Salisbury to Robert Cecil, 28 January 1924, 
MSS 51085, ff. 116-117. Baldwin to Salisbury, 25 January 
1924, 25 January 1924, S(4) 108/83-84.
96'Narrative of the General Election 1924', Gladstone 
Papers, MSS 46,480/309.
97Taylor, English History, p. 218. See Churchill to 
Balfour, 3 April 1924, AJB-S, GD 433/2/19, Reel 4, for 
Lloyd George's proposal for a 'future "Conservative and 
Liberal Union" Administration'.
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With so much at stake, an issue as delicate as
Ireland could create just the sort of 'ferment' that
Lloyd George thrived on, and which both Labour and the
Conservatives were determined to avoid at all costs.
Before he left office, Baldwin tried making this clear to
Craig when the latter defied appeals for the release of
the imprisoned Cahir Healy, one of the two Nationalist
MPs representing Fermanagh and Tyrone. 'I think I see
your difficulties', Baldwin told the Northern Ireland
premier in mid-January,
but I want you also to see some of mine. If we go 
into Opposition, as is now most probable, and I am 
still Leader of the Party, my hands will be full 
with our own problems over here. I do not want the 
Irish conflict revived in the House of Commons in 
any shape or form if it can justly be avoided.98
The man about to succeed Baldwin could not have
agreed more.
98Baldwin to Craig, 19 December 1923? Craig to Baldwin, 
27 December 1923? and Baldwin to Craig, 14[?] January 1924, 
SB Vol. 101, ff. 178-179, 183-186, and 197-198. Healy was 
released in late January, only to find himself banned from 
a quarter of his constituency, including his home town, 
Enniskillen. This order was finally lifted at MacDonald's 
insistence in mid-February. See Craig to MacDonald, 16 





... We all ought to work to close a 
chapter in English and Irish history that 
is best forgotten.
- J.H. Thomas1
James Ramsay MacDonald stepped into No. 10 Downing 
Street on a day 'for which English history afforded no 
precedent.' Great Britain would have a minority 
government - one not formed by the largest party in the 
House of Commons but, rather, by a party which most of 
the establishment viewed with disdain at best, or 
'boundless alarm' at worst. No less than a revolution 
had taken place, 'a revolution in English politics as 
profound as that associated with the Reform Act of 
1832. /2
Ireland has largely been written out of the history 
of this, Britain's first Labour government.3 It is a 
strange omission. Just because Ireland's quarrels did 
not fit in with the Labour Party's notion of class 
politics, that did not mean that the problem would 
disappear, a lesson that MacDonald and his colleagues
lxNo Coercion of Ulster', The Times. 5 May 1924.
2Annual Register: 1924. p. 1-2, 8.
3See, e.g., R .W . Lyman, The First Labour Government. 
1924 (London, 1957), p. 193, 238. Possibly the only
attempt to explore Labour's mixed emotions about Ireland is 
G. Bell's Troublesome Business; The Labour Party and the 
Irish Question (London, 1982). Bell, however, does not 
claim that his study is definitive and, on the contrary, 
hopes that 'others will correct and expand this work'.
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learned many times over while in office. Yet, this 
oversight among historians is itself revealing, because 
in a very real sense it mirrors the ambivalent attitude 
that the party's early leaders felt about the Irish 
Question.
However much Labour opposed imperialism and 
colonialism, its support for Irish self-government in the 
years leading up to World War I was not to be taken as a 
given, a point which MacDonald himself made abundantly 
clear in 1905. Then-secretary of the Labour 
Representation Committee, MacDonald's distaste for the 
Irish cause was demonstrated by his tart reply to 
supporters who assumed that the LRC was a pro-Home Rule 
organisation.
'On what grounds?' he wanted to know.4
Whatever he had imbibed from socialism, Labour's 
first prime minister could never guite shake his Scottish 
Protestant's hostility toward the Church of Rome. 
MacDonald 'disliked Catholics', the historian of the 
Clydesiders has written, 'particularly Irish Catholics', 
a verdict given added weight by the Labour MP, Emanuel 
Shinwell. Anti-Catholicism, Shinwell remembered, was 'a 
factor in Ramsay MacDonald's attitude to the Irish 
question, and coloured his policy towards Bonar Law.'5
4Bell, Troublesome Business, p. 16-17.
5R.K. Middlemas, The Clydesiders: A Left Winer Struggle 
for Parliamentary Power (New York, 1968 [London, 1965]), p. 
110. E. Shinwell, I've Lived Through It All (London,
1973), p. 53.
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Nor were others in the Labour movement any more keen 
to support Irish self-determination. While the Fabians 
were, at best, 'unenthusiastic supporters' of Home Rule, 
the Independent Labour Party viewed Ireland as a 
diversion from the 'bread and butter issues' which were 
its main concern. It is notable that the Irish question 
was not even debated at the party's annual conferences 
until 1918.
This ambivalence continued through the Anglo-Irish 
War. Although the party's 1920 conference voted to 
support 'absolute freedom' for Ireland, even if that 
meant an Irish republic, its leaders were willing to go 
no further than to support Dominion status. At the same 
time, while Labour officially opposed partition, J.H. 
Thomas warned his colleagues that it was 'idle to deny 
there was an Ulster problem.' What party leaders really 
thought about the Irish Question was summed up by J.R. 
Clynes in 1919. Ireland, Clynes told the House of 
Commons, was a 'troublesome subject', and that was truer 
than ever now that Labour was about to take office.6
Labour's Irish Triumvirate
Labour's 'inarticulate' attitude about Irish affairs 
made it difficult for officials in Dublin to predict the 
course of its relations with the new government. While 
MacDonald was reputed to be 'an honest politician', Kevin 
O'Shiel pointed out to the Executive Council that 'as far
6Bell, Troublesome Business, p. 7, 10, 38, 42-43, 56- 
57. HC Debf Vol. 114, Col. 1505, 3 April 1919.
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as we are concerned he is a dark horse.' Not so the new 
colonial secretary, J.H. Thomas, who 'has never shown 
himself to be conspicuously friendly to us'. According 
to O'Shiel, although he had voted for the Treaty Thomas 
made it plain that he supported the 'special treatment of 
"Ulster".,7
According to Manchester Guardian editor C.P. Scott, 
Ireland was the reason for Thomas's appointment to the 
Colonial Office. When George V questioned the choice, 
MacDonald claimed to have told the king: 'Perhaps your 
Majesty forgets that Ireland now comes within the domain 
of the Colonial Office.' MacDonald confided to Scott 
that he needed someone with Thomas's negotiating skills 
to handle the Irish and that 'had been the ground for his 
selection./8
Thomas evoked strong reactions from those who met 
him. Described by Birkenhead as 'the cleverest 
politician' yet to emerge from Labour's ranks, he was 
also, Hazel Lavery observed, 'very vain'■ In any event, 
his importance to Anglo-Irish relations over the next 
nine months would be second only to MacDonald's.9
7'RE. North-Eastern Position', ? January 1924, D/T, S 
1801/D. Thomas, however, denied that the 1920 Act 'meant 
that the six counties were to be left intact and free from 
all further consideration'. See HC Deb. Vol. 150, Col. 
1445, 17 February 1922.
8Scott diary, 2-3 February 1924, MSS 50907, vii, p. 90-
92.
9Lord Birkenhead, Contemporary Personalities (London, 
1924), p. 185. S. McCoole, Hazel: A Life of Lady Hazel 
Lavery. 1880-1935 (Dublin, 1996), p. 114.
241
The third member of Labour's government who would 
have to confront the boundary question was Arthur 
Henderson, the new home secretary. Henderson's 
biographer has described his performance in the 1924 
government as 'undistinguished', and he seems to have 
played, at most, a supporting role to Thomas's lead in 
handling the boundary question. A vocal critic of the 
Coalition's early Irish policy, Henderson, like others in 
the Labour movement, was deeply ambivalent when the 
question turned to Ulster. Perhaps his most revealing 
remark on this subject was made during the Treaty 
debates. If any members of Parliament were Ulster's 
natural allies, Henderson told the House of Commons, it 
was 'those of us who are and have been so long officially 
connected with trade unions ... [which] have large 
numbers of members in the North of Ireland.'10
'A loss of prestige'
In his analysis of MacDonald's incoming government, 
Kevin O'Shiel predicted that the Free State could expect 
a fair deal from Labour on the boundary question if for 
no other reason than that in main parts of Britain the 
party depended on Irish votes.11 In fact, this analysis
10C. Wrigley, Arthur Henderson (Cardiff, 1990), p. 144. 
Bell, Troublesome Business. p. 53, 65-68. HC Deb. Vol.
149, Col. 309, 16 December 1921. John Wheatley, the one 
Cabinet member who might have been sympathetic to the Free 
State was excluded by MacDonald from discussions of the 
boundary question whenever possible. See Canning, British 
Policy, p. 88-89.
11'RE. North-Eastern Position', ? January 1924, D/T,
S 1801/D.
242
missed the point. MacDonald and his lieutenants did not 
accept the seals of office to solve the Irish Question. 
Rather, they meant to use this time to disprove once and 
for all Churchill's allegation that Labour was 'unfit to 
govern'.12 Whatever the merits of this strategy, it most 
certainly meant that there would no bold, new initiatives 
on Ireland. Quite the contrary. Inexperienced in 
government, Labour's ministers relied heavily on civil 
servants, and this was as true in Irish affairs as in 
other matters. Mindful, too, of the need to remain on 
good terms with the Conservatives, it is not surprising 
that Thomas and Henderson fell back on Devonshire's 
conference proposal as the starting point for their own 
Irish policy. 'The Boundary question', The Times noted 
after Labour took office, was 'the only surviving 
obstacle to ... good relations between the two states'. 
Now it was Labour's turn to see if it could find a way 
around this hurdle.13
But while there was no new thinking on this issue in 
London, a fundamental re-assessment of the boundary 
question was under way in Dublin. In mid-January, 
Cosgrave told the Executive Council that while 
reunification continued to be the government's ultimate
12Taylor, English History. p. 210. Marquand,
MacDonald, p. 310-312. For Churchill's allegation, see 
'Mr. Churchill on Russia', The Times. 16 February 1920.
“MacDonald diary, 3 February 1924, JRM, PRO 
30/69/1753/1. Cowling, Impact of Labour. p. 380. 
Marquand, MacDonald, p. 307. Thomas to Healy; Henderson to 
Abercorn; and Abercorn to Henderson, all 24 January 1924? 
and Healy to Thomas, 29 January 1924, in Cmd. 2155. Nos. 9- 
12. 'Irish Boundary Conference', The Times. 1 February
1924.
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goal, it was 'not a likely probability and appears so far 
off as to be out of the arena of practical politics for 
the present.' Instead, he believed that Craig, with 
British backing, would propose that the two Irish 
parliaments remain separate 'with a link of the two 
cabinets', whose joint meetings would act as a substitute 
for the Council of Ireland. Cosgrave was willing to 
consider this idea - but only if Dublin was seen to be 
the dominant partner. As the Irish president wrote when 
explaining how the joint Cabinets would function: 'We 
preside./14
His prediction proved to be largely accurate. After 
two days of meetings in early February, the boundary 
conference adjourned so that the Irish governments could 
consider a seven-point plan put forward by Thomas. As 
Cosgrave thought, the British proposal revolved around 
the Council of Ireland with the two Irish Cabinets acting 
in its place for a provisional period of one year. 
Meanwhile, the Dail and the Northern Ireland House of 
Commons would also hold joint sittings to enact 
legislation enabling the two Cabinets to function 
together. Crucially, no measure would become law unless 
it received a 'double majority', i.e. separate majorities 
would be required in both parliaments to enact 
legislation. During the provisional period, the Free 
State would stay its demand for the Boundary Commission.
In return, Craig's government would delay its plans to
14See Cosgrave memorandum, 17 January 1924? and 
'Conference on Boundary Commission', 28 January 1924, D/T, 
S 1801/D.
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abolish proportional representation for county council 
and rural district council elections.15
Thomas's scheme pleased no one. 'The most fatal 
criticism of the proposals', O'Higgins wrote, 'is that 
the country would not touch them.'16 In Irish eyes, 
Thomas's proposal struck at the heart of the Free State's 
newly won sovereignty, whose importance the Colonial 
Office never seemed to understand. This attitude was 
summed up by Lionel Curtis following the Free State's 
admission to the League of Nations the previous 
September. 'Our friends' heads are, of course, pretty 
full at the moment', Curtis wrote. That would soon 
change once they realised that their position in the rest 
of the world counted for little 'apart from their 
position in the British Commonwealth of Nations.'17
But the Irish were discovering no such thing. Far 
from it. Having won international recognition, they were 
not about to allow the British to engage in a 'whittling 
down' of their status even if that was the price to be 
paid for ending partition. Gaining 'the political 
semblance of national union' was, one Free Stater wrote,
'a very big thing indeed but we shall have come down at
15Ibid, 'Outline of Proposals for Consideration', 2 
February 1924.
160'Higgins memorandum, ? February 1924, D/T, S 1801/E.
17Curtis to Antrobus, 25 September 1923, CO
739/25/45749.
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least 50 degrees in our world status.'1® Thomas's 
proposal looked like an attempt to do exactly that. 
Accepting the plan, Cosgrave argued, meant 'a loss of 
prestige' while Craig's government was 'called upon to 
sacrifice nothing' so long as Northern Ireland continued 
to send MPs to Westminster. 'Is there not a great 
danger', Cosgrave asked, 'of such a plan tending in time 
to pull the whole of Ireland, through the North, more and 
more towards London?'19
From his perch in the Cabinet secretariat, Tom Jones 
had few illusions that the proposal would get the British 
out of their Boundary Commission pledge. The 'snag', 
Jones wrote, was Ulster's demand for 'fifty-fifty' 
representation in the joint Cabinet meetings, in effect 
giving the Unionists a veto over its deliberations.20
Although Craig and Lord Londonderry reportedly 
favoured the proposal, it was given a stormy reception by 
their colleagues in the Northern Ireland Cabinet. Hugh 
Pollock heatedly denounced the scheme, calling it 
'unthinkable'.21 In this instance, Pollock, not Craig, 
reflected grassroots Unionist feeling. While Craig was 
spending less and less time in Northern Ireland, his 
ministers were daily exposed to public opinion on the
18 'Some Possible Dangers in the N.E. Situation', 
undated, D/T, S 1801/C.
19Cosgrave memorandum, ? February 1924, D/T, S 1801/E.
2°Jones diary, 2 February 1924, Vol. Ill, p. 225-226.
21Tallents to Anderson, 18 February 1924, HO 
45/12296/1(b).
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streets of Belfast and they were unwilling to antagonise 
rank and file Unionist opinion.22
Unwanted and unloved, Thomas's scheme became an 
orphan like so many other British attempts, before and 
after, to reconcile the Irish. Despite Pollock's 
opposition, Tallents believed that Craig might have been 
able to convince his Cabinet to give the plan a chance, 
were it not for the fact that his health broke down. Due 
to re-assemble at the end of February, the Irish 
Conference had to be postponed when Craig fell ill with a 
debilitating attack of influenza. His doctor informed 
Wilfrid Spender that under no circumstances could Craig 
attend any more sittings of the conference before the end 
of March, and then only after an extended sea voyage to 
regain his health. While Craig's symptoms were real 
enough, the illness itself may have been psychosomatic 
or, at least, was made worse by his worries over the 
boundary dispute. In any case, the conference was now 
indefinitely put on hold.23
'Spoiled children of politics'
This unexpected suspension left Cosgrave dangerously 
exposed to attack at home. Even some government 
supporters were forced to agree with the pro-Republican 
journal Eire that this latest delay proved that Article
22Buckland, Factory of Grievancesr p. 200.
23Tallents to Anderson, 18 February 1924, HO 
45/12296/1(b). Thomas to Cosgrave, 18 February 1924, CO 
739/26/8213. Bryan Follis disputes the notion that Craig 
consciously used his illness to delay the boundary 
negotiations. See State Under Sieae. p. 160.
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12 had been a 'fraud' and a 'delusion' all along. 'It
matters not whether it is a Labour, Liberal or
Conservative government', Eire told its readers. The 
British had no intention of enforcing the boundary
clause, and another round of meetings in London would be
a 'farce'.24
Cosgrave, albeit reluctantly, had come the same 
conclusion. Although he realised that setting up the 
Commission would be 'the real beginning not the end of 
his boundary worries', he saw no point in another round 
of meetings. In an interview with N.G. Loughnane, the 
Irish president 'described the Ulster Protestants as the 
spoiled children of politics' who were 'quite incapable 
of making concessions'. Faced with high unemployment and 
the 'disquieting symptom' of demobilised Free State 
soldiers being won over by Sinn Fein, the government 
could ill-afford to alienate their supporters any further 
by not pressing the boundary issue. For the moment, 
Cosgrave felt that he could count on the army's continued 
loyalty. Although several leading officers were still 
'confessed Republicans', Cosgrave assured Loughnane that 
they had shown 'no manifestations of disloyalty' with the 
Treaty settlement.25
Days later the Free State Army mutinied.26
24'Mr. Thomas Breaks the Treaty', Eire, 8 March 1924.
25Loughnane to Curtis, 4 March 1924, CO 739/26/10823.
26The mutiny was sparked by the army's plans for large- 
scale demobilisation and by conflict between secret 
societies within its ranks. See J.P. Duggan, A History of
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Although the army crisis really had nothing to do 
with the boundary question, its repercussions were soon 
felt north of the border. Acting in Craig's absence,
Lord Londonderry immediately postponed planned reductions 
of the Special Constabulary. He defended the move, 
telling Henderson that the Free State Army was led by men 
'who are notorious for their hostility to Northern 
Ireland' ,27
Neither did the Free State government's handling of 
the mutiny increase confidence in London. 'Having shown 
themselves weak in handling the mutiny', Jones unfairly 
concluded, 'the Free State Government are determined to 
show themselves strong on the Boundary issue.'28 In 
fact, the hardening of attitudes in Dublin had little to 
do with troubles in the army, but reflected growing 
frustration in government circles over the continued 
postponement of the boundary conference.
The situation became acute once the Irish learned 
that Belfast now wanted to rule out another meeting of 
the conference before the end of April. Resumption had 
been delayed several times due to Craig's illness, 
despite the fact that the 2 February meeting had 
adjourned on the understanding that discussions would 
resume within twenty-eight days. Although the Free State
the Irish Army (Dublin, 1991), p. 129-137.
27Londonderry to Henderson, 11 March and 26 March 1924,
PREM 1/34.
28Jones diary, 19 March 1924, Vol. Ill, p. 226.
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had requested a resumption as early as mid-February, the 
Home Office did not formally contact Northern Ireland's 
governor general about the matter until 4 March.29 Four 
days later, Tallents learned that Craig intended to go on 
a Mediterranean cruise from the middle of March to the 
middle of April. After his return the Unionists would 
not be ready to meet their British and Free State 
counterparts until the end of the month, as Craig would 
need 'a day or two in Northern Ireland after his voyage 
so as to sense the position before entering into 
Conference. /3°
For the Irish, this was one delay too many. On 15 
March a strongly-worded letter from Healy asked that the 
British take whatever steps were necessary to set up the 
Boundary Commission. An accompanying memorandum rejected 
Thomas's February proposals as 'unworkable'.31
In an attempt to hold the conference together, a 
reluctant Tom Jones was dispatched to Dublin. Jones was 
to persuade the Free Staters 'to resume negotiations on 
Craig's return and make one more desperate effort at a 
solution which would further postpone [the] boundary 
issue.' His own choice of words is revealing. While the 
Dublin government's aim was to settle the boundary
29Healy to Thomas, 16 February 1924; and Henderson to 
Abercorn, 4 March 1924, Cmd. 2155. Nos. 13 and 14.
3°Tallents to Anderson, 8 March 1924; and Abercorn to 
Henderson, 10 March 1924, in HO 45/12296/l(b).
31Thomas to Healy, 11 March 1924, Cmd. 2155. No. 17. 
Healy to Thomas, 15 March 1924, with Free State memorandum, 
undated, CO 739/26/12703.
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problem, the object of their British counterparts still 
was to put off the final reckoning.32
Jones succeeded, but only after narrowly averting 
Cosgrave's demand that the Boundary Commission should be 
established on 1 May if the conference failed to achieve 
a breakthrough. '[W]e must not think of failure', Jones 
urged, 'but rather of every means of making your next 
meeting a real step forward towards unity.' Thomas took 
this same line several days later. If they were to 
achieve the Treaty's 'real object' - an Ireland 'as 
united as Great Britain herself' - there had to be one 
more attempt at negotiations. Any steps taken to set up 
the Commission, he persuaded Cosgrave, were bound to leak 
to the press. The Unionists would then stage a walk-out 
and 'almost certainly bring the Conference to an 
immediate end.'33
Financial pressure
One of the most puzzling facts about British efforts 
to solve the boundary dispute is that a way was never 
found to use their most effective weapon: i.e., financial 
pressure. This is all the more peculiar when it is 
recalled that the imperial government was continually 
short of funds and thus had an additional incentive to 
cut expenditure wherever possible. Nor can it be said
32Jones diary, 27 March 1924, Vol. Ill, p. 227. Jones 
to Curtis, 30 March 1924, TJ GG/2/9.
33 Jones to Cosgrave; Cosgrave to Jones; Thomas to 
Cosgrave; and Cosgrave to Thomas, 1, 5, 10, and 15 April 
1924, D/T, S 1801/F.
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that civil servants failed to make their masters aware of 
the steady flow of sterling across the Irish Sea.
Treasury officials in particular were determined to put 
an end to the 'perpetual demands from Northern 
Ireland' .34
While the Conservatives hesitated to make use of 
this weapon, MacDonald came to office intending to wield 
it for all it was worth. The link between the boundary 
negotiations and Northern Ireland's dependence on the 
imperial exchequer was explicitly drawn by G.C. Upcott in 
a memorandum to the new chancellor of the exchequer, 
Philip Snowden, on 30 January. The British, Upcott 
pointed out, were in 'a position to put considerable 
pressure on Sir James Craig should they desire to do so'. 
This may have been the reason behind Snowden's refusal to 
allocate the £1 million that Neville Chamberlain had 
promised to recommend for the Special Constabulary in the 
1924/25 budget.35 Clearly, it was on MacDonald's mind 
when he discussed the Irish situation with C.P. Scott.
The grant 'could be discontinued at any time', MacDonald 
intimated, if the Unionists 'showed an intractable 
spirit' in the boundary negotiations.36
34Upcott memorandum to Snowden, 30 January 1924, T 
160/131/F.4855/02/1. Also, see Snowden memorandum to 
MacDonald, 26 September 1924, JRM, PRO 30/69/61.
35Ibid, Upcott memorandum. Snowden to Craig? Craig to 
Snowden and to MacDonald; and MacDonald to Craig, 18, 20, 
and 22 February 1924, CJ 1/2.
36Scott diary, 2-3 February 1924, MSS 50907, vii, p. 
89-92.
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This is what Labour leaders had in mind when they 
met with Pollock on 11 April. At Thomas's instigation, 
Snowden played 'bad cop' to the colonial secretary's 
'good cop' in order to win concessions on the boundary 
question.37 Unfortunately for Thomas, Ulster's finance 
minister was singularly unimpressed with their 
performance, and the financial weapon broke in his hands.
In fact, Labour's colonial secretary was proving to 
be not at all successful when it came to Ireland. Yet, 
Thomas never lost faith in his own negotiating skills. 
Behind the scenes, he was willing to 'bring every 
possible pressure' to bear on Craig to solve the boundary 
question. 'He can have a b...,y Dukedom if it will do 
the trick', Thomas said during one outburst.38 What he 
never seemed to realise was that such temptations had no 
effect on Northern Ireland's prime minister. Nor, in the 
end, did the threat to bring financial pressure to bear 
on the Belfast government make any headway. That might 
have been different had Labour stayed in office; Snowden 
later claimed that he would have opposed 'any grant 
whatever' for the Specials.39 As it happened, Labour was 
never put to the test.
'Under Craig's thumb': the conference collapses
Any hopes that the boundary conference would finally
37Jones diary, 24 April 1924, Vol. Ill, p. 229-230. 
Follis, State Under Siege, p. 130.
38Ibid, Jones diary.
39HC Deb. Vol. 180, Col. 1681, 23 February 1925.
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achieve a breakthrough were dashed almost as soon as 
discussions resumed on 24 April.
The talks began well enough. Cosgrave was willing to 
accept Craig's idea for a 'voluntary' body of experts 
representing both Irish governments to examine their 
claims. That was until he learned that the price of such 
a deal was Dublin's surrender of its right to the 
Boundary Commission if this group failed to reach an 
agreement. Even Curtis and Jones saw that Cosgrave could 
not possibly accept these terms and, on the 26th, the 
Free State formally asked the British government to bring 
the Boundary Commission into operation.40
Curtis blamed Thomas for the breakdown. When it was 
clear that the talks were foundering after only one day, 
Jones suggested that MacDonald should be brought in to 
add the prestige of the prime minister's office. But, 
Thomas 'would not hear of it.'41 The colonial secretary 
was 'under Craig's thumb', Curtis believed, and 'as 
usual, it is Craig's word which carries most weight in 
Whitehall.' Curtis told Jones that he had been willing 
to stay on at the Colonial Office as long as he believed 
the 'Government here were making an honest effort to put 
the Treaty through.' But it was clear to him that both 
Thomas and Craig were playing a 'game of delay' which, in
4°Jones diary, 24 April 1924, Vol. Ill, p. 229-230.
Lavin, Curtis, p. 221. Pail Deb. Vol. 7, Col. 178-180, 25 




the latter's case, was carried on in hopes that 'this 
Government may be succeeded by a Tory Government ere many 
months are past.'42
Indeed, this was Craig's strategy from the 
beginning. The longer the Boundary Commission could be 
delayed, the less likely that it would ever be formed at 
all. Craig's official biographer admitted as much when 
he described the outcome of the April meeting. 'The 
Conference ended without a decision', St. John Ervine 
later wrote, 'which was, in effect, a decision in favour 
of Craig.'43
Faced with the Ulster leader's intransigence, Jones 
believed that the Labour government ought to involve 
Baldwin, along with Asguith and Lloyd George, in the 
negotiations. 'Once Craig can be made to realise that he 
could not split the parties', Jones wrote, 'it would make 
an immense difference.' Yet again, Thomas blocked the 
way. Henderson warned that his colleague would oppose 
any such step 'which took away from his own importance in 
the matter. '44
MacDonald became a major player in the boundary 
negotiations only when illness temporarily removed Thomas 
from the scene. Pre-occupied with foreign affairs, 
MacDonald had been happy to leave the Irish problem to
42Ibid, 15 May 1924, p. 231-232.
43St. John Ervine, Craiaavon: Ulsterman (London, 1949),
p. 490.
44Jones diary, 8 May 1924, Vol. Ill, p. 230-231.
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the Colonial Office. His initial contact with Cosgrave 
in February had, in any event, done nothing to dispel his 
prejudices about Ireland or its leaders. In his 
estimation, the Free State president was 'a weak man, but 
one who wd. fight hard if driven into a corner.'45
Proposing one last-ditch round of negotiations, 
MacDonald invited Cosgrave and Craig to meet with him at 
the prime minister's country residence at Chequers. 
Already, his government had informed Dublin and Belfast 
that Northern Ireland's refusal to appoint its 
Commissioner took the problem beyond the realm of party 
politics. Constitutional issues were now involved: 
namely, was the province bound by a Treaty ratified by 
the Imperial Parliament? Unless the three men could 
reach an agreement, Belfast's refusal would have to be 
settled by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.46
By this time, it was no longer certain that Cosgrave 
could attend any further meetings even if he wanted to. 
'Open conferences', O'Higgins complained, 'have 
repeatedly failed and hold no promise of future success.' 
British officials were aware of this mounting opposition
45Scott diary, 2-3 February 1924, MSS 50907, vii, p. 
89-92.
46MacDonald to Cosgrave and to Craig, 27 May 1924; and 
Cosgrave to MacDonald, 28 May 1924, Cmd. 2166: Further
Correspondence Relating to Article 12 of the Articles of 
Agreement Between Great Britain and Ireland (London, 1924), 
Nos. 1-3. Thomas to Healy, 23 May 1924; and Henderson to 
Abercorn, 24 May 1924, Cmd. 2155. Nos. 32 and 33.
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within the Executive Council.47 Cosgrave appears to have 
decided to defy his Cabinet after receiving what he 
believed was an assurance from Thomas. Should a further 
round of meetings again end in stalemate, Free State High 
Commissioner James MaCNeill was told that Craig had 
agreed to do all that was 'needful to facilitate the 
operation of Article XII'.48
MacNeill's source for this extraordinary claim was, 
of all men, Alfred Cope. Even though he had left the 
Irish Office in 1922, Cope seems to have acted as an 
unofficial go-between for the Colonial Office sounding 
out the Irish on possible alternatives to the Boundary 
Commission such as 'joint administration' of Northern 
Ireland.49 It is certain that both Thomas and Jones were 
behind his 13 May discussion with MacNeill. What is not 
clear is who, if anyone, authorised Cope to commit 
Ulster's leader to the pledge mentioned by MacNeill.50
The Chequers conference of 31 May began as a two-way 
discussion because, wrote an annoyed Sir John Anderson, 
Cosgrave arrived 'about three hours late'.51 In his
470'Higgins to Cosgrave, 10 June 1924, D/T, S 1801/H. 
Jones diary, 13 May 1924, Vol. Ill, p. 231.
48MacNeill to Cosgrave, 13 May 1924, D/T, S 1801/H.
49See, e.g., FitzGerald to James MacNeill, 14 April 
1924? and MacNeill to FitzGerald, 16 and 17 April 1924, 
DFA, G 10/1923.
50Jones diary, 13 May 1924, Vol. Ill, p. 231.
51'Notes of a Conference Between the Prime Minister and 
Mr Cosgrave and Sir James Craig at Chequers on 31st May, 
1924', HO 246/2. All subsequent quotes from the meeting 
are taken from this source.
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absence, Craig confided to MacDonald that,
'notwithstanding all his previous utterances', he was 
prepared to appoint Northern Ireland's Boundary 
Commissioner - but at a price. Just as Thomas had sought 
to bring financial pressure to bear on the Unionists, 
Craig now turned the tables. A deal on the boundary 
could be had, he intimated, if Labour was willing to meet 
his financial demands.
In exchange for accepting the Boundary Commission 
and its award - which must be unanimous - Craig said that 
he must be assured that a series of issues dividing the 
two governments would be 'satisfactorily disposed of.'
Top of his list was amalgamation of Britain's and 
Northern Ireland's unemployment insurance funds.
Returning to the Boundary Commission later in the 
discussions, Craig promised to support the handover of 
any area 'provided the inhabitants clearly expressed 
their wish to go.' He would do so, however, only if 
'provision' was made to re-settle anyone who did not wish 
to be transferred into a new jurisdiction. The financial 
implications of this demand were staggering. MacDonald 
chose to side-step them concentrating, instead, on 
Craig's insistence that any Commission award must have 
the backing of all three members. Such a concession, 
MacDonald pointed out, 'would be to give Northern Ireland 
a veto on any changes she did not like.'
The atmosphere of the meeting did not improve with 
Cosgrave's arrival, whose demeanor was 'polite but cold'.
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Neither Irish leader thought much of MacDonald's 
suggestion that the soon-to-be-appointed Boundary 
Commission chairman might be asked to mediate a 
settlement. Pointing to the 'complicated pattern of the 
carpet' on the floor, Craig told MacDonald that he was 
underestimating just how tangled this problem really was.
MacDonald's next proposal seems to have been 
designed to shake his guests out of their complacency.
Why not follow the precedent used after World War I to 
resolve the Polish-German dispute in Upper Silesia, he 
suggested. Such a plan could begin with a determination 
of the areas to be considered for transfer, followed by a 
plebiscite. If MacDonald meant to stir up the meeting, 
he succeeded. The idea left Craig 'obviously alarmed', 
Anderson wrote, especially 'at the prospect of large 
areas such as whole counties being even brought under 
examination in a preliminary way.'52
MacDonald's suggestion prompted Craig's appeal to 
Cosgrave to 'give the go-by to Article 12' and settle the 
issue between them. That was impossible, the Free State 
president responded. No one in Dublin had the power to 
by-pass Article 12, his supporters would not stand for it 
- an odd thing to say in the circumstances. Cosgrave 
claimed that Nationalists were not laying claim to 
specific territory, explicitly mentioning Fermanagh and 
Tyrone. Rather, theirs was a 'demand for the "discovery"
S2In fact, the Silesian precedent figured prominently 
in the Boundary Commission's origins. See chapter 2 above.
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of the facts', in other words, whether the people of the 
border wished to be in the Free State or under Belfast's 
jurisdiction. It was soon clear that Craig and Cosgrave 
disagreed on just about everything when it came to the 
boundary question. Where Cosgrave believed that Article 
12 put the wishes of the local inhabitants above all 
other considerations, Craig was adamant that geographical 
and, even more, economic, factors should be given equal 
weight. The three sides were again at an impasse, and 
Cosgrave told his counterparts that it was politically 
impossible for him to be involved in any further 
discussions. Bitter recriminations 'that the Treaty was 
not "fool-proof" or that the Imperial Parliament could 
not make its recalcitrant province toe the line' were 
increasing and, once they took hold, his government would 
be overthrown in favour of de Valera's Republic. The 
stakes for Cosgrave were that high.
'A probable enemy'
Cosgrave's demand that London make the Ulster 
Unionists 'toe the line' was made at just that moment 
when British officials were questioning their power to do 
so. As one of his last acts before resigning from the 
Colonial Office, Lionel Curtis drafted an unofficial 
memorandum outlining the trouble that British forces 
would likely encounter once the Boundary Commission set 
to work. If the Commission decided that a plebiscite was 
necessary, 'the situation will become very difficult' as 
it was 'almost certain to meet with the armed resistance
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of the Protestant majority throughout Northern Ireland', 
especially from the British-funded Special Constabulary.
If, on the other hand, the Commission restricted 
itself to minor border revisions, or if the North's 
refusal to appoint a representative prevented it from 
functioning, Curtis thought it likely that a republic 
would be declared in Dublin. In that case, the British 
would find themselves right back where they were before 
the Treaty was signed in 1921. 'The most merciful 
course' to follow should this happen, Curtis advised, 
would be a blockade of the 26 counties, until power could 
'gravitate into the hands of the more reasonable 
propertied classes'.53
Curtis's analysis raised disturbing implications for 
British security far beyond Ireland. Whichever way the 
Boundary Commission ruled, the War Office explained, 
relying on the army to implement its award meant the 
commitment of at least three divisions. 'The Empire will 
thus be deprived for an indefinite period of its only 
mobile reserve', a situation that would have dire 
consequences should a crisis erupt in Iraq or Egypt. Nor 
was the army as sanguine as Curtis about containing 
trouble in the South by means of a blockade. If it 
failed, 'no other course beyond the re-conquest of S. 
Ireland seems possible'. Plainly, the War Office wanted 
to have nothing to do with the Boundary Commission. Such
53'Appreciation of the Present Political Position in 
Ireland', 9 May 1924, CAB 21/281.
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a commitment would be 'unlimited, indefinite and fraught 
with serious dangers both for the army itself and for 
Imperial defence./54
In fact, there was reason to question the army's 
willingness to implement a Commission award that went 
against Northern Ireland's wishes. Only a decade had 
elapsed since the Curragh mutiny, and among officers 
there remained a well-spring of sympathy for the Ulster 
cause. This included the commander of British forces in 
the six counties, A.R. Cameron.
In a separate memorandum, prepared as part of a 
general defence review, Cameron maintained that any plan 
which addressed defence 'seriously' had to regard the 
'Irish Free State with its armed forces as certainly a 
possible and really a probable enemy.' Although the 
earlier War Office analysis had dismissed the Special 
Constabulary as so partisan as to be 'useless' if there 
was a dispute over the boundary, Cameron took quite the 
opposite view, maintaining that their 'value in an 
emergency is clear'.55
The following March Cameron was informed that the 
Army Council 'concurred' with this analysis. For the 
first time, perhaps, the War Office officially regarded a
54Ibid, War Office 'Note on the Colonial Office 
Memorandum on Ireland', 11 June 1924.
55Ibid. 'Home Defence Scheme - Northern Ireland', 4 
July 1924, WO 32/5313. Not surprisingly, Craig agreed that 
the Irish boundary should be regarded as a potentially 
hostile frontier. See NI HC Deb. Vol. 4, Col. 715-716, 6 
May 1924.
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British dominion as a potential enemy. This fact later 
prompted Michael Farrell's sober observation that no 
matter how many times the Free Staters proved their 
fidelity to the Treaty settlement they would never be 
regarded as trustworthy by the British establishment.56
More immediately, the adoption of Cameron's 
recommendations raised serious questions should any 
government attempt to carry out a Boundary Commission 
award that was opposed by Northern Ireland. When, in 
August, Craig's Cabinet suggested that the Specials 
should be mobilised to guard the boundary, Cameron 
endorsed the proposal despite Home Office reminders that 
border security was the British Army's sole 
responsibility. Cameron's response to this argument was 
telling. There was little his forces could do alone, he 
replied, considering the 'great preponderance of numbers 
of Constabulary over troops'.57
This preponderance was also cited by Cameron when 
explaining 'the impossibility of the G.O.C. [General 
Officer Commanding] dealing with the situation direct 
from his Headquarters'. Although the Home Office had by 
this time accepted the necessity of using the Specials as 
an auxiliary to regular troops, Cameron turned this
56Cubitt to Cameron, 12 March 1925, WO 32/5313/23A and 
23B. Farrell, Arming the Protestants. p. 229. This 
mistrust was rife throughout Whitehall. See Canning, 
British Policy, p. 112-113.
S7Blackmore to Tallents, 11 August 1924; Maxwell to War 
Office, 18 August 1924? and Cameron to Creedy, 13 January 
1925, WO 32/5313.
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policy on its head. Instead of the army defending the 
frontier, his troops 'would naturally be employed to 
support the Constabulary' and only then would a military 
officer take charge. This stance reflected the desire of 
Craig's ministers to keep control of the Specials out of 
British hands. Incredibly, the War Office not only 
abdicated responsibility for border security but further 
agreed that 'command of the combined forces should only 
pass to the General Officer Commanding at the request of 
the Northern Government.'58 No one, it seems, considered 
what the army would do if the Specials put up armed 
resistance to a Boundary Commission award ceding large 
tracts of Northern Ireland to the Free State.
Article 12's 'alleged ambiguity
At the end of April, Lord Birkenhead delivered a 
speech to the Liverpool Conservative Club, in which he 
declared that only minor re-adjustments to the Irish 
border could be expected from the Boundary Commission.59 
Although this was not the first time that Birkenhead had 
made such remarks, his speech hit a raw nerve in Dublin. 
On 6 May, Kevin 0'Higgins hit back. Article 12 had been 
Craig's choice, not theirs, O'Higgins told his audience. 
While the Free State would not coerce 'that portion of 
North-East Ulster which is homogeneously Orange and
58Ibid, Anderson to Creedy, 16 December 1924; Cameron 
to Creedy, 13 and 27 January 1925; 'Copy of Memorandum sent 
to Prime Minister Northern Ireland on 21st January 1925'; 
Cubitt to Cameron, 12 March 1925, [two letters].
59See chapter 7 below for more on this speech.
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Unionist', neither would it allow Craig's government to 
coerce those 'units which are predominantly Nationalist 
and desirous of being within the jurisdiction of our 
State.760
Behind the scenes, O'Higgins saw Birkenhead's speech 
as a warning. '[W]e cannot allow ... an alleged 
ambiguity in Article 12', he told Cosgrave, 'to be left 
to ... a Chairman appointed by the British Government.' 
O'Higgins wanted the matter settled at once. Did 
MacDonald and Thomas agree with Birkenhead that the 
Boundary Commission was only empowered to make minor 
border re-adjustments? If there was any question between 
the two governments about Article 12, O'Higgins insisted, 
'we must have the ambiguity cleared up before the 
Boundary Commission sits', possibly by arbitration.
Hugh Kennedy, the Free State's attorney-general, 
disagreed. Whatever Birkenhead claimed, none of the four 
British governments that had been in office since the 
signing of the Treaty had raised this issue, and there 
was no reason for the Irish to get 'tied up' by the 
conclusions of an arbitrator. Moreover, 0'Higgins's 
strategy was 'based on the assumption that there is some 
ambiguity which we have always denied and cannot now 
admit.' Both governments had repeatedly said that it was 
up to the Commissioners themselves to set their terms of 
reference. Why stir up a controversy where none might
60'Statement by Minister for Home Affairs, Howth, 6th 
May 1924', D/T, S 1801/R.
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exist? If the issue arose, Eoin MacNeill could easily 
refer the matter to Dublin; then would be the time to 
settle any dispute.
Cosgrave also told O'Higgins that Curtis had 
answered Birkenhead's claim, pointing out that the 
British hardly were in a position to 'interpret an 
Article to which they were but one party of two.'
O'Higgins agreed. But 'I go further', he wrote, 'what 
the British Government cannot do, the British nominee on 
the Boundary Commission ought not to be allowed to do.' 
Possibly, O'Higgins allowed, the two governments were at 
one on this question. But 'the tone of practically all 
the leading British newspapers' convinced him that the 
Irish were foolish to allow this issue to remain 
unresolved.61
O'Higgins had good reason to be alarmed. On 5 May 
Craig reported to his Cabinet that Thomas had confided to 
him that the Boundary Commission would restrict itself 
only to 'an adjustment of the actual boundary.'62 A week 
later, a similar story reached James MacNeill in London, 
and he immediately relayed the information directly to 
Cosgrave.63 Yet Kennedy's view prevailed. Just as 
British politicians wished to avoid the boundary issue
610'Higgins to Cosgrave? Kennedy to Cosgrave? and 
O'Higgins to Cosgrave, 7, 9, and 10 May 1924, D/T, S
1801/R. 'The Irish Boundary', The Timesr 2 May 1924. 'The 
Irish Boundary. Meaning of Clause 12', Morning Post. 7 May 
1924.
“Cabinet Conclusions, 5 May 1924, PRONI, CAB4/112/12.
“MacNeill to Cosgrave, 13 May 1924, D/T, S 1801/H.
266
generally, their Irish opposites similarly averted their 
eyes from this specific question hoping, it seems, that 
it might go away on its own.
Delay following delay
On 2 June, MacDonald formally notified Cosgrave and 
Craig that in the face of Belfast's continued defiance, 
it was unclear whether the Boundary Commission could 
function with only two members and, if not, whether 
London had the power to name Belfast's representative. 
These questions posed a constitutional dilemma and could 
only be answered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council.64 Strangely, MacDonald's Cabinet did not ask, 
and the committee did not reach out to answer, the most 
important question: namely, was it within the power of 
Northern Ireland's subordinate Parliament to defy an 
agreement reached by the Imperial Parliament? Put 
another way: 'Have the King, Lords and Commons of Great 
Britain and the Six Counties any authority whatever in 
the Six Counties?'65
To ensure the widest possible backing for the 
committee's decision, the Cabinet decided that two of the 
panel members should be from the dominions. While a 
Canadian judge was being sought, it had already been 
arranged for the chief justice of Australia to sit on the 
committee. But, given the distances that both men had to
64MacDonald to Cosgrave and to Craig, both 2 June 1924, 
Cmd. 2166. Nos. 4 and 5.
65'Viewpoints', Irish News. 23 June 1924. Also, see 
Pail Deb. Vol. 7, Col. 2360-2361, 13 June 1924.
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travel, it would be some time before a judgment could be 
expected. The interval should not be wasted. In his 
June letters to Cosgrave and Craig, MacDonald announced 
that the British were about to name the Boundary 
Commission chairman. To spare everyone from the 
'difficulties by which we are all at present confronted', 
he again proposed that the chairman should be employed in 
one last attempt to reach 'an amicable settlement'.
If MacDonald thought this action would win any 
plaudits in Dublin he was mistaken. Even before his 
despatch reached the Irish capital, Healy informed Thomas 
that the Free State government now demanded that the 
Commission should be established immediately. In both 
this letter and one written the following day by 
Cosgrave, the Irish all but openly accused Labour of 
deliberately frustrating the intentions of Article 12. 
'[D]elay follows delay', Cosgrave bitterly complained 
and, to the Irish, the appeal to the Judicial Committee 
looked like a 'device' to 'shelve the whole matter.'
This accusation was vigorously denied in separate letters 
from MacDonald and Thomas. In fact, the Irish were 
closer to the truth than they knew.66
In his 6 June letter to Cosgrave, MacDonald pointed 
out that no formal reguest to appoint a Boundary 
Commissioner had been put to the Northern Ireland 
government until 29 April and that its formal refusal had
66Healy to Thomas; Cosgrave to MacDonald? MacDonald to 
Cosgrave? and Thomas to Healy, 3, 4, 6, and 12 June 1924, 
Cmd. 2166. Nos. 6, 8, 11, and 12.
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not been sent until 10 May. The British knew that 
Craig's government 'might' refuse to appoint its 
representative, it was true. But they did not know this 
for sure until mid-May and, MacDonald argued, 'we should 
get into difficulties if we try to deal with 
contingencies before they have actually arisen.' But as 
early as 2 April Thomas had informed the Cabinet that 
this contingency was 'almost certain'.67 And, less than 
a week later the government's law officers reported that 
without a Northern Ireland representative, the Boundary 
Commission could not in their view legally function.68
By contrast, in early May Ulster's government was 
already working on the assumption that the issue would be 
sent to the Privy Council and Craig was attempting to 
influence its decision. 'I fancy that he is taking 
steps, though I am not sure through what channel', 
Tallents reported, to secure an interpretation favouring 
the Unionists. If Craig succeeded and the Privy Council 
ruled out large-scale transfers of territory, the feeling 
in Belfast was that Cosgrave would 'take little further 
interest' in the boundary question. Were this to happen, 
Craig himself suggested that the Free Staters might then 
take advantage of the ensuing uproar to repudiate their 
financial obligations in Article 5 of the Treaty.69
67C. 24(24), 2 April 1924, CAB 23/47.
68'Boundaries of Ulster. Opinion of the Lord
Chancellor and Law Officers of the Crown', C.P. 242(24), 7
April 1924, TJ GG/2/20.
69Tallents to Anderson, 8 May 1924, HO 144/3915/7.
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Whatever Craig was getting up to behind the scenes, 
this latest development further strained relations 
between London and Dublin. Even if the best of 
intentions are attributed to British motives, the 
practical effect of not arranging for an early sitting of 
the Judicial Committee allowed the government to again 
put off the inevitable. Curtis, for one, was well aware 
that this would be the result. At the very least, he 
pointed out in early May, such a move would buy time.70
The irritation made plain in Cosgrave's 4 June 
letter to MacDonald reflected the growing mistrust of 
Labour among Free State politicians. Following the 
breakdown of the Chequers conference, Cosgrave and his 
colleagues had to show their supporters that their 
patience was at long last about to bear fruit. This 
could best be demonstrated, Healy informed Thomas on 3 
June, by putting the new chairman and MacNeill to work 
ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants in the border 
counties.
Dublin's proposal, O'Higgins pointed out, was 
'within the Treaty and is preparatory to its 
enforcement'. MacDonald's idea of using the chairman as 
an intermediary was 'preparatory to its evasion'. Worse, 
the idea was fast gaining ground in Ireland that the 
British had no intention of taking account of the wishes 
of border-county Nationalists, that doing so was 'not
70'Appreciation of the Present Political Position in 
Ireland', 9 May 1924, CAB 21/281.
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within the sphere of practical politics.'71
'A miserable farce'
In mid-June Cosgrave was forced to allow time for a 
Dail debate on Britain's 'long series of evasions' 
regarding the Boundary Commission which had long since 
'become a miserable long-drawn-out farce.' Opposition 
TDs pointed out that these delays had allowed Unionists 
to create 'acute difficulties' for Northern Nationalists 
'which did not exist when the Treaty was signed in 
1921./72 Here, the source for complaint was Craig's 
continuing assault on proportional representation.
Although the Northern Ireland Parliament abolished 
PR for local elections in 1922, Craig had found it 
politic to postpone implementing the legislation for 
county council and rural district council elections until 
1924. Unionist allies were told that the postponement 
was necessary to allow for the redrawing of electoral 
boundaries.73 Redistricting, combined with the abolition 
of PR for municipal elections, had already deprived 
Northern Nationalists of their majorities on councils in 
Londonderry, Enniskillen, and Downpatrick.74
710'Higgins to Cosgrave, 10 June 1924, D/T, S 1801/H.
72Dail Deb. Vol. 7, Col. 2355, 2357, 2364, 2366, and 
2630, 13 and 18 June 1924. It was during this debate that 
the government was also attacked for agreeing to suspend 
the Council of Ireland. See chapter 4 above.
73'Local Elections in Northern Ireland', 22 April 1924, 
DO 35/893/1/X11/123.
74See chapter 3 above. Phoenix, Northern Nationalism, 
p. 268-269.
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That same outcome, about to be repeated at the 
county level, was directly linked to the boundary 
question. Those 'responsible in the Free State were 
fiddling', a rally of Tyrone Nationalists were told, 
while they faced 'a war of extermination'. At this same 
meeting a resolution was passed protesting not only 'the 
grossly scandalous gerrymandering' that had occurred but 
also against 'the delay in settling our claim to form 
part of the Irish Free State'.75
These protests help to explain Cosgrave's repeated 
requests to the British government that they establish 
the Boundary Commission before the end of May. With 
Nationalists no longer in the majority on so many local 
government councils, the case for including the border 
counties in the Free State would be far harder to make. 
Unfortunately for Northern Nationalists, the weapon with 
which they chose to demonstrate their opposition both to 
the abolition of PR and to redistricting played into 
their opponents' hands. A Nationalist boycott of 
elections held on 1 June ensured Unionist victories. 
Significantly, the boycott did not have the backing of 
the North-Eastern Boundary Bureau, which correctly 
forecast that the move would back-fire.76
At the same time, the boycott won no sympathy for 
the Nationalists in Whitehall. While it was admitted
■75'Tyrone Asks Fair Play', Freeman's Journa 1 . 8 April
1924. 'The Gerrymander Scandal', Ulster Herald. 12 April 
1924.
76PhOenix, Northern Nationalism, p. 302.
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that the redistricting plans 'were most carefully thought 
out by the Unionists to secure them a majority7, one Home 
Office official observed that the Nationalists had only 
themselves to blame for their dilemma. According to this 
official, Nationalist refusal to participate in hearings 
on the redistricting plans, or their 'purely destructive 
criticism7 of those plans when they did attend such 
meetings, robbed their objection of 'much of its 
force7.77
Meanwhile, Craig7s government was busily creating, 
what a later generation would call, 'facts on the 
ground7.78 As one TD predicted, these facts would make 
all the difference. Once the Unionists gained control of 
the county councils with the patronage that accompanied 
that control - and coupled these powers with the physical 
force of the Specials - they would have no problem in 
turning a large majority against them into a majority in 
their favour.79
'The grave of reputations7
On 5 June MacDonald informed the House of Commons 
that his government was at last ready to name the 
chairman of the Irish Boundary Commission.80 Richard 
Feetham, a native of Monmouthshire, had made his
77'Local Elections in Northern Ireland7, 22 April 1924, 
DO 35/893/1/xl1/123.
78The phrase is often used to describe Israel7s 
settlements policy, especially in and around Jerusalem.
79Dail Deb. Vol. 7, Col. 2366, 13 June 1924.
8°HC Deb. Vol. 174, Col. 1469, 5 June 1924.
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reputation as a barrister in South Africa where, only the 
year before, he was appointed to that country's Supreme 
Court. For his decision to go to South Africa in the 
first place, Feetham largely had one man to thank: Lionel 
Curtis. The two met while studying at Oxford and 
continued their association in South Africa, working in 
Alfred Milner's famous 'Kindergarten' of civil servants. 
Among other appointments, Feetham served as legal adviser 
to the Die-hard Tory leader, Lord Selborne, when the 
latter was Britain's high commissioner in Pretoria. 
Feetham and Curtis retained their links through the Round 
Table group and, ironically, Curtis had wanted his old 
friend to draft the final version of the Irish Treaty in 
1921. 'Feetham's Irish hour' was not then. It had come
now.81
Feetham, however, was not the first choice for this 
job. As early as September 1922, Curtis had suggested to 
Churchill that the ideal candidate would be former 
Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden.82 When 
approached about the chairmanship in May 1924, however, 
Borden was willing to accept only on condition that 'both 
Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State will appoint
81Richard to Mary Feetham [his mother], 4 July 1924, RF 
MSS Afr. s. 1793, Box 6, File 1. Thomas to Selborne, 19 
May 1924, Selborne Papers, MSS 84, ff. 165. Jones diary, 
27 May 1924, Vol. Ill, p. 232. Lavin, Curtis, p. 14, 19, 
192, 223. G. Hand, 'MacNeill and the Boundary Commission', 
in F.X. Martin and F.J. Byrne, The Scholar Revolutionary: 
Eoin MacNeill. 1867-1945. and the Making of the New Ireland
(Shannon, Ireland, 1973), p. 219-222.
82Curtis to Churchill, 13 September 1922, CO
739/7/45885.
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representatives and if I am assured that my acting is 
desired by both.' As he later confessed to Lord 
Beaverbrook, he 'was not sorry that the North persisted 
in its refusal', taking him off the hook.83
Like Borden, Feetham's understanding of the Irish 
Question was rooted in an empire and Commonwealth 
framework.84 Recent Irish historians have been decidedly 
reluctant to subject Feetham to harsh scrutiny. This may 
be an embarrassed reaction to the 'Feetham-cheat 'em!' 
abuse suffered by the chairman at the hands of 
Nationalist critics.85 To be sure, there is no evidence 
that Feetham was vetted for his views on what he thought 
the Boundary Commission ought to achieve. But given his 
background and associations, there was no need. As 
Curtis later told Churchill, Feetham was selected
83'Paraphrase Telegram, Governor General of Canada to 
Thomas', 7 May 1924, HO 45/12296/12. Borden to 
Beaverbrook, 9 October 1924, BBK C/51.
84 J .E . Kendle, 'The Round Table Movement and "Home Rule 
All Round"', The Historical Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3, Autumn 
1993, p. 332-353.
85Hand, 'MacNeill', p. 221-222. Hand, Report. p. x- 
xxi. According to Joseph Lee, Hand's 'dispassionate 
assessment of Feetham' retrieved 'the reputation of Irish 
scholarship'. See Ireland, p. 148, n. 411. While 
emphasising that Feetham was 'conscientious', Hand, p. x- 
xi, notes however that he was 'unimaginative' and his 
approach to the Commission 'was marked by a legalism and 
remoteness from political realities ... it is just possible 
that he was not the right kind of man' for the job. The 
abuse hurled at Feetham was, in any event, scurrilous. 
Both Labour's Thomas Johnson, and Farmers' Party chief 
Denis Gorey suggested that Feetham's career depended on 
pleasing his English 'master'. See Pail Deb. Vol. 8, Col. 
2505, 2558, 15 October 1924. For a dispassionate, though 
no less critical assessment of Feetham, see Gwynn, History 
of Partition, p. 231-232.
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precisely because he was a man of 'conservative 
temperament' who could be counted on to reject the sort 
of 'preposterous and extravagant claims' being made by 
the Free State. 'Feetham', he assured Churchill, 'is a 
chairman exactly of the kind you contemplated.' Quite 
so. On hearing of Feetham's appointment, Curtis sent his 
old friend a cryptic, two-word telegram: 'England 
expects'.86
MacDonald gave a similar assurance to Lady 
Londonderry. Any arbitrator, the British prime minister 
wrote, was bound to say that the Commission could do 
nothing more than make minor changes to the Irish border. 
'I understand this is Feetham's view', MacDonald 
continued, though he admitted that his information was 
the product of 'mere gossip'.87
Feetham's appointment did not mean that MacDonald 
had 'abandoned hope' that the two Irish Governments 
might yet reach a mutual settlement.88 Soon after his 
arrival in London, Feetham was dispatched first to 
Dublin, then to Belfast and back to Dublin again for 
informal talks with the two Irish governments. Curtis 
was under no illusions about Feetham's task. Solving the
86Curtis to Churchill, 19 August 1924, Curtis Papers, 
MSS 89, ff. 76-83. Hand, 'MacNeill', p. 220. Curtis's 
telegram was a reminder of Nelson's order to the fleet just 
before the Battle of Trafalgar: 'England expects every man 
to do his duty'.
87MacDonald to Lady Londonderry, 5 August 1924, quoted
in H.M. Hyde, The Londonderrys: A Family Portrait (London, 
1979), p. 159-160.
88HC Deb. Vol. 174, Col. 1259, 4 June 1924.
276
Irish problem, he pointed out to a mutual friend, had 
been 'the grave of reputations and also of old 
friendships'. But he was confident that Feetham would 
soon show the Irish, North and South, that he was 'a man 
who cannot be twiddled around anyone's finger.'89
Feetham's discussions with Cosgrave and Craig 
achieved nothing. Although the Irish president ruled out 
another conference before the Boundary Commission set to 
work, Feetham nevertheless suggested such a meeting when 
he met with Craig on 3 July. The Northern Ireland prime 
minister was willing to consider another conference, 
though any proposal to transfer loyalists from the six 
counties 'on any large scale would not be tolerated'.
Craig also danced around Free State demands for a 
plebiscite in the border areas, saying that 'he would not 
insult loyalists by asking their wishes, since he had no 
doubt what the replies would be.' Incensed over what he 
considered to be British 'bungling' of Feetham's visit 
(the government had failed to consult him beforehand), 
Craig told his Cabinet that during the interview he 'had 
brought home to Mr Feetham the gravity of the question 
which he was handling and the very grave dangers which 
would ensue from any mistakes.'90
If anyone had reason to worry after Feetham's first
89Curtis to Lady Selborne, 28 June 1924, Lady Selborne 
Papers, Eng. Lett. d. 430, ff. 52-54.
9°'Index to Dates and Conferences', 1-4 July 1924, D/T, 
S 1801/P. Cosgrave memorandum, 6 July 1924, D/T, S 1801/1. 
Cabinet Conclusions, 4 July 1924, PRONI, CAB4/117/5.
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visit to Ireland, it should have been the Free Staters. 
During their second interview, the Boundary Commission 
chairman questioned Cosgrave on his government's attitude 
about transfers of territory from the Free State to the 
North. Cosgrave told Feetham that his government 'had 
never admitted the possibility of losing any of our 
territory.' Nevertheless, this possibility was clearly 
on Feetham's agenda.91
Before leaving Ireland, Feetham embarked on a four- 
day tour of the border so that he could familiarise 
himself with the area's 'economic and geographic 
considerations'. The press statement explaining his 
actions heartened Unionists. It was proof, reported one 
newspaper, that he had concluded that any changes 
proposed by the Commission 'must keep close to the 
border '.92
91Ibid, Cosgrave memorandum.




Heading for Irish Rocks
... London is much excited over Ireland.
Ulster and the Morning Post are on the war­
path; Ll.G. feels that 'all's right with the 
world' again, and I am terribly gloomy.
S.B. is either dishonest or he absolutely 
agrees with me, but has he the clearness of 
conviction and the force of will to impress 
the Ulstermen? It will be a miracle if we 
keep our ship off the rocks.
- Austen Chamberlain1
Not long after his return from Dublin at the end of 
March, Tom Jones was 'startled' one morning to find the 
ex-prime minister of Great Britain standing in his office 
doorway. So unexpected a visit was 'very like' Stanley 
Baldwin. And so was Jones's reaction. Never one to miss 
an opportunity, he decided to tell the Conservative 
leader 'something of my visit to Ireland and the coming 
trouble on the Boundary Commission'. A crisis was just 
over the horizon, and Jones hoped that Baldwin might use 
his influence with Carson and Craig 'to bring Ulster into 
a more reasonable mood.'2
Despite Labour's difficulties with the Irish 
boundary, the Conservatives remained largely silent on 
the issue through the winter and spring of 1924. Even 
behind the scenes, party leaders avoided the issue as
Austen to Ivy Chamberlain, 1 August 1924, AC 6/1/548.
2Jones diary, 9 April 1924, Vol. I . p. 275-276.
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much as possible.3 But however much they tried steering 
their ship clear of Irish rocks, strong currents were 
pulling them in that direction. It was true that the 
Conservative ship was not the only one that might run 
aground. But though Labour was in office and the 
Liberals, especially Lloyd George, had Irish skeletons of 
their own, the potential for damage was greatest for the 
Tories.
For two of Austen Chamberlain's ex-Coalition 
partners the boundary dispute was particularly dangerous. 
One on the fringe of the Conservative Party, the other 
desperate to get back in, both Birkenhead and Churchill 
feared that the brewing trouble over Ulster would cause 
them 'considerable difficulty' if it again became a major 
political issue. Over the next two years they were to 
play increasingly prominent roles in creating the 
conditions that would contain the boundary question for 
the next half century. In the meantime, the stakes for 
themselves and for their party were high and the crisis, 
when it erupted, would be one of the most serious that 
the party ever faced.4
The return of Birkenhead and Churchill
Although the Tory high priests had been willing to 
'kill the fatted calf' for Austen Chamberlain, there were
3For a rare exception, see Bernard to Chamberlain? and 
Chamberlain to Bernard, 18 and 25 February 1924, AC 35/4/7- 
8.
4Churchill to Birkenhead, 30 April 1924, Comp V . 1 . p.
151-152.
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no burnt offerings on Birkenhead's return to 'the true 
fold' after the 1923 election. His reinstatement in the 
Conservative leadership had been 'a more difficult 
proposition', only allowed because it was a case of 
'Austen and F.E. or no Austen'. Party leaders hoped that 
once the two men were re-established in the Tory 
hierarchy, what Salisbury called the 'very honourable 
though perverted chivalry' which bound the two would 
disappear. They could be patient and in time rid 
themselves of Birkenhead - if his 'drunkenness and loose 
living' didn't do the job for them.5
The enmity which Conservatives felt for Birkenhead 
was nothing compared to the detestation reserved for 
Churchill. Though still a Liberal until Asquith allowed 
Labour to take office, rumours that Churchill was about 
to rejoin the Conservative Party had been circulating for 
over a year - a prospect that many stalwarts viewed 
'without enthusiasm.'6 At the same time, Churchill's 
desperate efforts to regain a Parliamentary seat 
intensified feeling against him.
In such a climate, neither Birkenhead nor Churchill 
could afford to see an issue as divisive as the Irish 
Question re-emerge. Churchill, edging his way back into
Salisbury to Baldwin, 26 January 1924, SB Vol. 159, f.
258-261. 'Memorandum of conversation with Mr Baldwin,' 
4[?] February 1924, AJB-S, GD 433/2/19, Reel 4. Baldwin to 
Salisbury, 25 January 1924, S(4) 108/83-84. Chamberlain 
diary, 18 November 1923, NC 2/21. The Ulster Unionists, 
though, could not forgive or forget. See Lady Carson's 
diary, 7 and 9 February 1924, D.1507/C/8.
6Lady Spender's diary, 27 May 1923, D.1633/2/26.
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the party of his father, was especially determined that 
'this difficulty' should not become 'gravely 
embarrassing' to himself. It was imperative, he later 
told Lionel Curtis, to keep the boundary question out of 
Parliament. Once it became a domestic political issue, 
it could not 'fail to raise the question of the meaning 
to be attached to Article 12' - and for Churchill, that 
could be very embarrassing indeed.7
'Political dynamite'
An indication of the sort of trouble the boundary 
question could cause occurred when Birkenhead addressed 
the issue at the end of April. Speaking to the Liverpool 
Conservative Club, the former lord chancellor boldly 
defended his decision to sign the Irish Treaty. Article 
12 was written in 'plain language', he insisted, and 
meant that only a minor border readjustment could be 
expected from the Commission's work. Ulster had nothing 
to fear and could appoint its representative and so save 
the country from the 'political dynamite' which its 
refusal might ignite.8
If Birkenhead thought that his speech would allay 
Ulster Unionist concerns, he was wrong. Craig was 
incandescent. 'How any Britisher, any man with the blood
7Winston to Clementine Churchill, 19 August 1924, CSC 
2/17/13-15. Churchill to Curtis, 15 August 1924, WSC 
2/570/18. According to John Ramsden, local Conservatives 
would not consider Churchill's candidacy in the in West 
Toxteth by-election that spring 'because of his past 
attitude to Ulster'. See Balfour and Baldwin, p. 192.
8'Ulster and the Boundary. Lord Birkenhead's Appeal', 
The Times. 1 May 1924.
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of his forefathers in him, can contemplate such an 
outrageous action', he told the Ulster Association,
'passes my comprehension'.9 He was equally scathing 
when, during an hour and a half meeting that same day, he 
told the Shadow Cabinet that he 'got more time and 
interest from the present Government on the Ulster 
question than he did from his own associates' in the Tory 
Party. To smooth over matters, it was agreed that 
Birkenhead, along with Carson and Sir Douglas Hogg, would 
act as a 'special committee' to co-ordinate strategy 
between the Tories and Ulster Unionists. In return, the 
Conservatives made it clear that 'it was of vital 
importance' for Ulster Unionist MPs to 'be in constant 
attendance at Westminster' in case their votes were 
needed by Baldwin. Despite the agreement, hard feelings 
remained. All the Conservatives, Lady Carson wrote in 
her diary, 'except Lord Cave were rotten about Ulster.'10
At the same time, the Shadow Cabinet formed a 
separate committee to examine the legal implications 
arising out of Northern Ireland's refusal to appoint its 
Boundary Commissioner. The committee's report was far 
from reassuring. On the one hand, the committee's 
members - Birkenhead, Cave, and Hogg - agreed that the 
Commission could not function unless Ulster was 
represented on the panel. That said, once the Commission
9'Ulster's Resolve', The Times. 2 May 1924.
10L .C . Min. 1 (24), 1 May 1924, Cave Papers, Add. MSS
62,489, ff. 75-77. Cabinet Conclusions, 5 May 1924, PRONI, 
CAB4/112/12. Lady Carson's diary, 3 May 1924, D.1507/C/8.
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was legally constituted, there was no certainty that it 
would limit itself to making minor changes to the Irish 
frontier. Quite the contrary, even a Boundary Commission 
award which transferred the whole of Fermanagh and Tyrone 
to the Free State 'could not be treated as bad in law or 
set aside by any Court.'11
The upshot of these events was to make the 
Conservatives more wary than ever of the boundary 
question. Afterward, it was decided that 'as far as 
possible party leaders should avoid making any public 
pronouncement on the Irish question.' Whatever the 
merits of this decision, it stymied discussion of the 
issue within the party's higher counsels and meant that 
the Tories would not be 'prepared to meet any probable 
eventuality.' As spring gave way to summer,
Conservatives pinned their hopes on the idea that Labour 
might somehow solve the boundary dispute, even though the 
dangers to the party were obvious should Ireland again 
erupt as an issue in British politics.12
'Beastly awkward': the Privy Council decision
For Austen Chamberlain, the summer of 1924 seemed to 
drag on forever. 'The session is slowly petering out', 
he wrote to his wife from the House of Commons at the end 
of July; 'everybody is bored and a holiday would be good
1XL . C . 10 (24), 5 May 1924, Cave Papers, Add. MSS
62,464, ff. 69-72.
“Robert Cecil to Salisbury, 9 May 1924, S(4) 109/44- 
47. L.C. Min. 2, 5 (24), 6, 28 May 1924, Cave Papers, Add. 
MSS, 62,489, ff. 78-79, 91-93.
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for all.' Chamberlain was not the only MP longing to get 
away from London. Months of negotiations - with the 
Europeans on reparations, the Soviets on trade and, 
lately, with the Irish - had put MacDonald, and his 
colleagues, under a great strain. 'I am living in a 
perpetual succession of special Cabinet Meetings', one of 
them wrote, interrupted by 'sittings of the House ... 
called at short notice'. It was agreed that Parliament 
would adjourn after the first week in August and would 
not reconvene until the end of October. 'Only Ireland is 
menacing', Chamberlain confided to his wife. 'Will there 
never be an end to that bitter chapter?'13
The menace referred to by Chamberlain was the report 
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The 
committee's decision was about to be issued and, Jones 
confided to his diary, it was 'beastly awkward'. Charles 
Craig, who was also apprised of its contents, quickly 
sent word to his brother, James. In effect, the 
committee closed off any avenue the government might take 
to call the Boundary Commission into being without the 
passage of additional legislation. There could be no 
Commission without a representative from Northern 
Ireland? the Crown, acting on the advice of its British 
ministers, could not force Northern Ireland's governor- 
general to appoint a representative? nor, as Article 12
13Austen to Ivy Chamberlain, 29 July 1924, AC 6/1/543. 
MacDonald diary, 2 and 6 August 1924, JRM, PRO 
30/69/1753/1. Olivier to Reading, 7 August 1924, 10, MSS 
Eur. E. 238/7, No. 29.
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was written, could the government in London make the 
appointment on its own. Jones dreaded the prospect of 
Parliament passing an Irish boundary bill. Were that to 
happen, he wrote, 'Cosgrave's opponents would say that if 
the British Parliament could alter the Treaty, so could 
the Irish Free State.'14
Finally, on 30 July MacDonald heeded Jones's advice 
and invited other party leaders to discuss what had 
become a matter 'of serious Parliamentary importance.'15 
Even before the invitations were sent, Jones was ordered 
to sound out Baldwin. What he got was a 'diehard 
reaction, more so than I ever remember having before from 
him.' Jones was surprised by Baldwin's attitude toward 
the Free Staters and shocked when his once and future 
master told him that it was 'difficult to forgive 
assassination and to forget their behaviour in the 
war./16
Baldwin's reaction is easy to explain. Alarmed at 
the prospect of boundary legislation, he was, in effect, 
'being asked to open up old wounds among his most loyal
14Jones diary, 31 July 1924, Vol. Ill, p. 233-234. 
Charles to James Craig, 30 July 1924, PRONI, CAB9Z/3/2. 
Cmd. 2214: Report of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, as Approved by Order of His Majesty in Council, of 
the 31st July. 1924. on the Questions Connected with the 
Irish Boundary Commission Referred to the Said Committee. 
(London, 1924).
15C. 45(24), 30 July 1924, CAB 23/48. Duff to Lloyd
George, 30 July 1924, LG G/13/2/1. Besides Lloyd George, 
Asquith, Baldwin, Birkenhead, Austen Chamberlain, and 
Worthington-Evans were invited to the meeting.
16Jones diary, 29 July 1924, Vol. Ill, p. 233.
286
followers so that the Labour Party should be spared 
embarrassment.'17 Thomas confirmed as much when he 
informed the other party leaders that the government 
intended to pass a one-clause bill allowing it to name 
Northern Ireland's Boundary Commissioner. Furthermore, 
unless the other leaders 'had some better suggestion to 
make', Labour expected cross-party support for the 
legislation so that it could be enacted as quickly as 
possible.18
The participants at the 30 July meeting were well 
aware that Labour's attempt to by-pass Craig's government 
would be thrown out by the House of Lords. In that case, 
Jones noted in his diary, 'Ireland will be back in our 
politics'. Baldwin, sensing the danger for himself and 
for his party, was 'for going very slow' before any final 
decision was made.19 He adamantly opposed the suggestion 
that the adjournment might be postponed to rush the 
legislation through Parliament, telling one confidante 
that he would do his 'utmost to stave that off.'20
His nemesis, on the other hand, could not have been 
more pleased with this turn of events. Lloyd George was 
in his element, pledging Liberal support for the
17Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin. p. 269-270.
18C. 44(24), 30 July 1924, CAB 23/48. For evidence
that Labour was expected to introduce such a bill, see 
Austen to Ivy Chamberlain, 29 July 1924, AC 6/1/543.
19Jones diary, 31 July 1924, Vol. Ill, p. 234.
2°Baldwin to Joan Davidson, 30 July 1924, Davidson
Papers.
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government's bill and urging its immediate passage.
'L1G. is just bursting with new-born hope', Chamberlain 
told his wife, while 'S.B. sees himself confronted with 
disaster.' Both men knew that if Tory peers rejected the 
legislation, Labour and the Liberals could then go to the 
country on a platform of 'the Lords versus the People'.
In any such election, Chamberlain predicted, the 
Conservatives would suffer a 'smashing defeat'.21 Other 
Tory leaders were equally pessimistic. Lord Derby 
thought that MacDonald would be 'rather glad' to see 
Parliament dissolved over the boundary question as Labour 
was 'in a peck of troubles' over a number of other 
issues.22
In fact, MacDonald was no more anxious to fight an 
election on Ireland than was Baldwin. At this same time, 
he was immersed in two separate foreign policy issues: 
the struggle to resolve disputes over post-war 
reparations and efforts aimed at normalising relations 
with the Soviet Union. The MacDonald-led discussions to 
bring round both France and Germany to accept the Dawes 
Plan on reparations would not achieve success until mid- 
August. Meanwhile, the government's discussions with the 
Soviets were proving to be especially difficult.
21 Austen to Ivy Chamberlain, 31 July 1924, AC 6/1/546. 
Neville Chamberlain called Lloyd George's reaction 
'downright unpatriotic'. See Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 
3 August 1924, NC 18/1/446.
22Derby to Rawlinson, 15 August 1924, quoted in R. 
Churchill, Lord Derby. 'Kina of Lancashire': The Official 
Life of Edward. Seventeenth Earl of Derby. 1865-1948 
(London, 1959), p. 572-573.
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The collapse of the Soviet negotiations, just as the 
crisis over the boundary bill erupted, was followed less 
than twenty-four hours later by the dramatic announcement 
that an agreement with Moscow had been reached after all. 
On the same day that the Irish bill was given its first 
reading in the House of Commons, MPs were stunned to 
learn that British and Soviet negotiators had concluded 
two treaties: a trade agreement, along with a general 
treaty which held out the promise of government-backed 
loan guarantees to Moscow. This astonishing turn of 
events, claimed the Tory press, was evidence of communist 
influence deep within the bowels of MacDonald's 
administration. If anyone still doubted the charge, the 
Cabinet then handed its critics yet further ammunition 
with which to bring down the government.23
In late July, Britain's communist party newspaper, 
the Workers' Weekly. published an article calling on 
soldiers not to allow themselves to be used as strike­
breakers. A warrant charging acting editor John Campbell 
with incitement to mutiny was duly issued only to be 
suddenly dropped after a confused series of exchanges 
involving MacDonald, other members of the Cabinet and 
Labour backbenchers.24 As with the Soviet treaties, this 
sudden turnaround simply fuelled charges of a 'red 
menace' within the government.
23Lyman, First Labour Government, p. 192-196.
24Jones diary, 6 August 1924, Vol. I. p. 287.
Marquand, MacDonald, p. 364-370.
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From Labour's point of view, then, the atmosphere 
was hardly propitious for a general election even if they 
could make Ireland and the Lords the main issues.
Anyway, no one in the party leadership really wanted to 
re-visit the Home Rule crisis. It was not their fight. 
Moreover, MacDonald had as much as reason as Baldwin for 
wanting to stop 'Lloyd George and his miserable minded 
following' from capitalizing on the boundary dispute.
'This is a thing to settle between friends', MacDonald 
told Lady Londonderry. They should not allow themselves 
to be dragged down into a squabble between 'dishonest 
politicians and hard mouthed bigots.'25
Other Labour grandees felt that the party needed 
more time in office to prove itself and this alone was 
reason for avoiding an early election. 'All depends on 
whether the P.M. pulls off a satisfactory settlement with 
France', Beatrice Webb wrote. 'If he does, the Labour 
Government is in for another nine months - until the next 
budget'. But, she feared, if 'neither the Russian loan 
nor Irish boundary business "comes off" we may be turned 
out in November.'26
On 2 August MacDonald, along with Thomas and 
Henderson, met with Cosgrave, Kennedy, Londonderry, and 
Pollock (Craig again being ill) to inform them of the 
government's plan of action. Privately, Cosgrave was
25MacDonald to Lady Londonderry, 5 August 1924, quoted
in Hyde, The Londonderrys. p. 159-160.
26Webb diary, 21 July 1924, Vol. 38, 4096-4102. Also,
see Gretton to Carson, 16 September 1924, PRONI, CAB9Z/3/2.
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told that although the boundary legislation would be 
introduced on 6 August, it would not be passed until 
Parliament reconvened in late autumn.
That was two months too long, the Irish president 
replied. His government's ten-vote majority in Dail 
Eireann did not account for some forty members who 
refused to take the Oath of Allegiance and, therefore, 
were denied their seats. Cosgrave believed that Thomas 
Johnson, the Dail's Opposition leader, planned to argue 
that the Treaty had been broken by Britain's continued 
refusal to set up the Boundary Commission. That being 
so, the forty abstentionist TDs could take their seats 
without submitting to the Oath - and if that happened, 
the Irish Republic would become a fait accompli.
Despite this warning, MacDonald and his colleagues 
agreed that 'even this very serious risk was outweighed 
by the practical certainty that the Bill ... would be 
rejected by the House of Lords? [and] that a General 
Election might have to be undertaken under unfavourable 
conditions'. According to a Free State account of the 
meeting, MacDonald warned Londonderry and Pollock of the 
'possibility of constitutional changes' if the North 
persisted in its refusal to appoint a Commissioner and 
the House of Lords threw out Labour's bill. The threat 
to abolish what powers remained in the Lords made no 
impression on either Unionist leader. Yet, even when 
faced with this stubborn reaction, MacDonald and Thomas 
still hoped that they might persuade the Ulstermen to
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name a Commissioner on their own. They were certain that 
only this could save them from an election on the 
boundary dispute.27
Inflaming passions
Any doubts that Ireland still had the power to 
inflame passions were dispelled when Thomas rose to speak 
in the Commons on 1 August. His announcement of the 
proposed boundary bill 'completely overshadowed' all 
other business. Now that the Irish spectre had re­
appeared in the House of Commons, its presence confirmed 
Baldwin's worst fears. 'The old feeling', H.A.L. Fisher 
recorded in his diary, was 'very intense'. Clearly, a 
large body of Conservative MPs were ready to fight the 
legislation without considering the political damage this 
might do to them in the country at large. 'Disaster is 
staring you in the face!' one MP cried out at the 
government? but his words might have served as a better 
warning to the Opposition front bench.28
Five days later the boundary bill was given its 
first reading in the House of Commons. Unless Craig and 
his followers were prepared to appoint their own Boundary 
Commissioner, Thomas declared that there was no 
alternative but to pass a bill allowing the imperial 
government to do so for them. Pressed by Baldwin for a
27C. 46(24), 4 August 1924, CAB 23/48. Free State
memorandum on 2 August 1924 conference, undated, D/T, S 
1801/J.
28MacDonald to George V, 2 August 1924, JRM, PRO 
30/69/228. HC Deb. Vol. 176, Col. 2401-2406, 1 August
1924. H.A.L. Fisher diary, 2 August 1924, MSS 19.
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go-slow approach on the one hand, and the Free State's 
demand that the legislation be enacted immediately,
Thomas split the difference and announced that Parliament 
would reconvene on 30 September to complete the bill's 
passage.29
What happened next 'produced one of the most 
interesting days of the Session.' Baldwin limited his 
remarks to the problems that would be entailed by 
Parliament's early recall. Sir John Simon, speaking for 
the Liberals, took a decidedly different course. Not 
only would his party back the boundary bill, Simon 
announced; it was also willing to extend Parliament's 
current sitting so that the measure could be enacted 
without delay. MacDonald called the speech a 'thinly 
disguised' attempt 'to inflame passion and political 
prejudice'. It did just that, provoking 'ominous cries' 
from Conservative and Unionist backbenchers and forcing 
the Speaker to intervene before the situation got 
completely out of hand.30
For those who recalled the Home Rule crisis, the 
scene was all too familiar. The 'Prince of Darkness', 
one contemporary journal noted, was again 'active in his 
old hunting ground'. This was territory many MPs had 
hoped they would never have to re-visit. Yet they seemed
29Ibid, Col. 2930-2932, 6 August 1924. Cosgrave to 
MacDonald, 3 August 1924, D/T, S 1801/J. C. 48(24), 6
August 1924, CAB 23/48.
3°Ibid, Col. 2934-2937. MacDonald to George V, 7 
August 1924, JRM, PRO 30/69/228. Annual Register; 1924. p. 
86-88.
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to be set on a course taking them precisely in that 
direction, with the added danger of a third general 
election in less than two years at the end of the road.31
The Conservatives' dilemma
Except for his brief intervention on the 6th,
Baldwin maintained a disquieting silence during the 
opening days of the boundary crisis. That evening, 
however, he lashed out. Speaking at Hemel Hempstead, the 
Conservative leader argued that a pledge of honour was 
implicit in the 1920 Act, a pledge as binding as any of 
the promises explicitly made in the Treaty. His harshest 
criticism was reserved for the Liberals 'who were 
prepared, apparently, to throw the whole of this subject 
back into the political arena' and to 'plunge the country 
into a crisis of the gravest character imaginable'. For 
his part, Baldwin vowed that Conservative MPs would fight 
any legislation to 'alter the Treaty by changing the 
character' of the Boundary Commission - a pledge which 
was in fact more ambiguous than his listeners may have 
realised.32
Baldwin was in a delicate position. Although the 
Die-hards were the most vocal section of his party when 
it came to Ireland, most Tories saw no reason why they 
should risk being dragged into electoral oblivion just 
because Craig was unwilling to compromise. After all,
31'The Devil and the Peace Treaties', The Nation. 9
August 1924.
32'Mr Baldwin on Irish Crisis', The Times. 7 August
1924.
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Lord Derby pointed out to Baldwin, Labour's bill was 
'only compelling them to do what, legally, they are bound 
to do.'33 Conservative leaders had to take account of 
these divisions; their national executive considered 
postponing the party's annual conference 'in view of the 
Political Situation which had arisen over the Irish 
Boundary question'.34
Even if Baldwin could keep these rifts from breaking 
into the open, the party still might be torn apart.
Hints coming from Belfast held out the tantalizing 
possibility that the Ulstermen might accept the boundary 
bill. But, as Baldwin explained to Edward Wood: 'The 
Lords are the crux'.35 Tory members of the upper house 
were unwilling to 'incur the odium of letting the bill 
through' without public backing from the Belfast 
government.36 This, Craig and his colleagues were 
unwilling to provide. In that case, the Lords would 
block Labour's bill, Conservatives in the Commons would 
feel bound to support them, and Labour - and Lloyd George 
and the Liberals - would have a golden opportunity to 
smash the party.
To be sure, not every Tory leader felt that they
33Derby to Baldwin, 4 September 1924, SB Vol. 99, ff. 
130-131.
34Executive Committee minutes, 9 September 1924, NUA 
4/1/4, ff. 101.
35Baldwin to Wood, 6 September 1924, Halifax Papers, 
A4.410/14/1.
36Salisbury to Baldwin, 25 August 1924, SB Vol. 99, ff. 
122-125.
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were in such dire straits. Leo Amery admitted that the 
Tories might 'have to face the possibility of the Goat 
trying to lead a raging campaign against Ulster in the 
hope of bringing about a Liberal Socialist combination 
and swamping us.7 But, he assured Baldwin, 'It won't 
come off.7 Even if MacDonald could be tempted into such 
an alliance with Lloyd George, most Labour MPs would not 
stand for it. Nor was Amery convinced that British 
voters would turn against the Tories for backing the 
House of Lords. The 'country, sick of Ireland, as it is, 
is just as likely to be cross with those who force on an 
election7.37
Few of Amery7s colleagues shared his optimism, 
however, and they did not include Baldwin. From the 
beginning, Austen Chamberlain felt that the party's 'only 
hope7 would be for Baldwin to somehow persuade Craig to 
compromise. Otherwise, 'nothing but crushing disaster 
awaits us.7 Ireland, Chamberlain told his wife, 'is 
indeed a fatal influence in British politics.738
Baldwin's visit to Belfast
A week after Parliament recessed, Baldwin 
reluctantly decided that must go to Belfast to impress 
upon Northern Ireland's Cabinet the gravity of the 
impending crisis. He was going against his better
37Amery to Baldwin, 3 August 1924, SB Vol. 99, ff. 118-
119.
38Austen to Ivy Chamberlain, 31 July 1924, AC 6/1/546. 
Also, see Birkenhead to Churchill, 21 August 1924, WSC 
2/570/48-49.
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judgment, having earlier told Craig that he did not want 
to make the trip 'unless it is absolutely necessary'.
Such a visit was bound to attract press speculation which 
'might do harm'. Baldwin, though, was sure that the 
Labour government was about to fall. 'It is difficult to 
see how they can get over the Soviet treaty in early 
November', he confided to Joan Davidson. But before that 
could happen, there might still be 'a crash over 
Ireland', and to prevent such an accident he was willing 
to risk a visit to the six counties.39
For the better part of Sunday, the 17th, Baldwin was 
involved in 'protracted discussions' with Craig and his 
colleagues. At the outset, their guest made it clear 
that there was little enthusiasm among Conservatives to 
do battle over the Irish boundary. Only two members of 
the Shadow Cabinet were inclined to pick a fight on the 
issue; the consensus, rather, was that 'it would be 
better to get the matter cleared up by this Government if 
Ulster would consent.'40
Craig, on the other hand, wanted his British allies 
to fight Labour's bill just short of forcing a general 
election on the issue. '[B]ut I showed him the snag', 
Baldwin explained in separate letters to Lord Salisbury 
and Edward Wood. Such a strategy was bound to fail,
39Baldwin to Joan Davidson, 14 August 1924, Davidson 
Papers. Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 270. As Baldwin 
suspected, his visit to Belfast did not remain secret for
long. See 'Belfast's Farewell to Mr. Baldwin', Morning 
Post. 19 August 1924.
4°Craig to Carson, 18 August 1924, PRONI, CAB9Z/5/1.
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because 'the Lords will never assent' to the bill 'unless 
they have your assurance of agreement.' Once the peers 
rejected the legislation, Labour might immediately call 
an election and 'we may be in a grave difficulty.'41
Despite this warning, Craig refused to give any 
concrete assurance that the Ulster Unionists would help 
their Tory allies. At most, he was willing to consider 
acguiescing to the boundary bill 'under duress'. In 
exchange, Baldwin gave the Northern Ireland government 
what amounted to a veto over any Boundary Commission 
award it did not like. 'If the Comn. should give away 
counties', he told Edward Wood, 'then of course Ulster 
couldn't accept it and we should back her.' At any rate, 
Baldwin was confident that this scenario would not occur. 
Labour would 'nominate a proper representative' to be 
Northern Ireland's Commissioner, he wrote, and 'he and 
Feetham will do what is right.'42
After his return from Belfast, Baldwin was 'inclined 
to think that the election will not be on Ireland'. And, 
he hinted to Joan Davidson, 'there are strong forces 
working to that end.'43 Baldwin had good reason to be 
optimistic. After his visit to Northern Ireland, Craig 
suggested to Edward Carson that, perhaps, the time had
41Baldwin to Wood, 6 September 1924, Halifax Papers, 
A4.410/14/1. Baldwin to Salisbury, 2 September 1924, 
Salisbury Papers, S(4) 110/25.
42Ibid, Baldwin to Wood.
43Baldwin to Joan Davidson, 21 August 1924, Davidson 
Papers.
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come confront the boundary problem, 'to face the music 
and have done with it.' Like Baldwin, Ulster's premier 
had concluded that it would be wise if the Unionists 'did 
not force a General Election' as it would be 'impossible 
to explain the intricacies of the Boundary question to 
audiences other than those which in any event would be 
likely to vote Conservative'. If Labour's bill was 
thrown out by the Lords, the election 'would be fought on 
whether the Commons or the hereditary peers were to 
prevail', and on that platform the Liberals and Labour 
would happily join forces. Ulster could expect 'little 
mercy' from a Lib-Lab government which might decide that 
they had 'a mandate to do what they liked.'44
Even if this nightmare scenario did not come to pass 
a Conservative victory, large or small, also posed a 
dilemma. Baldwin 'would be immediately faced with the 
problem of how to carry out the Treaty and this might 
possibly split the Conservative Party once more.' Aside 
from these considerations, Craig intimated that they had 
little to fear from MacDonald and Thomas. He was certain 
that Labour would nominate a 'safe person' to represent 
Northern Ireland on the Commission, who, with Feetham, 
could be trusted to 'override the Free State 
representative' if needs be.45 None the less, Craig 
still refused to take the next step and make public his 
willingness to accept Labour's bill. Instead, because of
44Craig to Carson, 18 August 1924, PRONI, CAB9Z/5/1.
45Ibid.
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his continuing ill-health, Ulster's premier let matters 
stand and set off on another three-week sea cruise.46
With Craig somewhere on the Baltic and Baldwin on 
holiday in France, matters were allowed to drift. An 
attempt by Salisbury to hammer out an agreement between 
the Unionists and Conservatives led nowhere. Salisbury 
was emphatic that only a 'public expression' by Craig 
would enable Tory peers to pass the boundary bill. 
Anything less, he pointed out to Lord Cave, 'would rob us 
of the last atom of credit which the Irish question has 
left us.'47 Fearing a sell-out, however, the Ulster 
Unionists still refused to budge.
The Birkenhead letter 
These were the circumstances that led to the 
publication of Birkenhead's famous letter to Arthur 
Balfour. Written to head off Balfour's defection from 
the Coalition in March 1922, the letter was intended to 
lay to rest his anxieties over the Irish Treaty.48 When 
the boundary crisis broke two years later, the Shadow 
Cabinet was told that a deal 'would be much easier' if it 
could be shown 'beyond dispute' that the Treaty's 
signatories never envisioned anything more than minor 
readjustments to Ireland's frontier when they agreed to
46Ervine, Craigavon, p. 491.
47Salisbury to Baldwin, 25 August and 5 September 1924, 
SB Vol. 99, ff. 122-125 and 132-133. Salisbury to Cave, 2 
September 1924, Cave Papers, Add. MSS 62,464, ff. 77-80.
48See chapter 3 for the letter's origins. The text is 
reprinted in Appendix III.
300
Article 12. Winston Churchill believed that Birkenhead's 
letter was the answer to their prayers. The importance 
'of such a document in the discussions to which we are 
now condemned', he pointed out to Balfour, could be 
decisive.49
Churchill hoped that by producing this letter he 
would finally be absolved of his role in the Irish 
settlement, thus paving the way for his return to the 
Tory fold. With an election in the offing, he was 
particularly anxious to be adopted as the candidate for a 
safe Conservative seat which had yet to be found for him. 
In fact, party chairman Stanley Jackson had already 
approached a number of local Conservative associations 
about adopting Churchill? but, noted one party insider, 
'they won't have him anywhere.'50
That Ireland was a stumbling block to Churchill's 
ambitions was made clear in a letter from Sir Harry 
Goschen, chairman of the Epping Conservative Association. 
Goschen would recommend Churchill's candidature in the 
constituency - but only on condition that he give his 
explicit backing to the party, its leader, and its 
policies 'especially as regards Ireland'. The cost of 
the Epping seat was a pledge to back no change of the 
Irish boundary that did not have Northern Ireland's
49L .C . Min. 6 (24), 30 July 1924, Cave Papers, Add. MSS
62,489, ff. 95-96. Churchill to Balfour, 7 August 1924, 
WSC 2/134/57.
5°Churchill to Jackson, 14 August 1924, WSC 2/134/69.
Bayford diary, 29 July 1924, p. 216.
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approval.
For Churchill, the price was worth paying.51
On 19 August Churchill triumphantly sent Craig a 
copy of Birkenhead's 1922 letter. Given its contents, he 
hoped the Ulster government might now see that they had 
nothing to fear from the Boundary Commission and might 
even appoint their representative, rendering Labour's 
bill - and its likely veto by the Lords - unnecessary.
An autumn general election was all but certain, Churchill 
pointed out, and in the coming campaign 'we must not 
allow ourselves to be out-manoeuvred ... when the forces 
of evil are so strong.'52
Despite the importance Churchill attached to 
Birkenhead's letter, it did not make the open-and-shut 
case he claimed. A series of letters between Churchill 
and Birkenhead, and one from Birkenhead to Chamberlain, 
hint that Birkenhead harboured deep misgivings about the 
Coalition's handling of the boundary issue during the 
Treaty negotiations. Moreover, the version of 
Birkenhead's 1922 letter that Churchill now proposed to 
publish may have been materially altered.
Although Birkenhead readily agreed with Churchill's 
plans to give the letter to the press, he raised a 
disquieting question about its authenticity. According
51Goschen to Churchill; and Churchill to Goschen [two 
letters], 5, 11, and 28 August 1924, Comp V . 1 . p. 172-175, 
183-184.
52Churchill to Craig, 19 August 1924, PRONI, CAB9Z/8/1. 
Lady Carson's diary, 17 August 1924, D.1507/C/8.
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to the published version, Birkenhead maintained that 
Collins's claim that the Boundary Commission would 
transfer whole counties to the Free State had 'no 
foundation whatever except in his overheated 
imagination.753 But, writing to Churchill on 20 August, 
Birkenhead pointed out that, in the original draft of his 
letter, he had 'qualified in it my reference to Michael 
Collins by a phrase which substantially ran "honest if 
hot-headed."7 In other words, Collins's claim might have 
been made in a moment of hot-headed anger, and it might 
have been at odds with the British interpretation of 
Article 12. But admitting that the claim is an honest 
one contradicts the dismissive assertion that it was 
purely the product of Collins's imagination. These words 
were now missing and, Birkenhead continued: 'I cannot 
understand their omission from the letter as sent7.54
Two days after he sent this letter to Churchill, 
Birkenhead wrote to Austen Chamberlain. This second 
letter paints a wholly unflattering picture of the 
conduct of the negotiations surrounding Article 12. 'The 
plain truth7, he admitted, was that the Treaty never 
would have been signed had it not been for the promise of 
the Boundary Commission. The current crisis, Birkenhead 
observed, boiled down to the simple question of whether 
or not the imperial government had the right to act on
53Appendix III.
54Birkenhead to Churchill, 20 August 1924, WSC
2/570/38.
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Northern Ireland's behalf to fulfil its Treaty 
obligation.
In my opinion we possess such a power. ... The 
Northern Government has in fact already so far 
recognised the Treaty as to avail itself of an 
option which only came into existence in virtue of 
the Treaty. In my judgment it is futile to reply 
that certain extremists in the South of Ireland, 
and many organs of the Press are making excessive 
and even absurd claims for the possession of Ulster 
territory. Every one of us knew that such claims 
had been made in the past and would be made in the 
future. We decided that they should be pronounced 
upon by a Commission. We decided upon the 
appropriate formula for reference to this 
Commission. Having satisfied ourselves that the 
words employed were only capable ... of the meaning 
which we placed upon them we assented to the 
addition of other words at the earnest entreaty of 
the Irish negotiators. We should not have agreed 
to the insertion of these words if we had not 
believed that they were powerless to affect the 
meaning of the article taken as a whole. ... In 
other words we agreed upon a reference to the 
Commission which many of us knew to be disputable 
but which we were certain could only be decided in 
one way. ...55
Several conclusions can be made when this remarkable 
letter is read in conjunction with Birkenhead's 20 August 
note to Churchill. First, these letters contradict the 
assertion made in Birkenhead's 1922 letter, and 
elsewhere, that the extensive territorial claims made by 
the Free State were simply the product of one man's 
'overheated imagination'. On the contrary, Birkenhead 
admits that the Irish Treaty delegates were led to 
believe that the Boundary Commission would substantially 
reduce Northern Ireland's territory. Thus, when Collins 
asserted these claims in early 1922, he may have been
55Birkenhead to Chamberlain, 22 August 1924, WSC
2/570/50-56.
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'hot-headed' but he was also 'honest' in making them.56
Second, the letter to Chamberlain provides damning 
evidence to substantiate the charge that the Irish 
negotiators were deceived when they were told that the 
Boundary Commission would ensure Ireland's 'essential 
unity' - which was Arthur Griffith's price for accepting 
Dominion status. As Birkenhead later admitted in the 
House of Lords, the Treaty 'never could have been signed, 
it never would have been signed, without Article 12'. If 
this was so, his letter to Chamberlain substantiates the 
conclusion reached by John Campbell that the Irish were, 
indeed, 'cheated' when they signed the Treaty.57
Third, and what may be most important, Birkenhead is 
explicit that after 6 December 1921 the 1920 Act was 
irrelevant when it came to determining Northern Ireland's 
frontier. It should be remembered that the first ten 
articles of the Treaty speak of Ireland as a whole. As 
Nicholas Mansergh has pointed out, the Treaty was between 
Great Britain and Ireland, not Southern Ireland or the 26 
counties. Other historians tend to dismiss this point 
about the Treaty. One has called it an attempt 'to 
reconcile the reality of partition with the imagination
56Appendix III. The opposite claim is made in Curtis 
to Churchill, 19 August 1924, Curtis Papers, MSS 89, ff. 
76-83.
57HL Deb. Vol. 62, Col. 1232, 9 December 1925.
Campbell, F .E. Smith. p. 583-584.
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of unification.'58
But, on the contrary, Birkenhead made it plain that 
the Treaty and its ratifying legislation superseded the 
1920 Act just as that legislation repealed the 1914 Home 
Rule Act before it. This admission undercuts one of the 
primary arguments in Birkenhead's earlier letter to 
Balfour. Article 12, Birkenhead had then claimed, 
'contemplates the maintenance of Northern Ireland as an 
entity already existing' whose boundaries were 'defined 
by the Act of 1920'. On that basis, he argued, it was 
'inconceivable' that the Boundary Commission had the 
power to make wholesale changes in a 'creature already 
constituted'.
But if Northern Ireland's Parliament gained the 
right to vote the six counties out of a single Irish 
state only through Article 12, the entity created by the 
1920 Act was irrelevant, and so were its boundaries. If 
that was true, Birkenhead's assurances to Balfour were 
beside the point, meaning that the Boundary Commission 
was capable of making extensive changes to the size and 
shape of Northern Ireland.
Churchill was horrified by the implications of what 
Birkenhead had sent to Chamberlain. 'I hope you will not 
show the letter you have written to Austen to anyone 
else, or allow him to show it to anyone else', Churchill 
begged his friend. The defeat of Labour, he reminded
58Mansergh, Unresolved Question. p. 193. Boyce, 
Ireland. 1828-1923. p. 103. Pakenham, Peace By Ordeal. p. 
250-259. Fanning, Independent Ireland, p. 23.
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Birkenhead, was their primary concern and they must keep 
clear of * Irish cross currents.' Their best hope was to 
ensure the timely publication of the 1922 letter which, 
Churchill advised his friend, would 'do you good among 
the Die-hards and Ulstermen'.59
On the Irish issue, at least, Churchill was clearly 
aligning himself with the Die-hard wing of the 
Conservative Party, working closely with Carson as well 
as Balfour. Much as he wished the Ulster Unionists would 
appoint their Boundary Commissioner, Churchill now told 
Birkenhead that he would 'not in any circumstances oppose 
them.' He was well aware that he still had 'a lot of 
prejudice to overcome' among rank and file 
Conservatives.60 The Irish Treaty may not have been his 
greatest transgression in Tory minds, but because it was 
again a live issue it was causing the most problems, and 
he was anxious to avoid it when at all possible. 'Do 
not, I pray you, stress unnecessarily the Irish question 
in any speeches', he asked Robert Horne, prior to their 
joint appearance at a Conservative gathering scheduled 
for the end of August. 'It would only divide friends and 
unite enemies. The Russian issue is the one, and with 
good handling might well be decisive.'61
59Churchill to Birkenhead, 19, 25, and 30 August 1924, 
WSC 2/570/65-66, 69-76, and 78-80.
6°Lady Carson's diary, 28-29 August 1924, D.1507/C/8.
Churchill to Birkenhead, 25 August 1924, WSC 2/570/69-76. 
Coote to Churchill, 4 September 1924, WSC 2/134/117-118.
61Churchill to Horne, 30 August 1924, WSC 2/134/84-85.
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Lloyd George comes to terms 
Before Churchill could release Birkenhead's 1922 
letter to the press, he had to be sure that it would not 
be disavowed by Lloyd George. As early as 19 August, 
Churchill had won a verbal commitment from the Welshman 
to endorse the contents of Birkenhead's letter. But he 
was careful to keep Lloyd George on board, lest his 
sometime friend, sometime rival be tempted by other 
considerations.62
As it happened, Lloyd George had his own reasons for 
deciding that the Irish problem would not make such a 
good election issue after all. Although the two wings of 
the Liberal Party had reunited, there remained deep and 
bitter animosities. In August Edward Grey let it be 
known that he might lead a breakaway faction of the party 
and that he might raise the boundary issue to wound Lloyd 
George.63 'The truth' about the Treaty negotiations, 
Herbert Gladstone conceded, 'is shrouded in the grim 
vapours of the past', but that did mean that Lloyd George 
should be allowed to escape the 'onus' for the 
duplicitous tactics that he had practised with such 
reckless abandon.64
62Churchill to Birkenhead, 19 and 30 August 1924, WSC 
2/570/65-66 and 78-80. Churchill to Balfour and Carson, 1 
September 1924, AJB-S, GD 433/2/19, Reel 4.
63Grey to Maclean? and Pamela Grey to Maclean, 12 and 
25 August 1924, Maclean Papers, Dep. c. 467, ff. 94-95, 
110-113.
64Gladstone to Maclean, 14 August 1924, Maclean Papers, 
Dep. c. 467, ff. 96.
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Certainly, the developing crisis was raising awkward 
guestions about his handling of Ireland while at No. 10 
Downing Street. The Daily Herald spoke for many when 
several months before it called the boundary dispute 'one 
of the damnable legacies of Lloyd Georgeism.'65 Neville 
Chamberlain also suspected 'that Ll.G. did give Michael 
Collins reason to think he would get Fermanagh and Tyrone 
and at the same time allowed Craig to believe that no 
such transfer would take place.' A gleeful John St Loe 
Strachey was sure that 'before we reach the end we shall 
see L.G. hopelessly discredited.'66
The Russian treaties, on the other hand, held no 
such dangers for Lloyd George and resurrected no 
embarrassing ghosts. On the contrary, by coming to a 
'tacit arrangement' with the Conservatives, he hoped to 
position the Liberals so that they could recapture their 
place as the country's acceptable party of the left. At 
the same time, he deliberately withheld support from 
Asquithian Liberals so that the coming election could be 
used to purge the party. His leadership unchallenged, 
Lloyd George would then be free to reshape Liberalism in 
his own image. As one historian has put it: 'It might be 
said that Lloyd George decided to destroy the party in 
order to save it.' Finally, his endorsement of the
65'Ulster Boundary Crisis. A Lloyd Georgeism Legacy', 
Daily Herald. 29 April 1924.
66Gladstone to Maclean, 14 August 1924, Maclean Papers, 
Dep. c. 467, ff. 96. Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 3 August 
1924, NC 18/1/446. Strachey to Carson, 12 September 1924, 
Strachey Papers, S/4/2/11.
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Birkenhead letter also guaranteed his own safety in the 
forthcoming election, when he obtained a Conservative 
promise not to challenge him for his Caernarvon Boroughs 
seat.67
By the time Liberal Party leaders gathered in mid- 
September to discuss strategy, Lloyd George was all for 
directing their fire at Labour's Soviet policy. Asquith 
demurred, saying that 'important as was the Russian 
Treaty, the first, and perhaps the only, thing with which 
the House would deal would be Ireland.' But Lloyd George 
was better informed, and he told his colleagues that 'he 
had heard that there were grounds for hope' that the 
Irish issue would be contained after all. The 
Conservatives, Lloyd George said, 'were not anxious to 
make it an electoral issue, and the House of Commons men 
were doing their best to prevent the Lords rejecting the 
Bill.'68 That, of course, was Baldwin's hope. 'If we 
get over this fence', he wrote to Wood while on holiday 
in France, 'it looks as though the Soviet Treaty would be 
the next big event: and on that we can join issue 
gaily./69
67Churchill to Balfour and Carson, 1 September 1924, 
AJB-S, GD 433/2/19, Reel 4. Cowling, Impact of Labour, p. 
404-405. Campbell, Lloyd Georae. p. 87-89, 95-96, and 101- 
106.
68'Narrative of the General Election 1924', Gladstone
Papers, MSS. 46,480/310-311.
69Baldwin to Wood, 6 September 1924, Halifax Papers,
A4.410/14/1.
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Publication of the Birkenhead letter 
On 8 September, newspapers across Britain published 
Birkenhead's 1922 letter to Balfour. The Daily News 
summed up the reaction of most newspapers, calling the 
letter 'conclusive and irrefutable' proof that there had 
never been any intention to dismember Northern Ireland. 
The Daily Express went further, arguing that it would now 
be 'unthinkable' for the Boundary Commission or, more 
precisely, for Feetham, to interpret Article 12 
broadly.70
The Times magisterially observed that 'there has 
never, as a matter of fact, been any real doubt about the 
broad intentions of the Imperial Government'.
Conveniently forgotten was the fact that less than a year 
before this same newspaper had reported that it was quite 
likely that Article 12 would result in a 'considerable 
modification of the present boundary.' In any event, The 
Times still felt it was 'unreasonable to expect Northern 
Ireland to stake everything upon the reputation of an 
individual', whatever Birkenhead's letter said.71 Nor 
was the press entirely unanimous in its verdict on the 
Birkenhead revelation. 'The letter is interesting', the
7°'Ulster's Right. The Proof', Daily News: and
'Boundaries Not Areas. Lord Birkenhead's Letter', Daily 
Express. both dated 8 September 1924.
71'Irish Boundary. Lord Birkenhead on Article 12' and 
'New Light on the Irish Deadlock', The Times. 8 September 
1924. 'The Ulster Boundary. An Embarrassing Situation', 
The Times. 11 September 1923.
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Manchester Guardian commented, 'but it adds nothing 
new.772
These comments aside, Churchill was delighted with 
the letter's overall reception. 'Politics are, I hope, 
moving towards a crisis', he reported to Lord Rosebery 
two days later and for that reason it was 'essential that 
the Irish issue should be got out of the way.'73 It was 
soon evident, however, that Birkenhead's letter was not 
changing minds. While Die-hards might be glad that its 
contents had been made public, this did not mean that 
they thought that Northern Ireland should now name its 
Boundary Commissioner. 'That step', one told Lord 
Salisbury, 'Ulster will not and cannot take.'74 Nor had 
Birkenhead won any personal gratitude. If anything, the 
Belfast News-Letter told its readers, the letter was but 
one more example of the kinds of tricks Birkenhead had 
performed at the behest of his erstwhile master in the 
Coalition.75
Lloyd George contradicts himself 
Soon, the old master was himself in the thick of the 
controversy. On 10 September Lloyd George delivered what
72'Lord Birkenhead's Letter', and 'Lord Birkenhead on 
Article 12', Manchester Guardian: and 'Ireland's
Boundaries. Wishes of the Inhabitants the Kernel of Article
12', Daily News, all dated 8 September 1924. 'Events of
the Week', The Nation. 13 September 1924.
73Churchill to Rosebery, 10 September 1924, WSC
2/134/119-121.
74R.S. Howe to Salisbury, 8 September 1924, S(4)
110/29-30.
75'Birkenhead Letter. Irish Views', The Times. 9
September 1924.
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was billed as an 'important speech' on both the Russian 
treaties and the boundary question. As promised, he 
fully endorsed Birkenhead's correspondence with Balfour.
'I stand by the letter itself, and all that it contains', 
he told an audience in Wales. Ulster had nothing to fear 
from the Commission. Nor could he believe that its 
chairman would 'come to wild and unreasonable decisions 
which would tear up the territory of Ulster, and leave it 
as a province with nothing but an unconsidered remnant of 
its land and population.'
But as was so often the case with Lloyd George, what 
he gave with one hand, he took back with the other. 
Although most attention focused on his endorsement, the 
speech was in fact a gigantic contradiction. During the 
Treaty negotiations, Lloyd George explained, both sides 
agreed
that the boundaries of the Six Counties did not 
accurately represent the real division between 
North and South.... We then proposed that a 
Boundary Commission should be appointed with a 
view to arranging the fairest boundaries possible 
... which would hand over to the Southern States 
[sic] the Catholic parishes which were anxious 
to join them, but which would, on the other hand, 
transfer to the North those Protestant parishes 
which are now in the Free State. ...76
While this sounds inconsequential, an award based on the
wishes of the population in parishes, or poor law unions,
did not mean the exchange of pockets here and there along
the border. Based on memoranda presented by Arthur
76'Irish Boundary. Mr. Lloyd George's Position', and 
'The Birkenhead Letter. Mr. Lloyd George's Support', The 
Times, 11 September 1924.
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Griffith in 1921, along with evidence accumulated by the 
North-Eastern Boundary Bureau, it would mean that large 
portions of counties Tyrone, Fermanagh, and Armagh would 
go to the Free State, as well as Derry City, Strabane, 
and Newry - precisely what the Unionists feared.77
Next, Lloyd George disposed of the argument that the 
economic and geographical qualifications mentioned in 
Article 12 were intended to be equal counter-weights to 
the wishes of the inhabitants. '[T]here are islands of 
Catholics surrounded by Protestants, and islands of 
Protestants in the South surrounded by Catholics', Lloyd 
George observed. 'It was therefore further proposed that 
the boundaries should be based not only on the wishes of 
the inhabitants, but on geographical and economic 
considerations.' Dealing a further blow to Birkenhead's 
letter, Lloyd George explained that these qualifications 
were taken 'out of recent treaties where similar 
difficulties had to be faced in Central Europe'. In 
other words, the 1878 Treaty of Berlin was irrelevant; 
the Versailles Treaty and the boundary commissions 
provided in it were the only international guides to 
consider.
Craig refuses to budge
Despite the widespread publicity given to 
Birkenhead's letter, Churchill's effort failed to impress 
the one person at whom it was aimed. On his return from 
the Baltic, Craig told a crush of reporters that the
77See chapter 2.
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letter made 'no difference whatever' to his views on the 
Boundary Commission.78 This view was later confirmed 
when the Northern Ireland Cabinet met at Cleeve Court, 
Craig's English residence at Streatley-on-Thames. The 
Cabinet, Craig told Baldwin, felt 'bound to take every 
possible step to prevent the passage of the Bill revising 
the Treaty unless it is amended ... to apply merely to an 
adjustment of the Boundary.'
Any hopes Baldwin had for avoiding a vote on the 
Irish bill were dashed. Craig made it clear that his 
first allegiance was not to the British Empire, and 
certainly not to the Tories, as he felt 'entitled to look 
to any political party' to 'safeguard our rights and 
privileges under the Act of 1920.' Even so, Craig 
shamelessly urged Baldwin to use every means at his 
disposal as Conservative Party leader to amend the bill 
in Northern Ireland's favour. 'If there is any 
constitutional difficulty in getting such a clause 
inserted', Craig wrote, 'I should of course be glad if 
the Bill could be rejected'. If, on the other hand, Tory 
leaders were
convinced that I am merely asking them to provide 
against dangers which they consider to be purely 
imaginary and if they therefore feel unable to 
reject the amending Bill I rely upon you and them 
to give Ulster unqualified support later on should 
it prove that our fears are justified.79
7®'Ireland. Sir James Craig's Return', The TimesP 12
September 1924.
79Craig to Baldwin, 17 September 1924, PRONI,
CAB9Z/3/1.
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None of the warnings given by Baldwin, Salisbury, 
and other Conservatives seemed to have made the slightest 
impression on Northern Ireland's prime minister. Even an 
appeal from George V was met with an unyielding response. 
'I shall have to maintain a firm attitude to the end', 
Craig told the king's private secretary, 'else there 
would be no limit to the claims of the Free State.'80
Earlier, Lord Londonderry had confided to Salisbury 
that both he and Craig agreed that a general election 
fought over the House of Lords 'throwing out the Treaty 
would be disastrous.' Now, he was forced to admit that 
the Ulster Unionists were determined to defeat the bill, 
come what may. 'Our people are very headstrong', he 
ruefully admitted, 'and they can only think for 
themselves. They cannot take the long view of British 
politics which might be that an election on this point 
would not serve the interests of the Conservative 
Party./81
Londonderry could have gone further. As far as 
Ulstermen were concerned, they had little reason to care 
about what happened to a good many Conservatives who, 
they believed, would as readily sell out Northern Ireland 
as any other group of English politicians. This mistrust 
was given an added boost when Eamon de Valera produced 
letters from Arthur Griffith written during the Treaty
8°Stamfordham to Craig? and Craig to Stamfordham, 17 
and 20 September 1924, PRONI, CAB9Z/3/2.
81Londonderry to Salisbury, 8 and 18 September 1924, 
S(4) 110/32 and 43-44.
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negotiations. At a speech in Cork on 14 September, de 
Valera quoted extensively from the letters to show that 
the Irish had accepted Article 12 only on the 
understanding that it would cede vast tracts of Northern 
Ireland to the Free State.82
Griffith's letters caused no end of problems for ex- 
Coalition Tories. This revelation, one Unionist angrily 
told Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, 'hardly fits in with 
our ideas of what Ulster has been led to expect'.83 
Around any Conservative who took part in the Treaty 
negotiations, the suspicion still lingered that they had 
betrayed the cause before and might do so again. With so 
many of these same men in the party's front ranks, 
Unionists felt they had more reason than ever to be 
suspicious of the Tory leadership.
Baldwin's threat
The Unionists' decision to fight Labour's boundary 
bill meant that Baldwin was in exactly the same position 
he had been in when the crisis erupted in August. There 
was every danger that Conservative MPs might be swept up 
by an emotional impulse to fight Labour's bill and damn 
the consequences. The Die-hards, not surprisingly, were 
doing all they could to push the party in that direction. 
They believed the time had come 'to destroy the Socialist 
Government' in general, and their Irish bill in
82'No Boundary for Mr De Valera', Morning Post. 15
September 1924.
83Williamson to Worthington-Evans, ? September 1924, W- 
E, MSS Eng. hist., c.914, ff. 194.
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particular, 'with the utmost determination.' John 
Gretton accused Baldwin of 'half-hearted' leadership, 
telling Carson there 'should be no talk of compromise or 
fear of facing a General Election.'84
Yet even Gretton was forced to admit that much as 
the party hated Labour's bill, few if any Tory MPs or 
Parliamentary candidates actually wanted to fight the 
next election on Ireland and the Lords.85 However much 
the Ulster cause could still pluck at the heartstrings of 
Tory regulars, its power to strike a chord among the 
British people at large had long since faded. Other 
Conservatives realised this. Edward Wood felt that the 
party would be flirting with disaster if it became 
associated for a second time with an Ulster revolt. Far 
from being one of the party's shining moments, Wood 
suspected that 'the British law-abiding temperament was 
more shocked than we always recognised by Carson's 
performance' during the 1912-1914 crisis. In the new, 
post-war politics, 'Ulster will lose sympathy if she 
appears to be following that line'. And, of course, so 
would the Conservative Party.86
Tory moderates had an additional reason for wanting 
to avoid a fight over the boundary bill and to focus
84Gretton to Carson, 16 September 1924, PRONI, 
CAB9Z/3/2.
85Ibid. Gretton sought to minimize this point, noting 
that his canvass of current and prospective Tory MPs was
'quite limited'.
86Wood to Baldwin, 10 September 1924, Halifax Papers,
A4.410/14/1.
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instead on the Russian treaties. As Churchill observed 
in a letter to Carson, no one could foretell the outcome 
of the next election, and there was every reason to 
believe that the results could be as close as the outcome 
of the 1923 race. This meant that the Conservatives 
might need the support of Lloyd George and the anti- 
Labour wing of the Liberal Party. The Tory leadership 
'will have to come to some sort of terms with him', 
Churchill argued, 'if they are to turn the Socialists 
out.' That would be a lot less likely to happen if these 
same Liberals found themselves allied with Labour in a 
hard-fought battle over Ireland, only to be told that 
they were to switch sides to support the Conservatives 
against the Soviet agreements.87
Austen Chamberlain also doubted that the 
Conservatives were strong enough to beat Labour on their 
own. Once he was convinced that a general election was 
inevitable, he wrote with foreboding, 'then the 
deluge!'88 Like Churchill, Chamberlain felt that an 
understanding of some kind with the Lloyd George Liberals 
might be the price of power. His brother, Neville, 
however had reached a different conclusion. Even with
87Churchill to Carson, 18 September 1924, WSC
2/570/118-119.
88Austen to Ida Chamberlain, 5 October 1924, AC
5/1/334.
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the Irish Question looking 'insoluble', he felt that the 
Tories should 'risk a General Election' on the issue, 
believing the party would still come out of the race 
'with a very narrow majority. '89
While the younger Chamberlain may have been willing 
to take such a gamble, a strategy such as the one he 
advocated would be extraordinarily risky for the party's 
leader. Baldwin had 'wrecked his party once', the 
Quarterly Review reminded its readers. Were he to risk 
an election on a conflict between the two houses of 
Parliament over Ireland he would 'wreck his party again, 
and this time more effectively than before.'90 Running a 
political party aground once had been a mistake. Doing 
so a second time would look careless. Almost certainly, 
it would be fatal to Baldwin's political career. Small 
wonder, then, that the Conservative leader was still 
'anxious' about Ireland when Leo Amery saw him on the 
19 th.91
A week later, the Shadow Cabinet met to decide once 
and for all what position the party should take on the 
Irish legislation. 'The general conclusion was that we 
ought not to let the Lords wreck the bill', Amery wrote 
in his diary, but that the Conservatives should attempt 
an amendment defining the Boundary Commission's scope.
"Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 20 September 1924, NC
18/1/452.
"'Ireland Today', Quarterly Reviewr October 1924, No. 
484, p. 371.
91Amery diary, 19 September 1924, p. 386.
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Given that the chances of such an amendment passing were 
slim, the Shadow Cabinet decided it would then fall back 
on a none-too-subtle threat. 'If over-ridden', Amery 
wrote, the Tories would warn Labour that they would 
'resist any attempt to enforce against Ulster a decision 
based on what we regard as a false interpretation of the 
Treaty./92
That did not go far enough for the Die-hards, who 
were ready to fight the boundary bill 'whatever our front 
bench may decide'.93 What the Die-hards failed to see 
was the sheer brazenness underlying the Shadow Cabinet's 
statement. In effect, the Conservatives were handing to 
themselves - and through them, the Ulster Unionists - the 
right to veto any Boundary Commission award they did not 
like.
92Ibid, 25 September 1924, p. 387. Also, see annual
party conference minutes, 2-3 October 1924, NUA 2/1/40.




The Boundary Bill and its Aftermath
Is not the present debate in this House 
absolutely unreal? What are you thinking 
about? You are not thinking of the rights or 
wrongs of this question at all. You are 
really thinking about the General Election 
that is going to follow ... .
- Lord Carson1
In the third week of September Beatrice Webb decided 
that Ireland's boundary dispute would not bring down the 
first Labour government after all. 'The Irish question 
has disappeared', she wrote in her diary, 'all parties 
apparently having agreed to pass the Bill, and no 
sustained opposition being expected from the Lords.'2 
Lord Olivier was equally confident. If the Tory- 
dominated upper house refused to pass the Irish bill, 
'there might be a dissolution'; but he doubted that would 
happen. He was even beginning to think that the 
government would survive the furore over its Soviet 
policy.3
This mood reflected an unwarranted complacency 
within Labour's hierarchy. None of the government's 
leaders principally responsible for Irish policy - 
MacDonald, Thomas, and Henderson - seem to have paid much 
attention to the boundary problem during Parliament's
1HL_Deb, Vol. 59, Col. 616, 8 October 1924.
2Webb diary, 20 September 1924, Vol. 38, 4111-4116.
301ivier to Reading, 18 September 1924, IO, MSS Eur. E.
238/7, No. 32.
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two-month recess. MacDonald returned to his primary 
interests in foreign affairs; Thomas was in South Africa 
for much of August and September? and Henderson involved 
himself in arms reduction talks at the League of Nations.
Meanwhile, the government's critics turned their 
attention more and more to the Russian treaties, so much 
so that by mid-September this issue 'engaged the public 
attention almost equally' with the Irish boundary 
dispute. Although Craig still urged the Conservatives to 
put up a 'stiff fight' on the boundary bill, the Tories 
clearly had decided to concentrate their fire on Labour's 
Soviet policy. It was for this reason that the Russian 
treaties rather than the Irish bill became the issue on 
which 'the Government would have to fight for its life as 
soon as Parliament reassembled'. And, crucially, the 
Campbell case refused to go away.4
Nevertheless, MacDonald and his colleagues were 
wrong to think that they were safely out of the Irish 
bog. The saviour of Labour's boundary bill, when he 
came, would surprise everyone, including himself.
Craig bargains with Labour 
'Chilled and wretched' with a cold, MacDonald 
returned to London on the night of 28 September, little 
better rested than when Parliament had gone into recess 
eight weeks before. With the House of Commons scheduled
4Marquand, MacDonald, p. 357-372. J.H. Thomas, My 
Story (London, 1937), p. 78-79. Wrigley, Henderson. p. 
152-153. Annual Register: 1924r p. 95-96, 100. Craig to 
Gretton, 17 September 1924, PRONI, CAB9Z/3/2.
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to reconvene in two days' time, and Thomas not yet 
returned from South Africa, it fell to MacDonald to 
introduce the second reading of the Irish bill.
Beforehand, he was involved in two long discussions on 
the Boundary Commission: first, with Craig and, later, in 
Cabinet.
Why Craig made this last-minute approach to 
MacDonald is unclear. It is possible that the Ulster 
leader was attempting to play for time: Gretton had told 
him that from the Conservatives' point of view it was 
important that Parliament should not reconvene before the 
end of October.5 Alternatively, Craig may have been 
trying to win concessions from Labour now that the 
government was so clearly under pressure from other 
directions. As far as matters stood with the 
Conservatives, Craig had tried convincing Baldwin to 
fight the boundary bill with a series of 'strong' 
amendments which, though they stood no chance of passing, 
were meant to 'satisfy the people of Ulster' and their 
supporters in Britain.6 The Shadow Cabinet's decision on 
25 September ruled this out, and Craig may have been 
looking to see if he could cut a deal with the 
government.
If that was the case, he played his hand badly. At 
the outset of their discussions, Craig informed MacDonald
MacDonald diary, 29 September 1924, JRM, PRO
30/69/17531/1. Gretton to Craig, 16 September 1924, PRONI, 
CAB9Z/3/2.
6Craig to Carson, 20 September 1924, PRONI, CAB9Z/5/1.
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that his position on the Boundary Commission was 
'unchanged'. Even so, he had come to London to ask for 
three 'concessions' from the imperial government. First, 
he wanted the £1 million for the Special Constabulary 
which, he claimed, had been promised by the previous 
Conservative government. Next, he raised the question of 
amalgamating the British and Northern Irish unemployment 
insurance funds. Otherwise, he explained, 'Ulster would 
either have to reduce benefits or increase taxation.' 
Finally, Craig resurrected a proposal made at the 
Chequers conference in May that if the Boundary 
Commission's decision forced any Unionist to migrate, all 
relocation costs ought to be borne by the British 
government.
Supposing these points were conceded, MacDonald 
asked, would the Northern Ireland government accept the 
Boundary Commission's decision? Craig refused to give 
any concrete assurance, promising only that 'he would 
accept the decision if it were not too foolish.'7
Unfortunately for Craig, the chancellor of the 
exchequer had just prepared a detailed summary of the 
extensive financial support that successive British 
governments had already given to Belfast. 'Since 1921', 
it began, 'the British Treasury has been subject to 
continual demands for money from Ulster'. To members of 
the Cabinet, who were given Snowden's report at the same 
time as they were told about Craig's conversation with
7C. 51(24), 29 September 1924, CAB 23/48.
325
MacDonald, the Ulster premier's demands simply looked 
like more of the same.8
On one point, however, Snowden was wrong. He 
dismissed Craig's proposal that the British Exchequer 
should underwrite any population transfer triggered by 
the Boundary Commission's award, writing that the idea 
'has never been even informally mentioned to us'.9 But, 
on the contrary, MacDonald had already committed the 
government to Craig's idea - the cost of which no one 
could begin to foretell - without bothering to tell his 
chancellor of the exchequer. Craig attached great 
importance to this promise and it was one of a handful of 
factors that nearly persuaded him not to oppose Labour's 
Irish bill. The effects of any Boundary Commission 
award, he told Carson, would be 'greatly softened' 
because MacDonald had promised 'to generously compensate 
those Protestants who are now located in an area to be 
transferred to the South'.10
Craig's claim is supported by a Free State account 
of the 2 August meeting between MacDonald, Thomas, 
Cosgrave, and Londonderry. According to this version, 
however, MacDonald was willing to compensate any person 
whose home or business was transferred from one Irish 
jurisdiction to the other - not just Protestants who
8Ibid. Snowden memorandum to MacDonald, 26 September 
1924, JRM, PRO 30/69/61.
9Ibid, Snowden memorandum.
xoCraig to Carson, 18 August 1924, PRONI, CAB9Z/5/1.
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would find themselves in the Free State.11
At its 29 September meeting, the Cabinet did not 
discuss the proposal, and if MacDonald ever bothered to 
inform Snowden of the commitments he had made to the 
Irish there seems to be no record of it. Before reaching 
a final decision on how to handle their Irish bill, the 
Labour ministers were given yet one more bit of curious 
information. Less than a quarter of an hour before the 
Cabinet was due to meet, MacDonald was informed that if 
the government appointed Carson to the Boundary 
Commission, Craig 'would give a pledge that he would 
accept its findings.' MacDonald was suspicious - 'I 
smelt rats!' he confided to his diary - but he felt that 
the proposal could not be dismissed out of hand.12
Where this idea originated is a mystery. The 
Carsons believed that it came from MacDonald, though this 
clearly was not the case.13 At any rate, the list of 
suspects could not be confined to the government. For 
those who wanted to get the Irish dispute out of British 
politics, the thought of putting Carson on the Commission 
was seen to be a stroke of genius. This surely would 
allay fears in Belfast and, as Churchill put it, what 
'might have been a stumbling block will now pass out of
“Free State memorandum of 2nd August 1924 meeting, 
undated, D/T, S 1801/J.
“MacDonald diary, 29 September 1924, JRM, PRO
30/69/1753/1. The Cabinet minutes are typically vague, 
saying only that a 'particular name' was mentioned. See C.
51(24), 29 September 1924, CAB 23/48.
“Lady Carson's diary, 28 September 1924, D.1507/C/8.
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the sphere of immediate action.'14
Instead, the proposal prompted a number of leading 
Ulster Unionists to attack the very man who had led them 
through the Home Rule crisis. Carson was blamed for 
'losing' three of Ulster's nine counties during the 
partition settlement of 1920. Craig seems to have made 
no attempt to come to the defence of his old chief, and 
Carson eventually turned down his proposed appointment to 
the Boundary Commission after being told him that it 
would cause a 'crisis' in the six counties.15
Nor, in the end, was the British Cabinet willing to 
accede to any of Craig's demands. Whatever he had hoped 
to gain from his private talk with MacDonald was lost 
once Snowden's exposition was presented to the Cabinet. 
There would be no last minute 'bargain with Ulster'? 
neither would the Cabinet allow any further delays while 
it quibbled with Belfast over Carson's appointment to the 
Commission. The second reading of the government's 
amending bill would go ahead as planned.16
Passage of the boundary bill
'Not many years ago', MacDonald wrote to the king on 
1 October, 'a debate on the Irish question would have 
provided a ready outlet for the superfluous energy which 
members had accumulated as a result of the holiday
14Churchill to Balfour, 2 October 1924, AJB-S, GD 
433/2/19, Reel 4.
15Follis, State Under Siecre. p. 162-163. Also, see
Spender to Londonderry, 22 August 1924, PRONI, CAB9Z/8/1.
16C. 51(24), 29 September 1924, CAB 23/48.
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season. But', he continued, 1circumstances have 
changed.'17 Provided that the Conservatives could 
contain their extremists when it came to the Irish bill, 
it was clear that they meant to bring down the government 
on the Russian treaties. The difference between the two 
issues boiled down to a simple case of Parliamentary 
arithmetic. As the New Statesman pointed out, while the 
government could rely on Liberal support to see through 
its boundary legislation, no such help could be expected 
for its policy toward the Soviet Union.18
However, neither the Russian Treaties nor the Irish 
dispute was uppermost in the minds of MPs when they 
reconvened on 30 September. The 'explosion', when it 
occurred, was over the government's handling of the 
Campbell case, a prosecution, MacDonald sourly wrote in 
his diary, that had 'been foolishly entered upon but much 
more foolishly dropped'. Forced to watch as 'every 
political hypocrite' took the opportunity to denounce his 
government, MacDonald was compelled to schedule a debate 
on the incident before he could move onto the Irish bill. 
The outburst had one salutary effect. Having wasted so 
much of their 'superfluous energy' on the Campbell case, 
MPs had little left to expend on the boundary bill which, 
MacDonald told the king, was considered 'in a more sober 
and dispassionate manner' than might otherwise have been
17MacDonald to George V, 1 October 1924, JRM, PRO
30/69/228.
“ 'Comments', New Statesman. 20 September 1924.
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the case.19
MacDonald's distaste for the Irish legislation was
obvious at the outset of his speech. 'I cannot say that
I rise with any pleasure to move the Second Reading of
this Bill', he told the House. Yet, neither could he as
prime minister walk away from a solemn commitment. 'I
shall be delighted if any hon. Member has got the
ingenuity to find a way out of this difficulty, only it
must be an honourable way out', a mere contrivance of
words would not do. 'We are bound to make Article 12
work', MacDonald continued, reminding his listeners that
the Treaty had been given all-party support from the
beginning. That support could not now be abandoned.
Without it, Ireland would again tear apart British
politics and all that had been achieved 'will have been
destroyed once and for all.'20
Baldwin's reply was brief. Conservatives, he
announced, would not oppose the bill's second reading.
Instead, they would propose amendments during its
committee stage, making it clear that the Commission was
only meant 'to deal with the rectification of the
Boundary'. But if these amendments were not accepted,
what then? Then, Baldwin warned
... the responsibility for what is in the Bill 
must rest with the Government and with the 
Government alone; we can have no part in or
19MacDonald to George V, 1 October 1924, JRM, PRO
30/69/228. MacDonald diary, 30 September 1924, JRM, PRO 
30/69/1753/1.
2°HC Deb. Vol. 177, Col. 27, 37-40, 30 September 1924.
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responsibility for it, and we shall have to 
consider then what our action will be at a later 
stage.21
Later that night, MacDonald confided to his diary 
that the boundary bill 'is to go all right', seeming to 
believe that its passage was now a mere formality.22 In 
fact, debate on the legislation was stormy and was marked 
by a number of bitter exchanges, so that 'the temper of 
the House remained on edge for the rest of the 
sitting.'23 Determined to thwart a commitment they 
wished to see broken, the bill's opponents made any 
number of extraordinary assertions, which T.P. O'Connor 
rightly dismissed as a 'deluge of nonsense'.24
Central to the Die-hard case was their argument that 
once the Boundary Commission's chairman had been 
appointed, the imperial government had done all that it 
was legally bound to do. From that moment, it was up to 
Northern Ireland to decide whether or not the Commission 
could function, and the British were under 'no obligation 
either of honour or of legality' to pursue the matter any 
further. Moreover, according to the Ulster Unionist Hugh 
O'Neill many MPs had earlier supported the Treaty only on 
the understanding that if Ulster did not like the
21Ibid, Col. 41-45.
22MacDonald diary, 30 September 1924, JRM, PRO 
30/69/1753/1.
23Annual Register: 1924. p. 102.
24HC Deb. Vol. 177, Col. 409, 2 October 1924.
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agreement 'she need never appoint a Commissioner.'25
Although this claim was later denounced as the 
'greatest roguery', it was by no means the most damaging 
admission made by the bill's opponents. Not the least of 
these was Sir Laming Worthington-Evans's disclosure that 
he and his former Coalition partners had in fact deceived 
the Sinn Fein delegates during the Treaty negotiations.
Or, as Worthington-Evans himself put it: '[l]t is not 
always possible in the middle of negotiations to say 
fully and entirely what you would like to say ... 
sometimes it is discreet to be silent.'26
Elsewhere, Die-hard spokesmen actually conceded that 
if an award was based on the wishes of the inhabitants,
'we shall leave it in the power of the Commission to 
include in the Free State the whole of Tyrone, Fermanagh 
and a large portion of County Down.' This last remark 
drew another stinging rebuke from O'Connor. 'Am I', he 
bitterly asked the House of Commons, 'at this date to 
defend the principle that men must be free to choose 
their own government?'27
The main contention of the bill's opponents was 
that, in Baldwin's words, Parliament had a 'double debt 
of honour'. Pledges had been made to Northern Ireland, 
as well as to the Free State, and these earlier
25Ibid, Col. 52, 57, 67, 223, 30 September-1 October 
1924. 'In Honour to Ulster', Morning Post. 17 September 
1924.
26Ibid, Col. 156, 391-393, 1-2 October 1924.
27Ibid, Col. 365-367, 412, 2 October 1924.
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commitments also had to be upheld.28 But it was not the 
leader of the Opposition, nor any other Conservative for 
that matter, who espoused this view as straightforwardly 
as did Lord Grey. According to Grey, Parliament was 
being asked to choose between 'an honourable 
understanding with Ulster in 1920 ... [and] a definite 
engagement with the Free State'. Grey was for honouring 
the first commitment. 'I would rather face a demand from 
the Free State to be a Republic', he said, 'than see the 
understanding with Ulster broken.' Most peers heartily 
agreed.29
While Grey's speech was 'cheered in the House', 
those outside were left 'dumbfounded'. As The Nation 
pointed out, to accept Grey's reasoning meant that 'the 
understanding [with Northern Ireland] should override the 
definite engagement [with the Free State], because it 
preceded it in point of time.' Did the noble Lord, asked 
the journal, 'give no weight to the superior status of a 
definite engagement, concluded in the form of a Treaty, 
and ratified, as the understanding never was, by 
Parliament?'30
Coming from a former foreign secretary, Grey's claim 
was, indeed, strange - until the state of Liberal Party 
politics is recalled. As he had earlier intimated to
28Ibid, Col. 43, 30 September 1924.
29HL Deb. Vol. 59, Col. 550-553, 7 October 1924.
3°'The Scales of Lord Grey', The Nation. 11 October
1924.
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Donald Maclean, Grey was prepared to use the boundary 
dispute as a defining issue with which he might separate 
himself from the rest of the Liberal leadership - and 
from Lloyd George in particular.31 His speech likely was 
an attempt to do just that.
Although Baldwin had implied that the Conservatives 
would propose a series of amendments to the boundary 
bill, their attempt to alter the legislation boiled down 
to a single proposed change. This would have limited the 
Boundary Commission's award to one not 'substantially 
altering the area of Northern Ireland as fixed by the 
Government of Ireland Act, 1920./32 Despite Thomas's 
warning that the Conservative amendment could cost lives, 
lead to war, and 'shake the foundations of the Empire', 
observers were surprised when it was defeated by a 
comparatively slim margin of fifty votes.33 Because 
the committee stage of the boundary bill ended earlier 
than expected, Thomas proposed that its third reading
31Grey to Maclean, 12 August 1924, Maclean Papers, Dep. 
c. 467, ff. 94-95.
32HC Deb. Vol. 177, Col. 363, 2 October 1924. Two
other amendments were proposed by Ulster Unionist MP D.D. 
Reid. The first would have forbidden the transfer of any 
territory between the two parts of Ireland 'without the 
consent of the Parliament to whom jurisdiction over that 
territory has been granted by the Imperial Parliament'. 
See Col. 50, 30 September 1924. His second amendment, that 
'the expression ”in accordance with the wishes of the 
inhabitants” in that Article [i.e., Article 12] means the 
consent of the Parliament of the Irish Free State and of 
the Parliament of Northern Ireland' was ruled out of order. 
See Col. 423, 2 October 1924.
33Ibid, Col. 386, 419-424, 2 October 1924. Annual
Register: 1924. p. 103.
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should be considered that night. So it was that, because 
Baldwin was not in London, it fell to Austen Chamberlain 
to explain why the Conservative Party was not prepared to 
carry on its fight against Labour's Irish bill. Although 
only the day before he had attacked the boundary 
legislation as 'one-sided', Chamberlain now conceded that 
its rejection 'at this stage of the proceedings' would be 
unwise. Instead, he appealed to Thomas to appoint to the 
Boundary Commission 'a man as Ulster itself might have 
chosen had it been willing to do' so. He also called on 
the government to compensate anyone displaced by the 
Commission's award.34
Thomas willingly assured Chamberlain that his first 
concern would be met but refused to 'bind the Government' 
on the matter of compensation. With the boundary bill 
now assured of passage in the Commons, its highest hurdle 
was yet to come in the House of Lords. 'I do not know 
what the fate of this Bill may be', Thomas solemnly 
declared, but the government had no intention of seeing 
the measure passed in the lower house, only to have it 
defeated elsewhere. The boundary bill, unamended, must 
be enacted immediately. Labour would 'stand or fall by 
that position'.35
Salisbury's 'safety valve'
Though it was never likely that the Conservatives
34Ibid, Col. 169 and 465-467, 1-2 October 1924.
35Ibid, Col. 468-474, 2 October 1924. The final vote 
was 251 to 99 in favour of the bill.
335
would succeed in amending the boundary bill in the House 
of Commons, party leaders waited until the last minute 
before deciding what they would do if the unamended 
legislation was sent to the House of Lords. Convinced 
that an election was now unavoidable, Austen Chamberlain 
believed that even the Unionists wanted to get this issue 
out of the way. 'My own conviction', he told one of his 
sisters, 'is that Ulster or at least the Ulster members, 
are glad to see the Boundary Bill through.' In that 
case, there was simply no reason for the party to risk a 
fight in Parliament's upper house. 'If the Lords are 
wise', he continued, 'they won't touch the Bill, but then 
they are not wise enough for that I'36
It is not the least of ironies in this story that 
the saviour of the Irish boundary bill turned out to be a 
man who, in other circumstances, would have been one of 
its fiercest opponents. With no letter from Craig to 
absolve Tory peers of their commitment to Ulster, it fell 
to Lord Salisbury to extricate his colleagues in both 
Parliament and the Conservative Party from the corner 
into which they had painted themselves. He did not 
relish the task and, throughout, feared that he would pay 
a heavy price for performing this service.37
During the Lords' debate, Salisbury made it clear 
that any attempt on their part to amend the boundary
36Austen to Ida Chamberlain, 5 October 1924, AC
5/1/334.
37Brumwell to Salisbury, 11 October 1924, S(4) 110/92.
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legislation 'would amount to the rejection of the bill7. 
Once they did that, the matter would be out of their 
hands entirely and 'would be transferred from Parliament 
to the hustings7. That was 'the last thing7 any friend 
of Ulster should want, as the average British voter had 
little interest in, and even less understanding of, Irish 
affairs. To link the Irish dispute with a debate on the 
powers of the House of Lords, Salisbury maintained, was 
simply foolish.38
As an alternative to amending the government7s bill, 
Salisbury proposed that the Lords should instead attach a 
non-binding resolution. This would make clear that the 
Boundary Commission was created only to facilitate 'a 
readjustment of the boundaries7 and that in their opinion 
'no other interpretation would be acceptable7 - or could 
be enforced. His suggestion proved to be decisive. 'By 
the use of this safety-valve,7 the Round Table explained 
to its readers, 'the Lords avoided the risk of bursting 
their own boiler7.39
Even so, it was not certain that Salisbury7s 
compromise would win through until the House heard from 
Lord Carson. Although he had decided to 'acquiesce7 in 
the resolution, Carson proceeded to deliver a withering 
speech, one at least as bitter as his better-known attack 
on the Irish Treaty in December 1921. There was no point
38HL Deb. Vol. 59, Col. 596-600, 8 October 1924.
39Ibid, Col. 600-603. 'The Irish Boundary Question7, 
Round Table. December 1924, No. 57, p. 39.
337
in opposing the boundary bill, Carson told the House, 
because even if the Tories held office they would propose 
similar legislation. 'And why? Because all the eminent 
men of the Conservative Party are up to their neck in the 
original Treaty', which had led to this crisis, in the 
first place. In fact, Carson admitted a grudging respect 
for the Labour government, for he doubted that Tory 
ministers 'would show the same amount of courage' in 
dealing with Ulster's grievances.
Most of all, Carson was outraged that the Unionists 
were being sacrificed at the altar of British politics.
'Is not the present debate in this House absolutely 
unreal?' he asked. 'You are not thinking of the rights 
or wrongs of this question at all. You are really 
thinking about the General Election that is going to 
follow upon another question.' Carson's grudging 
acceptance, combined with Lord Londonderry's endorsement, 
finally ensured the bill's passage, although thirty-eight 
peers still could not be reconciled.40
Salisbury's compromise saved the boundary bill and 
ensured that Ireland would not be an issue in the 
upcoming election. Now, however, it was becoming a race 
against time to get the boundary bill onto the Statute 
Book before the government collapsed. For while the 
House of Lords was busy debating the Irish legislation, 
MacDonald's government was falling apart.
4°Ibid, Col. 615-616, 650-651, and 664.
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The fall of Labour
'I have no inside news to tell you7, Sidney Webb 
wrote to his wife on 2 October, 'but it is generally 
assumed that "our number is up"7. Like most of his 
colleagues, Webb expected to survive in office a few more 
weeks, if only because for both Tories and Liberals 'it 
would be unsatisfactory to defeat the Government before 
the Irish Bill is disposed of7.41 Throughout the first 
week of October, 'the air was full of impending crises7 
around Westminster. 'Nerves are on edge7, MacDonald 
reported to the king, and 'even a bill which raises such 
grave issues as the Irish bill occupies only a secondary 
position in that it does not seem to contain the germs of 
a domestic crisis.742 Soon, in fact, it would be hard to 
remember that the Irish boundary question had even been 
an issue in British politics.
Faced with a Conservative motion censuring the 
government7s handling of the Campbell case, and a Liberal 
motion condemning the Russian treaties, Labour7s first 
government was already teetering on 8 October. Matters 
were further complicated by a Liberal amendment to the 
Conservative motion which, instead of censuring the 
government, called for a Parliamentary select committee 
to investigate the Campbell affair. MacDonald announced 
that he would consider a vote for either the motion or
41Sidney to Beatrice Webb, 2 October 1924, Passfield 
Papers, 2/3/1/18/191-193.
42MacDonald to George V, 3 October 1924, JRM, PRO
30/69/228.
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the amendment as a vote of no confidence in his 
government and, if defeated, he would immediately call a 
general election.
The debate then took what one contemporary called 'a 
dramatic turn'. It was obvious, Baldwin told the House, 
that MacDonald planned to defeat the Liberal amendment by 
relying on Conservative votes, only to then appeal to 
Liberal MPs to defeat the Conservative motion 'and so 
ride off in triumph.' Before he would allow that to 
happen, Baldwin announced that the Conservatives would 
vote for the Liberal amendment to their own motion, thus 
ensuring Labour's defeat. MacDonald was left with no 
choice and, early on the morning of 9 October, he asked 
George V to dissolve Parliament that very afternoon and 
call the third general election in two years.43
MacDonald's 'extreme haste' in dissolving Parliament 
very nearly brought the boundary bill crashing down.
Once the House of Lords accepted Salisbury's resolution, 
no one in the government thought that there would be any 
more trouble about Ireland. They did not count on 
Carson, who saw in this sudden turn of events a chance to 
kill off the Boundary Commission once and for all. At 
the bill's third reading on 9 October, Carson sought to 
insert a proviso that the boundary bill would come into 
operation only after it was confirmed by Northern 
Ireland's Parliament, as well as by Dail Eireann. The 
effect of Carson's amendment, the Earl of Mayo noted,
43Annual Register: 1924. p. 105-107.
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'simply wrecks this bill' and, if passed, would put 
Ireland and the House of Lords squarely at the forefront 
of British politics. A contemporary account was certain 
that if Carson's amendment had been put to a vote it 
'would no doubt have been carried'. Once again, 
Salisbury's intervention saved the day. Carson withdrew 
his proposed change with the not altogether convincing 
claim that it was made merely 'to emphasise my protest 
against the coercion of Ulster.' With that, Labour's 
contribution to settling the Irish Question went onto the 
Statute Book at 6 p.m., just hours ahead of Parliament's 
dissolution.44
The Election of 1924
The election of 1924 was brought about because of 'a 
matter which the public understood but vaguely and in 
which it was little interested.'45 But if the Campbell 
case was not explosive enough on its own, when combined 
with the controversy over the Russian treaties, it proved 
to be a potent mixture in the hands of Conservative 
propagandists. Very quickly the campaign degenerated 
into one dominated by charges of Bolshevik influence 
inside the Labour Party, while the Liberals were held 
responsible for allowing the 'red menace' ever to take 
office. The Irish boundary dispute had no place in such 
a campaign. In fact, it was no longer discernible on
44HL Deb. Vol. 59, Col. 667-679, 9 October 1924.
Annual Register: 1924. p. 108.
45Annual Register: 1924. p. 109.
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Britain's political landscape, which was where most 
politicians wanted Ireland to be. 'It was quite evident 
as soon as I got up to London', Churchill wrote to 
Balfour, 'that the Irish question was not going to be any 
trouble. /46
The election, held on 29 October, gave the Tories a 
victory 'beyond their wildest expectations.' With no 
fewer than 413 members, Baldwin led a Commons majority of 
211 against all other parties combined. He had won the 
greatest single-party victory in twentieth century 
British politics, dwarfing all other landslides by any 
measure.47 In contrast, MacDonald saw Labour reduced 
from 191 to 151 members.
But it was the Liberal Party for whom the 1924 
election was a catastrophe. The Liberals went into the 
campaign with 159 MPs. Afterward, the once proud party 
was reduced to only 40 seats in the House of Commons 
depleted 'beyond hope of recovery'. Lloyd George's 
opponents within the party later blamed him for their 
annihilation, claiming that he had planned all along to
46Churchill to Balfour, 2 October 1924, AJB-S, GD 
433/2/19, Reel 4.
47Annual Register: 1924. p. 116-117. Only the Lloyd 
George Coalition scored a greater triumph, winning a 259- 
seat majority. The results of the century's other major 
victories were: 1906 - Liberal majority of 130; 1945 -
Labour majority of 146; 1959 - Conservative majority of 
100; 1966 - Labour majority of 97; 1983 - Conservative
majority of 144; 1997 - Labour majority of 179. See Butler 
and Freeman, British Political Facts, p. 140-144. G. 
Foote, A Chronology of Post War British Politics (London, 
1988), p. 4, 84, 123, and 243. 'The History Man', The
Guardian. 3 May 1997.
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use the election to purge them before refashioning 
Liberalism in his own image. Whether or not this is 
true, Lloyd George could not have foreseen the disaster 
which occurred, a disaster which was 'wholly unexpected' 
and which meant the 'practical disappearance ... of the 
Liberal Party from Parliamentary life.'48
The defeat of the Northern Nationalists
It was not the Liberals, however, who suffered most 
as a result of the 1924 election. While the Irish 
boundary dispute played no role in British politics, in 
one corner of the United Kingdom it was not just the main 
issue, it was the only issue. The fall of Labour gave 
Nationalists another opportunity to use the ballot box to 
demonstrate their desire to join the Free State. For all 
practical purposes, the election would be a plebiscite, a 
'test vote in the border counties' is the way one journal 
put it, which neither the British government nor the 
Boundary Commission could ignore.49
No one counted on Eamon de Valera.
Twice before, during the general elections of 1922 
and 1923, Nationalists had combined to elect T.J.S. 
Harbison and Cahir Healy to represent the two-member
48Annual Register: 1924. p. 116-117. Olivier to
Reading, 30 October 1924, 10, MSS Eur. F. 118/63(a), ff. 1- 
6. Campbell, Llovd George, p. 101-106.
49Annual Register: 1924. p. 145-147. 'Comments', New
Statesman. 18 October 1924.
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constituency for Fermanagh-Tyrone.50 On both occasions, 
de Valera had held that anyone participating in any 
election held in the six counties - never mind actually 
standing as a candidate - was guilty of an act of treason 
against the Irish Republic. Now, he argued that 
contesting the Fermanagh-Tyrone seats was 'the only means 
available of making the wishes of the people clearly 
known7 .51
There was, however, much more than that behind de 
Valera7s volte face. Having decided that he must lead 
his followers out of the wilderness into which they had 
condemned themselves in the Civil War, de Valera was 
setting off on the long road back into constitutional 
politics. Less than two years later, it would lead him 
to split Sinn Fein to establish his own Republican party, 
Fianna Fail. Meanwhile, the boundary issue played a key 
role in this strategy because, as he explained to his 
colleagues:
... The object of the Free State was to make it 
appear that we by our opposition [to the Treaty] had 
smashed the possibility of the North coming in. We 
will have to be very careful as to that. The Ulster 
problem will remain for us and it will be a very
5°Phoenix, Northern Nationalism, p. 262-264, 297-302. 
On his release from internment, Healy joined Harbison at 
Westminster to fight the Nationalist cause. He also wrote 
a series of newspaper articles to put their case directly 
to the British people. See, e.g., 'Will the Free State 
Fall?7, The People. 23 March 1924.
51'Comments7, New Statesman. 18 October 1924. Lord




It was at this time that de Valera began to nurture 
the myth that his opposition to the Treaty sprang wholly 
from a desire to prevent Ireland's partition. At public 
appearances, first at Ennis on 15 August and at Dundalk a
week later, de Valera maintained that if he had been
responsible for negotiating the Treaty, 'he would never 
have signed it until the boundary question was settled'. 
These speeches, one historian has written, vividly 
illustrated de Valera's propensity for 'deliberately 
twisting the truth'.53
The price of de Valera's return to constitutional 
politics was paid by the Nationalists of Fermanagh and 
Tyrone. Although the joint constituency was considered a
Nationalist stronghold when MacDonald called the 1924
election, de Valera had, by his action, 'willed 
otherwise'. The New Statesman called the move an act of 
unimaginable 'folly', placing Free State supporters in an 
impossible position. To avoid a three-cornered contest, 
Nationalist leaders reversed places with de Valera and 
called on their followers to abstain from the election, 
while demanding a plebiscite to show their desire for 
inclusion in the Free State. With Nationalist opinion 
bitterly divided, the only likely winners would be the
52Minutes of meeting of Comhairle na dTeachtai [Council 
of Deputies], 7 August 1924, reprinted in Gaughan, Stack. 
p. 335.
53'Mr de Valera and Final Success' Morning Post. 25
August 1924. T.R. Dwyer, De Valera: The Man & the Myths 
(Swords, Ireland, 1992), p. 136.
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Unionist candidates for the two seats. Nor would that be 
all. Were the Unionists to score such a victory, The 
Nation predicted, Craig's government would use the 
election 'as fresh proof of the homogeneity of "Ulster", 
and [it] may have a prejudicial effect on the Boundary 
Commission' - which, in the event, is exactly what 
happened. On election day, Northern Nationalists stayed 
away from polling stations in droves and, when the votes 
were counted, both Unionist candidates took the seats 
with overwhelming majorities.54
Unionists could not believe their luck. '[W]e have 
actually gained in Tyrone and Fermanagh', a stunned Lady 
Craig wrote in her diary. She attributed the triumph 
directly to the split created by de Valera's decision 
and, 'coming at this time, when the Boundary question is 
so acute, it is of tremendous import and assistance, and 
enormously strengthens J.'s hand.'55
Writing in her own diary that same day, Lady Carson 
was no less overjoyed. 'It's too thrilling', she wrote, 
and her husband could 'think of nothing else' once he had 
heard the news. With the taking of these two seats, the 
Conservative and Unionist victory of 1924 was complete. 
After the election, there could be no question but that
54Annual Register. 1924. p. 146-147. 'Events of the 
Week', The Nation. 25 October 1924. 'Comments', New
Statesman. 18 and 25 October 1924. Phoenix, Northern
Nationalism, p. 263, 308-310, 439, n. 40.
55Lady Craig's diary, 31 October 1924, D.1415/B/38/1- 
162. Because of Nationalist abstentions, the Fermanagh- 
Tyrone result was called a 'farce'. See 'Events of the 
Week', The Nation. 8 November 1924.
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Fermanagh and Tyrone would remain in Unionist hands.
'Now', Lady Carson wrote, 'no one will dare touch those 
counties./56
'A fatal policy attended by disaster'
With the election of 1924 what Winston Churchill 
called 'two years of insensate faction' finally came to 
an end. The country turned a corner or, to be more 
precise, it at last returned to the security of the two- 
party politics it had known before 1914. The Lloyd 
George Coalition left in its wake three roughly egual 
parties each vying for a place in a system designed for 
only two major players. From either end of the political 
spectrum it was agreed that this could not continue 
indefinitely. 'The basic fact', one journal told its 
readers, was this: 'there is no room in this country for 
three parties'. By the end of 1924, most voters agreed. 
As the third campaign in just two years drew to a close, 
The Nation was not surprised that what seemed to be 
uppermost in everyone's mind was 'the desire to put an 
end to this plague of annual elections'.57
Once Labour established itself as the party of the 
left, the contest boiled down to a bid over who would 
lead the country's anti-socialist forces. Even in 1924 
it was by no means certain that Lloyd George and the 
Liberals were going to lose in this competition, nor that
56Lady Carson's diary, 31 October 1924, D.1507/C/8.
57Rhodes James, British Revolution, p. 477. Ramsden,
Balfour and Baldwin, p. 199-202.
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Baldwin and the Conservatives were going to emerge to 
dominate British politics. Austen Chamberlain was 
convinced that years would pass before his party would 
again hold office, and by then he would 'be too old to 
take up the burden of leadership'.58 A number of factors 
working in the Conservatives' favour - not least, 
dissension within the Liberal Party's top echelon, and 
pure luck - were beyond their control. What was within 
Baldwin's power was his decision not to play the 'orange 
card' but rather, 'the red card of anti-socialism', and 
this proved to be decisive.59
Baldwin was walking a tightrope when he decided that 
his party's interests would not be served by picking a 
fight over the Irish boundary. With so much hanging in 
the balance, he could not afford to alienate Tory Die- 
hards? but neither could he ignore the consequences that 
would accompany their demand of unquestioning support for 
the Ulster Unionists. These dangers were amply 
demonstrated during an exchange between J.H. Thomas and 
Lord Hugh Cecil, when the latter insisted that the 
government should threaten to use force against the Free 
State in the boundary dispute. Thomas agreed that the 
British people would actively oppose the establishment of 
an Irish republic or abolition of the Oath of Allegiance.
58Austen to Ida Chamberlain, 10 March 1923 and 5 
October 1924, AC 5/1/268 and 334. Also, see Spender to 
Maclean, 2 October 1924, Maclean Papers, Dep. c. 467, ff.
134-135. Cowling, Impact of Labour, p. 419.
59Ibid, Cowling, p. 411, and 419-421. Ramsden, Balfour
and Baldwin, p. 199.
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But, he continued, 'believe me when I say I don't believe 
you could hold one-half your present seats on the 
question of the boundary'.60 Even if Thomas was 
exaggerating to make a point, his analysis was probably 
close to the truth. The point is that Baldwin also 
recognised this risk and he was unwilling to take it, 
even if his Die-hards were.
Instead, the Conservative leader opted for a less 
confrontational approach. The party allied with 
Unionists to wage a deft campaign, assiduously 
cultivating the popular press and promoting their point 
of view in the Irish dispute.61 By its own reckoning, 
during the 'acute stage of the boundary controversy' the 
Ulster Association, 'in addition to articles in the 
press', distributed over 300,000 pamphlets and over 
20,000 bulletins 'stating the Ulster case'. The result, 
according to the association, was a 'considerable change 
which has taken place in public opinion regarding Ulster 
affairs'.62 Down the road, this swing in popular opinion 
could be used to the Conservatives' advantage if they had 
to face any trouble from Dublin on the boundary issue. 
More immediately, it left the Tories in the happy 
position where they were seen to be giving their utmost
6°Exchange written on the back of an envelope, dated 30 
September 1924, Quickswood Papers, 33/12.
61See, e.g., Harmsworth to Baldwin, 28 August 1924, SB 
Vol. 159, ff. 209-210. Churchill to Carson, 8 September
1924, WSC 2/570/115.
62Ulster Association to Salisbury, 19 March 1925, S(4)
112/119-120.
349
support to the Unionists but at no real risk to 
themselves. Thus, Baldwin was able to contain his Die- 
hards while, at the same time, sidelining the Irish 
threat. Once this was accomplished, the Conservatives 
were able to concentrate on the anti-communist scare, and 
they were the ones who rode off in triumph.
Still, it came very close to being otherwise.
In early August MacDonald predicted that in the 
Irish boundary dispute Baldwin and his colleagues faced 
'a most critical decision on which the fortunes of their 
Party for the next few years may depend7. Later, he 
reported to George V that because the Conservatives had 
decided to direct all of their fire on the Campbell case, 
the Irish bill 'received an easier passage through its 
remaining stages than might have been anticipated in 
normal circumstances.763 These letters raise two 
intriguing, if ultimately unanswerable, questions: 
namely, if there had been no Campbell case, if there had 
been no Russian treaties, what then would have happened 
to Labour7s boundary bill? More broadly, what would have 
been the course of British politics if Ireland and the 
power of the House of Lords had been the main issues of 
the 1924 election?
It is surely more than mere speculation to say that 
in both instances what might have been would have been 
very different from what actually occurred. Without the
63MacDonald to George V, 2 August and 3 October 1924, 
JRM, PRO 30/69/228.
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diversion of the communist scare used so effectively by 
Baldwin and his lieutenants, it would have been 
impossible, as Edward Wood put it, to 'extricate us from 
the cul-de-sac' of Ireland.64 The boundary bill almost 
certainly would have met furious Conservative resistance 
in the House of Commons and would likely have been shot 
down in flames in the Lords. That would have brought on 
the general election so feared by Baldwin, a campaign 
whose focus would have been on the power of the peers 
versus the power of the people, the very campaign in 
which Lloyd George would have thrived.
It is impossible to know how such an election would 
have turned out, but it seems hardly likely that the 
Conservatives would have emerged with the greatest 
landslide of the century. Defeat would have cast Baldwin 
into outer darkness, his career one of shortest and most 
curious of those who have reached the pinnacle of British 
politics. There would have been no 'Baldwin-MacDonald 
Regime' - as Churchill called it - to govern, or 
misgovern, Britain during the inter-war years.65 Under 
Lloyd George, the Liberals might have been revitalized, 
and MacDonald's Labour Party might have won an outright 
Parliamentary majority, a goal that eluded him for the 
rest of his political life.
Instead, Baldwin was established as the dominating
64Wood to Baldwin, 10 September 1924, Halifax Papers,
A4.410/14/1.
65Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 21.
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figure in British politics for the next thirteen years. 
More immediately, this meant that the new British 
government would take a very narrow view of what was to 
be achieved by the Ulster clauses of the Irish Treaty. 
Theirs would be the interpretation that counted, whatever 
the Boundary Commission itself might say. The final 
chapter of the Irish Question would be written by men who 
had opposed Article 12 from the beginning or, if they had 
been responsible for the Treaty, had long since learnt 
the price of going against Conservative opinion on this 
issue. They would not make that same mistake again.
But this boldness, this certainty of a firm policy 
on Ireland, was not the result of Tory commitments to the 
Ulster Unionists. What made it possible was the 
fundamental change that had taken place in British 
politics.
During the peers' debate on the boundary bill, Lord
Londonderry wondered aloud if MacDonald and his
colleagues had any real Irish policy to speak of, and
decided that they did not:
I feel myself forced to the conclusion that the 
present Government, like the Coalition Government, 
is clinging to the slender hope that, by keeping 
the framework of the Treaty in being and by the 
avoidance of anything which might give offence to 
one or other of the parties concerned, a solution 
will be found in some indefinable way which will 
relieve them of their responsibilities and bring 
about a settlement in the process of time. That, 
in my judgment, is a fatal policy ... [and] ... 
can only be attended by disaster.66
Although Londonderry's remarks were directed at MacDonald
66HL Deb. Vol. 59, Col. 565, 7 October 1924.
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and Lloyd George, his charge applied with equal - perhaps 
more - justice to Bonar Law and Baldwin. The unstable 
condition of British politics between the fall of Lloyd 
George and the 1924 election was bound to affect any 
attempt to settle the Irish Question. No party could 
afford to take on such a divisive issue. The risks were 
simply too great in such an uncertain political climate 
and that is why Jones's concept of 'indefinite 
postponement' was so attractive to all politicians, 
especially the Conservatives.67 It is true to say that 
the Tories would have fought any large-scale boundary 
change whatever the outcome of the 1924 election. Craig, 
however, was not alone in fearing that even if the party 
won the election a fight over Ireland 'might possibly 
split the Conservative Party once more.'68
What made the difference was the scale of the 
party's victory. Baldwin and his colleagues could 
confidently settle the Irish Question on their own terms 
because they could rely on a massive and united 
Parliamentary majority to back them. They need not 
reckon with the views of any other party on this issue.
The Liberals counted for nothing, and Labour for not much 
more. No government, including the Coalition, had been 
in such a position since 1910.
Nevertheless, during its brief first term in office 
Labour played a crucial role in settling the boundary
67Jones diary, 10 June 1923, Vol. Ill, p. 221.
68Craig to Carson, 18 August 1924, PRONI, CAB9Z/5/1.
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dispute. That this role is seldom acknowledged may have 
much to do with the ambivalence Labour has felt about 
Ireland since the party's inception, an ambivalence 
personified by its first prime minister.
On the day that MacDonald tendered his resignation 
to the king, Lady Lavery wrote to tell him of the Free 
State government's gratitude for his 'courage and 
fairness in dealing with a problem that was not of your 
making.' Given MacDonald's feelings about the Irish, it 
is doubtful that he would have responded in kind.
Between them there had never been any empathy nor 
understanding. As Lavery was forced to admit in this 
same letter, the Free Staters were 'conservative in their 
sentiments'. Their goals were not MacDonald's, and his 
goals were not theirs.69
In any case, it no longer mattered. MacDonald's 
first, unhappy encounter with the Irish was at an end.
He would next face them in the person of Eamon de Valera; 
but nearly eight years were to elapse in between - time 
enough for MacDonald to prepare himself for that supreme 
ordeal. He would never become entangled in the boundary 
question again.70
69Lavery to MacDonald, 4 November 1924, JRM, PRO 
30/69/1433/73-74. 'I think', O'Higgins once told the Dail, 
'that we were probably the most conservative-minded 
revolutionaries that ever put through a successful 
revolution'. See White, O'Higgins. p. 145. Also, see 
McCoole, Lavery. p. 117.
7°Dwyer, Man and Myths. p. 165-169. Thomas delivered 
Labour's response to the boundary agreement the following 
year. See HC Deb. Vol. 189, Col. 321-326, 8 December 1925.
Ireland did not figure as a chief concern when 
MacDonald decided that Labour should take office. But of 
all the issues that he encountered during those 
tumultuous nine months, the Irish boundary dispute had 
proved to be the most intractable, the most impervious to 
compromise, and remained so to the very last hours of his 
first government. With evident relief, MacDonald turned 
his back on the Irish. Walking away from their bitter 
quarrel that night, he wrote in his diary: 'And tonight 
as I go into a new world, the dead come to me and in 
companionship I have spent an hour with them.'71





... It was a merit of the Treaty that it 
retained this Council of Ireland. It was 
an all-Ireland body, and with it 
disappears the last hope of unity in our 
time.
- Cahir Healy1
Shortly after dawn on the morning of 9 December 
1924, three 'rather apprehensive looking' men stepped 
from a train at a stop just north of the Irish frontier. 
Almost three years to the day after its conception, the 
Irish Boundary Commission was at long last ready to begin 
its work. 'We drove rapidly to Armagh', Stephen Tallents 
reported, where the Commissioners, their retinue of 
assistants, and 'their extensive luggage' were housed in 
the local judge's lodgings, 'without even a dog to watch 
them.' No one in the town seemed to notice, or care, 
about the Commission's arrival. 'When I came away at 
noon', Tallents wrote, 'Armagh still preserved its 
customary air of languid boredom.'2
Given the passions aroused by the Boundary 
Commission since its inception, its members must have 
been surprised that their arrival was met with such 
indifference. In fact, a shift of opinion was taking 
place. Among Free Staters bitter resignation had 
replaced earlier expectations that the Commission would
^Agreement Signed in London', Ulster Herald. 12
December 1925.
2Tallents to Maxwell, 9 December 1924, HO 267/179.
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reunite their country. Having demanded the boundary 
panel for so long, Nationalists were beginning to realise 
that it might not produce the desired outcome. 'They
have asked for their pound of flesh', one correspondent
wrote to Lord Salisbury, 'and now apparently they do not 
like the prospect of receiving it./3
This bitterness contrasted with the benign 
indifference and, in some cases, growing confidence, felt 
by leading border-county Unionists. 'I found the 
proposed visit to be regarded by them as more a matter of
routine than I had expected', Tallents reported to the
Home Office. One prominent County Fermanagh landowner 
(and future Northern Ireland prime minister), Sir Basil 
Brooke, told Tallents that he was not at all worried 
about the Commission's proposed tour, which he viewed 
'with equanimity'.4
This was not the view from Belfast. Although Sir 
James Craig entertained hopes that the Commission might 
actually expand his domain to include Unionist East 
Donegal, he nonetheless set out to frustrate its work 
within his jurisdiction.5 On hearing of the proposed 
tour, Craig fired off a letter to Britain's new home 
secretary, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, warning of 
'considerable alarm' about the impending visit. Ulster's
3Dail Debf Vol. 8, Col. 2502-2568, 15 October 1924.
Brumwell to Salisbury, 11 October 1924, S(4) 110/92.
4Tallents to Anderson, 28 November 1924, HO
45/12296/55(a).
5Cabinet Minutes, 22 October 1924, PRONI, CAB4/126/16.
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premier found it particularly galling that Eoin MacNeill, 
a man he accused of taking part 'with Roger Casement and 
the German Government' in the Easter Rising of 1916, 
should be allowed to set foot in the six counties. For 
MacNeill 'to venture at any time into the heart of a 
loyalist population' would, Craig predicted, lead to 
trouble. If the Commissioners wanted to take evidence 
from anyone living in the border counties, Craig's advice 
was that the witnesses ought to be invited to London to 
give their testimony - at British expense. His friends 
in Baldwin's new government deemed the suggestion 
'undesirable'.6
Such incidents were to characterise much of the 
Boundary Commission's work over the next year.7 Buoyed 
by the results of the 1924 election, Ulster Unionists had 
little to fear from the tribunal. While Craig might not 
always get his way, his supporters were safe in the 
knowledge that a Conservative government in London would 
not enforce any Boundary Commission award unless it had 
Belfast's blessing. 'We thought we knew what 
Conservative ministers meant by Article 12', the Irish 
high commissioner wrote in the wake of the 1924 election. 
But after what these same men had said during the fight 
over Labour's boundary bill, Free Staters could no longer
6Craig to Joynson-Hicks [two letters]? and Joynson- 
Hicks to Craig, 25, 26, and 28 November 1924, PRONI,
CAB9Z/3/2.
7See, e.g., Tallents to Bourdillon, 2 December 1924, 
CAB 61/18. Spender to Tallents, 9 February 1925, HO 
267/210.
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justify that belief. Now, these same Tories filled the 
top ranks of Baldwin's new government? men who, according 
to James MacNeill, would refuse 'to be honourably bound 
by any decision which the Six County Government would 
likely resist.'8
Northern Nationalists, on the other hand, saw 
themselves as increasingly isolated. Despite solemn vows 
from Dublin that they were kith and kin, in a year's time 
Northern Nationalists would accuse Cosgrave's government 
of throwing them 'unceremoniously to the wolves'.9 There 
would be a good deal of truth in that accusation.
Baldwin's second government 
Although some Tories might claim that the 1924 
election was a vindication of the 'old "Die-Hard" 
movement', the Conservative landslide actually freed 
Baldwin from these supporters and allowed him to remake 
the party in his own image.10 This he proceeded to do, 
and the result was to have a profound impact on the 
settling of Ireland's boundary question. While old 
allies were rewarded for their loyalty, former 
Coalitionists were at the same time given prominent roles
8MacNeill to FitzGerald, 31 October 1924, D/T, S/1801
K.
9'"Callously Betrayed."', Ulster Herald. 12 December
1925.
10Gretton to Baldwin, 1 November 1924, SB Vol. 36, ff. 
22-24. Tyrrell to Baldwin, same date, SB Vol. 42, ff. 226- 
227. According to Maurice Cowling, the election enabled 
Baldwin to 'command all the forces Lloyd George had tried 
to lead from 1920 onwards'. See Impact of Labour, p. 414- 
415.
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in the government. Austen Chamberlain became foreign 
secretary; and Lord Birkenhead took over the India 
Office, much to the consternation of the Die-hards.
'It's all very exciting', Lady Carson wrote in her diary; 
'some people have again started to grumble.'11
But these rumblings were nothing compared to the 
uproar that followed Baldwin's decision to make Winston 
Churchill chancellor of the exchequer.12 Though
Churchill's appointment did not sit well with a number of
Conservatives and Ulster Unionists, Craig immediately 
realised that it was a stroke of luck for his cause. The 
new chancellor of the exchequer was, in effect, on 
probation. 'It would be up to him to be loyal', Baldwin
remarked to Tom Jones - 'if he is capable of loyalty.'
In such a position, it is not surprising that Churchill, 
as Baldwin's biographers later wrote, 'was evidently 
prepared at this moment to go a long way to conciliate 
his new-found colleagues'.13
Given the behind-the-scenes role Churchill had 
played in the autumn boundary crisis along with his 
earlier support while at the Colonial Office, Craig 
surmised that the new chancellor was as anxious to re­
establish his Unionist, as he was his Conservative, 
credentials. For while Baldwin might be willing to
“Lady Carson diary, 6 November 1924, D.1507/C/8.
“Gilbert, Churchill: Vol. V . p. 58-62.
“Jones diary, 8 November 1924, Vol. I. p. 303.
Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin. p. 290.
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overlook the past, it rankled influential Conservatives 
that his Cabinet contained 'too many ministers identified 
with the Coalition's cowardly surrender to Sinn Fein ... 
in the so-called "Treaty"'.14 Churchill need not be told 
that he figured prominently on that list.
Craig wasted no time putting the new chancellor to 
the test. In a letter congratulating Churchill on his 
appointment to the Treasury, Ulster's leader let it be 
known that as soon as possible he wished to discuss 'a 
certain number of matters still outstanding' between the 
two governments. Although Churchill's response included 
a gentle reminder that the success of Baldwin's 
government depended on 'sound finance', Craig could be 
sure that 'I shall support you in essentials.'15
This exchange set off alarm bells at the Treasury, 
where officials saw themselves in an ongoing struggle to 
ward off Ulster Unionist raids on the British exchequer. 
The 'matters' that were on Craig's mind were the same 
three issues that had bedevilled relations between the 
Treasury and the Belfast government since 1921: funding 
of the Ulster Special Constabulary? amalgamation of the 
British and Ulster unemployment insurance funds; and, 
Craig's attempts to lower Northern Ireland's imperial 
contribution.16
14'Episodes of the Month', National Review. April 1925,
p. 200.
15Craig to Churchill? and Churchill to Craig, 8 and 10
November 1924, T 160/131/F.4855/02/1.
“ Ibid, Niemeyer to Churchill, 15 November 1924.
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In the run-up to Churchill's meeting with Craig,
Otto Niemeyer, along with two other senior Treasury 
officials, G.C. Upcott and P.J. Grigg, attempted to 
persuade the new chancellor to take a tough line with his 
guest. The trio concentrated on Craig's request for an 
additional £1 million grant for the Special Constabulary, 
a claim that he had been pressing on the Treasury since 
the fall of Baldwin's first government. Britain could 
give into Craig's demands, they argued, only at the cost 
of 'breaking the Treaty' since Belfast was supposed to be 
responsible for funding its security forces.
More immediately, the existence of the Specials had 
a direct bearing on the boundary question. For these 
reasons, Upcott and Grigg pointed out, Churchill's 
predecessor had resisted Craig's demand for the money. 
Niemeyer added that if Craig's government rejected the 
Boundary Commission's findings, it was altogether likely 
that it would use the British-funded force to prevent 
implementation of the award. Such a development,
Niemeyer wrote with considerable understatement, would be 
'very awkward'.17
Churchill was having none of this. 'The Free State 
have got Home Rule', he truculently responded, 'but since 
when has Great Britain lost the right to do what she 
chooses within her own borders.' Writing separately to 
Niemeyer, he staked out the Treasury's new position:
17Ibid, 'Claims of Northern Ireland', Upcott 
memorandum; and Niemeyer to Churchill, which includes a 
notes by Grigg and Churchill, 14 and 15 November 1924.
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Nothing in the Treaty gives the Free State 
any right to complain of any measures wh. we may
choose to take for maintaining the peace and 
security of Northern Ireland. It is our duty to 
sustain the Northern Govt, effectually either by 
subvention or by troops, or by both during the 
difficult period through wh. they are now passing - 
through no fault of their own. The fact that the 
boundary commission is sitting makes it all the 
more necessary that the Northern Govt, should be 
solidly supported ....18
For the moment, the three officials were more successful 
at convincing Churchill to resist Craig's appeals for re­
consideration of the first Colwyn Committee award and his
insistence that Northern Ireland's unemployment insurance 
fund should be linked to its British countpart.19
But on the immediate issue, Churchill stood firm.
'I shall certainly agree to the Million grant at once', 
he wrote. Craig's paramilitary force was safe for the 
present and, perhaps, even longer. A future grant to the 
Specials should not be ruled out, Churchill informed 
Niemeyer, but would be decided upon once 'we see what the 
Boundary Commission award and what is the state of 
affairs thereafter.'[sic]20
At their second meeting, Baldwin's new Cabinet not 
only approved the £1 million grant for the Specials; it 
also authorised an immediate advance of an additional 
£250,000 at the chancellor's discretion. More
18Ibid, Niemeyer to Churchill? and Churchill to 
Niemeyer, 15 November 1924.
19The new minister of labour was also opposed. See 
Steel-Maitland to Churchill, 19 November 1924, T
160/187/F.7136/2.
2°Churchill to Niemeyer, 15 November 1924, T
160/131/F.4855/02/1.
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importantly, the Cabinet put Churchill back at the centre 
of Irish affairs. He, not the home secretary, was to be 
the 'medium of communication' with Craig on all financial 
questions.21 With this direct line into the Treasury, 
Craig could rest assured that his pleas for assistance 
would be heard by a chancellor who was anxious if not 
always able to help.
That said, the government's decision to fund the 
Specials was coolly received by the House of Commons. 
Critics pointed out that Parliament was expected to fund 
a paramilitary force whose exact numbers it did not even 
know - Churchill could only say that there were 
'something like 35,000'. If these numbers were correct, 
one Liberal MP pointed out, Craig had at his command an 
armed force that was larger than the armies of Austria or 
Bulgaria. The most damaging allegation was made by 
Snowden, who told the House that the proposed grant was 
nothing but a round-about attempt by Craig, with 
Churchill's collusion, to help Northern Ireland's 
unemployed.22 Despite Parliament's evident distaste for 
underwriting the Specials, Baldwin's overwhelming 
majority ensured that Churchill got his way. According 
to one opposition MP, the chancellor of the exchequer 
obviously meant to 'redeem his past in the matter of
21C. 60(24), 19 November 1924, CAB 23/49.
22HC Deb. Vol. 180, Col. 1651-1686, 23 February 1925.
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Ireland.' Craig was delighted.23
The Boundary Commission sets to work 
At the same time that Baldwin was busy forming his 
new government, in another part of London the Boundary 
Commission was itself setting to work. With offices in 
the Strand at 6 Clement's Inn, Eoin MacNeill, the Free 
State's representative, and Richard Feetham, the 
Commission's chairman, were joined by Joseph R. Fisher, 
the man at long last appointed to represent Northern 
Ireland.24
Fisher has been called the 'shadowy figure' of this 
story, a man whose views 'were not generally known 
outside his own circle.'25 That is not really true. As 
a barrister and later as editor of the Northern Whig. 
Fisher had already played a prominent role in the Ulster 
Unionist cause. Earlier than most of those in the 
movement, he had advocated partition, not as a means of 
thwarting Home Rule, but as an end in itself.26
23Ibid, Col. 1673. Lady Craig diary, 23 February 1925, 
D .1415/B/38/1—162.
24Hand, 'MacNeill', p. 232.
25Hand, Report. p. xi. Gwynn, History of Partition, p.
232.
26Buckland, Documentary History. Nos. 152, 199, 229. 
Gwynn, History of Partition, p. 229-230. In one of many 
articles promoting the Unionist cause, Fisher compared the 
Ulster counties that wished to remain a part of the United 
Kingdom with the counties of Virginia which opposed that 
state's secession during the American Civil War. The 
comparison is revealing as these counties were themselves 
partitioned to form the state of West Virginia. See J.R. 
Fisher, 'The "Unreasonableness” of Ulster', Nineteenth 
Centuryf May 1918, p. 1088-1091.
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After the signing of the 'Midnight Treaty', as he 
called it, Fisher argued that if there must be a Boundary 
Commission, it should not be hindered by 'ancient county 
boundaries'.27 Implicitly, he suggested that the 
Boundary Commission might be used to copper-fasten 
partition for all time by restructuring Northern 
Ireland's frontier. In a private letter to Craig, he 
explained what he meant. 'Ulster can never be complete 
without Donegal', he wrote, and with 'North Monaghan in 
Ulster and South Armagh out', the Belfast government 
'would take in a fair share of the people we want and 
leave out those we don't want.' As has been noted 
elsewhere, Fisher, far from being opposed to a 
substantial revision of the Irish border, was all for 
it - 'albeit in one direction.'28
Fisher's selection as Northern Ireland's Boundary 
Commissioner is something of a mystery, and there is 
debate over whether or not Craig was allowed to do behind 
the scenes what he refused to do in public.29 The best 
evidence of a link between Ulster's premier and Ulster's 
Boundary Commissioner comes from Fisher himself. When 
informing Wilfrid Spender that he was taking 'this most
27'Irish Boundaries. The "Principal Act"', The Times. 
4 February 1924.
28Ervine, Craiaavon. p. 481-482. Phoenix, Northern 
Nationalism, p. 267. Craig also favoured the incorporation 
of Donegal into his state. See '"The Proper Border"', 
Irish Independent. 27 March 1925.
29Bryan Follis, e.g., maintains that Craig took no part 
in Fisher's appointment. See State Under Sieae. p. 164.
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thankless job', Fisher proposed setting up a back channel 
of communication so that the Belfast government could 
provide 'the necessary statistical, economic, and 
topographical information' he would need to counter Free 
State claims.30 It is barely credible that information 
only passed one way in these communications, and that any 
information provided by Fisher would have been withheld 
from Craig.31
The advantage of a secret line of communication 
became even more important after the Commission's first 
meeting. All three members agreed to a strict code of 
secrecy; they would neither 'consult any of the 
Governments concerned as to the work of the Commission' 
nor would any member discuss his work with 'any 
individual without first consulting his colleagues.'32 
Feetham observed this agreement; so did MacNeill, much 
the chagrin of his colleagues in Dublin.33 Fisher did 
not. Over the following year, he wrote a series of
3°Fisher to Spender, 12 October 1924, PRONI, CAB9Z/3/2.
31Canning, British Policy, p. 105. Craig maintained 
that he knew 'nothing whatever' of the Commission's 
deliberations. See NI HC Deb. Vol. 6, Col. 1118, 7
September 1925. Also, see Follis, State Under Siege. p. 
173, 180.
32Commission Minutes No. 1, 6 November 1924, CAB 61/1.
33MacNeill later explained that in his view he 'was not 
purely and simply the representative of a government nor 
was I an advocate for a particular point of view'. See 
Pail Deb. Vol. 13, Col. 796, 24 November 1925. His 'vow of 
silence was particularly exasperating to the Free State 
government'. See White, O'Hicrcrins. p. 207. Ironically, 
the British Cabinet took it for granted that MacNeill kept 
his colleagues informed of the Commission's deliberations. 
See I.A.(25)-lst Minutes, 23 November 1925, CAB 27/295.
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letters to the wife of a Sir David Reid, a prominent 
Ulster Unionist MP, divulging details of the Commission's 
work. Again, it is barely credible that this sort of 
information would not have been passed on to Craig and 
his colleagues.34
Although he was not a member of the Boundary 
Commission as such, F.B. Bourdillon, the tribunal's 
secretary, played a key role in its deliberations.
Having served as a member of the commission that 
determined the German-Polish border in Upper Silesia, 
Bourdillon came to the attention of Lionel Curtis after 
writing a highly critical article of the Free State's 
case as put forward in the Boundary Bureau's Handbook of 
the Ulster Question. Curtis was so impressed that he 
ordered copies of the article for all senior civil 
servants responsible for British policy on the boundary 
dispute.35 It is likely that on the basis of this work, 
Bourdillon was asked to become secretary to the 
Commission sometime in early 1924.36 That his views had 
any influence on the Commission, or more particularly on 
the Commission's chairman, cannot be proved. But it is 
noteworthy that Bourdilion's interpretation of Article 12
34Ervine, Craiaavon. p. 498-500. Nor was Lady Reid the 
only recipient of such correspondence. See Fisher to 
Carson, 18 October 1925, Carson Papers, D.1507/A/44/52.
35Bourdillon to Curtis? Bourdillon article; Curtis to 
Whiskard? and Curtis to Bourdillon, 28 November, 7, 13, and
19 December 1923, CO 739/25/60802.
36Bourdillon to Curtis, 25 January 1924, CO
739/27/13299.
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bears a striking resemblance to the one later outlined by 
Feetham.37
Irish Nationalist fears that Feetham did not share 
their ideas about the Boundary Commission's mandate were 
confirmed before the end of 1924.38 The Commission's 
December tour of the border counties, the one that began 
in Armagh, was billed as a preliminary excursion, to 
allow the panel to 'acquaint' itself with the region. No 
evidence was taken and there were no formal sittings? 
those would occur at a later date.39 Before the panel 
left Londonderry, however, Feetham stunned Free State 
supporters by announcing that the Commission had no power 
to call a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the 
inhabitants.40 In the wake of this pronouncement, E.M. 
Stephens reported that many Nationalists were now 
unwilling to give evidence to the tribunal if they lived 
in 'areas which have very little hope of coming into the 
Free State'. There was, in fact, a growing belief among 
Northern Nationalists that the Commission was 'unwilling, 
or unable, to carry out its work.'41
37Hand, Report. 'Chairman's Memorandum', p. 32-68.
380'Doherty to Collins, 19 August 1924, J.H. Collins 
Papers, D. 921/2/4/20. Also, see Pail Deb. Vol. 8, Col. 
2424-2426, 2431-2439, 7 July 1924.
39'The Irish Commission. Tour of the Border Next Week', 
Manchester Guardian. 8 December 1924.
4°'Index to Dates and Conferences', 22 December 1924,
D/T, S 1801/P.
41Stephens to O'Higgins, 21 January 1925, D/T, S
1801/J.
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Why MacNeill did not protest against Feetham's 
statement is unclear. As a Free State minister, he was 
well aware of the Executive Council's insistence that as 
a 'first step' the Boundary Commission should hold 
plebiscites in the Poor Law Unions of each of Northern 
Ireland's border counties.42 Nor was this the first blow 
that Feetham had delivered to the Nationalist case. In 
the run-up to its December visit, the Commission heard 
evidence from a Free State legal panel headed by 
Attorney-General John 0'Byrne. Over the course of two 
days 0'Byrne and his colleagues contended that 'the onus 
is not on us to prove how much of Northern Ireland should 
be in the Free State, but on Northern Ireland to show how 
much of it should remain out of the Free State.'43
Feetham made it plain during these sessions that he 
did not share this view.44 As he later wrote, to accept 
Dublin's arguments meant that the Boundary Commission 
would 'be entitled to abolish Northern Ireland altogether 
and include the whole of its area within the territory of 
the Irish Free State.' Whatever the Commission's award 
might be, it must enable Northern Ireland, as well as the
42C.2/128, 5 September 1924, D/T, G 2/3. O'Higgins 
memorandum, 3 September 1924, D/T, S 1801/J.
43'The Irish Boundary. Free State's View of Article 
12', Manchester Guardian. 8 December 1924. Also, see
'Statement by the Irish Free Government', 20 November 1924, 
D/T, S 1801/L.
44Hand, Report. Appendix I, p. 8-9 and, especially, 
Feetham's exchange with Serjeant Hanna, p. 16-21.
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Free State, to 'retain its own identity'.45 Here, he was 
emphatic:
The term "Northern Ireland" as used in Article 
XII, clearly means not some vague indefinite area 
in the north of Ireland, but the Northern Ireland 
established and defined by the Government of Ireland 
Act, 1920, and it is the boundary between this 
"Northern Ireland" and "the rest of Ireland" which 
is to be "determined," or ... redetermined.46
Without saying so, Feetham had accepted the Unionists'
main point: namely, that the 1920 Act took precedence
over the Treaty. Even worse for the Dublin government,
according to Feetham's interpretation of Article 12, the
Free State could expect to lose as well as gain territory
from the Commission's award.47
How Feetham reached these sweeping conclusions has
never been explained. They suggest, however, the
influence of Lionel Curtis, an influence easiest to
identify in the decision not to hold plebiscites.
Shortly before leaving the Colonial Office, Curtis
reiterated his opposition to a vote in the border
counties in a memorandum that found its way into
Feetham's hands. A whole host of problems would arise
from such a request, including the need for enabling
legislation to allow the vote to take place. It should
be pointed out to Feetham, Curtis suggested, 'that it is,
for obvious reasons, extremely inadvisable to bring the
45Hand, Reportf 'Chairman's Memorandum', p. 34, 49.
46Ibid, p. 37.
47Ibid, p. 36-37. For Fisher's comments, see 'Irish 
Boundaries. The "Principal Act"', The Times. 4 February
1924.
371
proceedings of the Commission into the arena of 
Parliamentary discussion if it can possibly be 
avoided./48
Heeding his friend's advice, Feetham proceeded to do 
just that. A large part of the testimony delivered by 
the Free State's legal experts was taken up by questions 
about how the Boundary Commission should ascertain the 
'wishes of the inhabitants', with Feetham steadily 
chipping away at the Irish position. Might there not, he 
wondered, be other ways to glean the same information, 
say by looking at election results, census returns (which 
included statistics on religious affiliation), or by 
asking 'what the representative people of districts 
say'?49
0 'Byrne rejected the first two suggestions, arguing 
that they could give nothing more than a 'rough 
indication' of the person's political preference. As for 
Feetham's last idea, the Irish attorney-general pointed 
out that it was the Commission's duty to consult the 
wishes of all the people, not merely the region's leading 
citizens. In any case, such an idea would have been 
wholly unacceptable to Northern Nationalists given recent 
election results.
These exchanges revealed yet another blow to the 
Free State's case. Throughout, 0'Byrne had argued that
^'Plebiscites', Curtis memorandum, 18 September 1924, 
Feetham Papers, 7/2, ff. 1.
49Hand, Reportf Appendix I, p. 22-41.
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the Boundary Commission should consider conditions as 
they were when the Treaty was signed - not as they might
now find them. Feetham hinted that he took a dim view of
this position. Here, the years of delay most clearly
took their toll on the Free State's case. As Feetham
later wrote, partition had given rise to 'certain vested 
... interests ... during the four years which have now 
elapsed since it [the Treaty] first took effect.' These 
interests, he judged, 'should not be lightly interfered 
with.'50 Here again, Curtis's influence seems to have 
been at work for, as Free State officials were aware, he 
held the same view.51
In less than two months the Boundary Commission had 
travelled a long way down the road toward its final 
conclusions. In every respect, Feetham made it clear 
that the main elements of the Free State's case - that 
the Commission was empowered to make sweeping territorial 
changes, based on conditions as they were in 1921; that 
it had a right, if not a duty, to call a plebiscite in 
the border region; and that it had no mandate to transfer 
territory from the South to the North - were ones he did 
not share. Seven months before, 0'Higgins warned 
Cosgrave of just such a possibility if the two 
governments did not reach an understanding on the meaning 
of Article 12. His advice was ignored, not least because
5°Hand, Report. Appendix I, p. 27-31; 'Chairman's
memorandum', p. 54.
51Hand, 'MacNeill', p. 220.
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Curtis had assured the Free State president that the 
British government could not be the sole interpreter of 
an article of the Treaty. Instead, as O'Higgins had 
predicted, the Irish effectively handed that power to the 
British-appointed chairman.52 The competition over the 
interpretation of Article 12 was the crucial match? by 
failing to face the issue head-on, Cosgrave and his 
colleagues scored the deciding own goal.
And the Commission had not even heard its first 
witness.
'Not an inch': Northern Ireland's 1925 election
Despite the Commission's importance to the future of 
Northern Ireland, Craig and his Cabinet adopted an 
official policy of non-cooperation with the tribunal.53 
Unofficially, they enlisted the Ulster Unionist Council 
to act in the government's place with Herbert Dixon, 
chief whip of the Ulster Unionist Parliamentary Party, 
co-ordinating operations. Dixon was ideally placed for 
the job. As parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of 
Finance, he reported directly to the Cabinet where,
'albeit unofficially', he could at the same time report 
on the boundary issue. Thus, in private Craig and his 
colleagues could direct Unionist strategy while in public 
they maintained a policy of non-cooperation. As Spender 
later explained, this left Craig 'free to take action' if
520'Higgins to Cosgrave, 7 and 10 May 1924, D/T, S
1801/R.
53Spender to Bourdillon, 13 November 1924, in Hand,
Report. p. 7.
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the tribunal produced an award not to his liking. As 
with the Treaty, Craig could then say that his government 
had not been consulted and thus was not bound by the 
report.54
On 3 March the Boundary Commission returned to 
Armagh, at long last ready to take evidence from the 
people of the border counties. Within days its work was 
overshadowed when Craig suddenly dissolved Northern 
Ireland's Parliament and called an election on the 
boundary guestion. He freely admitted that he had 
deliberately called the election, scheduled for 3 April, 
'while the Commission is sitting in [our] midst'.
Feetham might be hesitant about taking a vote; Ulster's 
premier was not - albeit on his terms. The result, Craig 
confidently predicted, would demonstrate Northern 
Ireland's continued and overwhelming support for 
partition to everyone, not least to the Commission.55
It is likely that Craig hoped his sudden move would 
allow him to play on continuing Nationalist divisions as 
had occurred during the 1924 election.56 In an effort to 
avoid another such debacle, a convention of Devlinites 
and pro-Treaty Sinn Feiners nominated eleven candidates
54Follis, State Under Sieae. p. 166-167. Also, see 
Craig's remarks in NI HC Deb. Vol. 5, Col. 19-20, 10 March
1925. Unionists who agreed to testify also made it clear 
that they 'did not bind themselves in any way to accept the 
findings of the Commission'. See 'The Boundary Commission. 
Strabane Council Takes Action', Tyrone Constitution. 20
March 1925.
55NI HC Deb. Vol. 5, Col. 19, 10 March 1925.
56Kennedy, Widening Gulf, p. 137.
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to stand in the Northern Ireland election.57 Despite the 
effort to create a united front, Eamon de Valera 
announced that his party, too, would put forward 
candidates. In the event, the Republicans were all but 
marginalised; as Cahir Healy acidly noted, 'for the 
Nationalists in the north-east, it is not a question of 
Free State versus Republic; unfortunately they had 
neither' .58
In the run-up to the election, Craig's allies in the 
British press were confident that the results would prove 
once and for all that Northerners had no wish to be 'cast 
into the outer darkness' of the Irish Free State.5*
That, indeed, is how Craig interpreted the results.
Article 12, he told Northern Ireland's newly elected 
House of Commons, had charged the Boundary Commission to 
determine the Irish border in accordance with the wishes 
of the inhabitants. Very well. The Commission now had 
their answer 'supplied by the people themselves'.
April's election, he declared, proved that residents of 
the border counties had 'no desire to break their 
connection' with Belfast.60
In fact, Nationalists stood their ground in most of 
the border counties. In two constituencies, Fermanagh-
57Phoenix, Northern Nationalism, p. 317-321.
58Ibid, p. 320. Press statement, 20 March 1925, FLK, 
de Valera Papers, File No. 347.
59'Episodes of the Month', National Review. April 1925,
p. 201.
6°NI HC Deb. Vol. 6, Col. 24-25, 15 April 1925.
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Tyrone and Londonderry, Nationalist candidates polled the 
most first preference votes. In Armagh and Fermanagh- 
Tyrone, the final results were evenly split between 
Unionists and anti-partition candidates who took an equal 
number of seats in both constituencies. Unionists edged 
out Nationalists in Londonderry, taking three seats to 
two, a result that might have been reversed but for the 
presence of an anti-Treaty Sinn Fein candidate on the 
ballot. Of the border counties, only in Down were the 
Unionists overwhelmingly triumphant, taking six of the 
eight seats. And there all of the candidates ran 
unopposed, including both Craig and de Valera.61 As one 
contemporary journal noted, whatever Craig might tell his 
supporters, the election 'showed that on the partition 
issue things remained very much as they were in 1920./62
Elsewhere, Craig's party was sharply rebuffed. The 
Unionists' campaign slogan - 'Not an inch!' - rang hollow 
for working-class Protestants held in the grip of the 
economic depression.63 Craig recognised these growing 
fissures within Unionist ranks. According to the New 
Statesman in fact, he called the snap election to get a 
jump on his opponents before they could organise as an 
alternative to the official Unionist Party.64 
Nevertheless, official Unionists held on to only half of
61Follis, State Under Siege. Appendix 2, p. 198-200.
62Annual Register: 1925. p. 134.
63Farrell, Arming the Protestants, p. 239-241.
64'Comments', The New Statesman. 11 April 1925.
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Belfast's sixteen seats, while overall they were reduced 
from forty to thirty-two seats in the new Parliament. 
Thanks to proportional representation, ten Nationalists 
were elected to the assembly, along with four Independent 
Unionists, two anti-Treaty Sinn Fein candidates, and one 
tenant farmers' representative.65
Of these groups, the election of all three Labour 
candidates has been judged the 'most striking result' of 
the 1925 election, not least because it 'steeled' Craig 
in his determination to 'abolish PR once and for all.' 
Proportional representation served to accentuate 
differences within the Unionist community, and the 
party's leadership feared that the 1925 election might 
herald the beginning of the end of the Unionist 
alliance.66 Without the sectarian threat, the allegiance 
of Protestant working-class voters to the Unionist Party 
could not be taken for granted, which is what observers 
at the time predicted would happen once partition was 
taken out of Irish politics.67
Northern Ireland's Labour Party was not in any sense 
'anti-partitionist'. But as party leader Sam Kyle later 
explained, what mattered to his followers was 'housing, 
wages, unemployment insurance, national health insurance, 
old-age pensions, [and] education.' Comparatively
65Follis, State Under Siege. Appendix 2, p. 198-200.
66Farrell, Orange State, p. 103-104. Phoenix, Northern
Nationalism, p. 321.
67'Events of the Week', The Nation, 11 April 1925.
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speaking, the boundary was not 'a matter of very much 
importance'.68 The point here is, by the time elections 
were next held for Northern Ireland's Parliament, PR was 
abolished with telling results. In the 1929 election, 
only one Labour MP managed to hold onto his seat. Craig 
had learned his lesson well. Sectarian politics kept him 
in power and he would resort to it to the end.69
At the same time, Craig recognised that sectarian 
politics had its limits, and that his government had to 
appear more responsive to rank and file Unionist 
concerns. During a tour at the height of the 1925 
campaign, he vowed that so long as he was prime minister 
the 'B' Specials would not be disbanded. As well as 
reassuring Unionists over the boundary dispute, his 
promise appealed to the mass of Protestants who were 
associated most closely with this branch of the 
Constabulary.70 Behind the scenes, meanwhile, Craig 
redoubled his efforts to persuade London to amalgamate 
the Ulster and British unemployment insurance funds.
Solving Northern Ireland's financial crisis 
However much Unionists might claim that Ulster was 
'not financially dependent upon Great Britain', its drain 
on the British Treasury was impossible to ignore by 1925.
68NI HC Deb. Vol. 6, Col. 1115-1116, 7 September 1925.
69Morgan, Labour and Partition, p. 323. P. Buckland, 
James Craig: Lord Craiaavon (Dublin, 1980), p. 97. Laffan,
Partition of Ireland, p. 107-108.
70'„The Proper Border"', Irish Independent. 27 March
1925.
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It was 'obvious', one journal reported, 'that the 
Government of Northern Ireland is really living on the 
charity of England, and giving very little but trouble in 
return'.71
Northern Ireland's economic problems were deep- 
seated and reached to the creation of the state itself.
As far as possible the Ulster Unionists had modelled 
their six-county state after its British parent. But as 
Churchill noted, when it came to the provision of social 
services this model could properly function only if it 
was based on a 'sufficiently large area and large numbers 
of trades'.72 Even in the best of times, this could not 
be said of Northern Ireland. Hence, it was unrealistic 
to expect that social services provided in the six 
counties would ever be on a par with those offered 
elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
Nor could they be, if Craig and his colleagues were 
to stay within the bounds of the Colwyn awards.73 In its 
second report, delivered in December 1924, the Colwyn 
panel held that the imperial contribution should be 
determined only after Northern Ireland's government had 
paid for 'actual and necessary expenditure'. However, 
Belfast could not count any government service as
71See, e.g, 'Imperial Ulster', undated, DFA, Box 4,
37/D, which also contains other pamphlets presenting the 
Unionist case for partition. 'Events of the Week', The
Nation. 4 April 1925.




'necessary' if it did not exist in the rest of the United 
Kingdom, or if the service provided was of 'a higher 
average standard than exists in Great Britain'. On this 
second point, it further held that this 'average 
standard' rule would be broken if Ulster officials did 
not take into account Northern Ireland's lower cost of 
living. Because of this difference in the cost of 
living, disparities between social services provided in 
the two parts of the United Kingdom were bound to 
occur.74
Given the choice between staying within the bounds 
of the Colwyn rules or mollifying working-class 
Protestants, Craig and his colleagues decided to break 
the rules. As Ulster's Minister of Labour John Andrews 
warned Hugh Pollock, 'the political future of Northern 
Ireland [would] be seriously endangered' if rank and file 
Unionists ever concluded that they were not receiving the 
same benefits as their British counterparts.75 While 
these disaffected Unionists had no desire to join the 
Free State, once they became disillusioned with Belfast 
rule they might combine with Nationalists to support re­
integration into the United Kingdom. That would put 
Unionists back where they were before 1920 - forever at 
the mercy of British governments which might one day do a 
deal with Dublin over their heads.
74Cmd. 2389. p. 4. Lawrence, Northern Ireland, p. 43-
48.
75Andrews to Pollock, 21 June 1924, quoted in Foilis,
State Under Siege, p. 147.
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The only way out, Craig and his colleagues decided, 
was re-integration with Britain's social services 
beginning with unemployment insurance. Yet, even here 
there was a price to be paid. In effect, the Northern 
Ireland government had decided to destroy the 1920 
Government of Ireland Act in order to save it. As Sir 
John Anderson pointed out to a colleague in the British 
Ministry of Labour, amalgamation was 'an admission that 
the scheme of devolution provided for in that Act is 
unworkable./76
Re-amalgamation
On becoming chancellor of the exchequer, Churchill 
had resisted pleas to bail out Northern Ireland's 
unemployment insurance fund, reasoning that the 
province's reduced imperial contribution made any 
additional help unnecessary.77 The Treasury was not 
alone in opposing amalgamation of the unemployment funds. 
Although Craig might have expected the support of Cabinet 
Die-hards, Joynson-Hicks scolded the Unionists for 
wanting 'to be relieved of the consequences of self- 
government in so far as those consequences may be to 
their disadvantage.' Worse, this request was not 
intended to cover a special emergency. Rather, it was 'a 
claim for continuous assistance' and if used to bail out 
the unemployment insurance programme could be applied to
76Anderson to Wilson, 17 December 1924, HO 45/13743/6.
77Churchill to Niemeyer, 15 November 1924, T
160/131/F.4855/02/1.
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any of the other services for which the Belfast 
government had been made responsible.78
Craig, it seems, forced matters by making 
amalgamation an issue in the Northern Ireland 
elections.79 Writing to Churchill the day after he 
dissolved Parliament, he maintained that his supporters 
'never would have consented to accept self-government' in 
1920 had there been any suggestion but that 'living in 
Ulster was to be on a parallel with Great Britain'. For 
added emphasis, he resorted to his tried and true threat 
of resignation if these 'very definite pledges' were not 
carried through.80 Whatever caused the shift, in late 
March Baldwin's Cabinet reversed itself and decided that 
'on the grounds of equity' Britain should directly assist 
Northern Ireland in its 'difficulties' with the 
unemployment insurance fund.81
The problem was how. In the Cabinet committee set 
up to examine the issue, both Churchill and Lord Cave, 
the committee's chairman, swung behind Craig's plea for 
re-amalgamation.82 Otherwise, Churchill later explained 
to Tom Jones, Ulster's voters might begin to question the
78C.P. 53(25), 2 February 1925, T 160/187/F.7136/3.
79C.P. 167(25), 17 March 1925, CAB 27/279.
8°Craig to Churchill, 11 March 1925, T
160/187/F.7136/4.
81C. 17(25), 20 March 1925, CAB 23/49.
82Churchill to Steel-Maitland, 13 March 1925, T 
160/187/F.7136/4. 'Ulster Unemployment Insurance', 25 May 
1925, T 160/187/F.7136/2.
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wisdom of partition thus putting 'Ulster at the mercy of 
the Free State.783
Steel-Maitland, however, still opposed the idea 
precisely because it meant 'a complete reversion to the 
position prior to the Government of Ireland Act7.84 Even 
if the Free Staters did not object, the government might 
face a revolt from its own backbenchers who, despite 
economic hardship throughout Britain, were being told 
that prudence required continuing reductions in 
government spending. Yet, here was Baldwin7s Cabinet 
toying with an open-ended commitment far greater than the 
annual grants for Ulster7s Special Constabulary which had 
caused so much resentment when Parliament last debated 
that issue in February.85
The issue was again raised in Cabinet at the end of 
May, when a sub-committee of civil servants under the 
chairmanship of Sir John Anderson was appointed to 
examine the practical problems of amalgamation. For the 
first time, apparently, the Cabinet was warned that what 
they were doing was a 'departure from the spirit, if not 
the terms, of the [Irish] Treaty7. But 'the Cabinet did 
not accept this view7.86 One member was not so coy. In
83Jones diary, 17 May 1925, Vol. I. p. 316.
84C.P. 167(25), 17 March 1925, CAB 27/279.
85'Ulster Unemployment Insurance7; and Niemeyer to 
Bowers, both dated 25 May 1925, T 160/187/F.7136/2.
86C. 27(25), 28 May 1925, CAB 23/50. This last remark 
was struck from the minutes and replaced by a far more 
ambiguous explanation: '... the Cabinet did not feel that 
the consideration of this aspect of the matter would be
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arguing for amalgamation, Churchill conceded that such a 
scheme involved a 'substantial modification' of the 1920 
Government of Ireland Act; he even accepted that once 
word of the plan was made public it 'would be resented by 
the Irish Free State'. But this would be a good thing, 
he declared, if it gave the southern Irish 'an object 
lesson in the value of the British connection.'87
In mid-July, however, Anderson's sub-committee 
decided that full amalgamation of the two unemployment 
funds was impossible without raising 'difficult questions 
as to the constitutional relationships between Great 
Britain, Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State'. The 
problem was that the Treaty prevented any British 
government from extending the powers of Northern Ireland 
as this 'would be a blow to the cause of reuniting the 
country and a clear violation of the spirit of the 
Treaty'. By the same token, Dublin could object that any 
'diminution' of the powers and responsibilities of 
Northern Ireland's government was also a violation of the 
Treaty if it led to 'the ultimate re-inclusion of 
Northern Ireland in the political system of Great 
Britain'. Anderson and his colleagues could not be sure 
if Cosgrave's government would make such a claim, but 
they deemed it 'in the highest degree undesirable' that 
'the issue should ever be raised.'88
prejudiced by the proposed investigation'.
87N .I•U • (25) - 2nd, 26 May 1925, CAB 27/279.
88N .I.U . (25) 4, 15 July 1925, CAB 27/279.
Instead, the sub-committee proposed a complicated 
're-insurance scheme', and this became the basis of the 
1926 Unemployment Insurance Agreement. To stay within 
the letter, if not the spirit, of the Irish Treaty the 
British and Ulster unemployment insurance funds remained 
technically separate. To guarantee that the benefits 
offered by both funds would be the same, the Northern 
Ireland government agreed to contribute a yearly 
'equalization payment' to its own unemployment fund. If, 
after this payment was made, the Ulster fund was still 
short of the amount needed to offer benefits equal to 
those given to British workers, the Treasury in London 
would provide up to three-fourths of the additional 
amount needed. In addition, Craig's government had to 
accept sole responsibility for paying off the deficit 
already incurred by the Northern Ireland fund - £3.6 
million, a staggering sum when it is realised that the 
Ulster government's entire budget amounted to just over 
£5 million.89
Not surprisingly, the Ulster Unionists were less 
than happy with this arrangement. The charges involved 
'a much heavier depletion of our finances than can be 
contemplated', Spender told Anderson, and meant that in 
other areas of social spending standards in Northern 
Ireland would be 'debased by comparison with Great
89Cmd. 2588: Unemployment Insurance (Northern Ireland 
Agreements: Memorandum Explaining Financial Resolution
(London, 1926), xxii, 115, p. 3-4. Lawrence, Northern 
Ireland, p. 50-52.
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Britain.'90 But in the circumstances, this was the best 
they were going to get. Although the re-insurance scheme 
was approved by the British Cabinet on 7 August, Baldwin 
was in no hurry to put the matter before the House of 
Commons where it was 'certain to be most 
controversial.'91 Elaborate measures were taken to 
'shorten Parliamentary discussion' of the proposed 
legislation, and it was not until the following March 
that the agreement became law.92 In the interim, Baldwin 
and his colleagues had plenty of other Irish problems to 
keep them occupied.
The Boundary Commission hearings
While Craig was busy re-negotiating Northern 
Ireland's financial relations with the British 
government, the Boundary Commission had been taking 
evidence in the border counties. Beginning again in 
Armagh, the Commission held its first hearing on 3 March; 
its last sitting took place in Omagh, County Tyrone on 2 
July.93 To expedite the hearings, those giving evidence 
were cross-examined by the Commissioners themselves. The 
Commission also decided to bar newspaper coverage of its 
sessions and, instead, issued statements 'from time to
9°Spender to Anderson, ? July 1925, HO 267/174.
91C. 44(25), 7 August 1925, CAB 23/50. Upcott to
Newsam, 19 November 1925, HO 45/13743/22.
92'Northern Ireland Unemployment Insurance', Upcott 
memorandum, 28 October 1925, T 160/187/F.7136/5. C. 
51(25), same date, CAB 23/51.
93For the panel's itinerary, see 'Index to Dates and 
Conferences', D/T, S 1801/P.
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time'. The consequences of this last decision were far- 
reaching, once it was learned that the Commission did not 
propose to say publicly how it was interpreting the 
powers given to it by Article 12. In an atmosphere thick 
with rumour it proved to be the Commission's undoing.94
There are several accounts of the Boundary 
Commission's hearings and only a brief summary is 
necessary here.95 Initially, things seemed to go well 
for the Northern Nationalists. Their witnesses in County 
Down, for example, were 'splendidly organised', so that 
by the end of the hearings E.M. Stephens was confident 
that Newry 'had been won for the Free State.'96 In fact, 
Stephens had earlier reported to Dublin, 'hopes of the 
Free State supporters were rising'. He also found it 
encouraging that prominent Unionists such as Sir Basil 
Brooke had come round to accepting the fact that the 
Commission's award 'would be binding, and would probably 
be upheld by the British Government'.97
By the time the Commission finished taking evidence
94Hand, Report. p. 14-15. Commission Minutes No. 1, 6 
November 1924, CAB 61/1. Bourdillon to O'Hegarty, 2 
February 1925, D/T, S 1801/L. 'The Boundary Commission. 
Armagh City's Claim for Transfer', Tyrone Constitution. 13 
March 1925.
95See, e.g., Hand, 'MacNeill', p. 236-246. Phoenix, 
Northern Nationalism, p. 316-317, 322-328.
96Hand, 'MacNeill', p. 237. At the same time, though,
Feetham observed that the present border of 'Carlingford 
Lough might be regarded as a good natural boundary', not a 
good sign for the Nationalists.
97Stephens to 0'Higgins, 19 February 1925, D/T, S
1801/L.
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in Londonderry, Stephens was far less confident.
'[J]udging by the nature of the questions asked', he felt 
that 'the chairman was adopting a view adverse to the 
Nationalist claim.' In one exchange, Feetham suggested 
that transferring Derry to the Free State would be a 
'serious surgical operation', clearly implying that he 
was reluctant 'to make any change' in the status quo. On 
the other hand, Stephens reported that Londonderry's 
Unionists 'were becoming very anxious as to the fate of 
the city'.98
They need not have worried. By mid-summer, Fisher 
was able to report to Lady Reid: 'All is going smoothly, 
and the more extravagant claims have been practically 
wiped out. It will now be a matter of border townlands 
for the most part, and no great mischief will be done if 
it is worked out on "fair give and take" lines'.99
While Fisher's reports were being read with relief 
in Belfast, neither Dublin nor London had any real idea 
of what was going on. Like the Ulster Unionists,
Baldwin's government had declined to give evidence to the 
Commission and had kept contact with the tribunal to a 
minimum.100 While Free State ministers at least received 
regular reports from the Boundary Bureau, their British 
opposites seem to have known next to nothing about the
98Stephens to O'Higgins, 22 May 1925, D/T, S 1801/M.
"Ervine, Craiaavon. p. 499-500.




That changed in early June when the Commission 
suggested to both governments that a 'reasonable 
interval' should take place between the announcement of 
their award and its actual implementation.101 In the 
event, the Commission's suggestion was immediately 
quashed by Dublin. So far as the Free Staters were 
concerned, once the award was announced, this new 
demarcation would become 'automatically the boundary 
between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland'. 
Bourdillon was then informed that Baldwin's government 
concurred with this view.102
But in raising the issue the Commission forced both 
governments to realise that an administrative nightmare 
loomed ahead. This set in motion a series of meetings 
between Free State and British officials to discuss 
implementation of the award.103 Although designed to 
cover purely 'technical details', Craig's government 
refused to have anything to do with these discussions.
At the same time, Northern Ireland's attorney-general 
informed the Belfast Parliament that no Boundary 
Commission award could be implemented until it was
101Bourdillon to O'Hegarty, 8 June 1925, CAB 61/17. 
Bourdillon to Hankey, same date, CO 537/1072. 'Irish 
Boundary Commission: Memorandum', same date, D/T, S 1801/N.
1C20'Hegarty to Bourdillon, 27 July 1925, CAB 61/17. 
Hankey to Bourdillon, 29 July 1925, D/T, S 1801/N.
103See, e.g., Amery to Timothy Healy, 19 June 1925, CO 
537/1072. Minutes of a meeting held at the Dominions 
Office, 28 July 1925, HO 45/12296/75(b).
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sanctioned by the Imperial Parliament in London.104 
Craig and his colleagues obviously hoped that the 
Conservative majority in the House of Commons would be 
their last line of defence should the Commission surprise 
them with a large territorial transfer.
Fears that the Ulster Unionists might indeed be in 
for a nasty surprise intensified when, in late August, 
the Sunday Express reported that the Commission would 
hand over 'considerable territory' to the Free State.105 
The article sparked two months of fevered, and often 
contradictory, speculation in newspapers on both sides of 
the Irish Sea.106 One newspaper reported that leave had 
been cancelled for all Free State soldiers; another said 
that the British Army had established an outpost deep 
within County Fermanagh, indicating that a large part of 
the county was about to be ceded to the Free State.
Donegal Nationalists were warned that a part of their 
county was about to be handed over to Northern Ireland. 
Unionists were told that South Armagh and parts of South 
Down were to be transferred to the Free State. Appeals 
were made for another conference of the two Irish 
governments. Ministers in Belfast warned that 'not one 
inch of Northern territory would be transferred ...
104Buckland to Tallents? and Tallents to Buckland [two 
letters], 20, 21, 22 July 1925, HO 267/214.
105'New Border Puzzles in Ireland', Sunday Express. 23 
August 1925.
106For a running account of these reports, see 'Index 
to Dates and Conferences', August-October 1925, D/T, S 
1801/P.
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without the sanction of the people of Ulster.'
Throughout, the prime minister of Northern Ireland 
maintained a stony silence.107
Craig's refusal, either in public or in private, to 
'commit himself in any way', left his friends in London 
in a 'politically impossible' position. Both Amery and 
Joynson-Hicks were inclined to give Craig prior notice of 
the Boundary Commission's award. Otherwise, the 
government would be open to charges from its own 
supporters that they had treated their Ulster friends as 
cavalierly as had Lloyd George during the Treaty 
negotiations. Their senior advisers, however, pointed 
out that speed was essential if the award was to be 
implemented with a minimum of trouble. For this reason, 
they adamantly opposed giving Belfast any prior notice as 
details of the award would 'certainly leak out' once in 
Craig's hands.108
Tom Jones also spotted the danger. 'Once you begin 
to discuss', he warned Baldwin, 'you are in the Irish bog 
again.'109 Jones felt that the Boundary Commission's 
award should be implemented as soon as it was issued, and 
he pressed Baldwin to use his 'personal courage' to force 
this view on the Cabinet. But he failed. 'I could not
107Ibid, 27 August, 1, 14, 21, 22 September 1925. NI 
HC Deb. Vol. 6, Col. 1117-1118, 7 September 1925.
108C.P. 445(25), 26 October 1925, CAB 24/175. Amery
diary, 22 October 1925, p. 424,.
109Jones to Baldwin [memorandum excerpt], 28 October
1925, Vol. Ill, p. 236.
392
do right off what you wanted about Ireland', the prime 
minister told his assistant secretary. 'The moment the 
subject was mentioned at the Cabinet they all got 
excited; Salisbury and Jix were bursting their buttons 
with eagerness to talk'. The Cabinet meeting became 
fractious as its members were 'plunged into the regular 
Irish atmosphere'. Everyone was 'talking excitedly and 
most of them irrelevantly.'110 To soothe nerves, Baldwin 
offered to see the Boundary Commission chairman on his 
own and soon after put out feelers for a private meeting. 
But Feetham, mindful of the agreement with his colleagues 
not to discuss their deliberations with anyone else, 
could not be drawn. In any event, by the time Baldwin 
informed the Cabinet that no meeting had taken place, 
events had already taken a dramatic, and very public, 
turn.111
Feetham's memorandum on Article 12 
After its last hearing in County Tyrone in early 
July, the Boundary Commission continued its work in near 
total isolation for the better part of four months. Only 
a two-day hearing with Free State lawyers in late August 
interrupted their labours.112 Shortly afterward, on 11 
September, Feetham circulated a memorandum to his fellow
110Ibid, 29 [ ? ] October 1925, p. 236. 'Jix' was a 
nickname for Joynson-Hicks. Amery diary, 28 October 1925, 
p. 424.
1;L1Waterhouse to Baldwin, 31 October 1925, SB Vol. 99,
ff. 235-237. C. 52(25), 11 November 1925, CAB 23/51.
112Hand, Reportr p. 13-14? and Appendix IV, p. 55-72.
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Commissioners outlining his interpretation of Article 12. 
On this foundation, the Boundary Commission's report 
would stand.113
From Article 12's 'maddeningly few words', Feetham 
drew a 'wealth of meaning'.114 As he had hinted to Free 
State lawyers the previous December, the Commission's 
chairman would not consider wholesale changes of the 
border, nor would he countenance a transfer of territory 
where there was 'no sufficient reason' for doing so.115
Under the criteria laid down by Feetham, providing a 
sufficient reason would be no small task. First, the 
South African judge threw out the idea that the 
Commission's main task was to draw a boundary 'in 
accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants'. These 
wishes were a 'primary consideration', but they were not 
'paramount'. A 'substantial majority' must desire 
change, a term he vaguely defined, and which became 
vaguer still when he added that the greater the change 
demanded 'the higher the percentage of inhabitants ... 
should be required to justify it.' Even then, the 
Commission had a 'duty' to 'overrule' those wishes if 
they might cause 'economic or geographic 
inconvenience' .116
113Ibid, 'Chairman's memorandum', p. 32-68. Also, see 
Chapter III, p. 25-32, of the report.
114Ibid, p. xiii.
115Ibid, 'Chairman's memorandum', p. 52.
116Ibid, p. 49, 52-55.
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Feetham reiterated his opposition to the holding of 
plebiscites, arguing that as the word did not appear in 
Article 12 'it was not the intention of the parties to 
the Treaty that the Commission should ascertain the 
wishes of the inhabitants in that manner.' Instead, the 
Commission should rely on the returns of the 1911 Census, 
assuming that Protestants would desire to live in 
Northern Ireland, while Roman Catholics would desire to 
live in the Free State. He then rejected applying these 
figures to whole counties or poor law unions and, 
instead, opted for 'the smallest area' which could be 
regarded separately in any given place.117 Finally, he 
held that the Commission was fully within its rights to 
transfer portions of the Free State to Northern Ireland, 
as well as the other way round.118
In effect, Feetham claimed that the Commission had 
been handed a blank cheque, allowing it to do pretty much 
as it pleased, even if this meant that the criteria used 
to determine the boundary in one area contradicted the 
reasons used to determine it in another. Or, as Feetham 
himself wrote, it was 'impossible I think to lay down any 
precise rule as to the requirements which must be 
fulfilled in the case of individual areas'.119
The sight of this memorandum ought to have shaken 
MacNeill to his bones. If this was to be the basis for
117Ibid, p. 59-60, 61-64.
118Ibid, p. 36-37, 40.
119Ibid, p. 51.
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the Commission's findings, it was obvious that the award 
would be disastrous for the Free State. Surely, MacNeill 
did not need to be, as he later put it, 'a better 
politician ..., if you like a better strategist' to see 
that.120 If ever there was a time for him to signal to 
Feetham and Fisher that he could not possibly be a party 
to a report based on these assumptions, this would have 
been the time to do so.
Given the course of later events, MacNeill's action, 
or inaction, bears consideration. According to the Free 
State's Commissioner, there were 'profound differences 
... between the chairman and myself as to the fundamental 
principles upon which an award ought to proceed'.
MacNeill claimed that early on he realised that Feetham 
had 'imported' a new 'dominant condition' into the 
Commission's mandate: namely, that Northern Ireland must 
be preserved as a separate political entity even if this 
meant that the tribunal must 'override the wishes of the 
inhabitants.' Nor was there 'consistent application' of 
the Commission's principles. Feetham had made it 
possible 'in one part of our award, for us to make 
economic considerations dominant and, in another place, 
to make the wishes of the inhabitants dominant.'121
Nevertheless, there is scant evidence that MacNeill
12°Dail Deb. Vol. 13, Col. 802, 24 November 1925.
121Ibid, Col. 799-801. MacNeill returned to this 
complaint throughout his 24 November speech.
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raised these objections with either of his colleagues.122 
When the crisis later forced him to resign not only from 
the tribunal but from Cosgrave's government as well, 
MacNeill blamed his inaction on the fact that he was, in 
effect, a part-time Commissioner. Throughout the 
tribunal's deliberations, he had continued to work as the 
Free State's minister of education. Juggling these twin 
roles, he maintained, made it impossible for him to see 
what was happening until it was too late. 'The details 
came before us in a very gradual and a very piecemeal 
manner'. Only over time did he come to the 'conclusion 
that when those parts of the award were put together ... 
it would not be possible for me to defend them'.123
This defence is hard to square with the fact that 
MacNeill had to know where Feetham was headed once he 
read the September memorandum. When Feetham submitted 
these views to his colleagues, he specifically 'stated 
that he did not wish to invite written replies'.
MacNeill, however, did respond - but not with a wide- 
ranging critique like the one in his 24 November speech. 
Instead, he only questioned the Commission's right to 
transfer territory from the Free State to Northern 
Ireland (and concluded that it could not).124
A vital opportunity was lost. Because MacNeill 
raised no serious objections to Feetham's memorandum, the
122Hand, 'MacNeill', p. 248.
123Dail Deb. Vol. 13, 24 November 1925, Col. 802-803.
124Hand, Report. p. 32.
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Boundary Commission chairman, and Fisher too, assumed 
that their Free State colleague accepted these 
guidelines. Given that MacNeill did not resign from the 
Commission until 20 November, both men were justified in 
later telling the press that his decision 'came as a 
complete surprise'.125 In any event, during a series of 
meetings held in mid-October, the three men gave final 
shape to their award.126 In sum, 31,319 people and 
183,290 acres were transferred to the Free State; 7,594 
people and 49,242 acres were transferred to Northern 
Ireland. Dublin gained more people and territory - 
23,725 people, and 134,048 acres - than Belfast. The 
boundary itself was shortened by 51 miles.127
Fisher was elated. 'I am well satisfied with the 
result', he wrote to Carson the following day, which 
would
not shift a stone or a tile of your enduring work 
for Ulster. It will remain a solid and close-knit 
unit with five counties intact and the sixth some­
what trimmed on the outer edge ...
No centre of even secondary importance goes 
over, and with Derry, Strabane, Enniskillen, 
Newtownbutler, Keady and Newry in safe keeping your 
handiwork will endure.
If anybody had suggested twelve months ago 
that we could have kept so much I would have 
laughed at him ... .
On the balance the number of Protestants in
125MacNeill guoted their statement in Pail Deb. Vol. 13, 
Col. 797-798, 24 November 1925.
126Ibid. Hand, 'MacNeill', p. 248. Commission Minutes,
Nos. 20-24, 13-17 October 1925, CAB 61/1, though, provide 
no details.
127C. 55(25), 30 November 1925, CAB 23/51. Hand,
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Ulster has been increased - the number of R.C's 
materially decreased: - which will put an end to 
certain political difficulties in Tyrone and 
Fermanagh. .. .128
In this same letter, Fisher told Carson that another six
weeks would elapse before the Boundary Commission's award
would be ready for publication. He also let slip that he
had told at least one other person about the report.
Fisher had been indiscreet, and it was to cost him and
Feetham their triumph.
The Morning Post report 
On 6 November Bourdillon informed Hankey that the 
Boundary Commission soon would be ready to issue its 
report and that the imperial and Irish governments should 
waste no time in making arrangements to put the award 
into effect.129 Before these private arrangements could 
get off the ground, both governments were rocked by the 
Morning Post's dramatic publication of a forecast of the 
Commission's award. The tone of the article is best 
demonstrated by its comparison of Unionist gains in 
County Donegal, which would be 'of great commercial 
assistance', to Free State gains in County Armagh which, 
at best, was 'wild and very beautiful country'. In other 
words, the Ulster Unionists had lost nothing of value. 
Armagh's 'principal towns ... including the much 
discussed Newry' would remain under Belfast's
128Fisher to Carson, 18 October 1925, Carson Papers,
D.1507/A/44/52•
129Bourdillon to Hankey, 6 November 1925, HO
45/12296/88.
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jurisdiction. But what was striking about this report 
was the precision of the map that accompanied it.130
Without warning, this single newspaper report had 
put 'the fat in the fire'.131
It is all but certain that Fisher was the source for 
the Post report.132 What is not in doubt is that the 
article left Cosgrave's government dangerously exposed. 
'[N]ot since partition was introduced', commented one 
pro-government newspaper, 'has feeling run so high.' 
Although Boundary Bureau representatives did their best 
to play down the forecast, J.H. Collins reported that 
Free State supporters in the North 'were very angry.'133
On Thursday, the 19th, MacNeill returned to London 
and, the following afternoon, stunned Feetham and Fisher 
by resigning from the Commission. How MacNeill came to 
this decision is not entirely clear. It seems that he, 
along with other members of the Irish Cabinet, thought 
that this would make it impossible for the Boundary 
Commission to issue its award and thus the Free Staters
13°The article is reproduced in J.H. Andrews, 'The 
"Morning Post" Line', Irish Geography. Vol. IV, No. 2, 
1960, p. 99-106.
131'Episodes of the Month', National Journal r January 
1926, p. 675. Baldwin later blamed the report for having 
'precipitated a crisis'. See 'Irish Bill. Debate in the 
Commons', The Times. 9 December 1925.
132Mansergh, Unresolved Question, p. 236.
133Hand, 'MacNeill', p. 254. Collins to Stephens, 13 
November 1925, J.H. Collins Papers, D.921/2/4/121.
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would steer clear of disaster.134 Instead, Bourdillon 
informed the Free State government that as far as the two 
remaining Commissioners were concerned, MacNeill's 
resignation was not 'valid or effectual'. More 
worrisome, from Dublin's standpoint, the Commission had 
'continued its labours' and would soon 'be in a position 
to deliver the Award.'135
This is the likely reason for Cosgrave's hastily- 
arranged meeting with Baldwin on the 26th. At a 
conference which also included Chamberlain, Joynson- 
Hicks, Amery, and Tom Jones, the Free State's president 
warned of dangers, including 'a danger of bloodshed', if 
the Commission's award was implemented. It was obvious, 
Chamberlain later observed, that Cosgrave, though 
'anxious for peace', did not 'know how to deal with the 
situation'. At the very least, he faced an imminent 
revolt within his own party. If de Valera took Sinn 
Fein's abstentionist TDs into Dail Eireann, Cosgrave 
would find himself 'in a tight corner.' Worse, though 
the Free State president may not have known it, elements 
within the Irish Army had decided that they would resist 
any transfer of Free State territory to the North.136
134Hand, 'MacNeill', p. 254-259. Commission Minutes No. 
28, 20 November 1925, CAB 61/1.
135Ibid, Commission Minutes, No. 35, 28 November 1925. 
Bourdillon to O'Hegarty [two letters], 24 November 1925, 
CAB 61/17.
136I.A. (25)-3rd Minutes, 26 November 1925, CAB 27/295. 
Jones diary, 25 [sic] November 1925, Vol. Ill, p. 237. 
Farrell, Arming the Protestants. p. 247, 357, n. 47.
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Despite what was obviously a serious situation, 
Cosgrave's suggestion that 'the Boundary Commission 
should not issue their award either now or at any time' 
was coldly rebuffed. Austen Chamberlain, in particular, 
gave vent to his feelings. 'I took great risks' for the 
Treaty he told Cosgrave, far understating the price he 
had paid. Less candidly, he claimed that the Tories had 
been prepared to 'impose' the Commission's award on 
Craig's government 'whatever it might be'. If Cosgrave 
was looking for a way out of a dilemma created by his own 
demands, he would have to turn to Craig for a solution, 
Chamberlain told him. '[W]e cannot offer it.'137
Baldwin was equally unyielding. All three 
governments wanted peace, he pointed out. But the Free 
Staters had to remember that they had forced the British 
to impose the Boundary Commission on their Northern Irish 
allies. Then, Baldwin went in for the kill. 'If this 
unhappy disclosure had not been made [i.e., The Morning 
Post forecast], and had the report been favourable to 
you, you would have expected us to impose it on Ulster.'
'Yes', Cosgrave replied.
'It might have been such as to lead to Civil War', 
Baldwin observed. Now, however, the southern Irish 
expected the Boundary Commission's award to be quashed 
simply because it gave them less than they expected. No, 
no this was not good enough. 'We cannot compel Ulster in
137CA/H/48-lst Minutes, 26 November 1925, CAB 27/295.
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any direction', Baldwin told Cosgrave.138 The British 
government could not 'deprive Ulster of the benefit of a 
decision by the Commission because it proved more 
favourable to Ulster than the Free State had 
expected.'139 The best that the British prime minister 
was willing to promise was that he would ask Craig to 
meet with Cosgrave that afternoon. Perhaps a deal could 
be worked out between the two Irish leaders.
Birkenhead, for one, was not 'sanguine' about the 
prospects for such a meeting. 'It seems to me', he wrote 
that morning, 'that the differences which sunder Moslems 
from Hindus are not as bitter or as unbridgeable as those 
which divide Orangemen from the rest of Ireland.'140
The crisis widens 
As the boundary crisis edged to its climax Craig, at 
some point in mid-November, decided that the moment had 
arrived for him to become directly involved in the 
boundary negotiations. As he told his wife: 'All that 
matters in regard to Ulster's future is at stake, 
(financial), and I well know that if I left here, 
decisions would be come to behind my back, as on the 
famous occasion of the Treaty'. That, he vowed, would 
not happen again.141
138Ibid.
139I.A. (25)-3rd Minutes, 26 November 1925, CAB 27/295.
14°Birkenhead to Reading, 26 November 1925, 10, MSS Eur.
E. 238/8, No. 17.
141Lady Craig's diary, 23 November 1925, D.1415/B/38.
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This might have been the beginning of what Craig saw 
as a golden opportunity to get rid of more problems than 
just the Boundary Commission.142 Earlier in the month, 
he had intimated to Joynson-Hicks that he might be 
prepared to accept the Commission's award. The offer was 
only good, though, if financial compensation was provided 
for any Unionist whose home or business was transferred 
out of Northern Ireland, and if the imperial government 
was willing to meet his funding demands for the 
Specials.143
Craig later detailed what he had in mind. First, he 
wanted Northern Ireland's imperial contribution suspended 
for the next two years followed by a further re­
adjustment of future payments. Next, he suggested 
creating a tribunal (to be chaired by Fisher, 
interestingly) to adjudicate claims for financial 
'compensation to Protestants' arising out of the 
Commission's award or for damages caused by its 
implementation. No such compensation would be offered to 
inhabitants transferred to the North against their will 
nor for any damages caused in areas transferred to the 
Free State. Craig estimated that the compensation 
package would cost £4 million - roughly equal, 
conveniently, to Northern Ireland's imperial contribution
142Sir John Anderson believed this was what Craig was
up to. See notes from a meeting of civil servants, ? 
November 1925, CO 537/1104/545043.
143Joynson-Hicks to Baldwin, with memorandum, 4 November
1924, SB Vol. 99, ff. 238-241.
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for the next two years. Separately, he called for 
abolition of the Council of Ireland.144
These 'claims are outrageous', Churchill told his 
Cabinet colleagues. As it was, the Treasury had already 
promised Ulster £650,000 for its unemployment fund, along 
with another £500,000 for the Special Constabulary.
'This last vote will be extremely unpopular in the House 
of Commons', Churchill pointed out, 'and I shall have to 
face a storm of abuse on account of it.' Craig's 
continuing demands, of which this 'astonishing document' 
was just the latest, could not go on. Perhaps, the 
chancellor of the exchequer suggested, it was time to 
'undeceive' Northern Ireland's prime minister.143
The dispute came to a head on the 26th, at a meeting 
of the Cabinet committee formed in the wake of the 
Morning Post report.146 Churchill poured cold water on 
Craig's proposals, suggesting instead that there were 
really only two solutions to the developing crisis. The 
lesser of the two was that the Commission's award should 
be implemented. It was not 'injurious to Ulster' and the 
Free Staters had no grounds for setting it aside. The 
other alternative, 'which would be preferable if it were
144I.A. (25)2 and 5, 16 and 23 November 1925, CAB
27/295. Churchill memorandum with proposed letter to 
Craig, 26 November 1925, WSC 22/55/21-22.
145Ibid, Churchill memorandum.
146The committee, chaired by Austen Chamberlain, 
included Churchill, Joynson-Hicks, Amery, Lords Salisbury 
and Birkenhead, Worthington-Evans, and Sir Douglas Hogg. 
See C. 52(25), 11 November 1925, CAB 23/51.
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practicable', was this: 'leave the Boundary question as 
it was for a term of say 25 years'. In the interim, the 
two Irish governments could 'endeavour to build up either 
in the[ir] Senate[s] or on the Council of Ireland some 
plan for joint action between the North and South where 
common interests were affected.'147
Craig would have nothing to do with this idea. More 
than that, he now declared that it would be 'impossible' 
for him to meet with Cosgrave on the boundary question, 
until the committee addressed his claims for compensation 
and suspension of the imperial contribution.
At this point, it seemed that tempers would flare. 
Churchill was incandescent, telling the committee that 
these demands 'clearly showed that the real aim was a 
general easement of Ulster finance.' He was no more 
willing to do that 'than he would be prepared to give up 
the financial advantages of Article 5 of the Treaty, 
though', he caustically added, 'he had no doubt that he 
would be invited to do' just that. Baldwin, who was 
sitting in on the meeting, at this point intervened. He, 
too, urged Craig to meet with Cosgrave. If, in the end, 
a financial concession would smooth the way to an 
agreement, Baldwin promised that he would shoulder 
responsibility for it. Only then did Ulster's leader 
agree to meet with his Free State counterpart.14®
147I.A. (25)-3rd Minutes, 26 November 1925, CAB 27/295.
148Ibid. Craig's demands were 'put in a form well 
calculated to upset Winston'. See Amery diary, 26 November 
1925, p. 428.
407
In the event, their encounter solved nothing. 
Cosgrave had hoped that in return for leaving the 
boundary in place, Craig might be persuaded to release a 
number of Nationalists being held captive by the North. 
Craig offered to release only thirty IRA prisoners held 
since 1922, leaving Cosgrave with no other choice but to 
return to Dublin to lay this offer before the Executive 
Council.149 There, it was given short shrift by 
O'Higgins. As he later told Craig and Baldwin, the offer 
would have caused the Irish government 'to fall at 
once'.150 That being the case, O'Higgins was dispatched 
to London to see what he might work out. Craig, 
meanwhile, was growing ever more confident. 'It is a 
delicate, tedious, and nervy job', he told his wife. But 
'I have a feeling in my bones that the present boundary 
will be allowed to stand ... if I can bring off "Not an 
Inch", I will be very pleased.' He predicted one more 
thing. Article 5, that part of the Treaty dealing with 
the Free State's debt to the British Treasury, would be 
'washed out' too.151
The significance of Article 5
Although Article 5 never sparked the same passions 
as Article 12, its potential consequences were nearly as 
significant. The two clauses were similar in that, like
149Farrell, Arming the Protestants. p. 248. Amery
diary, 26 November 1925, p. 428.
15°I.A . (25) 7, 29 November 1925, CAB 27/295.
151Lady Craig's diary, 27 November 1925, D.1415/B/38.
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Article 12, an independent tribunal was to determine the 
Free State's share of Britain's public debt after taking 
into account claims that Ireland had been over-taxed 
since the Act of Union. Ulster Unionists saw this as yet 
another attempt to coerce them into an all-Ireland 
government, because while their imperial contribution was 
to be fixed the South's was open to negotiation.152 
Craig scored one of his first successes against the 
Treaty when he won a commitment from the Coalition to 
lower Northern Ireland's imperial contribution should the 
Irish claims prove to be successful.153
Early on, both governments agreed to delay 
negotiations on Article 5 until the boundary question was 
settled. Free State officials argued that it was 
impossible to determine their financial liabilities so 
long as the extent of their jurisdiction over the island 
of Ireland was unresolved.154 However, periodic press 
complaints about Dublin's failure to come to the 'relief 
of the long-suffering British taxpayer' ensured that the 
issue never entirely went away.155
Because of such complaints, perhaps, in April 1925 
members of Baldwin's second government began to press for
152Mansergh, Unresolved Question, p. 192-193, 198-199.
153P .G . 1. 48, undated [? January 1922], CAB 27/154.
154See Churchill's statement to this effect in CA/H/48- 
2nd Minutes, 1 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
155See, e.g., 'Boundaries in Ireland', The Times. 8 May
1924. 'Ireland Today', Quarterly Review. No. 484, October 
1924, p. 362.
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a resolution of the claims by Article 5.156 Shortly 
thereafter, an outline of the British case was sent to 
Dublin, but at the end of November the Treasury was still 
waiting for a brief of the Irish counter-claims.157 By 
then, Cosgrave and his colleagues had every reason to be 
skittish about facing this issue. With the Boundary 
Commission crisis breaking over their heads, de Valera 
was broadening his attack on the Free State government.
If anyone was still foolish enough to believe in the 
Treaty, he declared in one interview, they would be 
finally disillusioned when 'that other commission 
provided for in the "Treaty” - the Financial Commission - 
is set up and comes to deliver its award.'158
This is where matters stood when O'Higgins, along 
with Free State Commerce Minister Patrick McGilligan and 
Attorney-General John O'Byrne, arrived at Chequers on the 
weekend of 28-29 November. From the outset, Baldwin made 
it clear that only three options were on the table: 
accept the Boundary Commission's report? accept the 
existing boundary? or attempt another boundary conference 
with Craig, though no one seemed enthusiastic about that 
idea. Personally, Baldwin confided to his guests, he 
could not 'see how even an angel could devise a boundary
156R. Fanning, The Irish Department of Finance: 1922-58 
(Dublin, 1978), p. 157.
157Niemeyer memorandum to Churchill, 30 November 1925, 
T 176/15.
158De Valera interview, 24 November 1925, FLK, de Valera 
Papers, File No. 347.
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which would be agreed'.159
O'Higgins replied that the Boundary Commission's 
award was unacceptable in any shape or form. As far as 
the Free Staters were concerned, the tribunal had taken 
the line of 'least resistance', influenced not by the 
wishes of the inhabitants but by 'the truculent 
utterances' of Craig's Cabinet. Newry was 'the acid 
test'. Any award leaving this Nationalist-dominated town 
within Belfast's jurisdiction was not worth having. 
Moreover, Britain had allowed the Commissioners to be 
'terrorised' by the Specials and for that reason it might 
be time to take the boundary question to the League of 
Nations.160 Nor, O'Higgins told the British prime 
minister, could the Free State government accept the 
offer Cosgrave had taken back to Dublin on Thursday. It 
was simple fantasy to suggest that the Irish president 
should tell Dail Eireann, 'We are very sorry but the old 
line shall stand and in return Sir James Craig will give 
up 24 prisoners.' The moment that happened, McGilligan 
added, Cosgrave and his colleagues would 'disappear 
politically' .161
It fell to Tom Jones to suggest a way out. During 
their Saturday discussions, 0'Higgins repeatedly raised 
the plight of Northern Nationalists, arguing that the 
abolition of proportional representation and electoral
1S9I.A . (25)-6, 28 November 1925, CAB 27/295.
16°I.A . (25)-7, 29 November 1925, CAB 27/295.
161I.A. (25)-6, 28 November 1925, CAB 27/295.
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redistricting had made them 'politically impotent' while 
they were 'kept down by an army of Special Constables 
paid and maintained by the British Government.' If,
Jones asked, the boundary was left untouched but, at the 
same time, the situation for Northern Nationalists was 
alleviated, could the Free Staters then 'ride the storm?'
0'Higgins believed they might. Such a settlement 
would benefit Nationalists living far from the border who 
never had any hope of 'rescue' by the Boundary 
Commission's award in any case. Their satisfaction 
'would be some set-off against the disappointment of 
people who had been hoping that the award would get them 
out' of Northern Ireland.162 At no time during the 
Saturday talks was Article 5 an issue.
Most of this ground was gone over again when, on 
Sunday, Craig joined the discussions. Though he accepted 
the Free Staters' analysis of the boundary dispute, 
Ulster's leader would give no ground on demands that 
Belfast get rid of the Specials, re-institute PR, and 
reapportion its electoral districts. 0'Higgins later 
quoted Craig as saying that 'he could not re-enact what 
he had repealed, nor repeal what he had enacted.'163
Only then did Article 5 emerge as a major element in 
the negotiations. According to Craig, the article came 
up during an after-lunch conversation between himself and 
the Free State vice president. As Baldwin later told the
162Ibid.
163CA/H/48-2nd Minutes, 1 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
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Cabinet, Craig was 'satisfied that what was at the bottom 
of the whole difficulty was Article 5 of the Irish Treaty 
... and if that could be waived altogether the Free State 
might ride the storm and stand on the present 
boundary.'164 This was shading the truth, because the 
Free Staters would have much preferred concessions for 
the Northern Nationalists. Only when it was plain that 
Craig was unwilling to budge on this issue did the 
southern Irish turn to Article 5 as a 'safety valve' to 
channel outrage over the impending deal.165
The idea of such a trade-off was not new.166 What 
may have made it attractive now was Craig's reputed offer 
to help the Free Staters against the British. While he 
was unwilling to 'surrender an inch of Northern 
territory', Craig promised 'to help you all I can to get 
as much as you can out of these fellows.'167 The result, 
according to Birkenhead, was 'a greater degree of 
cordiality between Southern and Northern Ireland than has 
ever existed', as the two Irish sides happily joined 
together 'in the task of plundering us.'168 However, 
Craig's backing came at a price: the Free Staters also
164C. 55(25), 30 November 1925, CAB 23/51.
165CA/H/48-2nd Minutes, 1 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
166See, e.g., 'Irish Boundary Commission. Free State and 
the Treaty', Morning Post. 14 September 1923.
167Ervine, Craiaavon. p. 502. 0'Byrne was the source
for this story.
168Birkenhead to Reading, 3 December 1925, 10, MSS Eur.
E. 238/8, No. 18.
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had to accept the abolition of the Council of Ireland.169
Whatever hopes remained for the Northern 
Nationalists began to fade once Cosgrave joined the 
negotiations on 1 December. Craig's promise to 'sift ... 
to the bottom' of any Nationalist complaints of 
maltreatment was, in the end, all that the Free Staters 
got for their Northern allies. O'Higgins again pressed 
for the restoration of proportional representation and 
was again rebuffed. 'I can't stick PR', Craig told him. 
'Does not seem to be British. Too Continental.' 
Astonishingly, Cosgrave agreed, saying that he, too, 
would like to get rid of proportional representation in 
the Free State.170
Even more astounding, Craig's willingness to discuss 
steps to make joint Free State-Northern Irish Cabinet 
meetings a formal part of the agreement was lost because 
Cosgrave 'foresaw great difficulties' with the idea. It 
has been said that the Irish president disliked the 
proposal because it would have been 'tantamount to 
recognition of the legitimacy of the Northern 
government.' But that is no explanation at all, because 
the Free Staters had recognized the Ulster government's 
equal status by entering into these negotiations.171 So 
it was that yet another opportunity to bring about what
169Jones diary, 29 November 1925, Vol. Ill, p. 242.
17°Ibid, 1 December 1925, p. 243-244.
171Mansergh, Unresolved Question. p. 238. Wall, 
'Partition', p. 89.
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Churchill now called 'unity in Ireland' was allowed to 
slip away.172
The grievances of Northern Nationalists were 
disposed of once and for all the next day, when Cosgrave 
accepted that Craig could not 'deliver the goods' on 
improving conditions for Northern Nationalists and, as 
Churchill put it, the 'only question remaining to be
discussed was that of finance.'173
Although Baldwin's government was just as anxious as the 
Free State to bury the Boundary Commission report, its 
concessions on Article 5 'were not so readily forthcoming 
as is generally supposed'.174 There was notable 
opposition to the idea when it was initially raised at a 
Cabinet meeting on 30 November. At most, Baldwin's 
colleagues were willing to agree to a moratorium on the 
Free State's assumption of its share of the imperial debt
until 1933, when Britain's repayment of war loans to the
United States was due to increase.175
At this same meeting, it was decided that Churchill,
172CA/H/48-4th Minutes, 1 December 1925, CAB 27/295. 
Not surprisingly, Craig began to back away from the idea 
when Churchill spoke of it in these terms.
173CA/H/48-5th Minutes, 2 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
174Birkenhead to Reading, 3 December 1925, 10, MSS Eur.
E. 238/8, NO. 18.
175C. 55(25), 30 November 1925, CAB 23/51. The American 
connection was pointed out to the Free Staters. Churchill 
may have hoped that the Irish would use their influence in 
Washington so that the United States might become 'less 
rigid' on the war debts issue. If so, he hinted, none too 
subtly, the British would be 'in a position to deal more 
generously' with the Free State. See CA/H/48-3rd Minutes, 
1 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
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Birkenhead, and Salisbury should be delegated to handle 
the discussions on Article 5. Initially, both Churchill 
and Salisbury were inclined to take a 'fairly stiff 
stand' on the matter, and this was the line the 
chancellor of the exchequer pursued when discussions 
resumed the next day.176 The British could not simply 
waive Article 5, Churchill told the Free Staters, not 
least because it would lead to demands 'to reduce or 
abolish the Northern Irish contribution', as well.177
What seemed to turn matters round was the strong 
impression made by Cosgrave when outlining his country's 
economic plight. In such circumstances, Birkenhead 
thought it was senseless to pursue payments which the 
Dublin government 'could not possibly hope to 
discharge.'178 If, as he argued at a meeting of British
officials, they now had the chance 'to round the corner'
on the Irish Question, the financial sacrifices involved 
in such an agreement would be well worth it.179 Despite 
objections from Salisbury, Birkenhead brought Churchill 
and, eventually, the entire Cabinet to the same 
conclusion. By the end of an urgently held meeting, 
Baldwin's associates agreed 'by a large majority' to the 
framework of the 1925 settlement.180
176I.A. (25) 9, 2 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
177CA/H/48-2nd Minutes, 1 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
178CA/H/48-6th Minutes, 2 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
179I.A. (25) 9, 2 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
18°C. 56(25), 2 December 1925, CAB 23/51.
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In essence, the agreement covered four points:
First, the boundary between the two parts of Ireland was 
to remain unchanged. Second, the cases of republican 
prisoners held by Northern Ireland would be reviewed by 
British officials and their decisions would be accepted 
by Craig. Third, the Council of Ireland was abolished 
and its powers relating to Northern Ireland were 
transferred to Belfast. Instead, both governments agreed 
to meet 'as and when necessary' to work together on 
matters of common interest. The British Cabinet was also 
told that Craig and the Free Staters had reached a 
'personal understanding' that would lead to 'more 
friendly co-operation' but, interestingly, 'this could 
not be put in writing.'181
Solving the financial question proved to be somewhat 
less straightforward, until Cosgrave mooted a proposal to 
Churchill which proved to be the breakthrough on this 
issue.182 Article 5 was dropped. In its place, the Free 
State agreed to repay the British government for 
compensation payments that it had made for malicious 
property damage incurred during the Anglo-Irish War of 
1919-1921. In addition, the Dublin government promised 
to increase by 10 per cent its payments for malicious 
property damage which were incurred within its
181Ibid. For the text of the agreement, see C.P.
511(25), 4 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
182CA/H/48-6th Minutes, 2 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
417
jurisdiction during the Irish Civil War of 1922-1923.183 
As O'Higgins explained, this arrangement was preferable 
because it enabled the Free Staters 'to say that they 
were prepared to shoulder their own burdens arising out 
of the disturbances in Ireland.'184
By early evening, the deal was done. Cosgrave, 
obviously relieved, told Churchill that the settlement 
would 'promote goodwill between North and South' and 
'would go far to cement the friendship' of Irish and 
British peoples. 0 'Higgins added that the Dublin 
government would use its influence to 'induce the 
Nationalist members in Ulster to take their place in the 
Northern Parliament.'185 The following day O'Higgins 
made one last attempt to include in the agreement a 
clause promising Anglo-Irish co-operation should the two 
parts of Ireland ever wish to unite politically. Such a 
statement, he thought, would 'have a sentimental and 
political value.' Churchill was leery. Such a 
statement, he told the Irish, might lead to the 'possible 
opposition of eminent Ministers' in the British Cabinet. 
Cosgrave also agreed that this difficult point 'should 
not be pressed.'186
There remained, however, the Boundary Commission 
itself. Technically, no one could stop the Commission
183C. 56 (25), 2 December 1925, CAB 23/51.
184CA/H/48-7th Minutes, 2 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
185Ibid.
186CA/H/48-8th Minutes, 3 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
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from issuing its report, and Feetham was particularly 
keen to see the award published as the 'good faith of the 
tribunal was at stake7.187 It took a meeting with 
Baldwin, Churchill, Cosgrave, and Craig to persuade him 
to give up. Churchill admitted that the two 
Commissioners were being asked to make 'a great 
sacrifice7. They should know however, that due to their 
'secret labours7 this 'miracle of peace had come about.7 
Perhaps as 'an historical document7, their report 'might 
some day appear.7 But not now.188
Against such formidable opposition, the Boundary 
Commission7s chairman could not stand. As a consolation, 
Feetham was to be granted a personal audience with George 
V. Baldwin also promised that a statement outlining the 
Commission7s interpretation of its mandate could be 
published - but only after the 1925 agreement 'became an 
accomplished fact.7189
At 7.50 p.m., the leaders of the three governments 
met one last time to sign the new boundary agreement.
There followed a dinner, hastily arranged by Churchill 
and Amery, before the Free Staters had to leave to catch 
the 8.45 train from Euston. At one point earlier in the 
evening, Cosgrave turned to Craig and said, 'One of us no 
doubt will hear from the other?7 In fact, they never met
187C.P. 503(25), 3 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
188Ibid.
189Ibid. Feetham to Mary Feetham, 16 December 1925,
Feetham Papers, 6/1, ff. 61-63.
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again.190
Later that same evening, in a House of Commons 
swelled to its 'utmost capacity', Baldwin was cheered 
triumphantly as he entered to report the terms of the 
agreement.191 Almost immediately, the negotiations were 
compared with that other great diplomatic triumph of the 
day, the Locarno treaties. 'To the "midnight Treaty", 
hastily negotiated in 1921', The Times commented, 'the 
new agreement stands as the Treaty of Locarno to the 
Treaty of Versailles, a proof of the growth of 
appeasement and conciliation.'192 Arthur Balfour cast a 
more cynical eye over the settlement. For 'all their 
talk about the horrors of leaving a Roman Catholic 
population in the North and a Protestant population in 
the south', he observed, the two Irish governments found 
it more convenient to leave the border unchanged after 
all. The entire crisis, he told his sister, had been 
'exquisitely comic'.193
19°Ibid. CA/H/48—10th Minutes, 3 December 1925, CAB 
27/295. Amery diary, 2-3 December 1925, p. 429. Ervine, 
Craicravon. p. 508.
191'Irish Peace. A Threefold Agreement', The Times. 4 
December 1925.
192'The Irish Agreement', The Times. 5 December 1925. 
The Locarno treaties, named for the Swiss town in which 
they were signed, were a series of agreements aimed at 
stabilising Europe in the aftermath of World War I. The 
most important of these treaties provided for an Anglo-
Italian guarantee of the borders of France, Belgium, and 
Germany. See Dutton, Chamberlain. p. 230-258.




Late on the afternoon of 8 December, MPs gathered at 
Westminster to ratify the Irish agreement. The 'general 
tone' of the Commons debate, wrote one reporter, was in 
the main 'quiet and peaceful' and stood 'in striking 
contrast to the fiery animosity of 1913, and also to the 
mournful apathy of 1920'. Northern Ireland's MPs were 
there 'in force'. But Lloyd George was absent. So was 
Ramsay MacDonald.194
Baldwin set the mood. The work of the Boundary 
Commission had not been in vain; simply put, it had 
proved to be 'beyond the power of mortal man' to devise a 
new arrangement. Ireland's border was 'an accident of 
history', he admitted, but accident it would stay. As 
for the Commission's report, it would be kept under lock 
and key. Only when the Irish boundary aroused 'about as 
much excitement in Ireland as Offa's Dyke or Hadrian's 
Wall' aroused in Britain would it see the light of 
day.195
Few words were spoken against the pact, and these 
focused mainly on the agreement to waive Article 5. J.H. 
Thomas's single contribution to the debate was that 
'Irishmen, North and South, only agree when they are
194'Irish Bill. Debate in the Commons', The Times. 9 
December 1925.
195HC_Deb, Vol. 189, Col. 309-321, 8 December 1925.
This last remark was a reference to two ancient boundaries, 
the first dividing England from Wales, the second England 
from Scotland.
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getting something from England.'196 Another MP, Rosslyn 
Mitchell, attacked the government itself. Recalling the 
'havoc, the tragedies, the misery, the woe and want' that 
Conservatives had wrought by playing politics with the 
Irish Question, Mitchell said that Baldwin should have 
offered the agreement as an act of penance on behalf of 
his party.197
These 'sour and malignant reflections', Churchill 
told the Commons, did not befit the hour. It was, 
rather, time to look forward to a new day in Anglo-Irish 
relations. The agreement was ratified that same 
evening.198
Although Northern Ireland's Parliament was not 
required to approve the December pact, a debate was held 
on Craig's return to Belfast. Ulster's MPs were not as 
uncritical of the boundary agreement as is sometimes 
supposed. Aside from disappointment that East Donegal 
would not be transferred into Northern Ireland, Craig 
also had to announce the end of Britain's subsidy for the 
Special Constabulary.199 While the part-time 'B'
Specials would be retained, the full-time 'A' and 
voluntary 'C-l' Specials would be abolished completely. 
This, said one MP, was 'the great drawback' of the
196Ibid, Col. 321-326.
197Ibid, Col. 330-331.
198Ibid, Col. 356-363. The agreement was ratified by 
the House of Lords the next day. See HL Deb. Vol. 62, Col.
1271, 9 December 1925.
199Ervine, Craiaavon. p. 505.
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agreement.
It was 'a matter of unspeakable regret to have to 
part with these men', Craig agreed, but they had no 
choice and were lucky for the settlement they had got.
An additional £1.2 million would be contributed by the 
Treasury towards demobilisation of the force; at the same 
time, the British were forgiving a £700,000 loan for 
equipment. There was no hiding the fact that, given the 
ongoing depression, prospects for the Specials would be 
bleak. The most Craig could offer was a hope that 
businessmen in the province would recognise their 'moral 
responsibilities7 to the disbanded Constables. Barring 
that, he suggested that the former Specials might 
consider emigrating to the British dominions.200
Ulster's premier tried to sugar this bitter pill by 
making a general announcement about the Unemployment Re­
insurance Scheme which had been negotiated the previous 
July. But the effect was spoiled because Craig could not 
divulge any details about the plan (the legislation had 
still not been introduced in the British Parliament) and 
because what he did say was, at best, ungracious. The 
imperial government, he told Ulster's assembly, had 
'arranged to bear - I will not say a satisfactory share - 
because I am very hard to satisfy, but at all events a 
generous share of the burden which has been thrust upon
2°°NI HC Deb. Vol. 6, 1858-1860, 1872-1873, 9 December
1925.
423
us'. Hardly a ringing endorsement.201 In any case, MPs 
were more interested in knowing why Craig had not pressed 
for a reduction or abolition of Northern Ireland's 
imperial contribution. It hardly seemed fair, Labour's 
Sam Kyle pointed out, that while their contribution 
remained in place, the Free State was totally absolved of 
its share of the British debt.202
'This barren question': the Dail debate
Whatever criticism Craig faced in Belfast was 
nothing compared to the storm that awaited Cosgrave and 
his colleagues when they returned to Dublin. Demands for 
a referendum on the settlement were avoided only when 
Cosgrave declared that passage of the agreement was 
necessary to preserve public safety. Under the Free 
State's Constitution, this precluded such a vote from 
taking place.203
According to one contemporary estimate, those who 
opposed the agreement could expect to muster no more than 
sixty-six votes in the Dail - and that included the 
abstentionist TDs from Sinn Fein. At least seventy-four 
TDs were expected to back the government. But it was 
also noted that Cosgrave 'would not be satisfied with 
anything less than a two-thirds majority'. Failing that, 
'a general election may become inevitable. 7204
201Ibid, Col. 1860-1862.
2t>2Ibid, Col. 1865-1869.
2°3Mansergh, Unresolved Question, p. 238.
2°4'Irish Republican Activity', The Times. 9 December
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In other words, for the boundary agreement to be 
approved much depended on the course de Valera chose to 
take. A statement issued by the Sinn Fein leader 
assailed what he called this 'meditated crime7, made 
worse because the Free Staters had 'sold our countrymen 
for the meanest of all considerations - a money 
consideration.7205 However, there were considerations 
that de Valera himself thought worth bargaining over. 
Prior to the agreement, he suggested that the Boundary 
Commission7s award might be worth trading - not for 
Article 5, but for those hated elements of the Treaty: 
the oath and the crown.206 De Valera, then, had his own 
price when it came to selling out the Northern 
Nationalists.
Because the abstentionist TDs did not enter Dail 
Eireann even at this crucial moment, the American consul 
in Dublin reported that debate on the 1925 agreement 
lacked 'the edge of final conviction7 .207 De Valera7s 
official biographers later maintained that it would not 
have mattered if the abstentionist TDs had participated 
or not. In the Dail7s crucial vote on 10 December, the 
government won by a majority of 71 votes to 20.208 The
1925.
2°5'Speech at Dublin7, 6 December 1925, F.L.K., de
Valera Papers, File No. 347.
206Bowman, De Valera, p. 91.
2°7Mansergh, Unresolved Question, p. 238.
^Longford and O 7Neill, Eamon de Valera. p. 241. 
Annual Register: 1925. p. 141.
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addition of Sinn Fein's forty-seven votes, however, would 
have taken the opposition to within a whisker of 
defeating the government. Given that William Magennis 
and a handful of other Cumann na nGaedheal TDs had 
already defected from the party, is it mere fancy to 
suppose that the dramatic entry of de Valera and his 
followers might have swayed other, former colleagues to 
join them in fighting the agreement?
The suggestion cannot be dismissed out of hand.
Even if it meant taking the oath, Austin Stack, that 
bitterest of abstentionists, 'was inclined to favour the 
idea ... if our going in would defeat the proposal.'
Would it not, he asked de Valera, 'be the end of the Free 
State?' And what better issue on which to defeat their 
opponents 'than Irish territorial integrity?'209
Instead, Sinn Fein's leader opted for a policy of 
wilful impotence. On 7 December, de Valera and thirty- 
eight other Republican TDs held a joint meeting with 
Magennis, Labour's Tom Johnson and other members of the 
Dail opposed to the settlement. Cahir Healy, T.J.
Harbison and several Northern Irish priests also 
attended. Although 'strong pressure' was brought to bear 
on the Republicans, they steadfastly refused to take the 
fight into the Dail itself. As Cosgrave had earlier 
predicted, this proved to be the Free Staters 'one
209Stack to de Valera, 4 December 1925, FLK, de Valera 
Papers, File No. 1521.
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safeguard - de Valera's lack of political foresight.'210 
No matter what Sinn Fein's president might say, Ireland's 
unity meant less to him than party unity. 'For a united 
Ireland', de Valera had declared at the height of the 
boundary crisis, he and his followers 'would have been 
willing to go very far'211 - but not that far, it seems, 
if it meant crossing the threshold of Leinster House.
Once Sinn Fein's entry into Dail Eireann was no 
longer an issue, it was all over bar the shouting. 
According to one contemporary account, the Dail's debate 
on the boundary agreement was 'equalled in intensity of 
feeling only by the historic Treaty debate of 1921'.212 
But even as the old arguments were being resurrected, 
Cosgrave summed up the feelings of many TDs when he 
declared that it was time 'to put this barren question of 
the boundary behind us once and for all'. Those who 
opposed the settlement were, in the end, brought up 
against one unalterable fact: they had no alternative.213
What saved Cosgrave and his colleagues, at least for 
the moment, was sheer weariness. The people, declared 
one TD, 'are sick of these political and border 
questions. Should we not get back to business ... when
210'Irish Republican Activity', The Times. 9 December 
1925. Jones diary, 25 November 1925, Vol. Ill, p. 237.
211'Speech at Dublin', 6 December 1925, FLK, de Valera 
Papers, File No. 347.
212'Executive's Hopes Exceeded', Irish Times. 12
December 1925.
213Dail Deb. Vol. 13, Col. 1306, 1314, 7 December 1925.
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we are faced with problems of unemployment and bad trade 
in the country? In face of these matters, is it really 
not time to get back to our ordinary work?'214
'A last word'
On 18 December Richard Feetham boarded R.M.S. Saxon 
to begin the long journey back to South Africa. That 
same day his justification of the Boundary Commission's 
work was published in newspapers throughout the British 
Isles. The Times called his defence 'a dignified and 
impressive answer' to the months of abuse hurled at the 
Boundary Commission and at its chairman in particular. 
Although the Commission's report was suppressed, the 
newspaper was glad that Feetham had been given the 
'solace' of having 'a last word' in this chapter of Irish 
history.215
Feetham's wounded pride had, indeed, been soothed. 
Writing to his sister while on board ship, he noted 
triumphantly, 'I did get a little say in the end.'216 
Not everyone, though, was as charitable about Feetham's 
'elaborate summary', or about the tribunal he had led. 
'Peace', the Morning Post told its readers, 'can best be 
promoted now by forgetting that the Boundary Commission
214Dail Debf Vol. 13, Col. 1964, 15 December 1925.
215'Irish Boundary. Commissioners on Their Task'; and 
'The Boundary Commission - A Last Word', The Times. 18
December 1925.
216Richard to Mary Feetham, 22 December 1925, Feetham
Papers, 6/1, ff. 63a-63d.
428
ever existed.'217
If Feetham felt let down by the collapse of the 
Boundary Commission, that was as nothing compared to the 
feelings of Northern Nationalists. 'Not a thought was 
given to the denial of our civil rights', a group of 
their representatives protested. 'Not a word about our 
political prisoners, our educational difficulties, or our 
social disabilities' was in the agreement. What Cosgrave 
and 0'Higgins had signed in London, Cahir Healy later 
said, was 'a betrayal' of every promise made to the 
Ulster Nationalists since 1921. He was bitter most of 
all at the loss of the Council of Ireland, believing that 
with it 'the last hope of unity' in his lifetime had 
disappeared.218
The loss of the Council of Ireland has been called 
'an unmitigated disaster' for Northern Nationalists.219 
But even if Craig had not raised the issue, the British 
probably would have, as they were also anxious to be rid 
of the forum.220 At the same time, it would be wrong to 
dismiss the promise of joint Irish Cabinet meetings as an 
empty gesture. When recommending the settlement to their 
respective parliaments, all three leaders plainly
217'Mr. Justice Feetham's Apologia', Morning Post. 18 
December 1925.
218' "Callously Betrayed"' and 'Agreement Signed in 
London. Present Boundary Line to Remain', Ulster Herald. 12 
December 1925.
219Phoenix, Northern Nationalism, p. 332.
22°'Irish Boundary', Whiskard memorandum, 26 November
1925, CO 537/1106/54045.
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expected that the conferences would be a part of 
Ireland's political landscape.221 Others agreed. Sam 
Kyle, for instance, hoped that the meetings would lead to 
'reciprocal arrangements' to promote employment, while 
The Times told readers that 'any impulse to partition was 
more than counterbalanced by the new provisions as to 
mutual consultations'.222 Perhaps most tellingly,
Northern Ireland's Ministry of Finance worked on the 
assumption that the conferences would take place.223
What was lacking was both the will and the machinery 
to make this part of the agreement work. Once the crisis 
was over, there was little incentive in Dublin, and even 
less in Belfast, to build on the idea, while there were a 
good many reasons for walking away from it. Cosgrave saw 
nothing attractive in an arrangement that might infringe 
Irish sovereignty, while Craig found it easier to placate 
extremists by turning down even ceremonial invitations to 
visit the Free State capital.224 Even if these hurdles 
could have been overcome, the mutual suspicion and 
jealousy between both sides might have been 
insurmountable. The meetings were supposed to take place
221NI HC Deb. Vol. 6, Col. 1863, 9 December 1925. HC
Deb. Vol. 189, Col. 318-319, 8 December 1925. Dail Deb.
Vol. 13, Col. 1313, 7 December 1925.
222Ibid, NI HC Deb. Col. 1865-1866. 'Irish Bill. Debate 
in the Commons', The Times. 9 December 1925.
223Quekett to Martin- Jones, 15 March 1926, HO
45/12341/2.
224Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, p. 487. Fanning, 
Independent Ireland, p. 92. Mansergh, Unresolved Question, 
p. 238.
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'as and when necessary', fine words so long as Belfast 
and Dublin agreed on what constituted a matter for joint
action. But what if they differed?
What is harder to defend is that the Free Staters 
allowed the focus of the talks to shift entirely from the
effects of partition to the question of Article 5. After
the shock of the Boundary Commission report, Cosgrave 
apparently convinced himself that the Irish would receive 
similar treatment from the tribunal charged with 
apportioning Ireland's share of Britain's debt, leaving 
the Free State crippled by years of payments to the 
imperial Treasury. To be sure, until the very end 
Churchill was adamant that the British would not waive 
Article 5.225 Yet, the Free Staters had a rough and 
ready answer to these demands. Simply put, one Irish 
civil servant wrote in September, 'we have no 
contribution to give them'.226 Even Balfour, a man 
hardly known for his Irish sympathies, recognised that 
conditions in the Free State were such that 'she could 
not pay her debts to us' even if Cosgrave and his 
colleagues wanted to.227
After the deal was done, it was admitted that the 
British Treasury could have expected little more than a
225CA/H/48-2nd and 5th Minutes, 1-2 December 1925, CAB 
27/295.
226John Fitzgerald to Joseph Brennan, 8 September 1925,
quoted in Fanning, Irish Department of Finance, p. 163.
227A .J . to Alice Balfour, 4 December 1925, AJB-S, GD
433/2/76, Reel 8.
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'derisory proportion' of anything the Irish might have 
owed the Treasury.228 Under the terms of the 1925 
agreement, however, Dublin was obliged to pay a set sum 
of money. Article 5, one Cabinet minister said, 'was 
like having a sham pearl necklace and being offered a £5 
note for it. Naturally we handed over the necklace and 
took the money.'229
This, too, was Craig's view. As he told Baldwin 
during the negotiations: 'You'll never get a bob under 
clause 5'.230 In giving such advice, of course, Ulster's 
leader was working toward his own ends. Once 
negotiations began to concentrate on Article 5, attention 
shifted away from the boundary issue and from the plight 
of Northern Nationalists. For if they and, to a lesser 
extent, the Free Staters were the big losers in the 1925 
agreement, then Ulster Unionists - and especially Craig - 
were its biggest winners. Craig was certainly pleased 
with what he had got, knowing that he had given nothing 
in return. He told his wife that 'in his wildest dreams 
he had never expected to be able to keep Ulster 
completely intact, without some give and take'.231
For that he had Churchill to thank. Craig knew as 
much, telling Churchill that he had 'done the right thing
228'The Irish Agreement', The Times. 5 December 1925.
229'The Premier's View', Sheffield Daily Telegraph. 5
December 1925.
23°Jones diary, 29 November 1925, Vol. Ill, p. 242.
231Lady Craig's diary, 3 December 1925, D.1415/B/38.
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in a big way'.232 Others agreed that the talks had 
hinged on the chancellor of the exchequer. 'Winston 
really did all the work', Amery wrote. Tom Jones's 
assessment was much the same. 'Chamberlain was important 
at the early and Churchill at the later meetings', he 
confided in his diary. 'Birkenhead' was 'always big and 
helpful', Amery and Joynson-Hicks less so.233 
Salisbury's contribution was almost wholly negative. On 
at least one occasion, he bolted from the talks rather 
than be a party to the decisions being reached.234
By solving the boundary dispute, Churchill may have 
saved the Conservative Party from another Irish disaster. 
Ever since Bonar Law's acceptance of the Treaty on 
becoming prime minister in 1922, successive Conservative 
governments had been torn between their legal obligations 
to carry out the settlement and their 'moral obligation' 
to the Ulster Unionists.235 These conflicting 
responsibilities could be ignored so long as the British 
were able to delay facing up to the boundary question.
But when that was no longer possible, doubts over whether
232I.A. (25) 11, 3 December 1925, CAB 27/295.
233Amery diary, 2-3 December 1925, p. 429. Jones diary, 
3 December 1925, Vol. Ill, p. 245. P.J. Grigg praised 
Birkenhead's 'balanced and cool judgment'. See Prejudice 
and Judgment (London, 1948), p. 209.
234CA/H/48-6th Minutes, 2 December 1925, CAB 27/295. 
Also, see Ervine, Craigavon, p. 503. Nevertheless, 
Salisbury was angry that he was not asked to sign the final 
agreement. See Baldwin to Salisbury, 3 December 1925, S(4) 
115/92.
235Amery was particularly sensitive about this issue. 
See I.A. (25) 3, 18 November 1925, CAB 27/295.
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the Tories would implement the Boundary Commission's 
award actually made matters worse. Unionists came to 
believe that if they protested 'loudly enough' no 
Conservative government would dare face them down. This 
impression, one civil servant warned, made it certain 
that the Unionists would 'not merely protest against, but 
[would] resist' changes to the boundary - with the 
Specials to back them up.236
In that case, Lord Beaverbrook outlined what might 
have happened next: '... the British government would 
have had to enforce the new boundary against violent 
Ulster resistance; and 90% of the English Conservatives 
would have backed Ulster against their own leaders.'
Once Fermanagh and Tyrone were handed over to the Free 
State, Beaverbrook wrote, Baldwin's second 'ministry 
would have fallen.'237
However much this was wishful thinking on 
Beaverbrook's part, the danger was real enough. Speaking 
in the House of Lords on 9 December, Birkenhead admitted 
that everyone who had signed the Treaty of 1921 knew 
'that in Article 12 there lurked the elements of 
dynamite.'238 For over four years this bomb, in the form
236'Irish Boundary Commission', Whiskard memorandum, ? 
November 1925, CO 537/1096/50285. British officials 
considered disarming the Specials prior to the Commission's 
report, only to discover that they were powerless to do so. 
See Tallents to Buckland, 10 October 1925, HO 
45/12296/80(a).
237Beaverbrook to Brisbane, 30 November 1925, BBK C/64.
238HL Deb. Vol. 62, Col. 1232, 9 December 1925.
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of the Boundary Commission's award, had threatened to go 
off in their midst wreaking havoc in British affairs. At 
long last, the bomb had been defused. As Churchill said 
after the 1925 agreement was signed, the boundary 
question 'which has always hung over us', which baffled 
governments since before the Great War, 'this boundary 
question is absolutely settled.'239 The passions and 
bitterness that Ireland had aroused in the bosom of 
British politics were gone. Forever.
But Baldwin was taking no chances. The papers on 
the boundary negotiations were bundled together and put 
in the care of the ever trustworthy Tom Jones. Before 
shelving the Irish Question away, for all time he hoped, 
Jones scrawled a warning to himself and to anyone else 
who might be tempted to re-open this Pandora's box: 'S.B 
asked me to keep these papers from his sight', Jones 
wrote - 'and from everybody else's.'240
239'irish Peace. A Threefold Agreement', The Times. 4
December 1925.
24°'Boundary Commission', ? December 1925, TJ GG/4/1.
Conclusion 
'The Harvest Gathered In'
We must not expect too much. ... But neither,
I think, need we expect to see too little.
There very probably are members here in this 
chamber now who will live in a new Parliament 
to see the harvest gathered in and who will 
find at the side of Britain a free and united 
Ireland.
- Winston Churchill1
The boundary agreement of 1925 finally answered the 
Irish Question which had dominated British politics since 
Gladstone's embrace of Home Rule forty years before.
This was plain to Stanley Baldwin. A few weeks later, he 
reported that the House of Commons was now able 'to spend 
many hours discussing Irish affairs in an atmosphere of 
calm and moderation'. The change, he told George V, 'is 
a pleasant contrast compared with former times.'2
Even so, it would be no more true to say that 
Baldwin had 'conjured' the Irish Question out of 
existence than that Lloyd George had done.3 A changed 
political scene, rather, allowed the one to succeed where 
the other had failed. With the election of 1924, Baldwin 
emerged as the first prime minister since 1910 to command 
an overwhelming, and loyal, parliamentary majority, 
something that never could have been said of Lloyd 
George.
1fiC_Deb, Vol. 189, Col. 363, 8 December 1925.
2Baldwin to George V, 23 February 1926, SB Vol. 61, ff.
498-503.
3Taylor, English History, p. 161.
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The Irish Question was able to dominate British 
public life for so long because the country's politics 
had fractured. This was true not only of the left in 
British politics, of the struggle between Labour and 
Liberals and, in the latter case, between the supporters 
of Asquith and Lloyd George. Until the 1924 election, 
the cleavage in the Conservative Party was no less a 
threat to its long-term survival. As Maurice Cowling as 
pointed out, had the Tories split into two parties at the 
1922 election, 'almost anything might have happened'.4 
The difference between 1920 and 1925 was that British 
politics was again firmly moored to a two-party 
structure. Only a government with a massive 
Parliamentary majority of the sort led by Baldwin after 
1924 would be impervious to the passions aroused by the 
Irish Question. This explains his triumph.
No longer was there any question of a revolt within 
Tory ranks, as had been the case under Austen 
Chamberlain's stewardship. Once it was clear that 
Baldwin's government would give its wholehearted support 
to Craig, the Die-hards were satisfied. Former Coalition 
Tories, meanwhile, were not about to challenge this 
consensus. Baldwin was careful to involve all of the 
party's factions in the last stage of the boundary 
negotiations - former Coalitionists (Churchill and 
Birkenhead), Die-hards (Salisbury and Joynson-Hicks), as 
well as his own allies (Amery) - so that all would be
“Cowling, Impact of Labour, p. 419-420.
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implicated in the final deal.
At the same time, the government faced no real 
opposition in or out of Parliament. Labour was 
ambivalent about Ireland's problems, and after 1924 it 
did not much matter where the Liberals stood on this 
question. As for the Free State, even after taking 
account of the difficulties, not to say dangers, faced by 
Cosgrave and his colleagues, their often 'indifferent' 
attitude to the boundary is remarkable.5 It, at any 
rate, stands in marked contrast to the actions of 
Griffith and Collins, the only two Sinn Fein leaders who 
prized Ireland's unity as much as its independence. What 
advantages their successors did possess (e.g., the 
Council of Ireland) were traded for nothing in return.
0'Higgins realised that the boundary crisis left 
Cosgrave's government 'politically bankrupt'. No longer 
could they pretend that the Treaty would lead to the 
thirty-two county state that seemed to be so close in 
1921. This disappointment was profound and its 
consequences would begin to be felt only with time.6
Settling the Irish Question had no less an influence 
on the course of British politics. Lloyd George's 
handling of Ireland was instrumental in bringing about 
his own downfall. Many Conservatives, and not just the 
Die-hards, felt that their long-held suspicions of him
5Watt to Spender, 13 April 1923, PRONI, CAB9B/182.
6CA/H/48-2nd Minutes, 1 December 1925, CAB 27/295. 
Fanning, Independent Ireland, p. 91.
438
were borne out by his negotiations with Sinn Fein. These 
suspicions served to estrange Coalition Tories, who 
remained loyal to Lloyd George, from the rest of the 
party. It took the unexpected defeat of 1923 to convince 
most Conservatives that unity was essential, thus 
allowing Baldwin to invite the Chamberlainites back into 
the party fold. Even then, Ireland was still capable of 
arousing the bitterest Tory passions, as was all too 
evident during the summer and autumn of 1924.
At the same time, the 1924 boundary crisis had a 
direct impact on Labour's first government by forcing the 
Cabinet to recall Parliament earlier than planned. 
Although a delay might not have altered the final 
outcome, it could have allowed MacDonald and his 
colleagues to better handle the eruption over the 
Campbell case than they did. Certainly, they could not 
have handled it any worse. As was shown earlier, the 
Irish dispute did not figure as an issue in the general 
election campaign of 1924. But guaranteeing that it 
played no such role was essential if the Tories were to 
destroy the Liberal Party once and for all. Only by 
doing so were they able to achieve their sweeping 
victory, the outcome of which confirmed that Baldwin 
would be the dominant politician of the inter-war years, 
and that the Conservatives and Labour would be the main 
players in Britain's two-party political system.
So far as the conduct of Irish affairs was 
concerned, the boundary dispute taught British
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politicians, especially those in the Conservative Party, 
that to delve into those affairs was to play with fire. 
'Ireland is a country of surprises', a young Anthony Eden 
told the House of Commons in 1925. If British men and 
women wished to bring about Irish unity, the best service 
they could render 'in the light of history, is to keep 
silent on this subject.'7 To a generation of politicians 
who came of age during the inter-war years, and who saw 
what bitter passions the Irish Question so easily 
aroused, this sounded like exceptionally good advice.
They stuck to it, and so did their successors.
When at long last both British and Irish governments 
found that they could no longer ignore the problems 
created by partition, they returned to the old answers 
with a consistent and almost unfailing regularity. The 
abortive Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 resurrected the 
Council of Ireland which, like its predecessor, never 
met. Briefly, Margaret Thatcher even toyed with creating 
a new Boundary Commission.8 Redrawing the Irish frontier 
was also proposed by Oswald Mosley, still active half a 
century after he first denounced Lloyd George's Irish 
policies in the House of Commons.9 The Good Friday 
Agreement of 1998 included provision for joint meetings 
of the Dublin and Belfast Cabinets which were discussed 
in 1925 but never put into practice.
7HC Deb. Vol. 189, Col. 344, 8 December 1925.
8Douglas Hurd to the author, 11 November 1998.
9Skidelsky, Mosley, p. 519.
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In the wake of the 1925 agreement, Craig could be 
justifiably proud of his triumph. 'This time', one 
historian has written, 'the Unionists got all that they 
wanted'.10 Of the many players involved in this story, 
he alone held to the same position throughout and won 
through in the end. Those parts of the Treaty, and of 
the 1920 Act, that were meant to fetter his government 
and to make partition a long-term impossibility were 
eradicated one by one. Like the Boundary Commission 
award, the protections guaranteed by proportional 
representation were swept to one side. The Council of 
Ireland was abolished.
Most importantly, Craig secured his state 
financially. After the boundary agreement was reached, 
he admitted that the province's financial difficulties 
had posed just as serious a threat to Northern Ireland's 
existence as the Boundary Commission itself.11 His 
victory in the battle over parity in social service 
provision was particularly significant. The British 
subsidy further differentiated the six counties from the 
rest of Ireland and thus consolidated partition.
In the end, however, the settlement fashioned 
between 1920 and 1925 did not resolve the Irish Question 
so much as sweep the problem to one side. Left 
unreconciled within the six-county state was 'an
10Wall, 'Partition', p. 89. But see Follis, State
Under Sieae. p. 181.
11NI_HC_Deb, Vol. 7, Col. 17, 9 March 1926.
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uncomfortably large Catholic minority'. This minority 
was not small enough to be absorbed into Northern 
Ireland's larger community, nor was it large enough to 
force the Belfast government to deal with it on equal 
terms. The Boundary Commission's inability to address 
this issue only made matters worse, leaving behind 'deep 
scars on the landscape and in the human mind'.12
Nor, ultimately, did the settlement give long-term 
security to Unionists, especially those living in the 
border counties. One result of the violence that erupted 
in Northern Ireland after 1969 has been a large-scale 
demographic shift in the province. By 1995 the Roman 
Catholic population west of the River Bann had increased 
by 25 per cent, while Protestants fled to strongholds 
along the east coast. As a result, by the end of the 
century many of the areas argued over in front of the 
Boundary Commission were incontestably Roman Catholic, if 
not Nationalist, in their make-up.13 This was also true 
of south Armagh, an area which had elected Michael 
Collins as its first MP to the Northern Ireland 
Parliament and which remained 'fiercely nationalist' to
“Neville, Douglas, and Compton, 'Northern Ireland - 
Irish Republic Boundary', p. 218.
“ 'Canute of North Down?', The Guardian. 13 June 1995. 
According to the 1991 census, Catholics made up a majority 
in such local government districts as Londonderry (73 per 
cent), Strabane (64 per cent), Omagh (67 per cent), 
Dungannon (58 per cent), Newry and Mourne (77 per cent), 
Down (60 per cent), and all of County Fermanagh (57 per 
cent). In contrast, Protestants made up a majority in such 
east coast local government districts as Larne (76 per 
cent), Carrickfergus (92 per cent), and North Down (90 per 
cent).
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the end of the century. Had this area, known to the 
British military as 'bandit country', been ceded to the 
Free State in 1925, as many as 200 lives might have been 
spared during the violence that re-ignited in the late 
1960s.14
But that was down the road.
For most of the twentieth century, the boundary 
described by Lady Spender in 1923 has survived, a 
monument to political struggles in both Ireland and 
Britain from that earlier time. Perhaps the last word on 
the boundary dispute should be given to Robert Barton, 
the colleague-turned-foe of Arthur Griffith and Michael 
Collins. Imprisoned in Mountjoy Gaol during the Civil 
War, Barton heard a rumour that British law advisers were 
about to declare Article 12 invalid. As one of the 
Treaty's negotiators, Barton understood better than most 
that if Article 12 could be undermined so too could the 
rest of the agreement's Ulster clauses. 'Poor A.G. would 
turn in his grave', Barton wrote of Griffith. 'He looked 
upon the Boundary Commission as the grave of 
Carsonism./15
14B. Cathcart, 'It All Began With a Line on a Map', 
Independent on Sunday Magazine. 22 May 1994.
15Barton to 'Adj. General', 24 February 1923, FLK, de 
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ADDISON, Christopher (19 June 1869 - 11 December
1951). English politician. Born: Hogsthorpe, 
Lincolnshire. Education: Trinity College, Harrogate; St. 
Bartholomew's Hospital, London. Doctor and distinguished 
lecturer of anatomy. Political career: MP (Liberal), 
Hoxton, 1910-22; MP (Labour) for Swindon Division, 1929- 
31, and in 1934-35; Parliamentary Secretary to the Board 
of Education, 1914-15; Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Ministry of Munitions, 1915-16; Minister of Munitions,
1916-17; Minister of Reconstruction, 1917-19; President 
of the Local Government Board, 1919; Minister of Health,
1919-1921; Minister without Portfolio, 1921.
AMERY, Leopold Stennett (22 Nov. 1873 - 16 Sept. 
1955). British politician. Born: Gorakhpur, India. 
Education: Harrow; Balliol College, Oxford. Journalist 
with The Times; barrister, Inner Temple, 1902; served in 
World War I, 1914-16. Political career: MP 
(Conservative-Unionist) for Sparkbrook Division of 
Birmingham, 1911-45; Assistant Secretary to the War 
Cabinet and Imperial War Cabinet, 1917; staff member of 
the War Council at Versailles and of the Secretary of 
State for War, 1917-18; Parliamentary Under-Secretary for 
the Colonies, 1919-21; Parliamentary and Financial 
Secretary to the Admiralty, 1921-22; First Lord of the 
Admiralty, 1922-24; Colonial Secretary, 1924-29;
Dominions Secretary, 1925-29; Secretary of State for 
India and Burma, 1940-45.
ANDERSON, Sir John (8 July 1882 - 4 Jan. 1958). 
British civil servant and politician. Born: Midlothian, 
Scotland. Education: George Watson's College, Edinburgh; 
Edinburgh and Leipzig universities. Entered the Colonial 
Office, 1905; Secretary, North Nigeria Lands Committee, 
1909; Secretary, West African Currency Committee, 1911; 
Principal Clerk in the office of Insurance Commissioners, 
1912; Secretary to Insurance Commissioners, 1913; 
Secretary, Ministry of Shipping, 1917-19; additional 
Secretary to Local Government Board, 1919; Second
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Secretary, Ministry of Health, 1919; Chairman of Board of 
Inland Revenue, 1919-22? Joint Under- Secretary to the 
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1920; Permanent Under­
secretary of State, Home Office, 1922-32? Governor of 
Bengal, 1932-1937. Political career: MP (Independent 
National) for Scottish Universities, 1938-50; Lord Privy 
Seal, 1938-39? Home Secretary and Minister of Home 
Security, 1939-40? Lord President of the Council,
1940-43? Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1943-45. Created 
1st Viscount Waverley, 1952.
ANDREWS, John Miller (17 July 1871 - 5 Aug. 1956). 
Ulster businessman and politician. Born: County Down. 
Education: Belfast Academical Institute. Political 
career: member of Down County Council, 1917-37? MP, 
Northern Ireland Parliament, (Unionist) for County Down, 
1921-29, and Mid-Down and Down, 1929-53? Minister of 
Labour, 1921-1937? Minister of Finance, 1937-40; Prime 
Minister of Northern Ireland, 1940-43.
ANTROBUS, Maurice Edward (20 July 1895 - 23 Sept. 
1985). British civil servant. Education: Winchester? 
Trinity College, Cambridge. Assistant Principal, Colonial 
Office, 1920? Private Secretary to the Governor of 
Ceylon, 1927-30? Principal Dominions Office, 1930? 
Political Secretary, Office of UK High Commissioner in 
Union of South Africa, 1935-39? Assistant Secretary, 
Colonial Office, 1939? Principal Secretary, Office of UK 
Representative to Eire, 1939-41; Official Secretary, 
Office of UK High Commissioner in Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1941-44? Official Secretary, Office of UK High 
Commissioner in New Zealand, 1944-45? Assistant 
Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office, 1945? retired 
1955.
ARCHDALE, Edward Mervyn (26 Jan. 1853 - 2 Nov.
1943). Ulster politician. Education: Naval School, 
Portsmouth. Entered Royal Navy, 1866? Lieutenant, 1875; 
retired, 1880. Political career: MP (Conservative- 
Unionist) for North Fermanagh, 1898-1903 and 1916-21? MP, 
Northern Ireland Parliament, (Unionist) for Fermanagh and 
Tyrone, 1921-29; for Enniskillen Division, 1929-37? 
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, 1921-25; Minister 
of Agriculture, 1925-33.
ASQUITH, Herbert Henry (12 Sept. 1852 - 15 Feb. 
1928). British politician. Born: Yorkshire. Education: 
City of London School; Balliol College, Oxford.
Political career: MP (Liberal) for East Fife, 1886-1918? 
for Paisley, 1920-24? supported Gladstone in the first 
Home Rule crisis; Home Secretary, 1892-94; Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, 1905-8? succeeded Henry Campbell-Bannerman 
as Prime Minister and leader of the Liberal Party in 
1908; introduced the Third Home Rule Bill in 1912, 
precipitating the Home Rule Crisis of 1912-14? replaced 
by Lloyd George as Prime Minister, 1916; lost his seat in
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the 1918 general election? returned to Parliament two 
years later but was again defeated in the November 1924 
general election. Created 1st Earl of Oxford and 
Asquith, 1925.
BALDWIN, Stanley (3 Aug. 1867 - 14 Dec. 1947). 
British politician. Education: Harrow; Trinity College, 
Cambridge. Political career: MP (Conservative-Unionist) 
for Bewdley Division of Worcestershire, 1908-1937? 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1917-21; President 
of the Board of Trade, 1921-22? Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, 1922-1923? Prime Minister 1923-24, 1924-29 and 
1935-37? Lord Privy Seal, 1932-34? Lord President of the 
Council, 1931-35. Created 1st Earl Baldwin of Bewdley, 
1937.
BALFOUR, Arthur James (25 July 1848 - 19 March 
1930). British politician. Born: East Lothian,
Scotland? nephew of the 3rd Marquess of Salisbury. 
Education: Eton? Trinity College, Cambridge. Political 
career: MP (Conservative) for Hertford, 1874-85? for 
Eastern Division of Manchester, 1885-1906? for City of 
London, 1906-22; Private Secretary to the Marquess of 
Salisbury, 1878-80? assisted Lords Salisbury and 
Beaconsfield at Congress of Berlin, 1878? Privy 
Councillor, 1885? President of Local Government Board, 
1885-86; Secretary for Scotland; Vice-President of 
Committee of Council on Education for Scotland, 1886-87; 
Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1887-91; Leader of the House 
of Commons and First Lord of the Treasury, 1891-92; 
Opposition Leader, 1892-95? First Lord of the Treasury 
and Leader of the House of Commons 1895-1906? Prime 
Minister, 1902-5? Opposition Leader 1906-11? First Lord 
of the Admiralty, 1915-16? Foreign Secretary, 1916-19? 
Lord President of the Council, 1919-22 and 1925-29? head 
of the British Mission to America, 1917? led British 
Mission to Washington Conference, 1921-22. Created 1st 
Earl of Balfour, 1922.
BARTON, Robert Childers (? 1881 - 10 Aug. 1975). 
Irish politician. Born: County Wicklow? cousin of 
Erskine Childers. Education: Rugby; Christ Church, 
Oxford. Served with British forces in World War I. 
Political career: MP/TD (Sinn Fein) for West Wicklow,
1918-22? for Counties Kildare and Wicklow, 1921-23? 
Minister of Agriculture, 1919-21? Chairman of Wicklow 
County Council, 1920? Secretary for Economic Affairs, 
1921-22? delegate to the Irish Treaty negotiations, 1921; 
voted against the Treaty? joined Irregular forces? 
captured and imprisoned? retired from politics at the end 
of the Civil War.
BATES, Richard Dawson (23 Nov. 1876 - 10 June 1949). 
Ulster politician. Born: Belfast. Qualified as a 
solicitor. Political career: Vice-President of the 
Ulster Unionist Council? founder member of the Ulster
446
Volunteer Force, 1913; MP, Northern Ireland Parliament, 
(Unionist) for East Belfast and Victoria Division,
1921-29 and 1929-43? Minister for Home Affairs, 1921-43.
BAYFORD, 1st Baron, Robert Arthur Sanders (20 June 
1867 - 24 Feb. 1940). British politician. Education: 
Harrow? Balliol College, Oxford. Barrister, Inner 
Temple, 1891? Lt.-Colonel, Royal North Devon Hussars, 
1911-17? served in Gallipoli, Egypt, and Palestine. 
Political career: MP (Conservative-Unionist) for 
Bridgwater Division, Somerset, 1910-1923? for Wells 
Division of Somerset, 1924-29? Treasurer of the 
Household, 1918-19; Junior Lord of the Treasury, 1919? 
Under-Secretary for War, 1921-22; Minister of Agriculture 
and Fisheries, 1922-24. Created 1st Baron Bayford of 
Stoke Trister, 1929.
BEAVERBROOK, 1st Baron, William Maxwell Aitken (25
May 1879 - 9 June 1964). British newspaper owner and 
politician. Born: Ontario, Canada. Education: Public 
(Board) School, Newcastle, New Brunswick. Acquired 
political influence through ownership of newspapers, 
including the Daily Express and Sunday Express.
Political career: MP (Conservative-Unionist) for Ashton- 
under-Lyne, 1910-16? Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
and Minister of Information, 1918? Minister for Aircraft 
Production, 1940-41? Minister of State, 1941? Minister of 
Supply, 1941-42? Lord Privy Seal, 1943-45.
BIRKENHEAD, 1st Earl of, Frederick Edwin Smith (12
July 1972 - 30 Sept. 1930). British politician. Born: 
Birkenhead. Education: Birkenhead School? Wadham 
College, Oxford. Barrister. Political career: MP 
(Conservative) for Walton Division, Liverpool, 1906-19? 
principal assistant to Sir Edward Carson during the pre­
war Home Rule Crisis, earning the nickname 'Galloper 
Smith'? served with the Indian Corps in France, 1914? 
Solicitor-General, 1915? Attorney-General, 1915-19? Lord 
High Chancellor of Great Britain, 1919-22? took part in 
Irish Treaty negotiations, 1921? Secretary of State for 
India, 1924-28. Created 1st Earl of Birkenhead, 1922.
BLACKMORE, Sir Charles Henry (? 1880 - 13 May 1967). 
Northern Irish civil servant. Formerly Private Secretary 
to Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Pensions, and 
Financial Secretary, Admiralty? Secretary to the Prime 
Minister of Northern Ireland? also Secretary to the 
Cabinet of Northern Ireland and Clerk of Privy Council of 
Northern Ireland, 1925-39.
BLYTHE, Ernest (13 April 1889 - 23 Feb. 1975).
Irish politician. Born: County Antrim. Education: 
National School. Political career: MP/TD (Sinn Fein) for 
North Monaghan, 1918-21; for County Monaghan, 1921-33? 
Provisional Government Minister for Trade and Commerce,
1921-22? Irish Free State Minister for Local Government,
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1922-23; Minister of Finance, 1923-32? Minister of Posts 
and Telegraphs, 1927-32; Vice-President of the Executive 
Council, 1927-32. Member of Seanad Eireann, 1934-36.
BONAR LAW, Andrew (16 Sept. 1858 - 30 Oct. 1923). 
British politician. Born: New Brunswick, Canada? 
returned to Scotland after his mother's death where he 
was raised by relatives. Education: Gilbertfield School, 
Hamilton and Glasgow High School. Political career: MP 
(Conservative-Unionist) for Blackfriars and Hutcheson 
Division of Glasgow, 1900-6? for Dulwich, 1906-10; for 
Bootle, 1910-18? for Glasgow Central, 1918-23? 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, 1902? 
supported Joseph Chamberlain's campaign for tariff reform 
and Imperial Preference? elected Conservative Party 
leader, 1911; vehement opponent of the Third Home Rule 
Bill, 1912-14? Colonial Secretary, 1915-16? Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, 1916-19? Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the 
House of Commons, 1919-21? resigned, March 1921? Prime 
Minister, 1922-23? resigned after he was diagnosed with 
inoperable throat cancer.
BOURDILLON, Francis Bernard (3 March 1883 - 9 June 
1970). British academic. Education: Charterhouse? 
Balliol College, Oxford. Lecturer in German, University 
College, Reading, 1908-1914? Modern Languages Lecturer, 
Balliol College, Oxford, 1913-16? Naval Intelligence 
Division, 1916-19? assisted the British delegation to the 
Versailles Peace Conference, 1919? member of the Upper 
Silesian Commission 1920-22? Secretary to the Irish 
Boundary Commission, 1924-25? Secretary of the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1926-29? worked for 
the Foreign Office Research Department, 1943-49.
BRIDGEMAN, William Clive (31 Dec. 1864 - 14 Aug. 
1935). British politician. Education: Eton? Trinity 
College, Cambridge. Assistant Private Secretary to Lord 
Knutsford, Colonial Secretary, 1889-92. Political 
career: MP (Conservative-Unionist) for Oswestry Division, 
Shropshire, 1906-29? Junior Opposition Whip, 1911? a Lord 
Commissioner of the Treasury, 1915-16? Assistant Director 
of the War Trade Department, 1916? Parliamentary 
Secretary, Ministry of Labour, 1916? Parliamentary 
Secretary, Board of Trade, 1919-20; Secretary of Mines,
1920-22? Home Secretary, 1922-24? First Lord of the 
Admiralty, 1924-29. Created 1st Viscount Bridgeman,
1929.
BROOKE, Basil Stanlake (9 June 1888 - 18 Aug. 1973). 
Ulster politician. Born: County Fermanagh. Education: 
Winchester? Sandhurst. Served in World War I, 1914-19; 
active in the creation of Ulster Special Constabulary,
1920. Political career: MP, Northern Ireland Parliament, 
(Unionist) for Lisnaskea Division, 1929-63? Minister of 
Agriculture, 1933-41; Minister of Commerce, 1941-45?
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 1943-63. Created 1st
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Viscount Brookeborough of Colebrooke, 1952.
CAMERON, General Sir Archibald Rice (28 Aug. 1870 - 
18 June 1944). British soldier. Commissioned in the 
Black Watch, 1890; Captain, 1899? Adjutant, 1900-4;
Major, 1908? Lt.-Colonel., 1915; Bt.-Colonel, 1916? Maj.- 
General, 1921? Lt.-General, 1931; General, 1936? Military 
Secretary to Governor, Cape of Good Hope, 1904-7; served 
in the Boer War, 1899-1902? World War I, 1914-17?
Director of Staff Duties, War Office, 1925-27? General 
Officer, Commanding, 4th Division, 1927-31? General 
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Scottish Command, 1933-37; 
Governor of Edinburgh Castle, 1936-37.
CARSON, Sir Edward Henry (9 Feb. 1854 - 22 Oct. 
1935). Irish politician. Education: Portarlington 
School? Trinity College, Dublin. Barrister. Queen's 
Counsel, Irish Bar, 1889, and English Bar, 1894.
Political career: MP (Conservative-Unionist) for Dublin 
University, 1892 -1918; for Duncairn Division, Belfast,
1918-21? Solicitor-General for Ireland, 1892? Solicitor- 
General, 1900-6? Ulster Unionist leader, 1911-21? 
Attorney-General, 1915? First Lord of the Admiralty,
1917? Member of the War Cabinet without Portfolio,
1917-18? Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, 1921-29. Created 
Baron Carson of Duncairn (life peerage), 1921.
CAVE, George (23 Feb. 1856 - 29 March 1928).
British politician. Born: London. Education: St. John's 
College, Oxford. Barrister, 1880. Political career: MP 
(Conservative) for Kingston Division of Surrey, 1906-18? 
Solicitor-General, 1915-16? Home Secretary, 1916-19? Lord 
Chancellor, 1922-24 and 1924-28. Created Viscount Cave 
of Richmond, Surrey, 1918.
CECIL, Lord Edgar Algernon Robert (14 Sept. 1864 - 
24 Nov. 1958). British politician. Brother of the 4th 
Marquess of Salisbury and Lord Hugh Cecil. Education: 
Eton? University College, Oxford. Private secretary to 
his father, the 3rd Marquess of Salisbury. Called to the 
Bar, 1887. Political career: MP (Conservative) for East 
Marylebone, 1906-10? (Independent Conservative) for 
Hitchin Division, Hertfordshire, 1911-23? Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1915-16; Minister of 
Blockade, 1916-18; Assistant Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, 1918? Lord Privy Seal, 1923-24; 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1924-27. Created 
1st Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, 1923.
CECIL, Lord Hugh Richard Heathcote (14 Oct. 1869 - 
10 Dec. 1956). British politician. Brother of the 4th 
Marquess of Salisbury and Lord Robert Cecil of Chelwood. 
Education: Eton? University College, Oxford. Private 
Secretary to his father, the 3rd Marquess of Salisbury. 
Lieutenant, Royal Flying Corps, 1915. Political career: 
MP (Conservative) for Greenwich, 1895-1906? for Oxford
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University, 1910-37. Created 1st Baron Quickswood, 1941.
CHAMBERLAIN, Arthur Neville (18 March 1869 - 9 Nov. 
1940). British politician. Born: Birmingham? second son 
of Joseph Chamberlain; half-brother of Austen 
Chamberlain. Education: Rugby? Mason College,
Birmingham. Political career: Birmingham City Council, 
1911? Lord Mayor of Birmingham, 1915-16? Director-General 
of National Service and member of the War Cabinet, 1916- 
17; MP (Conservative-Unionist) for Ladywood Division of 
Birmingham, 1918-1929? for Edgbaston Division, 1929-40? 
Postmaster-General, 1922-23? Paymaster-General, 1923? 
Minister of Health, 1923, 1924-29, and 1931? Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, 1923-24 and 1931-37? Chairman of the 
Conservative Party, 1930-31? Prime Minister and First 
Lord of the Treasury, 1937-1940? Lord President of the 
Council, 1940.
CHAMBERLAIN, Sir Joseph Austen (16 Oct. 1863 - 16 
March 1937). British politician. Born: Birmingham? 
eldest son of Joseph Chamberlain; half-brother of Neville 
Chamberlain. Education: Rugby? Trinity College, 
Cambridge. Political career: MP (Liberal-, later 
Conservative-Unionist) for East Worcestershire, 1892- 
1914? for West Birmingham, 1914-37? Civil Lord of the 
Admiralty, 1895-1900? Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury, 1900-2? Postmaster-General, 1902-3? Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, 1903-5; Secretary of State for India, 
1915-17; resigned, 1917? Minister without Portfolio and 
member of the War Cabinet, 1918-19? Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, 1919-21; Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the 
House of Commons, 1921-22? leader of the Conservative 
Party, 1921-22; took part in the Irish Treaty 
negotiations, 1921? Foreign Secretary, 1924-1929? First 
Lord of the Admiralty, 1931.
CHARTRES, John Smith (5 Oct. 1862 - 14 May 1927). 
Irish political activist. Born: Birkenhead, England, the 
son of Irish parents. Education: Wellington College, 
Berkshire? London University. Admitted to the English 
Bar, 1908? reference librarian, The Times. 1904-14? 
economics correspondent, Daily Graphic. 1914-15. Joined 
the Ministry of Munitions, first as a secretarial 
assistant in the Intelligence and Record branch, 1915-18, 
later as Section Director, Labour Intelligence and 
Statistics Section, 1918. Transferred to the Ministry of 
Labour, serving as Principal Officer of the Secretariat 
and General Branch, London, 1918-19? again transferred to 
the ministry's Irish Department, 1920. Converted to 
Irish republican cause after meeting Arthur Griffith and 
Michael Collins? arms purchaser for the IRA in Germany, 
1921? appointed joint chief secretary to the Irish Treaty 
delegation with Erskine Childers, 1921? supported the 
Treaty? Provisional Government publicity agent in Germany 
and France, 1921-22? transferred to the Free State's 
Department of Industry and Commerce, 1922-27.
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CHILDERS, Robert Erskine (25 June 1870 - 24 Nov. 
1922). Irish Republican politician. Born: London, reared 
in County Wicklow; cousin of Robert Barton. Education: 
Haileybury; Trinity College, Cambridge. Clerk of the 
House of Commons, 1894-1910; served in the British Army 
in the Boer War and wounded in action, 1899; published 
best-selling novel, The Riddle in the Sands. 1903; 
converted to the Home Rule cause, 1908; smuggled arms for 
Irish Volunteers aboard his yacht, July 1914; served in 
the Royal Navy Air Services, 1914-19; member of the 
secretariat of the Irish Convention, 1917-18; converted 
to republicanism, 1919. Political career: MP/TD (Sinn 
Fein), Kildare-Wicklow, 1918-22; editor of the Irish 
Bulletin and Director of Publicity; one of two chief 
secretaries to the Irish Treaty delegation, 1921; opposed 
the agreement and joined anti-Treaty IRA; arrested by 
Provisional Government troops, court-martialled and 
executed for possession of a revolver.
CHURCHILL, Sir Winston Leonard Spencer (30 Nov. 1874 
- 24 Jan. 1965). British politician, soldier, and 
writer. Born: Blenheim Palace, England. Education: 
Harrow; Sandhurst. Entered the Army, 1895; served in 
India and the Sudan; correspondent for the Morning Post 
in the Boer War, 1899-1900; captured but escaped; joined 
South African Light Horse; served in World War I as Lt. 
Colonel, 1916-17. Political career: MP (Conservative) 
for Oldham, 1900-4; (Liberal) for Oldham, 1904-6; for 
Northwest Manchester, 1906-8; for Dundee, 1908-18; 
(Coalition Liberal) for Dundee, 1918-22; 
(Constitutionalist, then Conservative) for Epping 
Division of Essex, 1924-45; for Woodford, 1945-64; Under­
secretary of State for Colonies, 1906-8; President of the 
Board of Trade, 1908-10; Home Secretary, 1910-11; First 
Lord of the Admiralty, 1911-15; Chancellor of the Duchy 
of Lancaster, 1915; Minister of Munitions, 1917;
Secretary of State for War and Air, 1919-21; Colonial 
Secretary, 1921-22; took part in Irish Treaty 
negotiations, 1921; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1924-29; 
First Lord of the Admiralty, 1939-40; Prime Minister and 
Defence Minister, 1940-45; Opposition Leader, 1945-51; 
Prime Minister, 1951-55; Defence Minister, 1951-52.
CLARK, Sir Ernest (13 April 1864 - 26 August 1951). 
Northern Irish civil servant. Education: privately; 
King's College, London. Barrister, 1894. Assistant 
Secretary, Inland Revenue, 1919; Secretary, Royal 
Commission on Income Tax, 1919-20; Assistant Under­
secretary for Ireland, 1920-21; Secretary, Treasury of 
Northern Ireland, 1921-25; member of the Australian 
Economic Mission, 1928-29; member of the Joint Exchequer 
Board of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1930; 
Governor of Tasmania, 1933-45.
COLLINS, John Henry (3 March 1880 - 12 January
1952). Northern Irish solicitor and nationalist. Born:
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County Down. Education: Christian Brothers School,
Newry. Solicitor, 1910? senior partner, Collins & 
Collins? legal adviser to North-East Boundary Bureau for 
County Down. Political career: MP, Northern Ireland 
Parliament, (Nationalist) for South Down, 1929-33.
COLLINS, Michael (16 Oct. 1890 - 22 Aug. 1922).
Irish soldier and politician. Education: Lissvaird and 
Clonakilty National Schools. Emigrated to London where 
he worked as a bank clerk? joined the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood, 1909? returned to Ireland to take part in 
the Easter Rising? interned at Frognoch Prison, Wales, 
1916. On his release, Collins set about reorganising the 
republican movement as Secretary of the Irish National 
Aid and Irish Volunteer Dependents' Fund, and as Adjutant 
General of the Irish Volunteers. Political career: MP/TD 
(Sinn Fein) for South Cork, 1918-22? MP (Sinn Fein), 
Northern Ireland Parliament, for County Armagh, 1921-22? 
Minister of Home Affairs, 1919? Minister of Finance, 
1919-21? organised the National Loan? President of the 
Supreme Council of the IRB, 1919-22? IRA Director of 
Organisation and of Intelligence, 1919-21? Acting 
President of Dail Eireann, 1920? delegate to the Irish 
Treaty negotiations? led pro-Treaty side in Dail debates? 
Chairman of the Provisional Government, 1922? resigned as 
chairman to become commander-in-chief of the Free State 
Army, July 1922? killed in action.
COLWYN, 1st Baron, Frederick Henry Smith (24 Jan. 
1859 - 26 Jan. 1946). British rubber and cotton 
manufacturer. Director of Martin's Bank, Ltd. Served on 
various government committees, notably the Northern 
Ireland Special Arbitration Committee, which he chaired. 
Created 1st Baron Colwyn, 1917.
COPE, Sir Alfred William (14 Jan. 1877 - 13 May
1954). British civil servant. Born: London. Entered 
government service as a boy clerk? joined the detective 
branch, Customs and Excise, 1896? Second Secretary, 
Ministry of Pensions, 1919-20, where his administrative 
skills brought him to the attention of Lloyd George? 
Assistant Under-Secretary for Ireland and Clerk of the 
Irish Privy Council, 1920-22. Retired from the civil 
service to become General Secretary, National Liberal 
Organisation, 1922-24.
COSGRAVE, William Thomas (5 June 1880 - 16 Nov. 
1965). Irish politician. Born: Dublin. Education: 
Christian Brothers Schools. Joined the Irish Volunteers? 
took part in the Easter Rising, 1916. Political career: 
member of Dublin Corporation, 1909-22? Alderman, 1920? MP 
(Sinn Fein) for Kilkenny City, 1917-18? MP/TD for 
Kilkenny North, 1918-22? (Sinn Fein, later Cumann na 
nGaedheal) for Counties Carlow and Kilkenny, 1922-27? for 
Cork, 1927-44? Minister for Local Government, 1919-22? 
supported the Treaty? member, and later Chairman of the
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Provisional Government, 1922? President of Dail Eireann, 
September-December 1922; first President of the Executive 
Council of the Irish Free State, 1922-32; while 
President, held portfolio of Minister of Finance, 1922- 
23, and Minister of Defence, 1924; founded Cumann na 
nGaedheal Party, 1923? founder-member and joint vice 
president of Fine Gael Party, 1933? Fine Gael president, 
1935-44.
CRAIG, Charles Curtis (19 Feb. 1869 - 28 Jan. 1960). 
Ulster politician. Brother of Sir James Craig.
Education: Clifton College. Served in World War I with 
the Ulster Division? wounded and taken prisoner, 1916. 
Political career: MP (Unionist) for South Antrim, 1903- 
22? for County Antrim, 1922-29? Parliamentary Secretary 
to the Ministry of Pensions, 1923-24.
CRAIG, Sir James (8 Jan. 1871 - 24 Nov. 1940).
Ulster Unionist politician. Born: Strandstown, Belfast. 
Education: private and Merchiston Castle, Edinburgh.
Left school at 17 to work as a stockbroker in Belfast and 
London. Opened his own stock-brokerage firm and was a 
founder-member of the Belfast Stock Exchange, 1892? 
served in the Boer War, 1899-1902? quarter-master general 
of the 36th (Ulster) Division, World War I, 1914-15. 
Political career: MP (Conservative-Unionist) for East 
County Down Division, 1906-18? for Mid-Down, 1918-21? 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Pensions,
1919-20? Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the 
Admiralty, 1920-21, where he worked closely with Walter 
Long. Craig was Sir Edward Carson's principal lieutenant 
during the pre-war Home Rule Crisis and was a leading 
figure in the Ulster Unionist Council and the Orange 
Order. Succeeded Carson as leader of the Ulster 
Unionists, Feb. 1921, and became Northern Ireland's first 
Prime Minister, June 1921, positions he held for the rest 
of his life. Created 1st Viscount Craigavon, 1927.
CURTIS. Lionel George (7 March 1872 - 24 Nov.
1955). British civil servant. Education: Haileybury?
New College, Oxford. Called to the Bar? served in the 
Boer War; member of Lord Milner's 'Kindergarten' of civil 
servants; Town Clerk of Johannesburg? Assistant Colonial 
Secretary to the Transvaal for Local Government? member 
of the Transvaal Legislative Council? British Secretary 
to the Irish Treaty Conference, 1921? Colonial Office 
Adviser on Irish Affairs, 1921-24.
CURZON, George Nathaniel (11 Jan. 1859 - 20 March 
1925). British politician. Born: Derbyshire, England. 
Education: Eton? Balliol College, Oxford. Political 
career: MP (Conservative) for the Southport Division of 
Lancashire, 1886-98? Under-Secretary of State for India,
1891-92? Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
1892-98; Viceroy of India, 1898-1905? Lord Privy Seal,
1915-16? President of the Air Board, 1916? Lord President
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of the Council and member of the War Cabinet, 1916-19; 
Leader of the House of Lords, 1916-24; Foreign Secretary,
1919-24; broke with the Coalition and joined the Bonar 
Law government; Lord President of the Council, 1924-25. 
Created Earl, 1911, later Marquess Curzon of Kedleston,
1921.
DAVIDSON, Frances Joan (29 May 1894 - 25 Nov. 1985). 
British politician. Born: London; wife of J.C.C.
Davidson and confidante of Stanley Baldwin. Education: 
Kensington High School and in Germany. Political career: 
MP (Conservative) for Hemel Hempsted Division of 
Hertfordshire, 1937-1959. Created Baroness Northchurch 
(life peerage), 1963.
DAVIDSON, John Colin Campbell (23 Feb. 1889 - 11 
Dec. 1970). British politician. Born: Aberdeen, 
Scotland. Education: Westminster; Pembroke College, 
Cambridge. Called to the Bar, 1913. Private Secretary 
to the Colonial Secretary (Lord Crewe), 1910; to Lord 
Harcourt, 1910-15; and to Andrew Bonar Law, 1915-16; 
Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
Leader of House of Commons, 1916-20. Political career:
MP (Conservative-Unionist) for Hemel Hempstead Division 
of Hertfordshire, 1920-1923, and 1924-37; Parliamentary 
Private Secretary to Bonar Law, 1920-21, to Stanley 
Baldwin, 1921-22, and to Bonar Law again, 1922-23; 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1923-24; 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, 1924-27; 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1931-37. 
Conservative Party Chairman, 1927-30. Confidant of Bonar 
Law and Baldwin. Created 1st Viscount Davidson of Little 
Gaddesden, 1937.
DERBY, 17th Earl of, Edward George Villiers Stanley 
(4 April 1865 - 4 Feb. 1948). British politician. Born: 
London. Education: Wellington College. Lieutenant, 
Grenadier Guards, 1885-95; Aide-de-camp to the Governor- 
General of Canada, 1889-91; served in the Boer War 1899- 
1901. Political career: MP (Conservative) for West 
Houghton Division of Lancashire, 1892-1906; a Lord of the 
Treasury, 1895-1900; Financial Secretary to the War 
Office, 1900-3; Postmaster-General, 1903-05; Director- 
General of Recruiting, 1915-16; Under-Secretary for War, 
1916; Secretary of State for War, 1916-18 and 1922-24; 
Ambassador to France, 1918-20.
DE VALERA, Eamon (14 Oct. 1882 - 29 Aug. 1975).
Irish politician. Born: New York; reared in County 
Limerick. Education: Christian Brothers School, County 
Cork; Blackrock College; University College Dublin.
Joined the Gaelic League and, later, the Irish 
Volunteers; commandant of the 3rd Brigade during the 
Easter Rising, 1916; captured and imprisoned, 1916-17. 
Political career: MP/TD (Sinn Fein, later Fianna Fail) 
for East Clare, 1917-59; MP, Northern Ireland Parliament,
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(Sinn Fein) for County Down, 1921-25 and 1925-29; Sinn 
Fein President, 1917-26, and head of the Irish 
Volunteers, 1917-22? imprisoned, 1918, but escaped the 
following year? elected President of Dail Eireann, 1919? 
toured the United States of America, 1919-20? elected 
'President of the Irish Republic7 by the Dail, Aug. 1921? 
opposed the Treaty and resigned as President to joined 
the anti-Treaty IRA, 1922? imprisoned, 1923-24? founder- 
president of Fianna Fail, 1926? formed coalition 
government with Irish Labour Party, 1932? Free State 
President and later Taoiseach of Eire, 1932-48, 1951-54, 
and 1957-59? drafted new Irish Constitution, 1937? 
President of the Republic of Ireland, 1959-73.
DEVLIN, Joseph (13 Feb. 1871 - 18 Jan. 1934). 
Northern Irish politician. Born: Belfast. Education: 
Christian Brothers School, Belfast. Journalist, the 
Irish News. 1891-93. Political career: MP (Nationalist)
for Kilkenny North, 1902-6? for West Belfast, 1906-18? 
for Falls Division of Belfast, 1918-22? for Fermanagh and 
Tyrone, 1929-34? MP, Northern Ireland Parliament, 
(Nationalist) for County Antrim and West Belfast, 1921- 
25; West Belfast, 1925-29? and Belfast Central, 1929-34.
DEVONSHIRE, 9th Duke of, Victor Christian William 
Cavendish (31 May 1868 - 6 May 1938). British 
politician. Education: Eton? Trinity College, Cambridge. 
Political career: MP (Liberal-Unionist) for Derbyshire 
West, 1891-1908? Treasurer of His Majesty7s Household, 
1900-3? Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1903-5? a 
Civil Lord of the Admiralty, 1915-16? Governor-General of 
Canada, 1916-21? Colonial Secretary, 1922-24.
DUFFY, George Gavan (21 Oct. 1882 - 10 June 1951). 
Irish politician and lawyer. Education: French schools 
and Stonyhurst. Political career: MP/TD (Sinn Fein), 
South Dublin, 1918-23? Sinn Fein representative at the 
Paris Peace Conference, 1919? envoy to Italy, 1920? 
delegate, Irish Treaty negotiations, 1921? reluctantly 
recommended Treaty to Dail Eireann? Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, 1922? resigned from the Dail, 1923? High Court 
judge, 1936? President of the High Court, 1946.
DUGGAN, Eamon (? 1874 - 6 June 1936). Irish 
politician. Born: County Meath. Education: Dublin 
schools. Qualified as a solicitor, 1914. Joined the 
Irish Volunteers? took part in the Easter Rising, 1916? 
interned, 1916-17? Director of Intelligence, Irish 
Volunteers, 1918. Political career: MP/TD (Sinn Fein) 
for South Meath, 1918-22? TD for Counties Louth and 
Meath, 1921-23? (Cumann na nGaedheal) for County Meath,
1923-33? captured and again interned, 1920-21? delegate, 
Irish Treaty negotiations, 1921? supported the Treaty? 
Provisional Government Home Affairs Minister, 1922? 
Minister without Portfolio, 1922-23? Parliamentary 
Secretary to the President of the Executive Council and
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to the Ministry of Defence, 1927-32; member of Seanad 
Eireann, 1933-36.
DUGGAN, George Chester (? - 15 June 1969). Northern 
Irish civil servant. Education: The High School, Dublin? 
Trinity College, Dublin. Entered the civil service,
1908; Admiralty, 1908-10 and 1914-16? Ministry of 
Shipping, 1917-19; Chief Secretary's Office, Dublin 
Castle, 1910-14 and 1919-21? Assistant Secretary,
Northern Ireland Ministry of Finance, 1922-25? Principal 
Assistant Secretary, Northern Ireland Ministry of 
Finance, 1925.
FEETHAM, Richard (22 Nov. 1874 - 5 Nov. 1965).
South African jurist. Born: Monmouthshire, Wales. 
Education: Marlborough; New College, Oxford. Called to 
the Bar, 1899. Emigrated to South Africa. Deputy Town 
Clerk, Johannesburg, 1902? Town Clerk, 1903-05? Advocate 
of the Supreme Court, Transvaal; member the Transvaal 
Legislative Council, 1907-10? Legal Adviser to the 
British High Commissioner to South Africa (Lord 
Selborne), 1907: Member for Parktown in Legislative 
Assembly, Union of South Africa, 1915-23; Justice of the 
Supreme Court of South Africa, 1923-30? Chairman of the 
Irish Boundary Commission, 1924-25; Chairman of the Local 
Government Commission, Kenya Colony, 1926? Adviser to 
Shanghai Municipal Council, 1930-31; Judge-President of 
Natal Provincial Division, 1931-39; later Chancellor of 
the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg? opposed 
apartheid.
FISHER, Herbert Albert Laurens (21 March 1865 - 18 
April 1940). British politician and historian. Born: 
London. Education: Winchester? New College, Oxford. 
Political career: MP (Liberal) for Hallam Division of 
Sheffield, 1916-18? (National Liberal) for English 
Universities, 1918-26? President of the Board of 
Education, 1916-22? British delegate to the League of 
Nations Assembly, 1920-22.
FISHER, Joseph R. (? 1855 - 26 Oct. 1939). Ulster 
journalist. Born: County Down. Education: Royal Belfast 
Academical Institute? Queen's University, Belfast.
Foreign editor, the Daily Chronicle. 1881; assistant 
editor, The Standard. 1883-91; editor and managing editor 
of the Northern Whig. 1891-1913? Northern Ireland's 
representative on the Boundary Commission, 1924-25.
FISHER, Sir Norman Fenwick Warren (22 Sept. 1879 - 
25 Sept. 1948). British civil servant. Born: London. 
Education: Winchester? Hertford College, Oxford. Clerk, 
Secretaries Office of the Board of Inland Revenue, 1903; 
Private Secretary to the Chairman of the Board of Inland 
Revenue, 1908? Special Commissioner of Income Tax, 1910; 
seconded to the National Health Insurance Commission, 
1912-13? Deputy Chairman, 1914-18, and Chairman, 1918-19,
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of the Board of Inland Revenue; Permanent Secretary to 
the Treasury and Head of the Civil Service, 1919-39; 
Regional Commissioner for the north-western civil defence 
region, 1939-40; Special Commissioner for London, 1940- 
42.
FITZGERALD, Desmond (? 1889 - 9 April 1947). Irish 
politician. Participated in Easter Rising, 1916. 
Political career; MP/TD (Sinn Fein) for Pembroke 
Division, Dublin, 1918-22; Dail Eireann Director of 
Publicity and editor of The Irish Bulletin; Provisional 
Government Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sept.-Dec. 1922; 
Irish Free State Minister of External Affairs, 1922-27; 
Minister of Defence, 1927-32; member of Seanad Eireann, 
1938-47.
FREESTON, Sir Leslie Brian (11 Aug. 1892 - 16 July
1958). British civil servant. Education: Willaston 
School; New College, Oxford. Served in World War I, 
1914-19. Joined the Colonial Office, 1919; Secretary, 
Colonial Development Advisory Committee, 1929-31; 
Secretary, East African Governors' Conference, 1936; 
Assistant Secretary, Colonial Office, 1938; Chief 
Secretary, Tanganyika, 1939-43; Governor, Leeward 
Islands, 1944-48; Governor of Fiji, and High Commissioner 
to the Western Pacific, 1948-52; Secretary-General, South 
Pacific Commission, 1951-54.
FRENCH, John Denton Pinkstone (28 Sept. 1852 - 22 
May 1925). British soldier. Born: Ripple, Kent. 
Education: Eastman's Naval Academy, Portsmouth; left the 
Navy to join the Suffolk Artillery Militia, 1870; served 
in the Sudan, 1884-85, and in the Boer War, 1899-1902; 
Inspector-General of the Forces, 1907-11; Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, 1911-14; Field-Marshal, 1913; 
Commander-in-Chief, British Expeditionary Force, 1914-15; 
created Viscount French of Ypres and of High Lake, Jan. 
1916; Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, 1916-18; Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland, May 1918 - April 1921; created 
Earl of Ypres, 1922.
GREENWOOD, Sir Hamar (7 Feb. 1870 - 10 Sept. 1948). 
British politician. Born: Ontario, Canada. Education: 
Public School, Whitby, Canada. Served in World War I, 
1914-16. Political career: MP (Liberal) for York, 1906- 
10; for Sunderland, 1910-22; (Conservative) for East 
Walthamstow, 1924-29; Under-Secretary of State for Home 
Affairs, 1919; Secretary for Overseas Trade, 1919-20; 
Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1920-22. Created 1st Baron 
Greenwood of Holbourne, 1937.
GREER, Sir Francis Nugent (24 Feb. 1869 - 6 Feb. 
1925). British civil servant. Education: Trinity 
College, Dublin. Called to the Bar: Ireland, 1893; 
England, 1912. Parliamentary Draftsman, Irish Office, 
1908-23; Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury, 1923-25.
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GREY, Sir Edward (25 April 1862 - 7 Sept. 1933). 
British politician and diplomat. Education: Winchester? 
Balliol College, Oxford. Political career: MP (Liberal) 
for Berwick-on-Tweed, 1885-1916; Under-Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, 1892-95? Foreign Secretary, 1905-16? 
Temporary Ambassador to the USA, 1919. Created 1st 
Viscount Grey of Fallodon, 1916.
GRIFFITH, ARTHUR (31 March 1871 - 12 Aug. 1922). 
Irish politician and journalist. Born: Dublin.
Education: Christian Brothers School, Dublin. Apprentice 
printer. A founder-member of the Celtic Literary 
Society, Griffith also belonged to the Gaelic League and, 
for a time, was a member of the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood. Left Ireland for South Africa, where he 
supported the Boer cause in the South African War? 
returned to Ireland to edit the United Irishman; 
published The Resurrection of Hungary: A Parallel for 
Ireland, advocating a dual monarchy for Ireland and the 
rest of the United Kingdom, 1904? founded Sinn Fein, 
1907? opposed the Third Home Rule Bill, 1912-14; joined 
the Irish Volunteers, 1913? imprisoned, 1916-17? stood 
aside to allow Eamon de Valera to become Sinn Fein 
president, 1917. Political career: MP/TD (Sinn Fein) for 
East Cavan, 1917-22; MP, Northern Ireland Parliament, 
(Sinn Fein) for Counties Fermanagh and Tyrone, 1921-22? 
Minister of Home Affairs and Acting President of Dail 
Eireann, 1919-20? re-arrested, Dec. 1920 - July 1921? 
accompanied de Valera to first Anglo-Irish talks, July 
1921? led Irish delegation in Treaty negotiations, 1921? 
elected President of Dail Eireann, Jan. 1922.
GRIGG, Edward William Macleay (8 Sept. 1879 - 1 Dec. 
1955). British politician and political adviser. 
Education: Winchester; New College, Oxford. Joined the 
editorial staff of The Times. 1903? served in World War 
I? military secretary to the Prince of Wales, 1919? 
private secretary to Lloyd George, 1921-22? Governor, 
Commander-in-Chief, and High Commissioner for Transport, 
Kenya Colony, 1925-31. Political career: MP (National 
Liberal) for Oldham, 1922-25? (National Conservative) for 
Altrincham, 1933-45? Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Ministry of Information, 1939-40? Financial Secretary,
War Office, 1940? Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for War, 1940-42? Minister Resident in the Middle 
East, 1944-45. Created 1st Baron Altrincham, 1945.
GRIGG, Sir Percy James (16 Dec. 1890 - 5 May 1964). 
British civil servant. Born: Exmouth, England.
Education: Bournemouth School? St. John's College, 
Cambridge. Joined the Treasury, 1913? Principal Private 
Secretary to successive Chancellors of the Exchequer,
1921-30? Chairman, Board of Customs and Excise, 1930? 
Chairman, Board of Inland Revenue, 1930-34? Finance 
Member of Government of India, 1934-39? Permanent Under­
secretary of State, for War, 1939-42. Political career:
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MP (National) for East Cardiff, 1942-45? Secretary of 
State for War, 1942-45.
HAWTREY, Sir Ralph George (23 Nov. 1879 - 21 March 
1975). British civil servant. Education: Eton? Trinity 
College, Cambridge. Entered the Admiralty civil service, 
1903? Treasury, 1904-45? Director of Financial Enquiries,
1919-45.
HEALY, Cahir (2 Dec. 1877 - 8 Feb. 1970). Northern 
Irish politician. Born: County Donegal. Political 
career: MP (Sinn Fein) for Fermanagh and Tyrone, 1922-24? 
(Nationalist) for Fermanagh and South Tyrone, 1924-31 and 
1950-55? MP, Northern Ireland Parliament, (Nationalist) 
for Fermanagh and Tyrone, 1925-65. Interned, 1922-24 and 
1941-42.
HEALY, Timothy Michael (17 May 1855 - 26 March
1931). Irish politician. Born: County Cork? uncle of 
Kevin O'Higgins. Education: Christian Brothers School, 
Fermoy. Emigrated to England? parliamentary 
correspondent for The Nation. 1878-80? called to the 
Irish Bar, 1884. Political career: MP (Nationalist), 
Wexford, 1880-83? South Londonderry, 1885-86? North 
Longford, 1886-92? North Louth, 1892-1910? and North-East 
Cork, 1910-18? played a leading role in toppling Charles 
Stewart Parnell and splitting the Irish Parliamentary 
Party, 1890-91? rejoined the IPP, 1900? sympathized with 
Sinn Fein and stood down in 1918 general election? 
selected as first Governor-General of the Irish Free 
State, 1922-28.
HENDERSON, Arthur (13 Sept. 1863 - 20 Oct. 1935). 
British trade union leader and politician. Born:
Glasgow. Political career: MP (Labour) for Barnard 
Castle Division, Durham, 1903-18? Widnes, 1919-22? for 
Newcastle, 1923? for Burnley, 1924-31? for Clay Cross 
Division, 1933-35? chairman of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party 1908-10 and 1914-17? Labour Party Chief Whip, 1914,
1921-24, and 1925-27? Paymaster-General and government 
labour adviser, 1916? Minister without Portfolio and 
member of the War Cabinet, 1916-17? member of the British 
Mission to Russia, 1917? Home Secretary in the first 
Labour Government, 1924? Foreign Secretary, 1929-31? 
President of the World Disarmament Conference, 1932-33.
HEWART, Gordon (7 Jan. 1870 - 5 May 1943). British 
politician and jurist. Born: Bury, England. Education: 
Manchester Grammar School? University College, Oxford. 
Called to the Bar, Inner Temple, 1902. Political career: 
MP (Conservative) for East Leicester, 1913-22? Solicitor- 
General, 1916-19? Attorney-General, 1919-22? attended 
Versailles Peace Conference, 1919? took part in the Irish 
Treaty negotiations, 1921? Lord Chief Justice of England,
1922-40. Created 1st Viscount Hewart of Bury in County 
Lancaster, 1940.
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HOARE, Sir Samuel John Gurney (24 Feb. 1880 - 7 May
1959). British politician. Born: London. Education: 
Harrow; New College, Oxford. Assistant Private Secretary 
to the Colonial Secretary, 1905. Political career: MP 
(Conservative) for Chelsea, 1910-44? Secretary of State 
for Air, 1922-24 and 1924-29, with a seat in the Cabinet,
1923-24 and 1924-29? Conservative Party Treasurer, 1930- 
31? Secretary of State for India, 1931-35? Foreign 
Secretary, 1935? First Lord of the Admiralty, 1936-37? 
Home Secretary, 1937-39? Lord Privy Seal, 1939-40 ? 
Secretary of State for Air, 1940? Ambassador to Spain on 
Special Mission, 1940-44. Created 1st Viscount 
Templewood, 1944.
HORNE, Sir Robert Stevenson (28 Feb. 1871 - 3 Sept. 
1940). Born: Stirlingshire, Scotland. Education: George 
Watson's College, Edinburgh; University of Glasgow.
Called to the Scottish Bar, 1896. Assistant Inspector- 
General of Transportation, 1917? Director of Department 
of Materials and Priority, Admiralty, 1917? Director of 
Admiralty Labour Department, 1918? Third Civil Lord of 
the Admiralty, 1918. Political career: MP (Conservative- 
Unionist) Hillhead Division of Glasgow, 1918-37? Minister 
of Labour, 1919-20? President of the Board of Trade,
1920-21? Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1921-22. Created 
1st Viscount Horne of Slamannan, 1937.
JONES, Thomas (27 Sept. 1870 - 15 Oct. 1955).
British civil servant. Born: Monmouthshire, Wales. 
Education: Pengam County School? University College, 
Aberystwyth? Glasgow University. Career: Barrington 
Lecturer in Ireland, 1904-5? Assistant to Professor of 
Political Economy and Lecturer in Economics, Glasgow 
University? Special Investigator, Poor Law Commission, 
1906-9? Professor of Economics, Queen's University, 
Belfast, 1909-10? Secretary Welsh National Campaign 
against Tuberculosis, 1910-11: Secretary, National Health 
Insurance Commissioners (Wales), 1912-16? Deputy 
Secretary to the Cabinet, 1916-30. Secretary, later 
chairman of the Pilgrim Trust, 1930-45.
JOHNSON, Thomas (? 1872- 17 Jan. 1963). Irish trade 
unionist and politician. Born: Liverpool? left school at 
the age of 12? immigrated to Ireland, 1892? founder- 
member of the Irish Labour Party, 1912? Vice-Chairman of 
the party's executive, 1912-23; agreed to the Labour 
Party's abstention from the general election of 1918 to 
avoid splitting Nationalist vote? co-authored the 
Democratic Programme adopted by the first Dail Eireann. 
Political career: TD (Labour) for County Dublin, 1922-28? 
Opposition Leader, 1922-27? resigned as Labour Party 
Secretary, 1928? represented Labour in Seanad Eireann,
1928-36? founder-member of the Labour Court, 1946.
JOYNSON—HICKS, Sir William (23 June 1865 - 8 June 
1932). British politician. Born: Canonbury, England?
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known as 'Jix'. Trained as a solicitor. Political 
career: MP (Conservative) for Manchester North-West, 
1908-10? for Brentford, 1911-18; for Twickenham, 1918-29. 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department,
1922-23; Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1923-24? 
Health Secretary, 1923? Home Secretary, 1924-29. Created 
Viscount Brentford of Newick in Sussex, 1929.
KENNEDY, Hugh (11 July 1879 - 12 Dec. 1936). Irish 
jurist. Born: Dublin. Education: private? University 
College, Dublin? Royal University of Ireland. Called to 
the Irish Bar, 1902. Member of the committee which 
drafted the Irish Free State Constitution, 1922? Law 
Officer of the Irish Provisional Government, 1922? 
Attorney-General, 1922-24. Political career: TD (Cumann 
na nGaedheal) for Dublin City South, 1923-1924? member of 
the Free State delegation to the League of Nations, 1923.
LASKI, Harold J. (30 June 1893 - 24 March 1950). 
British academic and political philosopher. Born: 
Manchester. Education: Manchester Grammar School? New 
College, Oxford. Professor of Political Science; 
assisted in framing the Irish Treaty's Oath of 
Allegiance.
LAVERY, Lady Hazel (14 March 1880 - 3 Jan. 1935). 
Born: Chicago, Illinois. Society hostess and confidante 
of British and Irish politicians. Married Irish artist 
Sir John Lavery, 1910.
LIDDELL, Sir Frederick Francis (7 June 1865 - 19 
March 1950). British civil servant. Born: Oxford. 
Education: Eton? Christ Church Oxford. Private Secretary 
to Lord Stanmore, Governor of Ceylon, 1888-90? Fellow of 
All Souls College, Oxford, 1891-1906? called to the Bar, 
1894? 1st Parliamentary Counsel, 1917-1928? Counsel to 
the Speaker, 1928-43.
LLOYD GEORGE, David (17 Jan. 1863 - 26 March 1945). 
British politician. Born: Manchester; reared in 
Llanystumdwy, Wales. Education: Llanystumdwy Church 
School and privately. Solicitor. Political career: MP 
(Liberal) for Caernarvon Boroughs, 1890-1931?
(Independent Liberal) for Caernarvon Boroughs, 1931-45? 
President of the Board of Trade, 1905-8? Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, 1908-15? Minister of Munitions, 1915-16? 
unsuccessfully attempted to broker an Irish settlement, 
1916? Secretary of State for War, 1916? Prime Minister,
1916-22. Created 1st Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor, 1945.
LONDONDERRY, 7th Marquess of, Charles Stewart Henry 
Vane-Tempest-Stewart (13 May 1878 - 11 Feb, 1949).
Ulster politician. Cousin of Winston Churchill. 
Education: Eton? Sandhurst. Served in World War I, 1914- 
15. Political career: MP (Conservative-Unionist) for 
Maidstone, 1906-15; Under-Secretary for Air, 1920-1921?
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First Commissioner of Works, 1928-29 and 1931; Secretary 
of State for Air, 1931-35? Lord Privy Seal and Leader of 
the House of Lords, 1935. Political career, Northern 
Ireland: (Unionist) Minister of Education and Leader of 
the Senate, 1921-26.
LONG, Walter Hume (13 July 1854 - 26 Sept. 1924). 
British politician. Born: Bath. Education: Harrow? 
Christ Church, Oxford (did not take a degree). Political 
career: MP (Conservative), North Wiltshire, 1880-85? for 
East Wiltshire, 1885-92? for the Derby Division of 
Liverpool, 1893-1900? for the Southern Division of 
Bristol, 1900-06? for South County Dublin, 1906-10? for 
the Strand Division of London, 1910-18? for St. George's, 
1918-21; Parliamentary Secretary to the Local Government 
Board, 1886-1905; President of the Board of Agriculture, 
1895-1900? Chief Secretary of Ireland, March 1905; Irish 
Unionist leader, 1906- 11? founded the Union Defence 
League to oppose Home Rule, 1907? unsuccessfully stood 
for the Conservative Party leadership, 1911; opposed 
Third Home Rule Bill, 1912-14; President of the Local 
Government Board, 1915-16? Under-Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, 1916-19? opposed Lloyd George's Irish 
settlement, 1916? chaired Irish Situation Committee,
1918? First Lord of the Admiralty, 1919-21? chaired 
committee charged with framing the 1920 Government of 
Ireland Act, 1919-20. Created 1st Viscount Long of 
Wraxall, 1921.
LOUGHNANE, Norman Gerald (4 April 1883 - 19 March 
1955). British civil servant. Education: London 
University. Career: Barrister? Colonial Office 
representative in the Irish Free State, 1923-24? member 
of the Financial Commission of Enquiry, Mauritius, 1931? 
member of the British Food Mission in North America,
1943.
MACDONALD, James Ramsay (12 Oct. 1866 - 9 Nov.
1937). British politician. Born: Morayshire, Scotland. 
Education: Board School. Secretary, Labour 
Representation Committee, 1900-12? chairman of the 
Independent Labour Party, 1906-9? Labour Party leader,
1911-14. Political career: MP (Labour) for Leicester, 
1906-18? for Aberavon Division of Glamorganshire, 1922- 
29? for Seaham Division, County Durham, 1929-31?
(National Labour) for Seaham Division, County Durham,
1931-35? for Scottish Universities, 1936-37? Labour Party 
and Opposition Leader, 1922-24; first Labour Prime 
Minister and Foreign Secretary, 1924? Prime Minister,
1929-35? split the Labour Party with the formation of the 
National Government, 1931? Lord President of the Council, 
1935-37.
MACLEAN, Donald (? 1864 - 15 June 1932). British 
politician. Born: Tiree. Solicitor. Political career: 
MP (Liberal) for Bath, 1906-10? for counties Peebles and
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Selkirk, 1910-18; for counties Peebles and Midlothian, 
1918-22; represented Northern Division of Cornwall, 1929- 
31; Deputy Chairman of Committees, 1911-18; knighted, 
1917; led anti-Coalition Liberal MPs following the 1918 
general election, until Asquith's return in 1920; joined 
the National Government as President of the Board of 
Education, 1931.
MACMAHON, James (20 April 1865 - 1 May 1954). Irish 
civil servant. Born: Belfast. Education: Christian 
Brothers School, Armagh; St. Patrick's College, Armagh; 
Blackrock College, County Dublin. Career: Assistant 
Secretary, Irish Post Office, 1913; Secretary to the Post 
Office of Ireland, 1916; Under-secretary to the Lord- 
Lieutenant of Ireland, 1918-1922.
MACNEILL, Eoin [John] (15 May 1867 - 15 Oct. 1945). 
Irish politician and historian. Born: County Antrim; 
brother of James MacNeill. Education: St Malachy's 
College, Belfast. Founder-member and first vice 
president of the Gaelic League, 1893; appointed first 
Professor of Early and Medieval Irish History, University 
College Dublin, 1908; supported Third Home Rule Bill, 
1912-14; founder-member and Chief of Staff of the Irish 
Volunteers, 1913-16; imprisoned, 1916-17. Political 
career: MP/TD (Sinn Fein, later Cumann na nGaedheal) for 
Derry and the National University of Ireland, 1918-27;
MP, Northern Ireland Parliament, (Sinn Fein) for Derry, 
1921-25; Minister of Finance, 1919; Minister for 
Industries, 1919-21; supported the Treaty; Minister 
without Portfolio in the Provisional Government, 1922; 
Minister of Education, 1922-25; led Irish delegation at 
the League of Nations, 1923; Free State representative to 
the Boundary Commission, 1923-25; resignation from the 
Commission and from the government effectively ending his 
political career. Headed the Irish Manuscripts 
Commission, 1927; first president of Irish Historical 
Studies, 1936.
MACNEILL, James (27 March 1869 - 12 Dec. 1938).
Irish diplomat. Born: County Antrim; brother of Eoin 
MacNeill. Education: Belvedere School; Blackrock 
College, Dublin; Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Entered 
the Indian Civil Service, 1890; immigration investigator 
to the West Indies and Fiji; Chairman of Dublin County 
Council, 1922; member of the committee which drafted the 
Irish Free State Constitution, 1922; Free State High 
Commissioner, 1922-28; Free State Governor-General, 1928- 
32.
MACREADY, General Sir Cecil Frederick Nevil (7 May 
1862 - 9 Jan. 1946). British soldier. Born: Aberdeen, 
Scotland. Education: Marlborough; Cheltenham. 
Commissioned, 1881; served in the Boer War, 1900; 
promoted to general, 1918; Commission of the Metropolitan 
Police, 1919-20; General Officer Commanding of British
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forces in Ireland, 1920-22? retired from active service, 
1923.
MASTERTON-SMITH, Sir James (24 Aug. 1878 - 4 May
1938). British civil servant. Education: Harrow 
(Scholar); Hertford College, Oxford (Scholar). Entered 
Home Civil Service, Admiralty, 1901; Private Secretary to 
Second Sea Lord, 1904-8, to the Permanent Secretary,
1908-10, and to successive First Lords of the Admiralty, 
1910-17? Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Munitions, 
1917-1919? Assistant Secretary (Additional), War Office 
and Air Ministry, 1919-20 ? Joint Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry of Labour, 1920-21? Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 1921-24.
MAXWELL, Sir Alexander (9 March 1880 - 1 July 1963). 
British civil servant. Born: Plymouth, England. 
Education: Plymouth College? Christ Church, Oxford.
Joined the Home Office, 1904? Assistant Secretary, 1924? 
Chairman of the Prison Commission of England and Wales, 
1928-32? Deputy Under- Secretary of State, Home Office, 
1932-38 ?Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Home Office, 
1938-48.
McGILLIGAN, Patrick (? 1889 - 15 Nov. 1979). Irish 
politician. Born: County Londonderry. Education: St. 
Columb's College, Derry City; Clongowes Wood College, 
Dublin; University College, Dublin. Called to the Bar, 
1921, and to the Inner Bar, 1946. Political career: 
secretary to Kevin O'Higgins, 1919-23? TD (Cumann na 
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ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT FOR A TREATY 
BETWEEN 
GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND
ARTICLE I
Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in 
the Community of Nations known as the British Empire as 
the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, 
the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South 
Africa with a Parliament having powers to make laws for 
the peace, order, and good government of Ireland, and an 
Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be 
styled and known as the Irish Free State.
ARTICLE II
Subject to the provisions hereinafter set out the 
position of the Irish Free State in relation to the 
Imperial Parliament and Government and otherwise shall be 
that of the Dominion of Canada, and the law, practice and 
constitutional usage governing the relationship of the 
Crown or the representative of the Crown and of the 
Imperial Parliament to the Dominion of Canada shall 
govern their relationship to the Irish Free State.
ARTICLE III
The representative of the Crown in Ireland shall be 
appointed in like manner as the Governor-General of 
Canada and in accordance with the practice observed in 
the making of such appointments.
ARTICLE IV
The oath to be taken by Members of the Parliament of 
the Irish Free State shall be in the following form:
I . . .  do solemnly swear true faith and 
allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free 
State as by law established and that I will be 
faithful to His Majesty King George V., his heirs 
and successors by law, in virtue of the common 
citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her 
adherence to and membership of the group of nations 
forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.
ARTICLE V
The Irish Free State shall assume liability for the 
service of the public debt of the United Kingdom as 
existing at the date hereof and towards the payment of
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war pensions as existing at that date in such proportion 
as may be fair and equitable, having regard to any just 
claims on the part of Ireland by way of set-off or 
counter-claim, the amount of such sums being determined 
in default of agreement by the arbitration of one or 
ignore independent persons being citizens of the British 
Empire.
ARTICLE VI
Until an arrangement has been made between the 
British and Irish Governments whereby the Irish Free 
State undertakes her own coastal defence, the defence by 
sea of Great Britain and Ireland shall be undertaken by 
His Majesty's Imperial Forces, but this shall not prevent 
the construction or maintenance by the Government of the 
Irish Free State of such vessels as are necessary for 
the protection of the revenue or the fisheries.
The foregoing provisions of this article shall be 
reviewed at a conference of representatives of the 
British and Irish Governments to be held at the 
expiration of five years from the date hereof with a view 
to the undertaking by Ireland of a share in her own 
coastal defence.
ARTICLE VII
The Government of the Irish Free State shall afford 
to His Majesty's Imperial Forces:
(a) In time of peace such harbour and other 
facilities as are indicated in the Annex hereto, 
or such other facilities as may from time to time 
be agreed between the British Government and the 
Government of the Irish Free State? and
(b) In time of war or of strained relations 
with a foreign power such harbour and other 
facilities as the British Government may require 
for the purposes of such defence as aforesaid.
ARTICLE VIII
With a view to securing the observance of the 
principle of international limitation of armaments, if 
the Government of the Irish Free State establishes and 
maintains a military defence force, the establishments 
thereof shall not exceed in size such proportion of the 
military establishments maintained in Great Britain as 
that which the population of Ireland bears to the 
population of Great Britain.
ARTICLE IX
The ports of Great Britain and the Irish Free State 
shall be freely open to the ships of the other country on 
payment of the customary port and other dues.
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ARTICLE X
The Government of the Irish Free State agrees to pay 
fair compensation on terms not less favourable than those 
accorded by the Act of 1920 to judges, officials, members 
of police forces and other public servants who are 
discharged by it, or who retire in consequence of the 
change of government effected in pursuance hereof.
Provided, that this agreement shall not apply to 
members of the Auxiliary Police Force or to persons 
recruited in Great Britain for the Royal Irish 
Constabulary during the two years next preceding the date 
hereof. The British Government will assume 
responsibility for such compensation or pensions as may 
be payable to any of these excepted persons.
ARTICLE XI
Until the expiration of one month from the passing 
of the Act of Parliament for the ratification of this 
instrument the powers of the Parliament and the 
Government of the Irish Free State shall not be 
exercisable as respects Northern Ireland, and the 
provisions of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 
shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, remain 
of full force and effect, and no election shall be held 
for the return of members to serve in the Parliament of 
the Irish Free State for constituencies in Northern 
Ireland, unless a resolution is passed by both Houses of 
the Parliament of Northern Ireland in favour of the 
holding of such elections before the end of the said 
month.
ARTICLE XII
If before the expiration of the said month an 
address is presented to His Majesty by both Houses of the 
Parliament of Northern Ireland to that effect, the powers 
of the Parliament and the Government of the Irish Free 
State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland, and the 
provisions of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 
(including those relating to the Council of Ireland), 
shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, 
continue to be of full force and effect, and this 
instrument shall have effect subject to the necessary 
modifications.
Provided, that if such an address is so presented, a 
Commission consisting of three persons, one to be 
appointed by the Government of the Irish Free State, one 
to be appointed by the Government of Northern Ireland, 
and one who shall be Chairman, to be appointed by the 
British Government, shall determine, in accordance with 
the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be 
compatible with economic and geographic conditions, the 
boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of 
Ireland, and for the purposes of the Government of
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Ireland Act of 1920, and of this instrument, the boundary 
of Northern Ireland shall be such as may be determined by 
such Commission.
ARTICLE XIII
For the purpose of the last foregoing article, the 
powers of the Parliament of Southern Ireland under the 
Government of Ireland Act of 1920 to elect members of the 
Council of Ireland shall, after the Parliament of the 
Irish Free State is constituted, be exercised by that 
Parliament.
ARTICLE XIV
After the expiration of the said month, if no such 
address as is mentioned in Article XII hereof is 
presented, the Parliament and Government of Northern 
Ireland shall continue to exercise as respects Northern 
Ireland the powers conferred on them by the Government of 
Ireland Act of 1920, but the Parliament and Government of 
the Irish Free State shall in Northern Ireland have in 
relation to matters in respect of which the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland has not power to make laws under that 
Act (including matters which under the said Act are 
within the jurisdiction of the Council of Ireland) the 
same powers as in the rest of Ireland, subject to such 
other provisions as may be agreed in manner hereinafter 
appearing.
ARTICLE XV
At any time after the date hereof the Government of 
Northern Ireland and the provisional Government of 
Southern Ireland, hereinafter constituted, may meet for 
the purpose of discussing the provisions, subject to 
which the last foregoing Article is to operate in the 
event of no such address as is therein mentioned being 
presented, and those provisions may include:
(a) Safeguards with regard to patronage in 
Northern Ireland;
(b) Safeguards with regard to the collection 
of revenue in Northern Ireland?
(c) Safeguards with regard to import and 
export duties affecting the trade or industry of 
Northern Ireland?
(d) Safeguards for minorities in Northern 
Ireland;
(e) The settlement of the financial relations 
between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State?
(f) The establishment and powers of a local 
militia in Northern Ireland and the relation of the 
defence forces of the Irish Free State and of 
Northern Ireland respectively?
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and if at any such meeting provisions are agreed to, the 
same shall have effect as if they were included amongst 
the provisions subject to which the powers of the 
Parliament and the Government of the Irish Free State are 
to be exercisable in Northern Ireland under Article XIV 
hereof.
ARTICLE XVI
Neither the Parliament of the Irish Free State nor 
the Parliament of Northern Ireland shall make any law so 
as either directly or indirectly to endow any religion or 
prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof or give 
any preference or impose any disability on account of 
religious belief or religious status, or affect 
prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school 
receiving public money without attending the religious 
instruction at the school, or make any discrimination as 
respects State aid between schools under the management 
of different religious denominations, or divert from
any religious denomination or any educational institution 
any of its property except for public utility purposes 
and on payment of compensation.
ARTICLE XVII
By way of provisional arrangement for the 
administration of Southern Ireland during the interval 
which must elapse between the date hereof and the 
constitution of a Parliament and Government of the Irish 
Free State in accordance therewith, steps shall be taken 
forthwith for summoning a meeting of members of 
Parliament elected for constituencies in Southern Ireland 
since the passing of the Government of Ireland Act of 
1920, and for constituting a provisional Government, and 
the British Government shall take the steps necessary 
to transfer to such provisional Government the powers and 
machinery requisite for the discharge of its duties, 
provided that every member of such provisional Government 
shall have signified in writing his or her acceptance of 
this instrument. But this arrangement shall not continue 
in force beyond the expiration of twelve months from the 
date hereof.
ARTICLE XVIII
This instrument shall be submitted forthwith by His 
Majesty's Government for the approval of Parliament and 
by the Irish signatories to a meeting summoned for the 
purpose of the members elected to sit in the House of 
Commons of Southern Ireland and, if approved, shall be 
ratified by the necessary legislation.


















SEORSA GHABHAIN UI DHUBHTHAIGH 
(GEORGE GAVAN DUFFY).
6th December 1921.
1. The following are the specific facilities 
required:
Dockyard Port at Berehaven
(a) Admiralty property and rights to be retained as 
at the date hereof. Harbour defence to remain in charge 
of British care and maintenance parties.
Queenstown
(b) Harbour defences to remain in charge of British 
care and maintenance parties. Certain mooring buoys to 
be retained for use of His Majesty's ships.
Belfast Lough
(c) Harbour defences to remain in charge of British 
care and maintenance parties.
Lough Swilly
(d) Harbour defences to remain in charge of British 
care and maintenance parties
Aviation
(e) Facilities in the neighbourhood of the above 
ports for coastal defence by air.
ANNEX
Oil Fuel Storage
(f) Haulbowline {To be offered for sale to 
(commercial, companies under 
{guarantee that purchasers 





2. A Convention shall be made between the British 
Government and the Government of the Irish Free State to 
give effect to the following conditions:
(a) That submarine cables shall not be landed or 
wireless stations for communication with places outside
Ireland be established except by agreement with the 
British Government? that the existing cable landing 
rights and wireless concessions shall not be withdrawn 
except by agreement with the British Government; and that 
the British Government shall be entitled to land 
additional submarine cables or establish additional 
wireless stations for communication with places outside 
Ireland.
(b) That lighthouses, buoys, beacons, and any 
navigational marks or navigational aids shall be 
maintained by the Government of the Irish Free State as 
at the date hereof, and shall not be removed or added to 
except by agreement with the British Government.
(c) That war signal stations shall be closed down 
and left in charge of care and maintenance parties, the 
Government of the Irish Free State being offered the 
option of taking them over and working them for 
commercial purposes subject to Admiralty inspection and 
guaranteeing the upkeep of existing telegraphic 
communication therewith.
3. A Convention shall be made between the same 








I understand that you wish to be reassured as to the 
meaning of the clause in the Articles of Agreement which 
relates to the determination of the boundary between 
Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland.
It seems to me right in the first place to set out 
the exact words used in the Treaty, and to draw attention 
to the context in which they appear.
They appear in the form of a proviso to Article 12 
of the Treaty. The main purpose of that Article is to 
preserve to Northern Ireland, if the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland desire, the maintenance of the 
provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, so far 
as they relate to Northern Ireland. The Article 
contemplates the maintenance of Northern Ireland as an 
entity already existing - not as a new State to be 
brought into existence upon the ratification of the 
Articles of Agreement. It is regarded as a creature 
already constituted, having its own Parliament and its 
own defined boundaries.
The Article then proceeds (by way of proviso, as I 
have said) to provide for the modification of those 
boundaries, and it does so in the following form (leaving 
out immaterial words)
"Provided t h a t  a Commission shall
"determine, in accordance with the wishes of the 
"inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with 
"economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries 
"between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland, 
"and for the purposes of the Government of Ireland 
"Act. 1920. and of this instrument, the boundary 
"of Northern Ireland shall be such as may be 
"determined by such Commission."
We have, therefore, a territory, namely, that of 
Northern Ireland, the boundaries of which are defined by 
the Act of 1920, and we have an Agreement that those 
boundaries should be subject to determination by a 
Commission in accordance with certain conditions set out 
in the Treaty.
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This seems to me to differ in no way from the 
ordinary precedents set in innumerable Treaties between 
European States during the 19th century. Compare, for 
example, the establishment of the Principality of 
Bulgaria by the Treaty of Berlin. Article 2 of that 
Treaty sets out in detail the territories to be comprised 
within the new Principality just as the Government of 
Ireland Act sets out in detail the territories to be 
comprised within Northern Ireland.
The Article of the Berlin Treaty proceeds (I 
translate myself for clearness sake):-
"This delimitation will be fixed on the spot by 
"the European Commission on which the signatory 
"Powers will be represented. It is understood -
"(1) That this Commission will take into 
"consideration the necessity of His 
"Imperial Majesty the Sultan being able 
"to defend the frontiers of the Balkans 
"of Eastern Rumania.
"(2) That no fortifications can be 
"erected in a zone ten kilometres 
"round Samakow."
The only difference, as it seems to me, between the 
governing instruments in the two cases is that in one 
case (that of Bulgaria) the fixing of the territory and 
the power of rectifying the boundary of the territory so 
fixed are included in one document, and that in the other 
case (that of the Irish Treaty) the Government of Ireland 
Act, to which express reference is made in the Treaty, 
and the Treaty itself must be read together. Of course 
different considerations are set out in the two cases as 
those which the Commission is to apply as criteria, but 
this constitutes no difference in principle.
It appears to me inconceivable that any competent 
and honest arbitrator could take the opposite view. If 
the Article had meant what Craig now apprehends that it 
does, quite obviously the Agreement would have been 
drafted in very different words. I might remark 
incidentally that I can hardly suppose that in that case 
the duty would have been committed to a Commission. The 
natural course would have been that the Governments 
concerned should retain everything but details in their 
own hands, in accordance again with the precedents of 
Treaties. But assuming that it was intended that a 
Commission should operate which might conceivably wholly 
change the character of Northern Ireland by enormous 
reductions of its territory, I think it would have been 
necessary to say:
"A Commission shall determine in accordance with 
"the wishes of the inhabitants, etc., what portions
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"of Ireland shall be included in the Irish Free 
"State and what portions shall be included in 
"Northern Ireland, and shall fix the boundary 
"between the portions thus allotted."
That my own view is well founded is made even 
clearer by the attitude of Carson and Craig during the 
earlier debates on the Treaty. This particular clause is 
the only one which can interfere with the status of 
Ulster as fixed by the Act of 1920, and it therefore 
focuses the whole searchlight of the controversy. Yet 
until Collins made the suggestion, no living soul in 
either House ever suggested that the clause was capable 
of the fantastic meaning of which Craig now professes 
himself to be apprehensive.
In the debates of December, Carson was seeking, 
eagerly for any basis upon which he could establish his 
charge of treachery to Ulster. If you read his speech, 
you will not find a word suggesting that he then took 
this view. The real truth is that Collins, very likely 
pressed by his own people and anxious to appraise at 
their highest value the benefits which he had brought to 
them, in a moment of excitement committed himself 
unguardedly to this doctrine, and that it has no 
foundation whatever except in his overheated imagination.
If and when Collins and Griffiths obtain a majority 
and a sane Parliament, I think it highly probable that 
they will come to terms with Craig. If this does not 
happen, I have no doubt that the Tribunal, not being 
presided over by a lunatic, will take a rational view of 
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